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Abstract 
The conventional explanation, ancient and modem, for the emergence for the first time of 
the politically interventionist legion in the Roman Republic's history outside the southern 
Italian city of Nola in 88 BC, rests primarily on the idea that soldiers intervened in politics 
because of pecuniary self-interest: that is, what they could materially gain from the 
arrangement. According to this perspective, a mercenary spirit had infected the late-
republican citizen-militia which was subsequently exploited by insurrectionist generals 
such as L. Cornelius Sulla. This was largely possible because C. Marius in 107 BC 
abolished the traditional timocratic underpinnings of republican military service by 
allowing the previously-ineligible poor into the army, making pecuniary self-interest the 
dominant motivation for service in late-republican armies. In isolation and out of context, 
however, this is an unsatisfactory explanation for intervention. Soldiers had always 
expected to profit from war: this was a factor in 88 BC, but it was not the new, critical 
ingredient of late-republican military service that led to large-scale political intervention. 
Marius' 107 BC recruitment reform did not change the demographic makeup of the army, 
and the poor had always been represented in service in large numbers without this 
previously leading to insurrectionist or mercenary armies that were a danger to the state. 
Instead, Sulla's soldiers intervened for a range of other factors. A process of desensitisation 
to the risk of fighting fellow citizens, the citizen-militia's tradition of insubordination in 
political cause and as a forum for the redress of personal grievance, and the pernicious 
influence of contemporary endemic violence on Roman political discourse - along with the 
desire to profit from war - all played their part in persuading the army to support Sulla's 
sedition. In the background, too, was confusion among Sulla's soldiers over who 
legitimately represented the state. This confusion allowed Sulla to reinforce his credentials 
to legitimacy, reinforcing the soldiers' decision to help him. There was thus no single 
economic motive dominating the explanation for intervention. Rather, all these factors 
acted in unison, and on that day outside Nola in 88 BC, together they proved decisive. For 
the Republic, it meant that the emergence of the politically interventionist legion, and its 
subsequent persistent presence in late-republican political dynamics, was all but inevitable. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Response to Political Adversity: Studies in Contrast 
P. Cornelius Scipio in 184 BC: Political Competition and Withdrawal 
In 184 BC, the Roman general and statesman, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus - conqueror of 
Hannibal, censor, consul, and multiple times princeps senatus - retired from political life to 
the small southern Italian coastal town of Litemum after a series of political, personal and 
legal attacks by political opponents on his family, character, judgement and military 
record? It was a sort of exile. As long as Scipio remained there and took no further part in 
the political life of the Republic, his political opponents would not resurrect and prosecute 
charges against him? Scipio was bitter over his fate: when he died soon after,'* he gave 
instructions, according to literary tradition, that his body should be buried in Litemum, his 
tomb erected there, and that no funeral take place in his ungrateful homeland? It was an 
ignominious end to a distinguished public career. Both Scipio and his erstwhile 
Carthaginian enemy, Hannibal, had suffered in the years after the Second Punic War from 
conflict with fellow citizens,^ but Rome's treatment of Scipio was, according to Livy, 
worse because it drove out a successful and victorious citizen.' 
- Liv. 38.53; Zon. 19.9; App., Syr. 40; Diod. 29.21. 
' Liv. 38.53; Zon. 19.20; Gabriel, 2008, p. 233. See also Andreola, 2004, p. 7. Gruen, however, downplays the 
political conflict that involved the Scipios. He argues, for example, that there was no actual trial of P. Scipio: 
and in any case, the attacks against the Scipios did little to curb their influence or disrupt their political 
machinations. In'short, there was no 'fall of the Scipios' (Gruen, 1995, pp. 88 fQ. In my view, however, this is 
an unpersuasive argument; Gruen is too interested in nuance, and misses what the consistent vein of literary 
tradition from multiple sources says about the attacks against the Scipios, and the attempts to curb their 
influence. In all this, Gruen does admit there was a trial in 187 BC of L. Scipio, and there were attacks against 
P. Scipio (Gruen, 1995, p. 86). 
" It is not clear when Scipio actually died. Livy in 38.53 suggests he died 187 BC, but contradicts himself later 
in 39.52 when he writes that Scipio died in 183 BC. 1 assume that he needed to retire first to Litemum before 
dying, so 1 accept the later date. 
'Hann iba l , after being defeated by Scipio, for example, was in 196 BC elected sufete in Carthage, and 
attempted to introduce a number of economic and political reforms inimical to powerful interests in the 
For m o r e t h a n a d e c a d e a f t e r h is re turn f r o m A f r i c a in 201 B C , P. Scipio had been the m o s t 
f a m o u s and inf luen t ia l p e r s o n in Rome.^ If the e lec t ion o f C o m e l i i to the consu l sh ip w a s a 
re l iable ind ica tor o f pol i t ica l in f luence , then P. Scipio and his f a m i l y largely d o m i n a t e d 
pol i t ics in t h e years a f t e r Z a m a ' b e t w e e n 201 B C and 190 B C : o f the twen ty f o u r consu l s 
e lec ted du r ing th i s pe r iod , fo r e x a m p l e , six w e r e di rect ly re la ted to P. Sc ip io , ' " there w e r e 
ano the r six w h o suppor t ed S c i p i o ' s p o l i c i e s , " and P. Scipio h imse l f w o n a s e c o n d 
consu l sh ip ' ^ - an unusua l event dur ing peace t ime . In R o m e ' s dea l ings wi th the 
M a c e d o n i a n s and the Hel len is t ic k i n g d o m of A n t i o c h u s 111 in the ear ly second cen tu ry B C , 
w h e r e m u c h o f R o m e ' s fo re ign po l i cy e f fo r t w a s focussed , P. Sc ip io w a s a lso an impor t an t 
i n f l uence in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f that p o l i c y , " and t ravel led to the east a s part o f 
c o m m i s s i o n s to he lp de t e rmine R o m e ' s app roach there . ' ' ' In 190 B C , S c i p i o ' s b ro ther , L. 
Scipio , w a s e lec ted to the consu l sh ip and a l located Greece as his p rov ince to p rosecu te the 
c a m p a i g n aga ins t An t iochus ; ' ^ P. Sc ip io t ravel led wi th h im os tens ib ly as his legate."" A t the 
Carthaginian state. According to the literary tradition, they thus conspired to have the Romans send a 
commission to Carthage to investigate rumours that Hannibal was in alliance with the eastern potentate, 
Antiochus: Hannibal subsequently fled, never to return (Liv. 33.47). 
' Liv. 38.50; cf. Diod. 29.20. 
' Gabriel, 2008, p. 203; Scullard, 1970, p. 174. 
' The battle was fought in north Africa in 202 BC, and ended the long Second Punic War in Rome's favour 
(Plb. 15.19). 
For example, in 201 BC: Gn. Cornelius Lentulus (Liv. 30.40); 199 BC: L. Cornelius Lentulus (Liv. 31. 49); 
197 BC: C. Cornelius Cethegus (Plb. 18.11, Liv. 32.28); 194 BC: P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus (Liv. 34.43); 
193 BC: L. Cornelius Merula (Liv. 34.54); 191 BC: P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (Liv. 35.24); 190 BC: L. 
Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus (Liv. 36.45). 
" Gabriel, 2008, p. 206. 
Liv. 34.43. 
' ' Gabriel, 2008, p. 206. For a detailed discussion within the governing elite on the differences and arguments 
in the approach to foreign policy toward the east, see Gabriel, 2008, pp. 218 ff. Gabriel, for example, outlines 
the strategic preferences of Scipio toward the Greeks: his policy included establishing a basis of policy on a 
series of free alliances and relationships with the eastern kingdoms. Others, however, believed Rome needed 
security over any federation, and wanted to place an emphasis on actions which would achieve that outcome. 
Liv. 35.14. 
" Liv. 37.3. 
' ' Liv. 37.6. For Gabriel, however, there is no question which one of the Scipio brothers was really in charge 
in 190 BC: P. Scipio. He presents a persuasive argument to show why this was so (Gabriel, 2008, pp. 220 ff). 
Gabriel cites the fact, for example, that Antiochus repeatedly attempted to negotiate with the legate, P. Scipio, 
and not the consul, to discuss terms and conditions of treaties as evidence that Antiochus, at least, knew who 
the commander was, and where real power lay (Gabriel, 2008, pp. 220 and 221). In Liv. 37.7, in the lead-up 
to the battle of Magnesia, P. Scipio does seem to be approving the choice of route that his brother selected, 
although this may have been more like advice and agreement, rather than a necessary approval process. 1 
would also point out that P. Scipio was not at the decisive battle of Magnesia that same year; he was sick at 
another location, and his brother managed to destroy the Seleucid phalanx on his own (App., Syr. 30,35). L. 
Scipio was not, apparently, without his own abilities, and I suggest that the relationship between the two 
brothers may have been more complex. 
decisive battle of Magnesia in 190 B C , " the Roman army defeated the Seleucid phalanx, 
and routed Antiochus' forces; Antiochus subsequently sued for p e a c e , a n d the Scipios 
were back in Rome by 187 B C , " having failed in their attempt at prorogation.^" 
Political and legal attacks against the Scipio brothers in the senate and assemblies^' started 
soon afterwards, but it was not the first time that P. Scipio had encountered serious political 
opposition " In 205 BC, he was in conflict with much of the governing elite over his 
proposal to expand the war to Africa.^' After much debate in the senate, however, he 
eventually secured permission to cross to Africa if he thought it in the public interest.^"* The 
following year, members of the governing elite criticised Scipio for his love of Greek 
culture, as well as his handling of the a rmy? ' In 187 BC, however, the attack on his 
reputation, character and family was more sustained, determined, and invasive. P. Scipio's 
political enemy, M. Porcius Cato, for example, instigated in the senate and assemblies a 
series of investigations and arraignments against the Scipios.'^ In particular, he persuaded 
the two Petillii tribunes^' to prosecute P. Scipio on charges of bribery over his dealings 
with Antiochus, and for allowing the terms of Antiochus' peace to be milder than warranted 
" Gabriel uses January, 189 BC as the date of the battle (Gabriel, 2008, p. 226); it is not clear why, when the 
sources seem clear on the date (see also Roth, 2009, p. 79). 
App., Syr. 36,37; Liv. 37.44. 
" Liv. 38.50. 
™ Gabriel, 2008, p. 230. 
For a discussion on the various electoral and policy-setting assemblies present in the Roman constitution, 
including their different roles, responsibilities and limitations as it applied to ordinary citizens and members 
of the governing elite, see Chapter Six below. 
The existence of strong political competition and opposition within the Roman political system, especially 
among the highly-competitive members of the governing elite, was a normal - often highly-disruptive - part 
of republican political life: see Chapter Six below. 
Liv. 28.40. Of the opposition to Scipio's proposal, the most distinguished and powerful individual was the 
former dictator and five-time consul, Q. Fabius Maximus; he said vincere ego prohibui Hannibalem, ut a 
vobis quorum vigent nunc vires etiam vinci posset. "I have prevented Hannibal from defeating us, and so 
enabled you who are young and strong to conquer him" (Liv. 28.40). Maximus argued forcefully that 
Hannibal first needed to be defeated in Italy before expanding the campaign to Afi-ica; he saw Scipio's 
proposal as having more to do with personal ambition and glory than sound strategic considerations, and there 
was, at times, strong invective levelled against Scipio (Liv. 28.42). 
Naturally, he did (Liv. 28.45). 
^^  Liv. 29.19. 
These series of attacks, confused and disjointed in the sources, are referred to in some scholarly accounts of 
the period as the "Trials of the Scipios", as in Ruebei, 1977, p. 161. Having reviewed and attempted to make 
sense of the source evidence, I find myself agreeing with Gabriel: they are some of the most confused and 
uncertain episodes in Roman history (Gabriel, 2008, p. 228). Despite this, however, it is clear to me that the 
Scipios came under some sort of sustained and determined attack during 187 BC, which probably extended 
into the following years. 
" Unusually, both tribunes elected for 187 BC were named Q. Petillius (Liv. 38.50). It is not clear from the 
source evidence, scant as it is, if they were closely related. 
because of family considerations.^^ That failed when P. Scipio appealed to the memory of 
the victory over Carthage.^' Cato and the tribunes then switched their attack to L. Scipio 
with charges of peculation over his conduct of the war against Antiochus; L. Scipio was 
condemned for stealing a large share of the war indemnity,^" and convicted.^' P. Scipio did 
not react well to the attacks. In front of senatorial colleagues who were demanding an 
account of the war 's finances, for example, he tore up the account book, and asked how 
they could quibble over such a small amount when he had brought a fortune into the 
treasury: ab ipso P. Scipione requisitam esse in senatu tradunt libmmque rationis eius cum 
Lucium fratrem adferre iussisset, inspectante senatu suis ipsum manibus concerpsisse 
indignantem quod, cum bis milliens in aerarium intulisset, quadragiens ratio ab se 
posceretur.^^ Nevertheless, Cato and the tribunes again moved against P. Scipio, 
resurrecting old charges of luxury in his winter quarters at Syracuse; they also accused him 
of stealing money during the campaign against Antiochus and acting like a dictator." 
Realising that his enemies would continue their attacks, that further charges were 
inevitable,^'* and that they would not cease until they had a conviction, P. Scipio withdrew 
from public life, ceding the political ground to his enemies; the charges thus did not 
proceed. 
Intense competition between members of the governing elite, and the use of official 
position and the law to attack political opponents, may have been a normal part of 
republican political discourse.^^ Nevertheless, 1 argue that P. Scipio had cause to feel 
indignant at the treatment of his fellow citizens. He arguably had done more than any 
citizen, for example, to resurrect the fortunes of Rome during the long and traumatic 
Zon. 19.20; Liv. 38.51; App., Syr. 40. Antiochus had returned P. Scipio's captured son free of ransom (Zon. 
19.20). For a detailed narrative which attempts to unravel the charges and actions brought against the Scipios, 
see Gabriel, 2008, pp. 228 ff 
App., Syr. 40; Liv. 38.51. 
'°Zon. 19.20. 
' ' Liv. 38.50, 55, 58; Val.Max. 8.1. This conviction, however, did not greatly damage L. Scipio's career; he 
was not so disgraced or poor, for example, that he could not finance and celebrate large games in 186 BC 
(Liv, 39.22), or be a candidate for the censorship in 184 BC (Liv. 39.40). 
Liv. 38.55. "They demanded from Publius Scipio himself an account in the senate, and when he had 
directed his brother Lucius to bring the account book, he had himself with his own hands torn it up, angry that 
after he had brought two hundred million [sesterces] into the treasury, he should be asked to account for four 
million [sesterces]" 
" Liv. 38.51. 
Liv. 38.52. 
" See Chapter Six below. 
Second Punic War.'^ As a result of Rome's victory in that war, its dominion extended far 
beyond Italy, and the foundations for empire and wealth were laid. Scipio's talent for 
wining campaigns against his Carthaginian and Spanish enemies, his diplomatic judgment 
in securing those gains, and his firm grasp of political realities, had been a major part of 
this reality." P. Scipio's treatment, and the attacks against his reputation and family, 
occurred in the decades following the war; I argue that they could thus be interpreted as 
part of the larger effort by the state to return individual power and influence of its key 
magistrates to more conventional proportions within the political system.^^ None of this, 
however, was a comfort for Scipio; to him, as I have shown above, the political competition 
he faced looked like the actions of an ungrateful nation, and it embittered him. 
Diod. 29.20: according to Diodorus, he rescued his country. In my view, there was some truth in Diodorus' 
statement: not least, for example, was his vital contribution in the military sphere. He introduced into the 
army the practice of using units as separate parts, where they had been used before only as a part of the whole 
(Plb. 10.39). It gave commanders greater options to deploy their units, and the army greater tactical flexibility 
needed to defeat more skilful and experienced professional opponents. I argue that Scipio forged the army 
into something different by altering the way the maniples were used (on the structure of the Roman army, see 
Chapter Two below). From this moment, legions were capable of more flexible manoeuvres on the battlefield 
(on this point, see Gabriel, 2008, pp. 209 and 210; Grant, 1978, p. 107). As well as representing a physical 
change in the tactical disposition and handling of the army, Scipio's innovations also represented an evolution 
in military spirit; Scipio developed commanders who could conceive of using the army's component parts 
separately to take advantage of opportunities during battle. These reforms endured. When the legions faced 
the massed phalanx of Macedon at the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC, units were capable of operating 
separately to take advantage of fleeting tactical opportunities - a legacy of Scipio's reforms. The battle, for 
example, was won when an unnamed tribune detached the second and third maniples of his legion and turned 
inwards to attack the rear of the phalanx which had pushed past. The densely arrayed Macedonian pikemen, 
formidable front on, could not easily turn to meet an attack from the flank or behind, and were routed (Plb. 
18.26). The innovative use of maniples like this was, 1 argue, a result of the reforms in handling and thinking 
initially introduced into the army in Spain under P. Scipio's command. 
" Plb. 10.40; Liv. 38.53. For Eckstein, P. Scipio's contribution was especially significant for securing not 
only the peace deal with Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War, but for underpinning Rome's 
subsequent ascendency in the Mediterranean (Eckstein, 1987, p. 234). On the contribution of Scipio to 
Rome's security, see also Gruen, 1995, p. 59. 
The Second Punic War, for example, had done much to provide opportunities to inflate the power and 
influence of individual commanders, especially those who were regularly successful; as a result, it is not 
surprising that the state would want to readjust personal expectations in the aftermath, and reassert its control. 
There were, for example, attempts at reigning in prorogation in the years following the end of the Second 
Punic War. It had been a relatively rare event prior to the war (Gruen, 1995, p. 66), but the exigencies of long 
campaigns far from Rome had necessarily resulted in a growth of the practice (Liv. 28.40; Plut., Fab. 25; 
App., Pun. 6). In the decades after the war, the practice of extending command to magistrates beyond one 
year again became rarer, as the state attempted to limit its occurrence; L. Scipio and P. Scipio themselves 
were denied a prorogation in Greece after the battle of Magnesia, and new magistrates were appointed (Liv. 
37.50). In 189 BC, however, the magistrates made a case to the senate for prorogation, and were successflil 
(Liv. 38.35). But the point had been made: the senate reasserted its authority to limit individual aspiration (for 
more on this topic, see Gabriel, 2008, pp. 203 ff; Grtien, 1995, pp. 66 ff; Ruebei, 1977, p. 172). 
L. Cornelius Sulla in 88 BC: Political Competition and Insurrection 
When P. Scipio was faced with intractable and seemingly insurmountable political 
opposition and the price of continued resistance became too high personally, his reaction 
was to withdraw from Rome, leave political life, and retire quietly amongst his veterans at 
Litemum " When the consul, L. Cornelius Sulla, found himself in a similar position a 
century later in 88 BC, and was faced with the same intractable political opposition, his 
response was entirely different. Like Scipio, he left Rome, but he did not go into retirement. 
Instead, he fled to his veterans besieging the Campanian city of Nola south of Rome.'*® He 
discovered there that his political opponents had used force to manipulate the institutions of 
state and remove him from command of the impending campaign against the Pontic king, 
Mithridates."' Sulla, now reduced to irrelevance by the actions of his enemies, refused to 
hand over command of the army to two tribunes dispatched from Rome. Instead, he asked 
his soldiers to support him in his personal inimicitiae, and, when the army agreed, used it to 
march on Rome, defeat his political opponents, and impose a political solution on the 
state."^ 
The responses to political adversity of these two men thus could not have been more 
different. Nevertheless, there were similarities between their individual circumstances, 
although a century separated them. Both, for example, were successful, charismatic, and 
skilled generals, who had made their reputations in war by defeating competent enemies.''^ 
Both men found a loyal support base amongst the veteran armies that they had built up,""* 
' ' Litemum was one of five maritime colonies established in Campania for citizens by P. Scipio when he was 
consul in 194 BC (Liv. 34.45). As a result, I suggest that there was a good chance he settled many of his 
veterans there; this might explain why he decided to move to the colony, despite its reputation as an unhealthy 
location (Gabriel, 2008, p. 233). 
This was at during the last stages of the Social War; Nola was one of the last cities still occupied by the 
Italian rebels. See Chapters Two and Five below. 
App., BC 1.55; Plut., Suil. 8. The question of the leadership of the campaign against Mithridates, which 
promised to be lucrative, was the catalyst for Sulla's decision to turn the army against Rome, and reputedly 
the reason the army supported Sulla. It is thus critical to the narrative of insurrection: for a full discussion, see 
Chapters Three, Four, and Eight below. 
App., BC 1.57-59. 
" P. Scipio in the late third century BC Second Punic War, where he defeated the Carthaginians and their 
predominantly mercenary armies in Spain and Africa (Fib. 3.6 fO, and Sulla in the early first century BC 
Social War against the erstwhile Italian allies (App., BC 1.39 ff; Plut., Siill. 6; see also Chapter Two below). 
"" For example, 1 argue that nothing quite tests the loyalty of soldiers to their general like a mutiny in the 
ranks. The loyalty of the majority of Scipio's army was thus demonstrated at Sucro in Spain in 206 BC, when 
a portion of it mutinied (Liv. 28.27 fO. Scipio needed the rest of the army to remain loyal, which they did, but 
also to demonstrate that loyalty by participating in his plan to suppress the mutiny, and then help execute the 
and both in turn reciprocated with loyalty to their soldiers, and were careful to look after 
their interests."' Significantly, both men were also defeated in public life by the intense 
political competition of their opponents, and left Rome. As I have shown above, Scipio was 
forced from politics by an alliance of his enemies which included Cato and the tribunes; 
Sulla, who was the consul at the time,'"' was defeated politically by an alliance between his 
enemy, C. Marius, and the tribune, P. Sulpicius Rufus. In Sulla's case, his defeat occurred 
at a time of endemic political violence which characterised the decline of Roman political 
culture, the emergence of more assertive tribunes, the use of unconventional methods to 
pass controversial legislative programs, and the alienation of much of the governing elite.''^ 
Against this background, Sulla's enemies forced him to make a number of political 
concessions, and then flee Rome."^ In 187 BC, there were fears among members of the 
governing elite that the extent and reach of Scipio's power and influence had become a 
danger to consensus government'" more than 50 years before such concerns would 
accompany the rise of assertive tribunes and populist politicians.'" Scipio's personal 
reaction to the attacks fed these fears: he was often arrogant and dismissive, even to 
respected institutions such as the senate and the office of tribunate." Moreover, he had at 
35 ring leaders in a piece of theatre designed to maximise the impact of the punishment, which they 
enthusiastically did (Liv. 28.29). In Sulla's case, the army displayed its loyalty, and the fact that Sulla had 
successfully built up a support base inside it, most obviously by agreeing to help him in 88 BC (App., BC 
1.57). 
In Scipio's case, the care and obligation he felt toward his soldiers was most obviously on display when he 
used his influence and standing to persuade the state at the end of the Second Punic Wars to make highly-
unusual viritane allocations from the ager publicus to his many veterans (Liv. 31.4; 31.49, see also Gabriel, 
2008, pp. 205 and 206). It was one of the few occasions that the republican state, which normally left veterans 
to fall back on their civilian occupations after discharge (see Chapter Two below), made provision for 
discharged soldiers. Sulla similarly ensured his soldiers were looked after with land grants and booty (Plut., 
Sull. 12, 33; App., 5 C 1.96). 
A p p „ « C 1 . 5 2 . 
For a full discussion on the decline of Roman political culture, and the rise of violence as an accepted 
feature of political discourse in the second half of the second century BC, including its implications for the 
emergence of soldiers willing to intervene in politics, see Chapter Seven below. 
App., BC 1.56; Plut., Sull. 9. For a detailed discussion on the political situation in Rome in 88 BC as it 
affected Sulla and his army at Nola, including the concessions Sulla was forced to make, see Chapter Eight 
below. 
Diod. 29.21. On this point, see also Gabriel, 2008, p. 204; Scullard, 1970, p. 182. It has to be pointed out, 
however, that Scipio himself did not specifically encourage such pretensions; on the contrary, he did 
everything he could to suppress them. In Spain in 209 BC, during the Second Punic War, for example, Scipio 
defeated Hasdrubal, and in the aftermath of this victory captured Spanish troops hailed him as a king, and 
performed obeisance to him. Scipio rebuffed them, distanced himself from the attempt to hail him king, and 
asked that they instead call him imperator (Plb. 10.40). 
™ Plut., TO. 10.; App., BC. 12. On this point, and the rise of more assertive, populist tribunes from 151 BC 
onwards, see Chapter Seven below. 
Diod. 29.21; Liv. 38.45; Gabriel, 2008, p. 204. 
least on one occasion threatened to go to the people when obstructed by members of the 
governing elite.^^ 
There was, however, one crucial difference: when faced with political defeat, Scipio did not 
invite his veterans to become involved in his personal inimicitiae, or ask them to help him 
defeat his political opponents, march on Rome, and use violence to settle his grievances 
with Cato and the tribunes. Regardless of how bitter he felt toward his enemies, Scipio 
competed within the accepted political standards of the day ;" when he was given authority 
to raise troops, he used them in service of the state, not as a weapon against his political 
enemies. Sulla, however, did do this,^" and thus created a legacy which would inspire a 
future generation of insurrectionists: Sulla potuit, ego non potero?^^ 
The Thesis: Its Central Question, Scope. Limitations. Contribution. 
Methodology and Definitions 
The Central Question 
It is hard to overestimate the significance of Sulla's actions in 88 BC. The use of the army 
to intervene in politics made an indelible mark on the cultural memory of the late Republic: 
the thread that united late-republican writers who lived through the period - M. Tullius 
Cicero, C. Sallustius Crispus, and C. lulius Caesar^^ - was the belief that the tempus 
Sullamim was a catastrophe, that Sulla's example was pernicious, and that a repetition of a 
tempus Sullanum should be a v o i d e d . T h e emergence of the politically interventionist 
Liv. 28.40. This was during the debate over whether to allow Scipio to cross to Africa in 205 BC. In other 
words, the threat meant that if he could not get his way in the senate, Scipio would bypass the governing elite 
and the senate in the manner of the Gracchi, and obtain approval for his African expedition directly from a 
vote in the popular assemblies. Technically, this was possible, but it was a highly-symbolic and provocative 
threat to make, let alone actually carry out: see Chapter Seven below. 
See Chapter Seven below. 
For a discussion on the events immediately preceding Sulla's march to Rome while he was still at Nola, and 
the implications of the army's decision to support him, see Chapter Eight below. 
Cic., An. 9.10: "If Sulla could do it, why not me?" Cicero ascribed this comment to Cn. Pompey when he 
threatened those senators who remained in Italy at the start of the second civil war with C. lulius Caesar. 
' ' With regard to Caesar, somewhat ironically, given the turmoil and civil war that he unleashed upon the 
state by taking the initiative to use his army against his political opponents in the manner of Sulla. 
Lacey, 1970, p. 7. Lacey's analysis of Sulla's legacy is uniformly negative; Dowling, on the other hand, 
presents a more nuanced - and in my opinion interesting - picture. She argues that Sulla's example was 
presented by later authors in varied ways: at times he was an exemplum of good generalship and clemency; at 
other times, a picture of tyranny and brutality (for more on this complicated picture, see Dowling, 2000, pp. 
303 ff). 
legion in 88 BC was certainly unprecedented:'^ for the first time in the history of the 
Republic, a Roman army marched on Rome as if it were an enemy capital with the firm 
intention of capturing and holding it by force of arms, intervened decisively in large 
numbers in politics, and helped its insurrectionist general defeat his political enemies and 
impose a permanent political solution on the state. After centuries of service to the Roman 
state, the army had turned against it. There was now a new, decisive element in political 
discourse: military strength, and access to soldiers willing to support political ambitions, 
was from this point on the most important factor underwriting the legitimacy of political 
aspirants. All that followed would be different from what had come before ;" not least 
among the consequences were dictatorship, mass proscriptions,'" large-scale property 
seizures,®' and the Republic's first civil war. The army's role in this narrative was critical: 
generals such as Sulla were able to impose their will upon the state, suppress their enemies, 
and engage in civil war, only because ordinary citizens serving in the citizen-militia 
decided to support them.'^ Without their willing involvement, seditious generals could not 
have constituted a threat to each other, much less to the Republic. Moreover, the most 
direct agent of destruction of the Republic was the army: the Republic fell when armies 
fought in civil conflict in Italy and abroad in a contest that endured for nearly twenty years, 
and swept away the prior governmental system.®^ All that became subsequently possible at 
the precise moment in 88 BC when the army first decided to interfere in political discourse. 
Why, then, did the citizen-militia, traditional protectors of the state, defy centuries of 
tradition and turn on it in 88 BC, support Sulla in his personal inimicitiae, interfere directly 
in political discourse, and risk engaging fellow citizens in civil war? Why did Sulla, bested 
by political opponents in the street battles of Rome, feel he could approach the army in this 
manner and ask for its help? This was something that did not occur to P. Scipio a century 
earlier when faced with similarly intractable political opposition, or if it did, he felt that he 
could not approach the army in this way.®'* What had changed in the intervening period 
between P. Scipio and Sulla that created the necessary conditions for the army to do what 
Plut., S«//. 7; App., BC1.3 . 
Plut., Sull 7. 
More than 1600 names of citizens, for example, appeared on Sulla's proscription lists; up to a third of the 
governing elite may have perished (App., BC 1.95,96). 
" App., BC 1.65. 
" See Chapter Two below. 
' ' Gruen, 1974, pp. 365 and 366. 
" In Scipio's case, of course, he had no standing army to appeal to. 
none of its predecessors had done, and respond positively to Sulla 's invitation? Answering 
these questions is essential to understanding why the military interfered for the first t ime in 
the civilian political processes of the Republic: this thesis tackles this conundrum by 
positing an integrated theory of intervention that explains the emergence of the politically 
interventionist legion in 88 BC. 
Scope and Limitations 
This thesis looks to the field of enquiry into Roman late-republican military service and its 
nexus with late-republican political discourse as it relates to the first military intervention 
into the political process in 88 BC. It is not a general study of the Roman republican army, 
or a history of the army's involvement in civil war. In particular, it is neither a history of the 
generational civil wars that destroyed republican government, nor a general account of the 
long-running conflict between Rome and her Italian allies over citizenship and political 
integration. Nor is it an economic, political or general account of the revolutionary period 
of the late Republic. Instead, it is an explanation of the decision of ordinary soldiers to 
intervene in political discourse on behalf of their general. The thesis thus presents a fresh, 
holistic explanation for the emergence in 88 BC of the politically interventionist legion. It 
reappraises and challenges the orthodoxy conventionally used to explain the soldiers' 
decision to involve themselves in politics, exposing the limitations of its arguments. After 
arguing that the conventional explanation is an unsatisfactory explanation for intervention, 
the thesis offers an alternative explanation: a range of factors that induced Sul la 's soldiers 
to help him against his political enemies. Some factors represented changes in the nature of 
military service; some, like the desire to profit from w a r , ' ' were traditional aspects of 
serving in the citizen-militia. Analysis of these factors, which comprises the bulk of this 
thesis, '^ forms the foundation of a holistic, integrated theory of intervention that applies to 
the situation at Nola in 88 BC, and which more comprehensively explains why the army 
was receptive to Sulla's invitation to intervene directly in political discourse with organised 
military force. 
See Chapter Four below. 
With the role of pecuniary self-interest acknowledged, but placed in a proper context, these factors are laid 
out in Chapters Four to Seven below. They are then brought together in the specific context of 88 BC at Nola 
in Chapter Eight below. 
The focus of the thesis is to explain the actions of soldiers at a specific point in the history 
of the late Republic: the precise moment in 88 BC outside Nola when the citizen-militia 
decided for the first time to support a general in his personal inimicitiae with large-scale, 
organised military force. ' ' It focuses on this point in time because this is when the 
politically interventionist legion first became a reality for the Republic, and when the latent 
political potential of the army was first clearly demonstrated.'^ This was the pivotal 
moment; ' ' from this point on, Sulla's use of the army in this way found immediate 
imitators,'" and armies could draw inspiration for subsequent forays into politics from that 
first, seminal intervention." I argue, therefore, that this is the moment that most requires 
our attention if we are to understand why the army turned on the state, began supporting its 
generals in their political quarrels, and was willing to engage in civil war. As a result, the 
thesis does not concern itself with events beyond the decision of the soldiers at Nola in 88 
BC; after this, and with the example of Sulla's soldiers before it, I suggest that the cultural 
prohibition on the citizen-militia involving itself in politics no longer had any force. Given 
that the issue, however, of change in the nature of military service in the intervening 
century between P. Scipio and Sulla has a bearing on the central question, the thesis will 
draw upon key relevant events and developments in Roman military, social, political and 
economic life prior to 88 BC.'^ This discussion will be anchored mainly in the second 
century BC and the early first century BC; on occasion, however, it will examine relevant 
evidence from earlier periods of Rome's history. 
' ' ' A p p . , S C 1 . 5 7 . 
For example, Keaveney, 2007, p. 38. 
' ' App., BC 1.60. Appian makes the point here that once the army had intervened in politics on Sulla's behalf, 
sedition was decided only by fighting, and there was no restraint upon violence, either from the sense of 
shame, or regard for law, institutions, or country. 
™ Keaveney, 2007, p. 96. 
" For example, a year later, after Sulla had left Italy for the eastern campaign against Mithridates, L. 
Cornelius Cinna, bested by factional violence in Rome, disowned by a hostile senate, and forced to flee 
Rome, used the promise of financial gain, combined with personal appeals to justice, to help persuade the 
legion left behind at Nola to accept him as consul and act against his political enemies (Liv., Per. 79; App., 
BC 1.65; Veil. 2.20). The legion had the example of Sulla's army before it to justify and condone its 
subsequent intervention. 
For example, the thesis will examine the decline in Roman political culture of the late Republic, and the 
emergence of normative violence in political discourse, as they have a direct relevance to the emergence of 
soldiers willing to intervene in politics, and on Sulla's request to his army in 88 BC (see Chapter Seven 
below). 
As part of this enquiry, the thesis examines closely the role of the Social War'^ in 
desensitising ordinary citizen-soldiers to the concept of civil war: through the Social War 
against their erstwhile Italian allies, I argue, soldiers first became inured to the idea of civil 
war against fellow citizens. To support this contention, the thesis offers a new hypothesis: 
full integration theory, which describes how Italian allied units serving with Roman field 
armies gradually over time adopted Roman tactics, equipment, organisation, uniforms, and 
military culture, to the point that they were indistinguishable in form and function from 
their citizen counterparts.'' ' 
The thesis also focuses on a particular element of the army: the soldiers who supported 
Sulla, and without whose help his plan for intervention would not have been possible. 
Seditious generals were a threat to no one unless they had the willing support of ordinary 
citizens in the army, citizens who were ready to risk civil war on behalf of their general. I 
argue that a study on intervention needs to be focussed on these factors if we want to 
understand the behaviour of the army at Nola in 88 BC. The thesis thus approaches the 
rationale for intervention from the perspective of ordinary soldiers; it concerns itself with 
their motivations, and the influences acting upon them that day at Nola. With few 
exceptions,'^ it does not concern itself with the motivations of the principal actors normally 
the focus of scholarly study on the history of republican civil war, or Sulla's march on 
Rome'^ - except where they have a direct bearing on the central question of the thesis. 
Moreover, a work of this size cannot be exhaustive. A fiill account, for example, of every 
piece of scholarship and opinion that constitutes the conventional view in scholarship 
would alone consume a thesis-sized work, as would even a general account of the change to 
the nature of service in the Roman citizen-militia over the second century BC. Instead, the 
thesis necessarily narrows its scope to focus only on those themes, authors, perspectives 
and historical events that are subjectively considered to be relevant to the study. 
" See Chapter Two below. 
See Chapter Five below. 
" The thesis does, for example, examine the major characters of the increasing tension between ordinary 
citizens, an increasingly assertive tribunate, and members of the governing ehte that accompanied the decline 
of political culture from 151 BC onwards. Their place in the discussion, however, is always relevant to the 
central question of the thesis (see Chapter Seven below). 
For example, Flower, 2010, pp. 77and 78; Keaveney, 2007, p. 37; Konrad, 2006, p. 180. 
The Contribution of the Thesis 
In the broadest sense, the thesis contributes in its field to the general understanding of the 
crucial relationship that existed between the Roman military system, and the emergence of 
military power as a political force in the late Republic - and, ultimately, its place in the 
eclipse of the Republic by the imperial state. More specifically, there have been - of course 
- attempts in ancient literature and contemporary scholarship to explain the emergence of 
soldiers willing to support their generals' political aspirations, and intervene in late-
republican politics. The reason conventionally advanced for the behaviour of Sulla's 
soldiers, for example, was pecuniary self-interest: the soldiers supported Sulla in his 
sedition and risked civil war in 88 BC for what they could gain materially from the 
arrangement. ' ' Ordinary soldiers are overwhelmingly portrayed as one dimensional, 
economic creatures.'^ According to the conventional explanation, pecuniary self-interest as 
dominant motivator was a new factor of late-republican military service. Against a 
background of societal moral decay," it helped create the conditions in which 
interventionist soldiers could emerge. Moreover, such soldiers emerged largely because C. 
Marius in 107 BC had undermined the timocratic ideal that underpinned service in 
republican armies by opening up legionary service to the previously-ineligible poor. This 
infected the army with a mercenary spirit, and made it susceptible to the financial 
inducements of generals who wanted to engage in insurrection, and use military force to 
suppress their political enemies.^" This is the extent of the ancient perspective on the 
motivations of ordinary soldiers serving in late-republican armies who decided to intervene; 
their own voices are largely missing from the narratives of intervention in which they 
played so important a part.^' The explanation of pecuniary self-interest also permeates 
contemporary interpretations of the republican army's intervention into politics, and its 
subsequent involvement in civil war.^^ 
" App., BC 1.57; Sal., lug. 86; Plut., SulL 12. 
As they are in Martin, 2012, p. 94. 
™ Sal., Cat. 10; Luc. 1.160; Veil. 2.48 (see Chapter Three below). 
Sal., lug. 86; Gel. 16.10; Plut., Mar. 9. 
For a detailed survey of the conventional view as it is manifested in ancient sources, see Chapter Three 
below. 
For the purposes of this thesis, and to place some reasonable limits to the size of the project, 1 have focused 
primarily on English speaking scholarship. 
Given the centrality of ordinary soldiers to the events at Nola in 88 BC, their motivations 
should be the focus of deep analysis. 1 argue, however, that such depth of focus is largely 
missing. Instead, modem scholarship largely reproduces ancient economic themes as a 
rationale for intervention, and replicates the ancient emphasis given to the role of Marius.^^ 
Even Keaveney, who recently produced one of the more nuanced accounts of the events at 
Nola in 88 BC,^ '* and who challenged the conventional focus on Marius as the creator of the 
revolutionary army,^' does not question the economic motive as the dominant reason 
Sulla's men followed him to Rome.*' Moreover, in attempting to understand the events at 
Nola, the army's intervention, and the descent of the Republic into its first civil war, 
scholars primarily focus on the actions and motivations of key individuals such as Sulla, 
or on the broader political currents that contributed to the conditions of general unrest and 
tension between the main actors.** There is little focus in this narrative on the one critical 
element that made intervention, civil war, and the decline of the Republic possible:*' 
ordinary citizens organised not in their civilian assemblies, but as soldiers under 
sacramentum, willing to support the political ambitions of their generals and risk civil war. 
This thesis corrects that oversight; it brings to the field a sustained focus on the motivations 
of ordinary soldiers, a necessary ingredient for understanding why the army intervened that 
is lacking in ancient explanations, and absent in much of modem scholarship.'" In doing so, 
it provides a fi-esh analysis of - and challenge to - the suitability of the conventional 
explanation for intervention; something, I argue, which is much needed. It thus contributes 
to the field the view that the ancient and contemporary emphasis on pecuniary self-interest 
For example, Cagniart, 2008, p. 82; de Blois, 1987, p. 5. For a survey of modem explanations for the army's 
intervention into politics, and its subsequent willingness to risk - and engage in - civil war, see Chapter Three 
below. 
"" Keaveney, 2007, pp. 37 ff. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 37. Keaveney argues that Sulla, rather than Marius, politicised the army by abolishing 
the traditional delineation between a civil contio and a military contio at Nola by placing a domestic political 
issue before them (Keaveney, 2007, p. 42). For my response to this, see Chapter Eight below. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 94. Keaveney's analysis, for example, simply replicates ancient interpretations: Sulla's 
troops followed him to Rome because they feared they would miss out on the Mithridatic booty. 
For example, Keaveney's analysis of the role of Sulla in the events at Nola: Keaveney, 2005, pp. 50-51 (for 
more on this point, see Chapter Eight below). He devotes a whole book to the career of Sulla and his reaction 
and actions in 88 BC. 
For example. Flower 's work on the causes behind the first civil war: Flower, 2010, p. 79 (for more on 
Flower's analysis, see Chapter Eight below). 
^ 'Gruen, 1974, p. 358. 
As I have indicated above, one partial exception is Keaveney (Keaveney, 2007, pp. 93 ff). He at least 
focuses some of his scholarly attention on the ordinary soldiers of Sulla's army, even though he succumbs to 
the conventional explanation when it comes to their motivations (see Chapter Eight below). 
as the dominant explanation for the motivations of late-republican soldiers engaged in 
insurrection is exaggerated and misplaced." This is not to argue that pecuniary self-interest 
did not have a role to play at Nola; profiting from war was always an important benefit of 
republican military service. Rather, I will show that pecuniary self-interest, in isolation 
and out of context, is ultimately an unsatisfactory explanation for intervention. As I will 
argue below, a desire to profit from service was not the only - nor even the most important 
- factor making itself felt on the motivations of the army at Nola;'^ by itself, pecuniary self-
interest cannot fully explain why Sulla's soldiers decided to support him. What is missing 
from the conventional account of the events at Nola is an analysis of other factors that 
influenced the decision of the soldiers. The thesis thus opens up fresh enquiries into the 
motivations of ordinary soldiers and the nature of late-republican military service; its major 
contribution is to present a new, integrated theory of intervention with an original 
perspective on the underlying reasons for the army's intervention in 88 BC. 
Moreover, I argue that much of contemporary scholarship of the revolutionary period 
presents the army's insurrection of 88 BC as an accepted fact without ever providing a 
cogent explanation of how soldiers could get to the point where they were willing to defy 
centuries of tradition, risk civil war, and intervene in political discourse - beyond the 
conventional view that they did it for money.'" Whereas 12 years before during the 
campaign against Germanic invaders, the army was seen as the protector of the state, we 
now observe the army as its oppressor; the citizen-militia in the historical narrative is just 
suddenly 'there'. Yet, to understand why intervention occurred, I argue that it is critical to 
first understand how republican soldiers could plausibly make such a shift. To address this 
gap, this study offers a cogent and plausible explanation of the process by which late-
republican military service could conceivably produce soldiers willing to interfere in the 
political processes of the Republic - an explanation which is mostly missing from 
contemporary scholarship. 
" See Chapter Four below. 
Liv. 7.16. For more on this point, see Chapters Four and Eight below. 
" See Chapter Eight below. 
An example of this oversight is Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 1 and 187. Lintott argues, for example, that there is 
little doubt strife in the city was the first step to civil war; the transition from fighting with gangs in the streets 
to fighting with armies in the field was essentially one of scale. Beyond pecuniary self-interest, however, 
Lintott provides no cogent explanation of how civil strife could produce such soldiers willing to act against 
the state, or make the significant step to go from street violence to engaging in civil war as part of formed 
armies. Instead, we are left to guess how that was possible (see Chapter Seven below). 
M e t h o d o l o g y 
T h i s thes i s a ccep t s the in te rvent ion o f S u l l a ' s a r m y into pol i t ics in 88 B C as fact . It 
r e in te rpre t s ex i s t i ng anc ien t and c o n t e m p o r a r y exp lana t ions for in tervent ion , and cons t ruc t s 
a l te rna t ive a r g u m e n t s f r o m ancient e v i d e n c e and c o n t e m p o r a r y insights . It d r a w s on 
p r i m a r y s o u r c e ana lys i s o f anc ien t tex ts and , in s o m e cases , on a rchaeologica l e v i d e n c e to 
suppor t c o n c l u s i o n s d r a w n f r o m p r i m a r y source ev idence . ' ^ T h e thes is dea ls wi th the 
c red ib i l i ty o f sou rces w h e n this h a s a bea r ing on the a rgumen t . ' ^ In essence , it is 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y a s t udy o f a na r row sl ice o f R o m a n republ ican mi l i ta ry h is tory ; it 
inves t iga tes p r i m a r y anc ien t textual sources to bui ld a founda t ion for a ser ies o f a r g u m e n t s , 
w h i c h are i n f o r m e d b y ins ights d r a w n f r o m a w i d e select ion o f re levant s e c o n d a r y sources 
- bu t on ly as they sus ta in the a rgument , and h a v e a bear ing on answer ing the c o n u n d r u m 
that is centra l t o th is thesis . In do ing this, it t o u c h e s a lmos t eve ry aspect o f la te - republ ican 
his tory: pol i t ica l , mi l i ta ry , social , e conomic . 
T h e thes i s u s e s a w i d e r ange of ancient G r e e k and Latin sources: m a j o r sources inc lude 
Po lyb ius , the bes t source on the mid Repub l i can R o m a n mi l i ta ry s y s t e m , " App ian , w h o s e 
w o r k s con ta in t h e m o s t c o m p l e t e surv iv ing nar ra t ive o f the revo lu t ionary pe r iod , ' ^ and 
Sal lus t , w h o s e w o r k s on the w a r aga ins t J u g u r t h a and the Cat i l ine consp i racy are impor tan t 
" See Chapter Five below. 
It has to be acknowledged that ancient historians, for example, had a tendency to project contemporary 
attitudes and language into the past (Raaflaub, 2005, pp. 10-11). For an opposing view that argues ancient 
historians were also capable of recognising their own biases, and accurately transmitting historical fact, see 
Cornell, 2005, pp. 48 and 49. For my thesis, however, this disagreement over the historicity of sources has 
less significance; 1 argue that it only matters as far as we can see the probable views of history as they were 
held by soldiers and ordinary citizens in 88 BC (see Chapter Six and Chapter Eight). In other words, it is their 
perception of history - not its literal accuracy - that is important to my argument. 
" Matthew, 2010(a), p. 1; Hoyos, 2008, p. 68; Rosenstein, 2012, p. 272 (see also Chapter Five below). 
Polybius' Book Six of Histories is the primary source (Plb. 6.19 ff). He was a former soldier himself, 
accompanied Roman armies in the field, and recorded in meticulous detail the organisation, equipment and 
management of the army. He could also be clear-eyed about the Romans: they retain Demetrius at Rome 
against his pleas because it was in their own interests (Plb. 31.11), and continually arbitrated against the 
Carthaginians, not because they were always right, but because this is what was in their interests to do (Plb. 
31.21). For an excellent discussion on the motivations and historical career of Polybius, see Pelling, 2007, pp. 
245 ff. 
De Blois, 2008, p. 170. De Blois points out that Appian, although he could be prone to some exaggeration 
at times, is one of our better sources on the civil war period, using good information based on earlier works. 
He provides our only connecting narrative of the wars in Spain after 155 BC and of the Third Punic War. 
Rosenstein argues that the quality of Appian's work on these foreign wars is inferior to Livy and Polybius 
(Rosenstein, 2012, p. 273). Nevertheless, as our only complete narrative of the civil war period, 1 argue that 
Appian's contribution to our understanding of the motives of Sulla, and the events in Rome and at Nola 
leading up to the intervention - particularly the Social War (see Chapter Two below) - are especially 
valuable. 
sources for the decades leading up to the Social War, changes in the nature of late-
republican military service, and of the later civil war period." Livy is also an important 
source; although primarily a literary stylist interested in portraying history as a moral 
inspiration for contemporary g e n e r a t i o n s , h e nevertheless drew heavily on the accounts 
of earlier historians,"" and thus preserves particularly useful narratives on the evolution of 
the Roman army, and on the army's centuries-long record of insubordination toward the 
state as it is recorded as literary memory.'"^ 
Where the sources are largely silent on topics important to the study, such as the social 
relationship that developed between citizen-soldiers and Italian soldiers serving in 
campaigning Roman armies, the thesis deploys original research gathered in interview -
relevant sections of which are then used to help deduce the nature of military service in 
Roman consular armies, and to cross-check assumptions. Research into the experience of 
the modem Afghan National Army in building cohesion and social bonds between 
ethnically and tribally distinct recruits,'"' for example, is used to inform deductions about 
Sallust's contribution to our understanding of the revolutionary period is important; he provides an 
interesting and politically-informed analysis of many significant events. He makes it clear in his work on the 
war with Jugurtha that his focus is not so much on a minor war, but on the entire sweep of Roman history in 
the final centuries of the Republic; this sets his work apart from other contemporaries (Levene, 2007, p. 281). 
As a historian, Sallust could be moralistic and pessimistic, comparing the revolutionary period unfavourably 
with the period before 150 BC (Sal., lug. 41); a main theme of his works was inevitable decline: for example, 
at contra quis est omnium his moribus... "On the contrary, who is there in these degenerate days . . . " (Sal. lug. 
4). 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 272. 
"" Rosenstein, 2012, p. 272; Forsythe, 1994, p. 71; Chrissanthos, 2001, pp. 28-29. 
For example, Livy's account is the first record we have of the reformed fourth century BC army that had 
adopted maniples (Liv. 8.8), and preserves details of the army on its way to the second century BC army that 
Polybius describes (Plb. 6.19 ff). On the question of Livy's credentials as an historical source, 1 would note 
that Livy was aware of the problem of historical accuracy and bias; he admits, for example, that Rome's 
'semi-mythical past ' was hard to penetrate (Liv. 6.1), and retained enough historical sensibility to flag in his 
narrative when he thought a source that he used had its own bias (Liv. 7.42; see also Cornell, 2005, p. 48). For 
an analysis of the contribution of Livy to the historical narrative, which brings nuance and sophistication to 
his conclusions (arguing, for example, that criticism of Livy as a celebrator of Roman imperialism often fails 
to acknowledge Livy's clear-sighted account of the incompetence and immorality of Roman imperialists in 
Books 42-43), see Levene, 2005, 283 ff Again, 1 make the point that Livy's credentials as an accurate 
historical source are less important to my argument. What matters more is whether common citizens and 
soldiers in 88 BC were aware of the stories from Rome's past as preserved in the literary tradition, and 
whether that tradition was used to place contemporary events into context. 1 will argue that they were, and 
that they did (see Chapter Six below). 
" " Elements of the new Afghan National Army are being prepared for combat with the Taliban, and to take 
over responsibility for security in Afghanistan post-withdrawal of the allied coalition forces. Australia, along 
with the US, UK and Canada, is training Afghan soldiers and units. It is being formed into a cohesive whole 
from recruits from a wide variety of different ethnic and tribal areas throughout Afghanistan. Given that the 
dynamics of bonds formed between soldiers under the pressure of combat are relatively constant across time 
(see Chapter Five below), regardless of technological advances, the experience of the modem Afghan 
the social dynamics that may have conceivably existed between similarly ethnically-distinct 
citizen and Italian recruits that normal ly made up Roman consular armies. Interviews were 
conducted with a professional , high-ranking Australian Regular Army off icer w h o is not 
only an expert in building cohesion between soldiers, with years of relevant operational 
experience to draw upon in making his observations, but is also well-placed to comment on 
the recent recruitment and training experience of the Afghan National Army, and the social 
dynamics that exist between its diverse recruits. Major General Angus Campbel l , AM, is 
currently Deputy Chief of the Australian Army.""* In 2011, however, he was Commander 
Joint Task Force 633, United Arab Emirates (UAE), responsible for commanding all 
Australian forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan, including the Australian army units 
training the new, integrated Afghan army. In this capacity, he was in a unique position to 
observe the social and cohesive bonds that are developing between Afghan soldiers as they 
prepare to take over more responsibility for security in Afghanistan. The observations he 
thus makes, drawing on this experience, and his more general points about the imperative 
of maintaining cohesion between units on the battlefield, are useful for informing 
conclusions about the dynamics that may have plausibly existed in Roman consular 
armies. 
Definit ions 
Citizen-militia 
This term is used extensively, and is central to understanding the nature of republican 
military service. It describes the backbone of the Republ ic ' s military system; in this thesis, 
the citizen-militia means the traditional, land-based, part-time military institution which had 
a close association with Roman society and its political institutions,'"^ and upon which 
Roman power was based for most of the Republ ic ' s existence, and in which every citizen 
who met the min imum Servian property qualification had an obligation to serve. The term 
is used interchangeably with ' the a rmy ' ; it does not refer to the Roman navy. The basic 
National Army can inform the process of building cohesion in ancient armies, and the existence of social 
bonds that conceivably existed between Italian allied soldiers serving in Roman armies, and their citizen 
counterparts. The Afghan National Army, for example, shares similarities with Roman armies: recruits that 
are ethnically and tribally distinct, of poor education, and primarily from an agrarian background. 
For a complete biography of Maj Gen Campbell, see the official Department of Defence website 2013 
posting: hltp://mvw.defence.gov.au/op/afghanislan/bio/angiisCampbell/campbell.hlm 
Arguments that benefit from Maj Gen Campbell 's observations are contained in Chapter Five below. 
"" For more on the nexus between the citizen-militia and general society, see Chapter Two below. 
military unit of the citizen-militia was the legion; the citizen-militia was first organised as a 
phalanx, but evolved into the more flexible arrangement of the three-ranked legion based 
on maniples, and later cohorts. This arrangement would provide the basic structure of the 
citizen-militia for centuries.'"' The citizen-militia was not meant to be permanent; armies 
were raised each year personally by consuls at the start of the campaigning season, and then 
disbanded when the campaign was finished.'"^ The citizen-militia was never a 
'professional' institution in the sense of providing a vocation for citizens, having 
permanency, or being the kind of mercenary institution that could be hired. Early on, 
however, it inculcated professional standards of competency under the pressure of 
continuous war and expansion. The citizen-militia as a concept is the antithesis of the 
standing, vocational army characteristic of the imperial period. 
Roman Military System 
The Roman military system describes all the components that constituted the armed power 
and capability of the Republic: the way it was organised, its operating ethos, its institutions, 
the way it recruited its soldiers, integrated allied units, and the way individual citizens and 
allies interacted with military service."" The citizen-militia was, for example, part of the 
Roman military system, as was the timocratic ideal which governed eligibility for service in 
the army. As the term is used in this thesis, the military system is considered part of the 
structure of the Roman state, and a major arm of its ability to force, dominate and persuade 
other populations to acquiesce to Roman sovereignty. In particular, its close and enduring 
relationship with civilian power structures, society, and its role in integrating and 
eliminating practical difference between citizen and allied soldiers, rather than accentuating 
it, is emphasised. 
Full Integration Theory 
This is a new theory posited in Chapter Five which helps explain how the Social War could 
have plausibly felt like a civil war to the Roman citizens who fought it. It describes the 
process of homogenisation that Italian allied peoples serving over a long period of time in 
See Chapter Two below. 
For more on the evolutionary pressures which altered this traditional concept of service of the citizen-
militia, see Chapter Two below. 
For more on the characteristics of the Roman military system, see Chapters Two and Five below. 
republican consular armies were subjected to as a result of the imperative to maintain 
battlefield integrity of Roman battle lines. By such a process Italian peoples may have 
begun their military association with Rome as distinct soldiers, but ended up over time 
being fully integrated into Roman armies; although they still served in separate units 
alongside citizen legions, allied Italian soldiers nevertheless looked like citizen-soldiers, 
fought like them, used the same arms and equipment, and, I suggest, developed close social 
bonds with their citizen counterparts."® This would become important in an experiential 
sense during the Social War when Roman citizens were asked to fight their former, fully-
integrated, Italian allies. 
Politically Interventionist Legion 
This thesis is about the emergence of the politically interventionist legion; the term is used 
extensively. It refers to the specific behaviour - a peculiarly late-republican phenomenon -
of the citizen-militia interfering directly and consciously in Roman political discourse in the 
form of an organised military unit, and on behalf of its general. The term signifies the 
emergence of soldiers or armies willing to intervene on scale in politics. To constitute a 
politically interventionist legion, it is not enough for the soldiers or commander to express 
political opinions or represent political sentiments; the soldiers must physically act as a 
formed body directly in support of their leaders' political aspirations while under 
sacramentum. This very often required an illegal act, or the suppression of political 
enemies, their own loyal military units, or the broader population. The citizen-militia, 
behaving as politically interventionist legions, manifests itself primarily as supporters of 
individual generals and aspirants to power in the late Republic. A critical factor in Sulla's 
ability in 88 BC to impose his will on the state, the politically interventionist legion 
contrasts with citizens acting politically, individually or collectively, in their traditional 
civic assemblies, or individual veterans acting as members of street gangs. Its emergence 
represents a critical change in the psyche of the Roman military system and a seminal event 
in the history of the Republic; it made possible the subsequent civil wars, and ultimately, 
the eclipse of the Republ ic . ' " 
" " See Chapter Five below. 
' " S e e Chapter Eight below. 
Inimicitia/ae 
This Latin term, used extensively in this thesis, refers to the state of enduring, deep-seated 
unfriendly relations that exists between enemies and opponents. The term can technically 
refer to ill will and enmity across the spectrum of social and private life, but in this thesis, it 
is the larger sense of intense competition and rivalry that is played out in public life that is 
emphasised. To that end, it is used most commonly to describe the sense of enduring deep 
enmity between opponents and rivals in the political realm, such as that which existed 
between Sulla and Marius. I also mean it to describe a condition which exists primarily 
between two individuals and their immediate supporters, although I acknowledge that the 
enmity generated between individuals could spread to include family members, friends, and 
more widely to other political partisans. It is into this essentially personal political quarrel 
with Marius and his supporters that Sulla invited his soldiers to intervene, thus changing 
decisively the dynamic of that rivalry, and involving the whole Roman state in the 
subsequent consequences. 
Volunteers 
Throughout the Republic's history, citizens went beyond their civic obligation, and 
volunteered to serve in the army under popular or successful generals for various reasons, 
not least the prospect of improving their economic condition. Volunteers often augmented 
recruits assembled through the formal and annual dilectus. P. Scipio and Marius used them; 
such volunteers were particularly attracted to campaigns that promised much booty, and 
were generally hard to find where the obverse was true. In this thesis, the term denotes 
citizens who voluntarily offered themselves for service in the army. They were distinct 
from those citizens who were required to serve to meet their civic obligations or were 
conscripted - although, once in the legions, they were generally indistinguishable from 
them. This thesis does not use the term 'volunteers' interchangeably with 'mercenaries'; 
they were not able to be hired by anyone of any nationality rich enough to afford them. 
They were Roman or allied Italian citizens, joined only Roman armies, served under 
normal conditions of service under sacramentum. Furthermore, they were not clients of 
powerful individuals; when they joined the citizen-militia, they joined a national asset 
which served the state commanded by consuls who changed regularly. 
Professional 
The term 'professional' is used in this thesis to refer to two conditions describing soldiers 
or armies. In the first case, it describes a high state of technical competency; a condition 
where the army or soldiers had become so proficient at war that they approached 
'professional' standards. In this sense, it contrasts with 'amateur', where standards and 
proficiency are low. The Roman army was traditionally a citizen-militia, for example, but 
generally approached professional standards of competency, especially when engaged in 
war for long periods of time. In the second case, the term denotes a vocational calling 
which describes soldiers whose full-time profession is soldiering. They self-identify as 
soldiers first, civilians second, consider service in the army their only employment and 
source of remuneration, regard the legion as their only home, closely identify with its 
institutional character and serve in it for decades until retirement, incapacitation, or death. 
Even for the professional, however, Roman citizenship is still a pre-requisite to service. 
'Professional' also describes military institutions most closely associated with the 
permanent, professional legions of the imperial period. 'Professional' in this sense is the 
antithesis of the principles underpinning the cifizen-militia. 
Pecuniary Self-interest 
I have used this term extensively throughout the thesis. I mean it to refer to the mercenary 
impulse - that could become a strong motivating factor - of common citizen and allied 
Italian soldiers to profit from military service. It describes the sense that republican soldiers 
wanted to improve their economic condition from what they could gain materially from 
service in the Roman republican citizen-militia, and would act accordingly to satisfy it. As 
such, it covers a broad sweep of how common Roman and allied Italian soldiers might 
profit from service, including receiving donatives during, or at the end, of a campaign from 
successful generals, very commonly the acquisition of booty gained from sacking 
settlements, enemy camps or depots after a successful battle, the gathering of slaves during 
a campaign which could be sold to generate income, or - in some cases - the receiving of 
plots of land at the end of a campaign. 
The Chapter Outline 
This thesis comprises eight chapters in total: an introductory chapter, a background chapter, 
and six chapters addressing the substance of my arguments. Chapter One, this present 
chapter, introduces the topic, sets out the scope and limitations of the study, and provides 
the necessary structural and methodological information with which to approach the 
remainder of the thesis. Chapter Two provides the foundation and background that I 
consider necessary for the subsequent discussion of the reasons for the army's first decisive 
and large-scale intervention into Roman political discourse. It examines the key elements 
and underlying principles of the Roman military system, including its origins, structure and 
important characteristics. The crucial timocratic principle that governed military service for 
most of the Republic's existence - and which Marius reputedly undermined - is covered. 
The chapter explores key evolutionary pressures that acted on the army; it also covers the 
background of the difficult and bloody late-republican Social War between Rome and her 
erstwhile Italian allies which immediately preceded Sulla's march on the capital. 
Having provided this necessary military background. Chapter Three will outline the view 
that has conventionally been advanced to explain the emergence of politically 
interventionist armies: pecuniary self-interest. The chapter will survey the main proponents 
- ancient and modem - of this dominant perspective, and outline its key tenets. 1 will also 
demonstrate the emphasis that the conventional view places on the role of Marius in 
undermining the timocratic ideal that underpinned service in republican armies, opening up 
legions to the previously-ineligible poor, infecting the army with a mercenary spirit - and 
making it more receptive to the economic inducements of insurrectionist generals. Chapter 
Four will then contest the conventional explanation, in particular, the emphasis it places on 
pecuniary self-interest as the exclusive factor motivating soldiers to intervene in late-
republican political discourse. The chapter will argue that while the desire to profit had a 
part to play in motivating the army at Nola, it was not the vital, new ingredient of late-
republican military service; Roman soldiers had always looked toward military service to 
improve their economic condition. It will thus be argued that pecuniary self-interest was not 
the only factor shaping the actions of soldiers, and certainly not the unique, decisive factor 
of late-republican armies that made Sulla's plan possible. Furthermore, the Chapter will 
demonstrate that too much has been made of Marius' role. His 107 BC recruitment reform 
is placed into its proper context: the chapter will demonstrate that it did not lead to armies 
filled with poor willing to do anything for financial reward. Chapter Four will demonstrate 
that, in isolation and out of context, pecuniary self-interest is ultimately an unsatisfactory 
explanation for the rise of the politically interventionist legion. 
Having placed pecuniary self-interest into a proper context, the thesis will examine 
alternative factors which, I shall suggest, more accurately explain the behaviour of the army 
in 88 BC, and which explain why Sulla was able to suborn it to his ambitions. Chapter Five 
will thus argue that the decisive experience of the citizen-militia in the Social War against 
its Italian allies 'desensit ised' the army to the idea of civil war, and helped overcome any 
residual reluctance soldiers might have had to the prospect of fighting other citizens that 
Sulla 's plan so clearly risked. Significantly, the chapter provides a cogent explanation of 
how soldiers could have made this shift: the Social War prepared soldiers for civil war 
because the citizen-militia, for the first time in its history, fought an enemy that was 
identical to it in form, function and ethos, and with whom many citizen-soldiers shared ties 
of kinship. To support this argument. Chapter Five introduces a new paradigm, full 
integration theory: Italian allied units serving with consular armies gradually over time 
adopted Roman tactics, equipment, organisation, uniforms, and military culture under the 
imperative to maintain battlefield cohesion, changing not only the way the allied soldiers 
felt about Rome, but crucially how Roman soldiers felt about their allied counterparts. The 
consequence was that allied units became fully integrated into the Roman military system, 
to the point that they were indistinguishable on the battlefield from their Roman 
counterparts; for citizens, the Social War thus felt like a civil war. 
Chapter Six argues that another factor which influenced the motivations of Sulla 's soldiers 
was the a rmy 's tradition of political activism and insubordination. The chapter will argue 
that the citizen-militia was always a politically-interested institution, willing to act over not 
only incompetence, booty, or ill-treatment, but more abstract notions such as a sense of 
justice, economic hardship in society, and political or social reform. The chapter will 
demonstrate that this history of activism manifested itself primarily as seditio and 
insubordination against commanders, and through them, against the state; it could also 
appear as advocacy in the field for preferred individual political candidates in Rome. 
Moreover, Chapter Six will show that this activism was well known among late-republican 
citizen-soldiers as an inherited tradition; it provided a crucial reference point against which 
they could legitimise and situate their own insubordination against the state in 88 BC. 
Crucially, the tradition included stories of individuals with grievances appealing directly to 
the army as an ultimate source of legitimacy and authority; they enabled Sulla to tap into 
the tradition of insubordination inherent in the army with his appeal to justice. 
Chapter Seven turns to the pernicious rise of political violence in late-republican politics, 
and the decisive influence it had on the army as a catalyst for intervention. 1 will 
demonstrate here that Sulla's soldiers had already become unprecedented killers of Roman 
magistrates in a way no previous army had, and that, by 88 BC, the citizen-militia had 
learned to use and accept violence against traditional symbols of republican power and their 
office bearers. Chapter Seven will argue that this happened because of the rise of violence 
in the decades leading up to Nola as part of normative political expression in the conflict 
between the governing elite, a re-assertive tribunate, and their partisans. Against this 
background, soldiers ingested the lessons that violence worked, and that it had a kind of 
brutal legitimacy. The chapter will show that the army learned these lessons on the streets 
of Rome; soldiers were deeply involved in political violence well before 88 BC. Moreover, 
it will be argued that elements of the citizen-militia were used formally to suppress 
factional violence in Rome; exposing citizen-soldiers to mob and large-scale factional 
violence made it easier for them to accept the idea of the army using force to influence 
politics when Sulla requested their help. The chapter will show that this was a new -
perhaps the most decisive - factor in the life of the Republic unknown to previous 
generations; the events at Nola took to its logical conclusion the decades-long drift of the 
citizen-soldier into political violence. 
Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, plays an important role in the study by drawing 
together the range of factors discussed in the previous chapters that, as I argue, helped 
persuade Sulla's soldiers in 88 BC to assist him, and placing them in the specific context of 
88 BC at Nola. Summarising the findings, the chapter suggests that a series of factors - the 
desire to profit from war, desensitisation to the risk of fighting fellow citizens, the citizen-
militia tradition of insubordination in political cause and as the ultimate redress of 
grievance, and the pernicious influence of endemic violence on political discourse - all 
played their part in motivating the army. The chapter introduces a further consideration that 
existed at Nola: background confusion among Sulla's soldiers over who legitimately 
represented the state, allowing Sulla to emphasise his own credentials at the expense of his 
enemies. As well as providing the context of events that immediately preceded Sulla's 
flight to Nola, Chapter Eight explains how these factors practically framed the decision of 
the soldiers on the day. In doing so, the chapter argues that rather than a single factor 
dominating - long the conventional explanation for intervention - it was a grouping of 
factors acting in unison, which proved decisive. Despite these findings, however, Chapter 
Eight also acknowledges that much remains unknown in the deepest motivations of Sulla's 
soldiers; their voices are largely silent in the narrative of the history of the late Republic. 
But given their crucial role in the emergence of the politically interventionist legion, and 
the subsequent place the existence of such armies had in the fall of the Republic, the 
chapter concludes by making the point that the subject of the motivations of ordinary 
citizen-soldiers would benefit from further study - particularly with a view to 
understanding more comprehensively the various political, social and economic factors and 
influences over time that were likely to have affected the perspectives of citizen-soldiers. 
Chapter Two 
The Roman Military System - Key Concepts 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will examine the key elements and underlying principles of the Roman 
military system. I will outline its origins, structure and important characteristics, including 
the crucial timocratic"^ principle that governed military service for most of the Republic's 
existence, and particularly the concomitant assumption that linked a minimum amount of 
personal wealth to suitability for service in the army. The chapter will explore evolutionary 
pressures that acted on the army - and the resulting changes for the traditional concept of a 
citizen-militia and its expectations of service. Additionally, 1 will cover the background and 
causes of the difficult and bloody late-republican Social War between Rome and her 
erstwhile Italian allies which immediately preceded L. Cornelius Sulla's march on the 
capital, and which, I argue later in Chapter Five, had significant implications for the 
emergence of politically interventionist soldiers. 
A good knowledge of the military system and its place in Roman society is a prerequisite 
for understanding the history of the Republic, specifically the decline of the republican 
political system and its descent into the first civil war. 1 argue that the army was at the 
centre of the narrative of this decline and conflict: the civil war between C. Marius and 
Sulla was made possible, for example, because the army decided to intervene in politics; it 
did not intervene because civil war broke out. Moreover, the first indication in 151 BC that 
relative solidarity in political discourse was yielding to a period of increased conflict 
between the governing elite and a more assertive tribunate related to the army: it involved 
ordinary citizens and their obligation to make themselves available for military service for 
T h e under ly ing pr inciple o f the t imocra t ic ideal is that the higher a c i t i zen ' s weal th and census 
qual i f ica t ions , the greater the obl igat ion to serve in the mili tary, and consequent ly , the greater his political 
r ights ( for m o r e on the def ini t ion of a t imocra t ic sys tem in republican Rome, see Gabba , 1976, pp. 20 ft) . 
the unpopular war in Spain. Additionally, the one event that attracted more ancient and 
contemporary criticism than any other for creating the conditions that led to political 
intervention by the army, to civil war, and to the eventual extinction of the Republic, was a 
military one: Marius' 107 BC recruitment reform."'* 
More specifically, the evolution of the citizen-militia, the pressures acting upon it, and 
perceived changes in military service that occurred leading up the start of the Social War in 
91 BC are important to an appreciation of the significance of the events of 88 BC. The 
army was again at the centre of those events: Sulla was able to impose a political solution 
upon the state only because the army decided to risk civil war and support him. Moreover, 
Sulla himself, and his chief antagonist Marius, made their reputations in the army, and 
subsequently achieved political prominence by their record of public service achieved 
primarily through w a r . " ' This chapter will thus provide the necessary foundation for the 
subsequent discussion of the reasons for the army's first decisive and large-scale 
intervention into Roman polidcal discourse. 
The Roman Military System: Origins and Structure 
The origins of the republican military system are found in Rome's semi-mythical past: war, 
the practice of war, and the organisation of society for war, were fundamental elements of 
Roman public life ab urbe condHa}^^ The army itself originated in the Servian constitution. 
According to the Roman literary tradition, the penultimate king of Rome, Servius 
Tull ius ," ' conducted the first census, and used its results to organise citizens into various 
" ' i t was, for example, the first sign that the tribunate was prepared to act in a more obstructionist and 
revolutionary manner against the wishes of the governing elite. The tribunes forcibly interceded in the levy on 
behalf of ordinary citizens who complained of unfair treatment by consuls pursuing the levy for Spain with 
great thoroughness. When the consuls refused to grant exceptions, the tribunes imprisoned them (App., Hisp. 
45 ff; Liv., Per. 48). For more on the significance of this event, see Chapter Seven below. 
" " Sal., lug. 86; F lo r , Epit. 1.36; Plut., Mar. 9; Gel. 16.10. This reform, and its implications for the 
emergence of politically interventionist soldiers, will be covered in extensive detail in Chapters Three, Four 
and Eight below. 
Marius first achieved prominence serving in the army, and derived much of his reputation, character, 
approach to leadership, and political influence from his military experiences (Plut., Mar. 2). Sulla also derived 
his reputation from his military record, having first come to prominence while serving as Marius' quaestor in 
the army during the war against Jugurtha (Plut., SuU. 3). 
' " R o t h , 2009, p. 10. 
This was during the regal period, traditionally dated to 753 BC - 534 BC (Forsythe, 2008, p. 24). 
According to Livy, who drew on information provided by the ancient historian Fabius Pictor (Liv. 1.43), the 
introduction of the Servian constitution occurred sometime between 578 BC and 534 BC (Liv. 1.44). 
military classes based on wealth, so that participation in the military system was in 
proportion to personal wealth and status in society. The military system he created was 
interlinked with the comitia centuriata,^^^ one of Rome's three traditional voting 
assemblies: the organisational structure of the comitia centiiriata provided the foundation 
for the formation and battle-deployment of the Roman army in the field."' Citizens were 
arranged into different centuries;'^" this original criterion determined their role in the army. 
The richest citizens, for example, were divided into a separate group of 18 centuries; the 
cavalry was drawn from this c l a s s . T h e other classes provided heavy infantry and 
skirmishers: the next richest citizens were divided into the first class of 80 centuries, with 
two centuries of fabri}^^ The second, third and fourth classes were each made up of 20 
centuries. The fifth class, representing the minimum property requirement needed to serve, 
consisted of 30 centuries and two centuries of horn blowers and t r u m p e t e r s . T h o s e who 
could not meet the minimum wealth requirements for enrolment in the fifth Servian class 
were placed in a single large century and excluded from service in the army:'^'' hoc minor 
census reliquam multitiidinem habuit; inde una centuria facta est immunis militia}^^ T h e 
poor, however, were still citizens, and thus had an obligation to serve in emergencies in 
non-regular units, separate from the main army.'^^ The Servian system originally required 
In its voting role, the comitia centuriata decided the election of senior magistrates, passed laws and ratified 
decisions of war or peace (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 55); it was one of the most important and long-lived popular 
assemblies, lasting for more than five centuries, and it continued to operate into the reign of Augustus as an 
electoral assembly. For more on the various Roman voting assemblies, and their effectiveness as fora for 
ordinary citizens to express their political will, see Chapter Six below. 
This military and political system was thus called the 'Servian constitution" (for examples of the term used 
in this manner, see Forsyth, 2008, p. 24; North, 2006, p. 261). 
The 'century' was the most basic Servian organisational structure of the Roman people arranged for civic 
and military purposes in the comitia centuriata; the use of centuries as the basic building blocks of the legion 
survived for hundreds of years, well into the imperial period; men organised into centuries, and commanded 
by centurions, formed maniples, and later cohorts. Their use in the army was thus a visible manifestation of 
the ancient link between the citizen-militia and the comitia centuriata. 
Liv. 1.43. 
Liv. 1.43. Given the etymology of the word, fabri were probably military engineers, responsible for 
building fortifications, obstacles and other military structures. 
Liv. 1.43. For a detailed discussion on the lowering of the minimum property qualification required for the 
fifth Servian class over time, and the important implications of this for the demographic makeup of the late-
republican army and the 107 BC recruitment reform of C. Marius, see Chapter Four below. 
' D.H. 4.19. They were called proletarii or capite censi; the name proletarii suggests their only service to 
the state was to produce offspring (Forsythe, 2008, p. 32). Also at Gel. 16.10: see this chapter below. 
Liv. 1.43: "Those who were assessed at less than this amount, being all the rest of the population, were 
made into a single century, exempt from military service." 
They could, for example, serve in the navy (PIb. 6.19). 
citizens to pay for tineir own weapons and equipment; '^ ' by the second century BC, 
inowever, tine state was providing arms and equipment to soldiers unable to afford tine initial 
cost, and recouping the money from their stipendium.™ 
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Weal th A 
Muuiiiiuii Wt^ili 
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The army and the comiHa centiiriata were thus inextricably linked; as well as organising 
the Roman people militarily, electing the army's leaders, and deciding if the state should go 
to war, the comitia was considered first and foremost an army of citizens sitting as a civic 
assembly,'^" and as a result, was not allowed to meet inside the pomeriumP^ Instead, the 
comitia met outside on the Campus Martins. Through wealth discrimination, the Servian 
Liv. 1.43; D.H. 4.19; Oabba , 1976, p. 2. Kor more on the issue of pay, and the introduction of state 
t lnancial support for mili tary service, and the implicat ions of this for poor ci t izens and the demographic 
compos i t ion of the a rmy, see Chapter h our be low. 
Plb. 6 .39. Presumably , as Ma t thew suggests , the m o n e y was recouped in instalments (Mat thew, 2010(a) , p. 
2; see a lso pp. 24 ff) . For the s igni f icance of this fact to the demographic m a k e u p of the la te-republ ican army, 
see Chap te r Four below. 
' - ' L i v . 1.43; D.H. 4 .19. 
Forsyth, 2008 , p. 26. 
T h e ancient rel igious and geograph ic line around R o m e which separated the civil f rom mili tary spheres of 
publ ic life (Liv. 24.7) . For more on its s igni f icance to the emergence of politically interventionist soldiers, see 
Chap te r FJght be low. 
constitution introduced role distinctions into the army: these distinctions persisted in 
various forms until the army was reformed at the end of the second century BC, and 
functional differences were abolished. '" The constitution established the defining 
characteristics'^^ of the republican military system: service as a civic obligation for citizen 
assidui"* and thus compulsory; the poor excluded from the army, but still available in an 
emergency; and a close relationship between citizen-soldiers and the society from which 
they were d r a w n . A c c o r d i n g to literary tradition, Servius Tullius also established a policy 
of using citizens, not mercenaries, to man the army; this prevented the state from 
exhausting its wealth on foreign soldiers.''^ Lendon, however, argues that Romans 
preferred not to use mercenaries because they wanted to experience war personally to 
validate their virtus.™ Whatever the reason, 1 argue that it was a conspicuous feature of the 
republican army not to rely on large numbers of mercenaries to do its fighting; the instances 
where it did so were rarc'^^ - although regular use was made of auxiliary contingents 
For a discussion of these reforms, and their significance to the relationship between Roman and allied 
soldiers, see Chapters Five and Eight below. 
These defining characteristics were persistent: for example, they remained largely in place until the 
establishment of the professional, standing army of the imperial period more than four centuries later. 
Citizens were classified either assidui or proletarii: these terms had a legal, as well as military, 
connotation: according to Rome's Law of Twelve Tables, only an assiduus could legally assume liability for 
another assiduus, whereas anyone could perform this function for the proletarii (Gel. 16.10). See also de Ligt, 
2012, pp. 98 and 99. 
The historicity of the Servian constitution is, however, contested. Lintott, for example, doubts its existence 
as described by Livy and Dionysius: "The descriptions provided by Livy and Dionysius are perhaps nothing 
more than antiquarian reconstructions of the reform attributed to Servius Tullius, based on the number of 193 
centuries (though the figures in the manuscripts of Livy produce a total of 194) and the principle that the 
cavalry and the first class must have a majority (Lintott, 1999(a), pp. 56 and 57). Lintott argues that the 
Servian system described by Livy and Dionysius cannot have reflected the military of the middle and late 
Republic; there was no place in it for legions, cohorts, and maniples, nor was there any necessary match 
between centuries in the assemblies and centuries in the army. Lintott is right to caution against using the 
Servian system described by Livy and Dionysius as a literal account of the early Roman army. Certainly by 
the time Polybius was describing the army of the middle Republic, age had replaced wealth as the functional 
discriminator which determined where a citizen would serve and his primary role (Plb. 6.21). As such, it can 
be argued that it is hazardous to categorically associate the comitia centuriata with any particular period in 
Roman history, although given the hoplite equipment associated with the first three classes (Liv. 1.43), it 
seems likely that Livy and Dionysius were describing a pre-manipular army, and thus before the end of the 
fourth century BC (see Chapter Five below). Lintott, while challenging the historicity of the Servian 
constitution, nevertheless acknowledges that the comitia centuriata and its rationale existed in some form, and 
went back to some point in the early Republic (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 58). 
D.H.4.23. 
Lendon, 2007, pp. 508 and 509. He argues, for example, that if there was one state in the ancient world 
that could afford mercenaries in its rise to hegemony, it was Rome. Instead, the Romans did not employ 
mercenaries because they saw no reason to pay others to do something they yearned to do themselves. They 
had allies who shared their outlook, and for centuries Romans of all classes - and many of their Italian allies -
felt a powerful urge to go to war in order to demonstrate their courage, their virtus. 
The use of mercenaries was unusual enough to draw a comment. Livy, for example, paused in his narrative 
of Rome's struggle with Carthage for Spain during the Second Punic War to announce that it was here in 213 
BC, that the Romans first used mercenaries: id modo eitis anni in Hispania ad memoriam insigne est, quod 
supplied by foreign allies, especially during the wars of expansion during the second 
century B C . ' " 
The Roman army was originally organised as an Italic hoplite phalanx; the first three 
Servian classes, for example, were equipped with round shields, helmets, bronze breast-
plates, greaves, and long spear, consistent with the panoply of a p h a l a n g i t e , a n d the 
Roman army decisively defeated by the Gauls at Allia in 390 BC used a phalanx."" Under 
the pressure to improve effectiveness in battle, however, the Romans fundamentally 
restructured the army, the first of two significant restructures they would make during the 
Republic's ascendency to hegemony and empire.'"^ By the early third century BC, '" ' they 
had replaced the phalanx with a more flexible manipular army; each of four legions raised 
annually used maniples'"*" as their basic tactical component arranged into three battle lines: 
the triplex acies}'^^ The army of the second century BC, as described by Polybius,'"^ 
mercennarium militem in castris neminem ante quam turn Cehiberos Romani habuerunt (Liv. 24.49). "This is 
the only occurrence of that year in Spain that is worthy of record, since the Romans had no mercenary 
soldiers in their camps before the Celtiberians whom they had at that time." Moreover, 1 also point out that 
there are a number of times where the status of Roman auxilia was not clear, and these troops may in fact 
have heen paid mercenaries. For example; Hispanis duplicia cibaria dari iussa: operaque eonim forti ac 
fideli persaepe res publica usa est (Liv. 24.47), and Eorum forti fidelique opera in eo bello usi sunt saepe 
Romani. Ager Hispanis in Hispania et Numidis in Africa post helium virtutis causa datus est (Liv. 23.45). 
Cretan archers are a good example. By the first century BC, these units had a long association with Roman 
consular armies, and were habitually attached to armies as missile troops to support the infantry (Liv. 22.37; 
Val.Max. 9.3.7; Plb. 3.75. See also Cagniart, 2008, p. 88). For their use in political violence, and the 
significant implication of this for evidence of the army's involvement in civil strife, see Chapter Seven below. 
See also Hoyos, 2008, p. 68. 
" " Liv. 1.43. For more discussion on the structure and organisation of the early Roman phalanx, see Forsythe, 
2008, pp. 30 and 31, and Roth, 2009, pp. 10 and 11. 
"" Liv. 5.38. The Allia was a tributary of the river Tiber. 
Rosenstein argues that the defeat at Allia is unlikely to have been the catalyst for the shift of phalanx to 
manipular army; the phalanx arrangement had worked well up until that point, and, instead, there are likely to 
have been gradual changes to the army over time, rather than a single, momentous shift (Rosenstein, 2010, pp. 
294 and 295). 1 argue, however, that Rosenstein is downplaying the implications of the defeat at Allia; it was 
no ordinary loss. It led, for example, to the unprecedented and traumatic sack of Rome. If there was ever 
going to be a catalytic event to prompt the Romans to fundamentally change their structure of the army, then 
Allia was the most likely candidate. But we cannot know for sure, and all we can say with certainty is that the 
army was in its manipular formation by the end of the fourth century BC, and certainly by the Pyrrhic wars of 
the early third century BC (for example, maniples and pila were used by the Roman army operating against 
Pyrrhus' phalanx; see D.H. 20.11). 
In my view, the most likely time for the change from phalanx to manipular army occurred around 340 BC 
during the wars to impose Roman hegemony over Italy; it is at this time that the newly organised Roman 
army first appears in the sources. Livy, describing the new army, wrote that the Romans formerly used small 
round shields, but now had oblong ones. Where there was previously a phalanx, there was now a battle line of 
maniples, with a line of skirmishers carrying light spears in front of the main line (Liv. 8.8). 
""" Manipuii, meaning 'handfuls". On this point, see also Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 96 and 97. 
Plb. 6.19. 
As 1 have pointed out in Chapter One above, Polybius is our best source on the mid-republican army 
(Matthew, 2010(a), p. 1; Hoyos, 2008, p. 68): book 6 of Histories is a primary source (Plb. 6.19 ff). De Ligt 
r e t a i n e d t h e S e r v i a n f u n c t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , b u t a g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e n o w d e t e r m i n e d r o l e 
a n d p l a c e in t h e b a t t l e l i ne ; a r e s i d u e o f S e r v i a n w e a l t h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s u r v i v e d , h o w e v e r , 
in t h e p r a c t i c e o f p l a c i n g p o o r e s t assidui i n t o t h e s k i r m i s h i n g velites}"^^ T h e R o m a n s a l s o 
c h a n g e d t h e e q u i p m e n t o f s o l d i e r s : t h e y m a d e t h e gladiiis a n d pila t h e p r i m a r y w e a p o n s o f 
t h e l e g i o n n a i r e , a n d r e p l a c e d t h e o r i g i n a l r o u n d s h i e l d w i t h a b o d y - l e n g t h o v a l s c u t w n * ^ -
a l t h o u g h t h e h o p l i t e o r i g i n s o f t h e a r m y w e r e st i l l e v i d e n t in t h e l o n g s p e a r s c a r r i e d b y 
o l d e r s o l d i e r s m a n n i n g t h e r e a r b a t t l e l i n e . ' ' " A s R o m e e x p a n d e d i ts h e g e m o n y a c r o s s I ta ly , 
a l l i e d c o n t i n g e n t s b e c a m e a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f t h e P o l y b i a n a r m y ; ' ' " t h e n u m b e r o f t h e i r 
i n f a n t r y in a c o n s u l a r a r m y t y p i c a l l y e q u a l l e d t h e R o m a n i n f a n t r y , w h i l e t h e n u m b e r o f 
a l l i e d c a v a l r y w a s n o r m a l l y t h r e e t i m e s t ha t o f c i t i z e n h o r s e . ' ' ' In t h e o r y , e a c h c o n s u l 
c o m m a n d e d a n a r m y o f t w o R o m a n l e g i o n s , ' " t w o a l l i e d f o r m a t i o n s o f s i m i l a r s i z e , a n d 
R o m a n a n d a l l i e d c a v a l r y c o n t i n g e n t s - a l t h o u g h a r m i e s c o u l d b e j o i n e d t o g e t h e r f o r 
s p e c i f i c b a t t l e s . ' " 
P o l y b i a n C o n s u l a r A r m y ' " 
R o m a n C a v a l r y Allied F o r m a t i o n R o m a n Legion R o m a n Legion Allied F o r m a t i o n Allied C a v a l r y 
suggests that, given that Polybius' description of the military system is often described from the point of view 
of the military tribune, he may in part have been drawing his information from a "self-help" handbook for the 
tribune officer class, responsible for running the dilecliis raising the armies (de Ligt. 2012. pp. 92 ff). 
Plb. 6.21. 
Liv. 8.8; Plb. 6.21 tT. 
Archaeological evidence corroborates Polybius" description of republican weapons and equipment. The 
major pictorial source for the mid to late-republican legionnaire is the altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus. The 
relief depicts a dilectus or a census, with representations of soldiers in uniform and carrying arms, probably 
from the late second century BC (Southern, 2006, p . l3 . For a facsimile of the altar, see Keppie, 1984, p. 54). 
The oval senium that Livy and Polybius described is clearly shown, as is Polybius" coat of chain-mail (lorica). 
The sword and a dagger are also shown, although at variance with Polybius" description of the sword worn on 
the right hip, as the relief shows a dagger on the right hip, and the gladius on the left. Other sculptures, 
however, show the gladius clearly worn on the right as Polybius suggests. For example, a relief of an early 
empire soldier belonging to legio XIV Gemina called Flavoleius, shows a sword on the right hip, and dagger 
on the left (Keppie, 1984. plate 19; see also Roth. 2009, p. 89). The sculptors for the Ahenobarbus altar may 
simply have got it wTong, or used artistic license to illustrate the symbolism of the sword used by 
legionnaires, rather than its exact position. We will never know. 
For example, in 218 BC. at the start of the Second Punic War, the Romans levied six legions totalling 
24.000 citizen infantry and 1800 cavaln', and 40000 allied infantry and 4400 horse (Liv. 21.17). 
' ' ' Plb. 6. 26. For an extensive discussion of the role and scale of the allied contribution to the Roman military 
system, including the implications of this for the emergence of politically interventionist armies in the late 
Republic, see Chapter Five below. 
Plb. 6.15; Roth, 2009, p. 28. The size of this army was around 18,000 fighting men. See also de Ligt, 2008, 
p. 116. 
As occurred often during the large, set-piece battles of the Second Punic War, 218 BC - 202 BC (Plb. 
3.68). 
Plb. 6.19 ff 
The army now used four different types of soldiers: the youngest soldiers, or the poorest 
assidui, were placed in the skirmishers that operated in front of the main battle line, and 
were armed with light throwing spears and round shields.'^^ The heavy infantry were 
placed in the main battle lines: the next youngest soldiers were in the first battle line, and 
called hastati'}^^ behind these came the second battle line of older men called principes.'^^ 
The third battle line comprised the veteran triarii. Polybius' legion, arrayed in its three 
battle lines,'^® worked by a complex interplay between maniples in the various battle lines. 
The hastati fell back through gaps in the second principes battle line, for example, if they 
could not defeat the enemy. The principes would then advance, and if they were 
unsuccessful, retreated behind the triarii battle line, which provided a final force with 
which to either commit to battle in a last attempt to break the enemy line, or provide a 
defensive hedge of long spears behind which the army could safely disengage.'^' 
Under this system, the sequential commitment of each battle line normally kept the older 
veterans out of the fighting; in most cases, battles were decided before the triarii were 
committed. The arrangement of the army on the battlefield, with separate maniples aligned 
in battle lines, and each battle line covering the gaps in the previous line, has been 
described as a three-line quincunx formation;'^" the maniples at Asculum in 279 BC, during 
the campaign against Pyrrhus, retreat and advance during the fighting: these manoeuvres 
probably reflected the operation of this three-lined quincunx formation in battle, as the 
maniples advanced, made parallel manoeuvres, and retreated through each other. ' ' ' Most 
Plb. 6.21. For more detail on the Polybian legion, see also Sekunda, 2007, pp. 348 ff. 
Plb. 6.23. The hastati probably carried spears originally, as well as the triariv. the etymology of the word 
'hastati' suggests they were armed with spears (hasta: a spear, so 'hastati' - spearmen). 
Plb. 6.23. 
The Polybian legion was made up of 30 maniples: each maniple of hastati and principes was 120 men 
strong (two centuries of 60 men), while the maniples of the triarii were smaller - 60 men (two centuries of 30 
men each). In addition, there were 1200 skirmishing velites'. including cavalry, the base strength of the 
Polybian legion was around 4200 men (see Matthew, 2010(a), p. 3). The size of the legion could also be 
increased in times of danger to 5000 men (Plb. 6.20). 
Liv. 8.14. The triarii were kept from the fighting if at all possible, and maintained as a tactical reserve. For 
excellent summaries of the Polybian legion, see Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 1-4; Connolly, 1988, pp. 188 ff. 
Interestingly, the long spears of triarii could be passed forward to battle lines in front if the tactical situation 
dictated. For example, military tribunes in 225 BC ordered the triarii to pass their spears to the front line 
hastati during a battle with a much larger force of Gauls (Plb. 2.33). 
For example, Rosenstein, 2010, p. 302; Matthew, 2010(a), p. 3; Keppie, 1984, p. 39. It was called this 
because the army's layout resembled the five dots on a dice cube. 
Plut., Vit.Pyrrh. 21.6. 1 cite the presence of maniples in the army that fought Pyrrhus, and the concomitant 
employment of more sophisticated battlefield manoeuvres, as further evidence that the transformation from 
phalanx to manipular army had been fully completed by the start of the third century BC (see also Rosenstein, 
2010, p. 302). 
likely the gaps between the maniples in the battle line, however , were closed up before the 
battle line made contact with the enemy. This was most probably achieved by the rear 
century of the maniple moving up to align itself with the front century; '^" not to do so 
would have al lowed an enemy, such as the fluid and fast-moving Gallic battle f o r m a t i o n , ' " 
to infiltrate the battle line through the gaps, get behind the maniples, and thus compromise 
the integrity and cohesion of the whole battle line. 
Polybian Manipular Legion in Battle Formation: 4200 Fighting Men'" 
Line of Skirmishing Velites 
Maniple 
Maniple 
Sscond Bittt* Lin« Primiptt 
Third Bjttl«_ Line Triofii 
Maniple 
SOmtn 
Cavalry Cavalry 
The manipular army was the basic tactical formation of the Roman military system until the 
Marian re forms at the end of the second century BC. Although its structure, tactics, 
weapons , and equipment changed, the army of the mid Republic retained continuity with 
the principles of the original Servian constitution. The military system, for example, still 
relied on its own populat ion, not large numbers of mercenaries; from the second century on, 
however , small contingents of specialised troops, such as Balearic slingers and Cretan 
A maniple was formed by combining two centuries, each century with Its own centurion, standard bearer 
and optio (Plb. 6.24). 
For example, the Gallic army that overwhelmed the Roman phalanx at Allla In 390 BC was fast-moving 
and flexible, lapping around the tlanks of the Roman army (Liv. 5.38). 
Plb. 6.20. 
archers, started to accompany consular armies, and may have been paid.'®' Soldiers still had 
to be citizens; this basic stipulation survived into the imperial period. By 225 BC,'®® 
however, increasingly large allied contingents, who were not fiill citizens, also served in 
consular armies.'®' Citizens also had to be assidui, and meet a minimum wealth 
qualification, to serve in the legions.'®^ Those who could not declare to the censors the 
minimum wealth requirement for the fifth Servian class remained excluded from the army, 
although I argue in Chapter Four below that the pressure of continuous war, and the need to 
man large armies from the Second Punic War onwards, weakened the artificial barrier to 
the poor serving in the army.'®' As I have shown above, a significant change, by which the 
Polybian legion broke most obviously with the earlier Servian tradition, was that age and 
experience replaced wealth as the main determinant of role and position in the legion. 
There was one more significant structural change to the republican army before the 
establishment of the fully professional, standing army of the imperial period: at some point 
between 105 BC and 59 BC, the Romans replaced maniples with larger cohorts as the basic 
manoeuvre formation of the legion.'™ I argue in Chapter Five below that Marius introduced 
the change during the campaign against the Cimbri at the end of the second century BC 
when he introduced other reforms into the a rmy. ' " The cohortal army was thus in 
widespread use at the start of the Social War in 91 BC, and cohorts were used in the army 
Hoyos, 2008, p. 68. 
This was the date of the formula togalonim which Polybius recorded, and which showed the allied 
contributions to the army for that year (for more discussion on the significance of Ihe formula togatorum, see 
Chapter Five below). This is a conservative estimate; allied contributions in numbers to Roman armies, in my 
view, probably went further back to the First Punic War (264 BC-241 BC). 
On the critical importance of the Italian contributions to the Roman military system, including the scale of 
their involvement, the seminal consequences this had for changing Roman views of their Italian allies over 
time, and the implications of this for the emergence of politically interventionist legions, see Chapters Five 
and Eight below. 
"'^Plb. 6.19. 
I refer here specifically to the successive lowering of the minimum property qualification for the fifth 
Servian class, and the implications this had, as 1 argue, for the demographic composition of the republican 
army over time, and the presence of professionals in the early second century BC army who were technically 
proletarii. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter Four below. 
A cohort consisted of six enlarged centuries of eighty men each, giving it strength of 480 men (Matthew, 
2010(a), pp. 29 and 30). It had been in selective use in the army throughout the second century BC (see 
Chapter Five below on this point), but was not in widespread use as the basic tactical formation of the legion 
until Marius' reforms at the end of the second century BC. The last time maniples are encountered in a 
Roman army is during the war against Jugurtha in 109 BC (Sal., lug. 50). For more detail, see Chapter Five 
below. 
For more on the role of Marius and cohorts, see Matthew, 2010(a). p. 29 ff; Sekunda, 2007, p. 356. 
that Sulla took with him to Rome four years later."" The reformed legion had ten cohorts: 
four in the front line and three each in the remaining two posterior lines in quincunx 
formation. '" 
Marian Reformed Legion " 
Cohort 
Cohort 
Cohort 
Replacing smaller maniples with larger cohorts meant the legion now had less tactical 
maneouver elements, but those elements were stronger, and were probably introduced 
under the pressure of a series of significant battlefield losses during the campaign to defeat 
See Chapters Five and Eight below. 
For more detail on the formation o f t h e cohortal army, see Matthew, 2010(a), p. 31. For a battle description 
that neatly illustrates the three-lined cohortal army arranged in the quincunx formation, with its signature gaps 
in the line for units to pass through, see Sulla's disposition of his army in 86 BC as he awaited the more 
numerous infantry of Archelaus (Fron., Str. 2.3). 
Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 30 and 31. 
the Germanic invasions in the final decades of the second century B C . ' " Very 
significantly, 1 argue that the reform also meant that the functional distinctions within the 
army, which had endured for more than four centuries, were eliminated: all soldiers were 
now equipped identically, had the same heavy infantry role within the legion, and could 
thus be placed anywhere within the three battle lines. The velites, hastati, phncipes, and 
triarii of the Polybian legion which had been the backbone of the republican military 
system, with their distinctive equipment, role and position in the legion, disappeared.'^' In 
their stead stood the standard, heavy infantryman of the cohortal legion. The cohort would 
provide the army's basic tactical formation well into the imperial period. 
The Roman Military System: A Thoroughly Citizen-Militia 
The Citizen and the Obligation to Serve 
The Roman republican army was a citizen-militia: it relied on a part-time citizenry to man 
the legions. Since the establishment of the Republic, for example, citizens had to leave their 
normal vocations to fulfil military obligations: idem bellator, idem agricola, genera tantum 
mutabat armorum; quod usque adeo verum est, ut aranti Quinctio Cincinnato dictaturum 
constet oblatum."^ The military system considered all male citizens, first and foremost, to 
be soldiers: there was an indivisible relationship between citizenship and the obligation to 
perform military service. Even those citizens who could not meet the minimum wealth 
This was the Cimbric War between 113 BC and 101 BC. The Roman military system initially had serious 
difficulty dealing with the massed Cimbric and Teutonic armies; several large Roman armies were decisively 
defeated, with catastrophic manpower losses. As a result, the invasion of Italy became a serious threat that 
eventually required the full resources of the Roman state to overcome (see Chapter Five below). Rosenstein, 
while arguing broadly for a more gradual process of evolution of the army's structure, admits that these 
tactical defeats of the Roman army by the Germanic armies led to the widespread adoption of cohorts 
(Rosenstein, 2010, p. 295). 1 find nothing to contradict this conclusion. 
The homogenisation of function, equipment and place within the legion that necessarily accompanied the 
shift from maniple to cohort as the basic tactical formation, would - 1 argue - have significant implications 
for the relationship between citizen-soldiers and allied soldiers serving with Roman armies, and thus for the 
emergence of soldiers willing to intervene in political discourse. For a detailed discussion of these 
implications, see Chapters Five and Eight below. 
There is a last certain reference to velites in the war against Jugurtha (Sal., lug. 46), although there also 
appears to be a reference to velites in Sulla's army that conducts a battle in the east against Archelaus in 86 
BC (Fron., Str. 2.3). That this was categorically referring to velites is, however, contested; see Sekunda, 2007, 
p. 356.1 share this skepticism, and argue that Frontinus' mention of lightly-armed skirmishers is too scant and 
isolated to support any firm conclusions. They could easily have been allied auxiliary troops. 
Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris 3: "The same man was both soldier and farmer, he changed the type of 
iron implement he carried, the truth of which is confirmed by the instance of Quinctius Cincinnatus who was 
following the plough when they came to offer him the dictatorship." 
qualification of the fifth Servian class were required to defend the state in emergencies, or 
serve in the navy. As I have shown above, the Republic drew upon a steadily increasing 
network of alliances with Italian allies to supply annual consular armies with large 
contributions of infantry and cavalry who were not c i t izens ." ' To serve in a Roman legion 
alongside them, however, a soldier had to be a citizen, and this characteristic could not be 
ignored by the a rmy 's leaders.'^" The fact that soldiers, for example, were also citizens who 
could vote in the comitia centuriata and other assemblies, and thus potentially influence the 
career of a member of the governing elite,'^' acted as a form of influence to restrain risk-
taking and reckless behaviour among army c o m m a n d e r s . C i t i z e n s were theoretically 
eligible for service in consular field armies between the ages of 17 and the functional 
organisation of citizens within the Polybian legion, which was based largely on age and 
experience, however, suggests that republican armies were predominantly made up of 
young men under the age of 30.'^'' The oldest soldiers in a legion of 4,200 men, for 
example, were the 600 triarii of the third battle line; this amounted to just 14 percent of a 
legion's total strength. '^' Older citizens aged up to 60 were normally exempt from service 
in field a r m i e s , a l t h o u g h the universal obligation to defend the state meant they could 
still be armed in emergencies, or man garrisons protecting settlements. During serious 
Gallic incursions, for example, an old republican law had a provision that allowed priests 
and old men, normally exempt from service, to be called u p . ' " After defeat at Lake 
Trasimene in 217 BC during the Second Punic War, the senate feared the Carthaginians 
The crucial advantage that Rome had over her strategic competitors because of her network of alhances 
with the Italian and Latin allies, and thus her access to large pools of Italian manpower to augment her own 
citizen legions, is explored fully in the context of the importance of the allied contribution to the Roman 
military system in Chapter Five below. 
Polybius, in his description of the Roman military system, makes a point of this fact: during the First Punic 
War (264 BC - 241 BC), for example, he reminded his readers that the Romans possessed four legions 
consisting of full citizens, as distinct f rom the contributions to consular armies made by the Italian allies (PIb. 
1.16). 
For the very real limits of that political influence, however, see Chapter Six below. 
Roth, 2007, p. 377. Political influence, limited as it was, could not, however, account for the sheer 
incompetence of army commanders , nor could it limit the effects on the army of destructive competition 
between members of the governing elite (see Chapters Seven and Eight below). 
PIb. 6.19. 
" " On this point, and its relation to the demographic history of Roman Italy, see de Ligt, 2012, pp. 55 f f 
Rosenstein also argues the legions were made up of mostly young men, and points out that most of them 
were probably unmarried (Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 85 and 86). Rosenstein uses this conclusion to support his 
larger argument that military service in the second century BC was easily handled within rural family 
structures, and that extended military service did thus not ruin the small farming class in the second century 
BC (see Chapter Three below). For more discussion on this point, see also de Ligt, 2012, p. 166. 
The 60 age limit for service seems to have survived well into the late Republic; Atticus took advantage of 
it in 49 BC to avoid leaving Rome on service: he had reached 60 years of age (Nep., Att. 7.1). 
A p p . , B C 2 . I 5 0 . 
would march on Rome, and thus repaired walls, and armed old men.'®^ In 171 BC, during 
the careful preparations for the Third Macedonian War, consuls received dispensation to 
recruit veterans up to the age of 50 in the effort to build as much experience as possible into 
the army before confronting the Macedonian phalanx.'^' 
As military service was a primary duty of the citizen,"® the universal obligation of service 
was arguably the one thing which bound together all strata of republican society, except the 
poorest: 
Just as military service was incuinbent upon every male citizen, an obligation 
embedded at the very core of what it meant to be a Roman citizen, so, too, was mihtary 
command simply a facet of political leadership, part of what it meant to be a Roman 
aristocrat and the fruit of electoral success. '" 
I argue that this obligation, and the experience of service in the national army, provided a 
unifying and homogenising influence on the citizenry."^ Military service, for example, 
transcended familial, social or regional differences and loyalties, and replaced them with a 
universal experience. A citizen, once deemed eligible for the army by virtue of his wealth, 
and then allocated a role according to age and experience, could not know who his 
immediate comrades would be: within broad functional classifications, the military system 
acted without regard to regional or social distinctions, and inside the maniples, it mixed up 
the citizenry. The selection process for the legions during the dilectm, for example, was 
specifically designed to even out the distribution of soldiers without respect to their civilian 
status or loyalties: four recruits at a time were brought forward and officers of the different 
legions took sequential turns selecting individuals."' A recruit could thus find himself in 
any of the four legions. In this way, the social, regional or familial obligations that may 
have dominated the civilian lives of recruits, were neutralised, and replaced with a shared 
experience of campaigning in the national army."" This mixing of the citizenry, and the 
concomitant neutralising of social or regional obligations between them, necessitated the 
App. , / / f l«n. I I . 
' ^ 'L iv . 41.33; 42.31. 
" " Erdkamp, 2008, p. 2. 
Rosenstein, 2008, p. 133. On the importance of military service to the political careers of the governing 
elite, see Roth, 2007, pp. 486 and 487. 
For the specific and important effect of homogenisation of military service over time on allied soldiers 
serving in Roman armies, see Chapter Five below. 
PIb. 6.20. 
" " For more on the effect military service had on changing loyalty hierarchies between soldiers, see Chapter 
Five below. 
application of an oath to help bind the recruits to each other, and to the new social order 
and the expectations that existed in the army. The oath required soldiers to pledge to stand 
by each other in battle, to obey their officers, and not to quit the ranks except to seek a 
weapon, strike a foe, or save a comrade."^ I argue that the oath was necessary because of 
the transcendent nature of serving in the national army; having mixed the citizenry, the 
military system could not rely on the regional or social obligations that recruits brought 
with them to keep soldiers faithful to each other in the stress of battle, and so implemented 
an oath to create social bonds and new obligations. 
Discharges and the Civic Nexus 
In theory, republican armies were not permanent:"^ most legions between 200 BC and 150 
BC, for example, were disbanded after only a couple of years' service; with a few notable 
exceptions, such as the Cannae legions," ' or those campaigning in the protracted war in 
Spain,"^ the average second century BC republican legion remained in continuous service 
for 2.5 years . ' " Imperial expansion, wars fought overseas, and longer campaigns, however, 
meant that a few armies remained in service for many years.^"" Instead of standing armies, 
republican legions were enrolled each season for specific campaigns by the consuls and 
their military officers: consuls were then expected to train, lead and supply them. In 
particular, commanders were expected to reward their soldiers.^"' The army, for example, 
expected that it would benefit financially from military service, and that their commander 
would provide opportunities for them to do so, especially as continuous success in wars led 
to increasingly ostentatious and extravagant displays of captured wealth during triumphs. 
Fron., Str. 4.1; Plb. 6. 21. For more on the implications of the mixing of the citizenry by military service, 
see Rosenstein, 2010, pp. 298 and 299. 
" 'Ra thbone , 2007, p. 166. 
" " Liv. 25.5. 
App., Hisp. 45.ff 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 146. During the late Republic, however, the time a legion remained formed varied 
greatly. The legions which L. Valerius Flaccus took with him to Asia in 86 BC during the civil war between 
Sulla and Marius were not discharged for twenty years, while those raised by L. Piso in 58 BC were 
disbanded in 55 BC (Brunt, 1962, p. 75). 
™ For example, at Liv. 40.1. For more on this point, see below. 
Plb. 6.19 f f For a concomitant discussion that argues that Polybius in his description of the dilectus was 
referring to the second stage of recruitment, after the men had been selected - most probably away from 
Rome, given the space limitations inherent in Rome: see de Ligt, 2008, p. 115 ff. For more on the duties and 
expectations placed by society on Roman commanders, especially in regard to their responsibility to 
financially reward soldiers, see Chapter Four below. 
For more on the expectation of financial benefit, the commander's key role, and the scale of wealth 
displayed by a series of triumphs during the second century BC, see Chapter Four below. 
To reinforce the personal nature of the compact between citizens entering military service 
and their general, recruits were sworn in by naming the consul who commanded the army. 
A military tribune, for example, began the oath ceremony referring to the commanding 
consuls: C. Laelii C. fili consults, L. Comelii P. fili consulis in exercitu...^"^ Armies thus 
were closely associated with their commanders, and the state gave them a high degree of 
autonomy;^"'' the military forces available to the Republic in 214 BC included the armies of 
Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus and M. Claudius Marcellus - consuls for that year who 
personally raised, trained and led the legions. 
Conversely, the consul was responsible for disbanding the army, or discharging its 
veterans, if the army stayed in the field for longer periods.'"' There were expectations of 
limited terms of service inherent in the social contract between the state and its citizen-
soldiers. These expectations were deeply embedded in the tradition of the citizen-militia; 
they were present in the army, for example, when it first remained in the field over winter 
in 403 BC. The governing elite was reminded that its soldiers were not slaves, but fellow 
citizens, and expected to be returned to civilian life for part of the year so they could fulfil 
their civic obligations, attend to their farms, and look after families.^"^ The military system 
normally ensured that citizens between the ages of 17 and 46 did not have to do too many 
consecutive years under sacramentum\ the rhythm of service alternated short periods in the 
army with work back on the family farm, or in other employment.^"^ Regular discharges 
were thus a manifestation of the impermanent nature of republican armies, and of the 
expectation of society to return soldiers to the community after they had met their 
obligations. Such discharges remained a feature of republican military service, even in 
times of significant danger to the state. In 210 BC, for example, during the difficult Second 
Punic War, the Republic was careftil not only to ensure that its military dispositions were 
sound, but that eligible veterans were properly discharged. The senate ordered two legions 
protecting Capua to be combined, and veterans with the longest service discharged, while 
^^ ^ Gel. 16.4: "In the army of the consuls Gaius Laelius, son of Gaius, and Lucius Cornelius, son of 
Publius..." 
Roth, 2007, p. 375. 
For example, in 187 BC as at Liv. 38.44. 
™ Liv. 5.2: admoneat collegas liberos et cives eorum, non servos, militare, quos hieme saltern in domos ac 
tecta reduci oporteat et aliquot tempore anni parentes liberosque ac coniuges invisere et usurpare libertatem 
et creare magistratus. On the expectation to be released back into the community, see Rich, 1993, pp. 44 ff 
' " ' D e Ligt,2012,p. 146. 
in Apulia, the commanding consul discharged all his forces except naval c r e w s . I n Sicily, 
praetor P. Cornelius Lentulus disbanded his army when the replacement consul arrived with 
a new one.^®' This compact between the state and citizen-soldier of limited terms of service 
could be broken, however, if it was perceived that soldiers had performed poorly in a battle. 
Soldiers, for example, were blamed for losing the battle of Cannae in 216 BC: its survivors 
were mustered into two legions and sent to Sicily for the duration of the war.^'" They were 
still serving more than a decade later.^" 
Parallels between the citizenry organised for electoral purposes and the assidui arranged in 
their various Servian classes for war helped reinforce the ideology of a citizen-militia, and 
emphasised its nexus with society. The comitia centuriata, for example, comprised all 
citizens, and combined their responsibilities for electing the chief magistrates of the 
Republic^'^ - censors, consuls and praetors - with their organisation for military service.^'^ 
I argue that the combination in a single electoral assembly of military and civic roles gave 
an emphasis to the ideological link between membership of the citizenry and service in the 
army.^'" Republican soldiers were thus drawn from a wide section of society, ensuring that 
martial effectiveness was never confined to a small portion of the citizenry or aristocratic 
elite. The Roman military system, drawing on its own integral strength and that of its 
Italian allies, prevailed over powerful rivals, such as the Carthaginians and Seleucids, who 
used large numbers of mercenaries, and where - as some scholars argue - the link between 
citizenship and military service was not as strong, or had been altered because of the 
reliance on mercenary soldiers.^'' Moreover, 1 argue that the symbiotic relationship 
between citizenship and military service conferred an ideological strength upon the army; it 
enabled soldiers to draw upon the tradition of service deeply ingrained in society, helping 
reinforce the concept of obligation and duty to the state. For citizens fighting for the 
Liv. 26.27. 
Liv. 26.27. 
Liv. 22.61; 23.25; 24.18. In contrast to this punishment, the surviving consul, C. Terentius Varro, was 
thanked by the senate for not losing faith in the state. On the issue of blaming soldiers for defeat where 
religious or ritualistic errors are not considered, see also Rosenstein, 2010, p. 295. 
Liv. 25.5. 
These magistrates, with the exception of the censors, also led the armies into war. 
North, 2006, p.261; Lintott, 1999(a), pp. 55-57. See also Chapter Six below. 
On the nexus between the procedures to marshal the citizen for war and his electoral responsibilities, see 
also Patterson, 1993, pp. 95 ff. 
Such as at Erdkamp, 2008, p. 2; De Ligt, 2008, 114. 
Republic, national defense was a duty, a responsibility and a privilege.^'^ This tradition of 
service helped nurture other republican traits: 
A blind devotion to one 's native land, which may be said to reflect the conservative 
instinct: it is, in a sense, passive, although the individual's subordination to the 
community was carried to a much higher degree in Rome than in other cities.^" 
The purpose of the army was to defend the state, win at war, and extend the ager 
publicus;^^^ a function which was a dominant part of the fabric of the Roman s t a t e . T h e 
army was not expected to involve itself in domestic politics, although by the end of the 
second century BC serving soldiers and veterans found themselves inexorably drawn into 
the civil strife that characterised increasing tensions between ordinary citizens, assertive 
tribunes, and the governing elite.^^" Citizens under sacramentum ostensibly left their civic 
status behind at the pomerium when they enlisted; the army was not expected to have its 
own political agenda. It was inevitable, however, given the close nexus between military 
service, citizenship, and political assemblies such as the comitia centuriata, that the army 
would, on occasion, retain a political conscience. 1 argue that this was the nature of a 
citizen-militia, and this conscience would manifest itself in a surprising record of 
insubordination and mutiny against the state and its elected representatives in civic cause 
during the Republ ic .Moreover , as I have shown above, the citizen-militia at its core was 
not a professional service: despite its centrality to public life, and the importance of war to 
the Roman state, republican citizens did not consider the army a vocation - although 
soldiers still expected to profit from war, and there were examples of citizens who 
- " K e p p i e , 1984, p. 17. 
^"Nicole t , 1980, p. 90. 
Serrati argues for Roman exceptionalism on the nexus of war and the Republic. He contends that warfare 
and the state were intrinsically linked during the Republic; with the possible exception of Sparta, in no other 
society in the ancient world were the two more fundamentally related (Serrati, 2007, p. 482). 
Such was the frequency of war that Oakley suggests the Roman state looked for war when there was none 
(Oakley, 1993, p. 16). This idea was originally articulated in detail in a monograph by William Harris in 1979 
called War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327 BC - 90 BC. A passage from Livy, which if an 
authentic reflection of the Roman attitude toward war, supports Oakley's conclusion, indicates that the state 
expected, even desired, annual warfare. Livy is referring to 303 BC, a year where so far there has been no 
reference to fighting: tamen ne prorsus imbellem agerent annum, parva expeditio in Umbriam facta est, quod 
niintiabatur ex speltmca qtiadam excursiones armatorum in agros fieri (Liv. 10.1). "Nevertheless, that their 
year might not go by without any war whatever, they [the consuls] made a little expedition into Umbria, 
because of a report that armed men issuing from a cave were making raids upon the farms." See also 
Plb.32.14. 
I will argue later that the army and soldiers were at the centre of this violence, and this would have 
significant consequences for the emergence of politically interventionist armies: see Chapters Seven and Eight 
below. 
This would also be significant to the emergence of soldiers willing to intercede in politics; see Chapters 
Six and Eight below. 
considered the army as a type of career.^^^ This fact, however, did not mean that the citizen-
militia was an amateur institution with regard to effectiveness. Constant war against 
competent enemies meant consular armies, especially those which remained together for 
longer periods,^^^ or included a higher proportion of veterans in their ranks,^^" approached 
very high standards of effectiveness and e f f i c i e n c y . T h i s was evident in the military 
system's emphasis on organisation, discipline, punishment and reward, and in its tactical 
habits in the field.^^^ The army's competence was also manifested in its record of success in 
campaigns, as measured by the frequency of triumphs held for victorious generals.^^' 
Between 282 BC and 264 BC, there were 22 triumphs, at least one a year; in the 42 years 
between 264 BC and 222 BC, there were 30 triumphs.^^^ The frequency of triumphs 
continued into the later Republic; there were 16 between 178 BC and 155 BC, and 17 
between 126 BC and 104 BC."^' The republican army may have been a citizen-militia, and 
it may have been defeated on occasion in battle, but from the middle of the third century 
BC onwards, it never lost a war.^'" 
Recruiting from the Countrvside 
Most of the army's recruits during the Republic came from the countryside; there were 
never many recruits from the cities^^' - although there were instances of legions raised 
See Chapters Four and Eight below. 
Such as L. Scipio's army that fought the battle of Zama in Africa against Hannibal in 202 BC during the 
Second Punic War(Plb . 15.10). 
For example, in the army that was carefully prepared for the Third Macedonian War in 171 BC against 
King Perseus (Liv. 42.31). 
Serrati, 2007, p. 484. 
See Chapter Five below. 
The success of Roman arms proved enduring, not just during its conquest of Italy, but also during the later 
Republic. This is reflected in the frequency of triumphs: I argue that this marker of major success in war is a 
reasonably reliable indicator that Roman armies, although a citizen-militia, were frequently successful, and 
enabled the state to expand and consolidate and hold its expanded territories. For more on evidence of the 
standard of Roman armies, and of its professional approach to war, see Chapter Five below. 
Oakley, 1993, p.29. Oakley's study of triumphs is an important contribution to the understanding of 
Roman effectiveness at war; Oakley's work indicates that there was a consistent and sustained record of 
military success throughout the Republic; although battles were lost, campaigns were invariably won. 
Oakley, 1993, pp. 29 f f 
1 refer here to the army's record of strategic success in wars during the second century BC and early first 
century BC. During the second century BC, it suffered setbacks and defeats (the catastrophic losses at Arausio 
in 105 BC against the invading Germanic tribesmen come to mind), but invariably won the war: the series of 
campaigns against Macedon, for example, and the wars in Spain, Africa and in the first century BC, the Social 
War. On this point, see de Ligt, 2008, p. 114. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 16; Brunt, 1988, pp. 253 ff; Crawford, 1978, p. 37. Crawford argues that farmers made 
up the majority of the citizen electorate; it was, he asserts, a community of fi-eeholders, for whom military 
service was as central an element of the citizenship as voting in the assembly. 
from urban populations, especially during periods of crisis. Two city legions, for example, 
were raised in 210 BC at the height of the difficult Second Punic War."^ For the most part, 
however, the military system relied on citizen and Italian small freeholders to supply the 
bulk of the manpower for the citizen-militia. The traditional link between the army and 
farmers was believed to go back to Rome's semi-mythical past. The dictator, for example, 
of 458 BC, L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, was said to have been called from the plough on his 
farm to rescue the army trapped by the Aequi, to win a major victory, and to celebrate a 
triumph.^" 
This relationship between army and countryside continued to dominate the demographic 
makeup of the citizen-militia for most of the Republic; the evidence for this conclusion is 
extensive. At Veii in 403 BC, for example, the army was filled with soldiers who normally 
spent half the year farming their own lands. During the First Punic War in 262 BC, 
knowledge of farming enabled the army investing the Sicilian city of Agrigentum to harvest 
the local grain crop to supplement their supplies; I suggest that it was thus composed of 
primarily of citizen-farmers."^ After the Second Punic War in 201 BC, the state, on one of 
the rare occasions it directly assisted veterans financially to resettle into civilian life,^' ' 
made the first of two large-scale viritane distributions for the Afi-ican veterans of P. 
Cornelius Scipio Africanus in southern Italy from the ager publicus in Samnium and 
Apulia.^^' In 199 BC, another large-scale land allocation was made to veterans from Spain, 
Sardinia and Africa;"^^ it is estimated that up to 40,000 veterans subsequently received plots 
of land from these state initiatives.^'' 1 argue that these soldiers were farmers, or had 
knowledge of farming; otherwise, the gesture of allocating land to help them readjust to 
civilian life after discharge did not make sense. The career soldier, Spurius Ligustinus, who 
Liv. 26.29. 
Liv. 3.26; D.H. 10.23. 
Liv. 5.4: "Former ly , the soldier was angry that he had to serve the state at his own cost; yet he was happy 
to be able, for half of the year, to till his own field and gain the means of keeping himself and his family, 
whether he were at home or with the army." 
^^^Plb. 1.17. 
^^ ^ It may have been the extraordinary circumstances of the long and difficult Second Punic War, and an 
acknowledgement that these circumstances had strained the normal social compact between soldier and state 
which governed military service, that prompted the Republic to take on the task of providing for veterans after 
discharge, an area normally left to the commanding general, and to the civilian vocation of the citizen-soldiers 
(for more on the pecuniary obligations of republican commanders to provide opportunities for their men to 
benefit economical ly f rom war, see Chapter Four below). 
Liv. 31.4; 31.49. 
Liv. 32.1, 
- " D e Ligt, 2012, p. 151. 
had amassed more than 20 years continuous service by 171 BC, was from a small Sabine 
farm.^''° Moreover, Roman and Italian veterans from the land, or with rural interests, were 
at the centre of the conflict which accompanied the passage of the agrarian bill of Ti. 
Sempronius Gracchus in 133 BC?"' I argue that soldiers and veterans were among those 
who came in from the fields to support the struggle against urban opposition to pass the 
legislation, and subsequently fought for his re-election in the violence that followed.^'*^ 
Moreover, in 129 BC, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus advocated in the senate 
for the land grievances of his former Italian veterans living in the countryside, or with rural 
interests, because they had made such good soldiers.^''^ 
Pressures of Service 
Reliance on predominantly rural recruits, however, with their own agricultural obligations, 
meant that the use of the citizen-militia on campaign was initially seasonal, and aligned 
closely with the agricultural cycles of the land?'''* Winter, especially when wars were 
™ Liv. 42.43. It has to be acknowledged that there is a question over Ligustinus' historicity (for example, 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 18); it always remains possible that he is a fictional character - although there is also 
nothing categorically to suggest this. In the end, however, his presence in literary record indicates, as 
Keaveney puts it, that the Romans could easily imagine a character such as Ligustinus existing, and his 
circumstances, including his poverty, rural origins, and career of extensive soldiering, as plausible (Keaveney, 
2007, p. 18). For this reason, I argue that Ligustinus's example remains credible. 
The legislative package included, for example, a provision which reduced the time required for military 
service (Plut., TG. 16). Moreover, the supposed decline of the population of citizen and Italian small 
freeholders in the 130s, as it adversely affected the ability of the army to man its legions, was the fundamental 
background against which was framed the legislative agenda of Ti. Gracchus and his agrarian reforms (Plut., 
TG. 9; also see Chapter Seven below). For a recent discussion of the various modem archaeological surveys 
which attempt to provide an archaeological foundation for the Gracchan land crisis as preserved in the literary 
tradition, and a discussion of the implications of their findings for the demographic history of ancient Italy, as 
well as the methodological problems associated with these surveys, see de Ligt's extensive analysis (de Ligt, 
2012, pp. 177 fO-
App., BC. 1.10.ff; 1.14. For more on the argument for involvement of soldiers and the army in the political 
violence of the late Republic leading up to the Social War and Sulla's march on Rome in 88 BC, and its 
important implications for the emergence of politically interventionist armies, see Chapters Seven and Eight 
below. 
App., BC. 1.19. 
™ Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 26 ff. The Mediterranean agricultural cycle saw farmers sowing their crops in 
autumn and harvesting them early next summer, after which, for the remainder of the long summer, little 
agricultural work was done until it was time to prepare the fields in autumn for next summer's crops again. 
These arable crops, argues Rosenstein, were the main target of an aggressor's attack in Mediterranean 
warfare; invading armies destroyed the enemy's means of sustenance and compelled them to come out from 
behind city walls to fight. States such as Rome using farmer-soldiers integrated military service into this 
schedule by ensuring they campaigned when the grain in the enemy's fields was ready to be harvested in late 
spring or early summer, but not collected and stored away out of reach. As a result, argues Rosenstein, 
campaigns were generally brief because provisioning the invading army became problematic after four or five 
weeks, even if the soldiers were living off the land and harvesting the enemy's crops. Moreover, the fact that 
fought close to Rome, provided a natural terminus to the campaigning season - and an 
opportunity to discharge soldiers.^"*^ At Veii in 403 BC, for example, the expectation 
among soldiers of the length of their obligation to serve matched the seasonal cycle: army 
leaders had an obligation to return them to their farms before the onset of winter.^'*^ By the 
middle Republic,^'" however, Rome had broken any link that persisted between agricultural 
seasons, the use of the army, and the length of c a m p a i g n s . T h i s occurred because of the 
imperatives of expanding empire; as Rome expanded first into Italy, and then overseas, 
campaigns were conducted further away from Rome, and the length of service expected of 
ordinary citizens concomitantly increased.^'" These pressures were evident by the end of 
the fifth century from this point on, armies could be kept in the field for longer, and 
serve in places fijrther away?^' In 264 BC, at the start of the First Punic War, the Roman 
military system sent armies overseas for the first time to Sicily against the Carthaginians;^^^ 
they were kept in the field conducting sieges for long periods.^" The Second Punic War 
with Carthage^''* exacerbated the pressure on conditions of service for ordinary citizens. 
attackers were also farmers restricted the duration of warfare, for their own crops might be ready to harvest at 
the same time the enemy's were ripening. 
This was especially the case when enemies were close and logistics systems undeveloped. As well as the 
citizen-soldiers, invaders also needed to prepare and sow their own fields in autumn before winter rains and 
cold restricted movement. On the dependence of early Roman armies to the agricultural cycle, see also Rich, 
1993, pp. 44 ff. He argues, for example, that for the period to 264 BC, when the Romans' military activity 
was confined to Italy, their warfare had an annual rhythm. For the most part it was restricted to the summer 
campaigning season. An army was levied, marched out to fight for a few months, and then returned to be 
discharged. 
™ Liv. 5.2. 
This was certainly the case by the start of the Second Punic War in 218 BC, and probably by the end of the 
First Punic War in the middle of the third century BC, when Rome had to support overseas armies for the first 
time. 
™ Having said this, winter cold still retain the ability to halt fighting. Liv. 22.32; Cum ad Gereonium iam 
hieme impediente constitisset helium, NeapolUani legali Romam venere. "Winter had already brought the 
fighting about Gereonium to a standstill when the envoys of Neapolis arrived in Rome." This passage referred 
to fighting between the Roman and Carthaginian forces in 217 BC during Hannibal's invasion of Italy. 
-" 'Keppie , 1984, pp. 51-52. 
Liv. 5.2. At Veii in 403 BC: cum spes maior imperatoribus Romanis in obsidione quam in oppugnatione 
esset. hibernacula etiam, res nova militia Romano, aedificari coepta, consiliumque era! hiemando continuare 
bellum. "As the Roman generals hoped more from a siege than from an assault, they even began the erection 
of winter quarters, a new thing to the soldier of Rome, and planned to carry the campaign on straight through 
the winter." 
For example, the consuls for 335 BC, 334 BC and 333 BC took over legions in the field from their 
predecessors. This suggests that the legions had spent the winter under arms and had not disbanded at the end 
of summer (Liv. 16.6). The consuls for 316 BC through to 313 BC, and again in 310 BC, during the Third 
Samnite War, did the same (Liv. 9.22). 
Rib. 1.12. 
The siege of Agrigentum in Sicily, for example, began in June 262 BC and concluded in January 261 BC, 
when the consuls retired with their legions to Messana for the winter (PIb. 1.17-20). For a further discussion 
on the instances of Roman armies remaining in the field over winter, see Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 31 -45. 
218 BC-202 BC (Roth, 2009, p. 268). 
The war, for example, expanded into Spain and Africa, and legions served at unprecedented 
distances and for increasing periods of time,^'^ placing communities under particular strain: 
Fremitus enim inter Latinos sociosque in conciliis onus, decimum annum dilectibus, 
stipendiis se exhaustos esse; quotannis ferme clade magna pugnare; alios in acie 
occidi, alios morbo absumi; magis perire sibi civem qui ab Romano miles lectus sit 
quam qui ab Poeno captus: quippe ab hoste gratis remitti in patriam, ab Romanis extra 
Italiam in exsilium verius quam in militiam ablegari... Si veteres milites non redeant in 
patriam, novi legantur, brevi neminem superfuturum. 
By the second century BC, wars were thus habitually fought overseas; as I have shown, 
discharges occurred and armies were disbanded, but the link between seasonal cycles and 
the use of the army was by that time a distant memory. The more unpopular campaigns, 
such as the drawn-out and unprofitable struggle in Spain in the 150s, could also become 
significant sources of friction between ordinary citizens and the governing elite.^" 
Conditions of service now bore little resemblance to the original compact evident outside 
Veii: no recruit could be sure for how long he would serve, and where he would serve.^^^ 
Second Century BC 'Agrarian Crisis'? 
These pressures, the growth of empire, and the concomitant influx of slaves into Italy in the 
late 3"* century BC due to a series of successful wars starting with the Second Punic War, 
have been conventionally held to have had severe implications for the legions' rural 
recruiting grounds, particularly for the free small-farm holder who was the mainstay of the 
Roman military system. The conventional view takes its lead in large part from the sources; 
Appian in his explanation for the Gracchan land reforms leading up to 133 BC cites the 
practice of the rich buying up uncultivated land to set up large estates run by slaves,^'' and, 
Although, as 1 have pointed out above, regular discharges of veterans were made during this period, 
helping alleviate the pressure of service. 
^^ ^ Liv. 27.9: "At local meetings of Latins and allies complaints began to be heard: for the tenth year now 
levies of money and men had been draining them dry; almost every year they suffered a grave defeat; some 
were killed in battle, others killed by disease. The townsman who was drafted into the Roman army were 
more completely lost to them than prisoners of war in Carthaginian hands; for the enemy sent prisoners home 
without a ransom, but the Romans dragged them off to fight outside Italy in what was more like exile than 
war. If veterans did not come home and new ones conscripted, soon there would be no one left." 
App., Hisp. 45 ff; Liv., Per. 48. 
The most striking difference between war in the late Republic and that of earlier times was multiple 
theatres of war (Adams, 2007, p. 199). 
Latifundia. 
as a result, many poor farmers were bought out or driven off their holdings.^'" The result -
by the second half of the second century BC - was a crisis on the land: de-population and a 
shortage of free military-aged men for the army, many of whom were now landless, 
destitute, and worn out by military service supporting an expanding empire outside Italy.^" 
According to the sources, it was for this reason - to counter the effects of the large slave-
run estates that were ruining the traditional small farm-holder and to restore the recruitment 
base for the army - that Ti. Gracchus launched his controversial programme of agrarian 
reform returning land to the rural poor?'^ 
The narrative found in the sources of the delitorious effects of expanding empire became 
important in modem scholarship as part of the broader conventional hypothesis for a 
breakdown in concensus between the governing elite and ordinary citizens, and for the 
supposed rise in the numbers of rural poor which fed into the 'mercenary' army which 
made the decline and eventual fall of the Republic possible?" Scullard, for example, 
believed that slave labour fuelled the growth of the plantation system in the second century 
BC, and supplanted the free farmers who were increasingly called away to serve in the 
army.^®" Brunt goes further, and places the cause of insurrection against the Republic firmly 
in the impoverishment of large numbers of rural poor in Italy by 133 BC,^" while Gabba 
argues the needs of expanding empire were incompatible with traditional notions of 
military service under the Republic, and led to an impoverishment of the rural recruiting 
base and a 'proletisation' of the army by the end of the second century BC.^ ®^ Hopkins, a 
strong proponent of the expansion of slavery in Italy after the Second Punic War, argues 
that the wars of the early second century BC, especially the Hellenistic wars, generated 
enormous riches and war indemnities for the Republic, much of which found its way into 
the pockets of the rich who then used it to buy up Italian land. Since most of this land was 
App., BC. 1.7-8. See also Plut., TO. 8. In these sources, we are told that the owners of these large estates 
preferred slaves to free men to run and work on them because free men were liable for army service, and thus 
would be absent for periods of time, while slaves were not. 
Of course, it follows that if a free farmer is forced from his land, he then is likely to fall below the 
minimum property qualification needed to serve in the legions. This is how the decline of free farmers could 
lead to a manpower shortage; the farmers are still physically there in most cases, but they are no longer 
eligible for the army. 
App. ,BC. 1.9.; Plut., TO. 9. 
See Chapter Three below for more detail on this perspective. 
Scullard, 2013, p. 322. 
Brunt, 1988, pp. 73, 246. See Chapter Three below for a more detailed explanation of Brunt 's view, and its 
nexus with the conventional explanation for insurrection. 
Gabba, 1976, pp. 23, 37 f f See Chapter Three below. 
previously fanned by small free-holders, the result was a growth of the slave run esdtates, 
and a decline of small Italian farmers.^^' Moreover, in an influential article re-appraising 
the effects of the Second Punic War on Italy, Cornell characterises the growth of large 
landed estates and the rise of a slave economy in the Republic as products of Roman 
imperialism, and argues the decline of the free small farm holder in Italy can be found as 
early as the middle of the third century BC.^''^ But according to Cornell, it was the large-
scale devestation of much of southern and central Italy during the Second Punic War^"' 
which intensified and accelerated the decline of the farming population; the conditions 
which drove susbsitence farmers off the land, however, benefitted the rich and powerful: 
It was a different matter, however, for large landowners whose aim was to produce a 
surplus for sale in the market. Such people had the necessary capital resources to 
recover quickly from the temporary setback of a visitation by the enemy; they were 
able to use slave labour, and even in times of real danger they could hire the services of 
men reduced to desperation by poverty and hunger. Inevitably this situation gave the 
larger landowners an incentive to increase the size of their estates, at a time when the 
poor were being forced to relinquish or abandon their holdings."™ 
Cornell argues that, combined with the demand of land from rich investors and the plenty 
availability of slave labour, subsistence fanners and their families could not cope with the 
with the pressures of military service in the new empire, and this generational crisis formed 
the backdrop leading up to the Gracchan agrarian reforms in 133 BC.^" More recently, 
Martin has re-emphasised Cornell's themes: he cites the occupation and use for private gain 
of Roman public land in Italy by rich landowners and increasing debt - along with the 
growth of latifundia - as the reason for the displacement and decline of Italy's small 
- " H o p k i n s , 1978, pp. 23 f f 
Cornell, 1996, p. 98. Cornell cites the enslavement of 25,000 inhabitants of Agrigentum in 262 BC (Plb. 
1.29.) by the Roman army during the First Punic War to show that slaves had started flowing back into Italy 
well before the start of the second century BC. The First Punic War probably netted Rome more than 70,000 
slaves, the sale of which earned the Roman treasury around 15 million denarii (Scullard, 2013, p. 322). 
For 15 years (218 BC to 203 BC), the primary areas where the armies of Rome and Hannibal were located. 
Raiding, devestation and systematic devestation of supplies and farm land were routinely carried out by both 
sides (Cornell, 1996, p. 101). The effects were accentuated by the 'scorched earth' policy of the Romans 
(esp., F. Cunctator) which was in place by 217 BC (Liv. 22.11.), and which involved removing the farming 
population to safety, and destroying all supplies, crops, and buildings in the path of the Punic armies. 
™ Cornell, 1996, p. 109. 
Cornell, 1996, pp. 110-111. The reason, according to Cornell, as to why the agrarian crisis took a 
generation to come to a head in the later half of the Second Century BC was because there had been land 
taken in the Second Punic War from rebellious allies and in Cisapline Gual to allocate to ruined farmers, and 
this helped soften the effects of the war in Italy. But after 177 BC, the available land largely ran out, and the 
effects were disastrous, leading eventually to a build up of social pressure that, by 133 BC, had reached the 
point where it could no longer be ignored (Cornell, 1996, pp. 111 f f ) . 
farmers.^'^ Meanwhile, Southern argues that many of the soldiers disposed by the large 
slave-run estates and their families either migrated to the provinces or joined the urban poor 
in Rome; their plight became the perennial feature of the political programmes of the late 
second century BC reformers?^' 
This traditional narrative, however, of an agrarian crisis^^" in Italy in the final decades of 
the second century BC leading to a manpower shortage for the army - and of unsustainable 
pressures on rural families caused by military service - is contested. Rich, for example, 
disagrees with the manpower shortage argument, pointing out that although there was a 
slight demographic decline observable in census figures by the middle of the second 
century BC, this has to be set against the much faster decline in the average number of 
legions required after the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War.^' ' Thus, according to 
Rich, there was no manpower shortage, and the Gracchan land reforms were instead not 
meant to solve a recruitment problem, rather deal with a more vague concern over the slow 
contraction of the free Italian population. Adams contests the basic assumption of an 
economic decline of the small landholding class, arguing that the narrative of agricultural 
decline has been much exaggerated, and that any damage done to land and its farmers was 
not irretrievable.^'^ Rosenstein also delinks the Gracchan agrarian programe from a crisis in 
manpower for the army. In a variation of Cornell's argument about a shortage of available 
land for re-settlement of destitute farmers,^' ' Rosenstein argues that there was simply was 
not enough land available by 133 BC to satisfy the needs of a high birth rate, and Gracchus 
applied the wrong remedy.^'^ In de Ligt's view, the challenge to the conventional 
interpretation is convincing enough "to the extent that it has become difficult to explain the 
" - M a r t i n , 212, pp. 84-85 ff. 
Southern, 2007, pp. 54-55, 
™ Cornell makes a distinction between 'an agricultrural crisis' and 'an agrarian crisis' (Cornell, 1996, p. 
109). According to Cornell, there was no crisis of Italian agriculture; the large slave owned estates flourished, 
the land continued to be productive, and the devastation and depopulation of southern and central Italy caused 
by the Second Punic War may have actually helped the land recover its fertility by thinning out the farming 
population. It is a persuasive point. 
Rich, 1983, pp. 287 f f 
Adams, 2007, pp. 204-225. For an argument in support of the ability of the land to recover quickly from 
deprevations and devestation caused by warring armies, see Cornell (Cornell, 1996, pp. 109 f f ) . Cornell 
makes this distinction to argue that there was no agricultural crisis of the land per se, but an agrarian crisis 
(see note above). 
" ' C o r n e l l , 1996, pp. 111-112. 
" ' R o s e n s t e i n , 2004, p. 169. 
Gracchan land reforms as an attempt to alleviate the immediate shortage of recuitable 
citizens.^'' 
Yet another challenge to the conventional view has come from specialists in Italian survey 
archaeology and archeolgical evidence on settlement patterns in Italy which seems to show 
not a profusion of large estates, but rather traces of numerous small farms, and of 
unprecedented density, dating to the second century BC.^*" The archeolgical evidence itself, 
however, has been questioned; much of what was originally dated to the end of the second 
century BC may in fact be much older, originating from before the start of the Second 
Punic War?^' Cornell, in an early attack on the veracity of the archeological evidence, 
argued that the archeologoical evidence, patchy and confused as it is, is too partial and too 
enigmatic to have any serious bearing on the question of changing patterns of land tenure in 
the second century BC.'^^ 
Many scholars have now also argued that the Roman military system was probably able to 
effectively manage the pressures of a growing empire, and contest the traditional narrative: 
it could secure an empire while limiting the damage done to society by changed conditions 
of service. It was able to do so partly because of the natural flexibility inherent in rural 
communities to accommodate relatively easily the absence of a male family member in 
service for longer periods. The major challenge to the theory of military service as an 
unsustainable pressure on rural families has come from Rosenstein; he highlighted the 
weakness of the conventional argument by pointing out that Roman armies began to 
campaign beyond the end of summer - the traditional end of the campaigning season -
from as early as the second half of the fourth century BC, and that rural families were well 
De Ligt, 2008, p. 119. De Ligt, in his 2012 mongraph on the deomographic trends of ancient Italy, points 
to a significant rise in census figures in 125/124 BC (i.e.; the majority of which reflect numbers of citizens 
eleigible for army service, and which also presumably largely reflects the rural population) to undermine the 
conventional theory of rural population decline (De Ligt, 2012, pp. 164, 167 f f ) . Of course, as 1 argue in 
Chapter Four below, this could also plausibly be a reflection of the artificial lowering of the minimum 
property qualification which admitted large numbers of previously ineligible poor into the lowest qualification 
band - as easily as it could be a refiection of a strong rural population. Thus, in my view, the meaning of these 
census figures are not conclusive, and must remain contested. 
Rathbone, 2007, p. 179. If this record is accurate (see below note), then it suggests that the growth of large 
slave run estates did not really get started untiul the early decades of the first century BC, undermining the 
'agrarian crisis' argument. 
De Ligt, 2008, p.l 19. De Ligt, a specialist in ancient Italian demography, has flagged a more extensive 
analysis of the archeological evidence in a forthcoming publication. For now, archeolgical evidence, and its 
bearing on the subject, remains inconclusive. 
Cornell, 1996, p. 110. 
placed to deal with the absence of family members on service.^^^ Other scholars have built 
on this theme: Keaveney, for example, argues that irrespective of whether they were male 
or female, family members could work the farm and ensure its survival.^®" De Ligt agrees: 
when soldiers had a family, there was a good chance that it was an extended family, 
working a limited amount of land; this made the absence of a soldier away on service for an 
extended period much easier to sustain 
There are also some grounds for thinking that many rural households were perfectly 
capable of dealing with the negative consequences of heavy recruitment and high 
casualty rates. It has been pointed out, for instance, that much of the productive work 
normally carried out by men could equally well have been done by women, many of 
whom are likely to have become the de facto heads of their households during the 
absence of their husband or sons. Moreover, many rural households are likely to have 
contained an extended multi-generational family or two co-resident nuclear families. 
Such households would have been in a good position to adjust to temporary or 
permanent changes in their manpower."*' 
If this thesis is accurate, then it made it possible for the governing elite to extend the service 
of armies without impoverishing rural society, or unduly damaging key social institutions, 
like the family. Moreover, most recruits were younger men:^^' they left behind families 
which could do the necessary work to ensure a farm's survival. If the soldier on extended 
service was an older man with a family to support,"^^ he was concomitantly more likely to 
survive, and thus continue to send money home to support the farm, and eventually return 
home himself The Roman military system, for example, minimised a man's involvement in 
battle when he was most likely to be married and have a family to support.^^' The oldest 
men in the legion were triarii, placed in the third battle line,^'" and thus rarely used: as a 
result, they sustained far fewer casualties on average than the younger velites, hastati or 
Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 26-52. 
™ Keaveney, 2007, p. 16. 
Ligt, 2012, pp. 1 6 6 f f 
- ' ' D e Ligt, 2008, p. 121. 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 145. De Ligt points out that Roman women generally married before 20 years of age, 
while most men married in their late twenties. Most soldiers were thus probably unmarried, with no families 
to support. 
If we can believe the rhetoric placed into the speeches of generals, such as P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, 
many soldiers in mid Republican armies, especially during the Second Punic War, had wives and children to 
support (Liv. 28.28; 30.32). This is, in my view, plausible: a big, protracted conflict, such as the Second Punic 
War, necessitated a wide selection of recruits to man the numbers of legions in the field; it was inevitable that 
there were many married citizens among them. 
Rosenstein, 2004, p. 85. 
PIb. 6.22, 23. 
principes}^^ Even if the farm fell into ruin, booty and donatives could be used to make 
repairs or buy a new farm; as the empire expanded, soldiers were required to serve for 
longer, but, at the same time, the expanding empire also increased opportunities for 
ordinary soldiers to profit from war."^ 
In the end, and contested as it is, the question of whether there was a significant decline of 
the traditional recruitment base among small free-holders in the second half of the second 
century BC - and a concomitant rise in the numbers of rural poor - remains inconclusive. 
To quote de Ligt: "The idea that the Gracchi tried to solve an acute manpower crisis has 
lost much of its appeal; the basic assumption that the free citizen population was in decline 
remains very much on the table."^'^ This does not, however, present an insuperable obstacle 
for the objectives of this thesis. The critical issue that needs to be addressed as far as this 
study is concerned is not whether the numbers of rural poor rose or fell for whatever 
reason, or even that there was a supposed 'agrarian crisis' in Italy; after all, there were 
always going to be large numbers of poor and destitute present in Roman and Italian rural 
and urban societies at any point along their historical timelines. Instead, the more relevant 
point that must be addressed is that the previously ineligible poor were supposedly admitted 
into army service at the end of the second century BC, where they previously had been 
barred from legionary service; an event of far greater import to this study, and one which 
has traditionally been linked to the 107 BC recruitment reform of C. Marius - and which, 
even today, is conventionally held to have changed the demographic makeup of the army, 
and, in turn, introduced a fatal mercenary motive into military service. This question will 
thus be addressed in detail below in Chapters Three and Four. 
The triarii were also exempt from some of the more mundane tasks associated with estabhshing and 
managing a marching camp. For example, they did not have to provide men to guard or wait upon the military 
tribunes in camp (PIb. 6.33). This concession may have been an acknowledgement of the dignitas of an older 
man in service; such tasks could be perceived as more servile. 
Nevertheless, the challenges faced by rural societies in adjusting to changed conditions of service, such as 
the length of campaigns, should not be underestimated. As I have shown above, it was certainly possible to 
accommodate the changes, but the transition would have been difficult. Rosenstein: "The difficulties among 
the soldiers in making the transition from brief campaigns to conducting a long drawn-out struggle would 
hardly be surprising. Without much prior experience in conducting operations of this type, problems were 
bound to arise as men sought to reconcile their agricultural responsibilities with the longer terms of service 
that the city was now asking of them" (Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 54-55). For fijrther discussion on how much 
soldiers profited from war in the second century BC, see Chapter Four below. 
- ' ' D e Ligt, 2008, p. 119. 
Supplying the Army 
The hnk between seasons and the length of campaigns was also broken because the 
Romans established a sophisticated system of logistics to supply field armies with the 
necessary provisions. Understanding this system is important to the question of the 
emergence of politically interventionist soldiers: if an army wanted to support an 
insurrectionist general, such as Sulla or Marius, it necessarily placed itself outside state 
support. This could be a crucial limitation on the ability of an army to rebel; who paid for 
its insubordination? Fortunately for insurrectionist generals, and armies that wanted to 
support them, there was a high degree of independence and flexibility built into the 
logistics system that meant armies could, and often did, operate outside state support. This 
helped establish the necessary pre-conditions for Sulla's insurrection in 88 BC. The 
emergence of a flexible and independent logistics system was an accident of imperial 
expansion: an effective way of supplying armies was an imperative of this expansion. 
Without it, Rome could not maintain armies further afield. As a result, it was established 
early; during the Samnite war in 320 BC, for example, there was an overland supply system 
in place.^'" By the end of the third century BC, armies were operating in Spain and Africa; 
to supply them, the Republic operated a sophisticated and effective supply chain, with 
supply depots and magazines.^'^ At the start of the Second Punic War in 218 BC, there was 
overland supply route in Cisalpine Gaul supplying armies operating against Hannibal, with 
a major depot at Clastidium: ad Clastidium vicum, quo magnum frumenti numerum 
congesserant Romani..?'^^ The Roman logistics system worked not only in the alpine 
regions close to Rome, but also in barren terrain far from Italy: it sustained, for example, an 
army besieging Thala for 40 days in the north African desert.^" 
Liv.9.13: turn quoque profetos inde ad Luceriam, iuxta obsidentes obsessosque, inopia vexavit. Omnia ab 
Arpis Romanis suppeditabantur, ceterum adeo exigue ut mililia occupalo stationibus vigiliisque et opera 
eques folHculis in castra ad Arpis frumentum veheret. interdum occurso hostiiim cogeretur abiecto ex equo 
frumento pugnare. "As it was, when they arrived in the vicinity of Luceria, besiegers and besieged alike 
suffered from scarcity of food: everything was carried up from Arpi for the Romans, but so precarious were 
their supplies, that while the foot-soldiers were busy with outpost-duty, guard-mounting, and entrenching, the 
cavalry brought up grain for them from Arpi in leather pouches, and now and then, encountering the enemy, 
were forced to jettison the grain from their horses and fight." 
Roth, 2007, p. 387. 
Liv. 21.48: "In Clastidium village, where the Romans had amassed a large amount of grain..." It was, 
however, captured by Hannibal and largely met his own supply shortages during the descent into Italy. 
Sal., fag. 75, 
The state's role in keeping its armies supplied varied:^'^ it could provide money to the 
army,^" send grain shipments,'"® or dispatch diplomatic missions to arrange supplies.'"' 
The state, however, did not normally play a major role in supplying consular armies:'"^ that 
responsibility rested primarily with commanders. '" ' As Roman hegemony expanded, 
distances between Italy and its armies grew; it made sense to allow commanders to procure 
their own supplies, and the state ceded to them considerable authority to fulfil this essential 
administrative task. There were many ways a commander could do this: he could use 
plunder to finance the army,'"'' or requisition supplies from local merchants.'"^ The 
commander could also let contracts to specialist Roman or Italian civilians to supply his 
army. This was a common method of meeting the victual needs of armies,'"^ and the 
contracts were lucrative: the publicani,^"^ who provided specialist supply services to the 
army, subsequently became a prominent class of wealthy businessmen.'"^ Alternatively, 
allies could donate supplies directly to armies in the field,'"' or armies themselves live off 
the land for short periods of time, harvesting ripening crops in the surrounding 
countryside,"" as both the Italian and Roman armies opposing each other in 89 BC during 
Polybius believed the state's direct role in supply amiies was critical: in his analysis of the Roman 
constitution, he concluded that consuls and their legions were completely dependent on the state for supplies 
(Plb. 6.15 ). I argue, however, that he overstated the role of the state, and the army's logistical dependency on 
Rome; as 1 show above, the army could operate without direct state support. He may have accentuated the 
dependency of consuls and armies on the state to support his broader point in his favourable critique of the 
Roman system of checks and balances in government. 
" " For example, Liv. 5.12. 
Plb. 1.52. For other examples of the state sending grain to the army, see Liv. 27.3; 36.2; 37.50; 42.31. 
Plb. 9.11. 
Serrati, 2007, p. 489. 
" " E r d k a m p , 1995, p. 188. 
™ Sulla did this in Greece (Plut., Sull. 12). 
P. Scipio used local merchants in 205 BC when he requisitioned grain fi-om Sicilian towns during 
preparations for African expedition against Carthage during the Second Punic War (Liv. 29.1). Other 
examples, primarily involving commanders purchasing grain for their late-republican armies, are at App., BC 
4 .108andPlu t . , Caei . 41.3. 
For example, they were transporting supplies to the army during the Second Punic War (Liv. 23.48,49; Liv 
25.3). They also extended their services to collect taxes in the provinces by the second century BC (Liv. 34.9). 
" " P l b . 6.17. 
" " Serrati, 2007, p. 489. 
" " Plb. 1.16; Liv. 22.37. The Syracusan king, Hiero 11, did this in Sicily during the First Punic War for Roman 
armies campaigning there against the Carthaginians. Another example on Sicily during the First Punic War 
was the effort made by the Romans' Sicilian allies to collect supplies and materials for the besieging legions 
and deposit them at a nearby supply depot at Herbesus, where the supply chain could then move them to the 
camp (Plb. 1.18). 
" » P l b . 1.17. 
t h e Socia l W a r a t t e m p t e d to d o . ^ " N e a r b y ci t ies cou ld a l so b e th rea t ened and coe rced to 
p r o v i d e suppl ies : 
One of the easiest ways for the Romans to acquire grain for their armies was to extract 
contributions from other states. The distinction between regular aid by allied states and 
ad hoc contributions, which were enforced by the presence of the Roman armies, will 
in some cases have been subtle."^'^ 
A r m i e s cou ld a l so su rv ive o f f la rge supp ly depo t s cap tu red f r o m the e n e m y . ' ' ' M u c h m o r e 
rare ly , a genera l cou ld b e o f f e r e d m o n e y by his o w n t roops to finance a c a m p a i g n . " ' ' N o n e 
o f t he se m e t h o d s necessa r i ly invo lved the s tate: the i r imp lemen ta t i on d id not r equ i re central 
d i rec t ion or la rge bu reauc ra t i c o v e r h e a d s , " ' and the c o m m a n d i n g genera l cou ld u s e h i s 
i n i t i a t i v e . ' " W h i l e d i rec t state he lp u n d o u b t e d l y m a d e the admin i s t r a t ive task o f 
c o m m a n d e r s e a s i e r , " ^ the a b s e n c e o f cen t ra l ly -p rov ided mater ia l suppor t or f u n d s w a s not 
au toma t i ca l l y a c r ipp l ing i m p e d i m e n t to c a m p a i g n i n g a rmies : wi thou t it, as I h a v e s h o w n , 
they cou ld su rv ive b y finding a l te rna t ive m e a n s . 
P a v i n g the A r m v 
R o m a n so ld ie rs and their I tal ian coun te rpa r t s se rv ing in consu la r a r m i e s rece ived a 
stipendiunr. t hey m i g h t se rve f r o m a sense o f c iv ic or t reaty ob l iga t ion , bu t t hey still 
e x p e c t e d to b e pa id . T h e stipendium w a s in t roduced ear ly in the evo lu t ion o f the c i t izen-
Diod. 37.24. The question of which army would harvest the ripening grain during harvest time was the 
cause, on several occasions, of heavy fighting. 
"^Erdkamp, 1995, p. 74. 
The army supplied its need in this manner at Acerrae in 222 BC when it captured large stocks of grain in 
the northern Italian alpine region, fighting Gauls (Plb. 2.34). P. Scipio also supplied his army in this manner 
in 209 BC when he captured New Carthage in Spain: he captured 400,000 modii of wheat, 207,000 of barley, 
18,300 Roman pounds of silver coin and bullion, and sixty-three cargo vessels loaded with supplies of every 
description (Liv. 26.47). 
Sulla benefited from this type of generosity when he began the campaign to re-take Italy during the civil 
war with Marius: his soldiers saw he needed money to finance the campaign, and offered it to him, each 
soldier providing what he could (Plut., SuU .27). 
To handle procurement and logistics within the army, a formal position within its officer rank structure 
was established: the quaestor. His duties included arranging the army's provisions and associated matters of 
administration (see also Erdkamp, 1995, p. 182). There are many examples of the quaestor in this role: during 
the Second and Third Punic Wars, for example (App., Pun. 116), and later during the campaign against 
Jugurtha (Sal., lug. 29). Another example is at Liv. 28.46. 
Erdkamp, 1995, p. 182. Erdkamp goes on to cite examples which support this point; the three legati sent to 
Apulia and Calabria in 172 B.C. to buy com on behalf of the army, and Octavian's freedmen, whom the 
triumvir sent during the Civil Wars to acquire grain. 
C. lulius Caesar, at the start of the Second Civil War in the middle of the first century BC, discovered that 
being placed outside state support presented considerable, but not insurmountable, supply difficulties for his 
army: his enemies in the governing elite thought that, short of funds and supplies, his army would soon break 
apart (Plut., Caes. 40). 
militia; the literary tradition records that the state first began paying soldiers at the start of 
the fourth century BC during the siege of the Etruscan city of Veii^'^ close to Rome.^" This 
was the first time the state extended service into winter;^^" the stipendium was probably 
intended to compensate soldiers for increasing their length of service. This date, however, 
is contested: Nicolet, for example, questions the plausibility of Veii as the catalyst for the 
introduction of pay.^^' He argues that payment of the stipendium presupposes the existence 
of money, which was unlikely at that time;^^^ Rich also thinks that the stipendium was 
introduced later during the Samnite campaigns.'^' 
Regardless of when it was introduced, by the second century BC, a stipendium for service 
was an established part of military service, and soldiers expected it would be paid on time, 
and in regular allotments. Failure to do this, for example, could lead to unrest; it was one of 
the main reasons P. Cornelius Scipio's soldiers mutinied in 206 BC at Sucro in Spain."" In 
the Polybian army, the stipendium was carefully regulated according to rank and function; 
an infantryman received (in Greek terms as Polybius wrote) two obols a day,^^^ a centurion 
twice as much, and a cavalryman was paid a drachma?^^ Allied contingents serving in 
Roman consular armies also received a stipendium-?^'' they were allocated a paymaster 
The siege at Veii was significant for a number of reasons: as I have shown, it was there that the terms of 
service were extended for the first time into winter. For scholars, it has represented a convenient point to mark 
the start of Rome's annexation of the Itahan peninsula; Rich is typical: "The annexation of Veii and 
distribution of its land were actions on a different, and for the Romans, unprecedented scale, and have rightly 
been seen as the first step in Rome's advance to an imperial power" (Rich, 2008, p. 13). 
D.C. 7.20; Liv. 4.59. The siege of Veii is traditionally dated between 400 BC - 396 BC (Roth, 2009, p. 
267). 
Liv. 5.4. 
™ See also Rosenstein, 2010, p. 293. 
"^Nicole t , 1980, p. 115. 
Rich, 2008, p. 18; Rathbone, 2007, pp. 158-160. 
Liv. 28.24: flagitatum quoque stipendium procacius quam ex more et modestia militari erat. "They made 
demands also for their pay with more petulance than accorded with the customary self-control of soldiers." 
See also Plb. 11.25. 
^•^This equated to a fixed rate of three copper asses a day, which was 3/10th of the standard sliver denarius 
(Rathbone, 2007, p. 159). Soldiers could also receive increased pay or rations as a reward for exemplary 
service; for example, in 343 BC, af^er defeating a Samnite army, where rations were doubled in perpetuity 
and other rewards allocated to the soldiers (Liv. 7.37). This equated roughly to an annual stipendium for an 
ordinary infantry soldier of about 94 denarii. 
Plb. 6.39. This equated to 1 silver denarius, or 10 cwiei (Gargola, 1989, p. 232). Polybius provided useful 
detail on the pay and ration system; in addition to pay, the infantry received a ration of wheat equal to about 
two thirds of an Attic medimnus a month, and the cavalry seven medimni of barley and two of wheat. Among 
the allies, the infantry receive the same and the cavalry one and one third medimni of wheat and five of 
barley. These rations are provided free to the allies, but in the case of Roman troops, the quaestor deducted 
from their pay the price of the wheat and their clothes, and any additional arms they needed. 
™ As at Sal., lug. 36. See also Lintott, 1993, p.70; Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 106-107. 
during the recruitment p r o c e s s , a n d paid out of the money levied from allied 
communities. '^' The introduction of the stipendium to help defray the costs of serving 
increased the administrative and financial burden on commanders to ensure there was 
enough money to pay their troops. Along with the natural resilience of rural communities, 
however, and the establishment of an effective logistics system, the stipendium helped the 
state keep soldiers in the field for longer periods. When other sources of finance were not 
available,'^" the money used to pay the army was raised from a tribute levied on the 
community;'^' this helped to apportion more fairly the cost of war between those who 
served and those who did not."^ The stipendium, however, was only ever meant to cover 
basic subsistence needs ;" ' the timocratic military system did not expect to have to support 
soldiers after discharge, and assidui were expected to have their own sources of income to 
fall back on."" 1 argue that the Polybian pay scales did not represent much money; a slave 
doing manual work, for example, could earn up to 12 asses a day , " ' three times the daily 
rate for an infantryman."^ When the costs of arms, food and other equipment were also 
deducted, the value of the stipendium was further reduced. Real money in service came not 
from pay, but from victory in war and the opportunities it provided to amass booty and 
donatives." ' 
The Roman Military System: The Minimum Property Qualification 
Central to the republican concept of a citizen-militia and military service was the ideology 
that a soldier would fight harder, be more loyal and dependable in battle, and more readily 
Plb. 6.21. 
Liv. 27.9; App., SC. 1.7. 
Those other sources of money could include, for example, reparations and tributes from former enemies 
defeated in battle (Serrati, 2007, p. 488). The scale of these reparations could be colossal: L. Aemilius 
Paullus, for example, secured 120,000,000 sesterces for the Roman treasury when he defeated the 
Macedonians in 167 BC, enough to maintain the pay of soldiers for years (Liv. 45.40; Plut., Aem. 32). For 
more information on the financial aspects of waging war in Republic, see Serrati, 2007, pp. 488 ff. 
Liv. 4.60. 
For Nicolet, the introduction of the stipendium, and the necessity to find money from the general 
community to support its regular allotment, was a definite step towards equalising the 'yoke of war' (Nicolet, 
1980, p. 115). 
™ Cagniart, 2008, p. 81. 
On the important question of who was expected to meet the financial expectations of soldiers as it became 
clear that the state's economy was benefiting considerably from war, see Chapter Four below. 
Cic., Q.Rosc. 9. It has to be acknowledged that Cicero's example is from the first century BC, but it still 
gives us a sense of the comparative value of the soldier's labour, even allowing for inflation. 
Nicolet also argues that pay was a relatively small sum by the standards of the day, and cannot have been a 
major incentive to service (Nicolet, 1980, p. 116). 
See Chapter Four below. 
sacrifice his comfort and life for the state, if he had a material staice in its continued 
survival 
Sed quoniam res pecuniaque familiaris obsidis vicem pignerisque esse apud 
rempublicam videbatur amorisque in palriam fides quaedam in ea firmamentumque 
erat, neque proletarii neque capite censi mililes, nisi in tumullu maxima, scribebantur, 
quia familia pecuniaque his aut tenuis out nulla esset.''' 
If citizens with such a stake in the Republic were more loyal and committed to it, then it 
followed that the use of soldiers who did not have such a stake - arming them, and 
allowing them into the army - was politically dangerous. Being poor, for example, they 
were dominated by the imperative to improve their economic condition, and would thus do 
anything for money: sustain the political ambitions of ruthless politicians,^'*® or even 
support sedition, attack the state, and engage in civil war.^'" This belief was manifested in 
the establishment of the Servian constitution: as I have shown above, it allocated citizens a 
specific role in the army, along with electoral influence, according to their regularly-
assessed wealth. A crucial objective of this timocratic system was to use wealth to exclude 
from army service those who it considered did not have enough of a material stake in the 
state to make reliable soldiers. This objective was enforced by the implementation of a 
wealth barrier to service: the minimum property qualification of the fifth Servian class, and 
all citizens who served in the army had to meet it.^"^ In theory, this ensured that the poorest 
of Roman society were excluded from the legions, were never regularly armed or trained 
for war, and that the demographic makeup of the republican army remained firmly assidui, 
predominantly small freeholders from the countryside.'''^ Along with the reliance on 
citizens and allied contributions to man the army, the timocratic ideal embodied by the 
Servian constitution was the ideological and practical foundation of the republican citizen-
militia: the minimum property qualification remained in place for centuries, excluding the 
poor from army service, until its supposed abolition by C. Marius in 107 BC.'"" 
A similar sentiment is at App., B C l . 11. 
Gel. 16.10: "But since property and money were regarded as a hostage and pledge of loyalty to the state, 
and since there was in them a kind of guarantee and assurance of patriotism, neither the proletarii nor the 
capite censi were enrolled as soldiers except in some time of extraordinary disorder, because they had little or 
no property or money." Similar sentiments are also at Plut., Mar. 9; D.H. 4.19. 
Sal., lug. 86. 
App., BC 1.57; 5.17; D.C. 33.108. For more on this line of thought, see Chapter Three below. 
Initially set at 1, 100 asses (Liv. 1.43). See discussion at Chapter Four below. 
As I have shown above, the poor still had an obligation to defend the state in emergencies. On the 
assumption that the minimum property qualification kept the poor out of the army, see Chapter Four below. 
See Chapters Three and Four below. 
The insistence on a minimum property qualification was another way the state could link 
the privilege of citizenship with the obligation to serve. By using wealth to restrict 
membership of the army, an emphasis was given to the exclusivity of military service, and 
of being allowed to take up arms to defend the state. This exclusivity was sharpened by the 
increasingly lucrative economic rewards associated with service as the empire expanded. 
Not everyone was eligible, and, for those that were, military exclusivity could feed feelings 
of contempt for the poor: quae civitas ad id tempus ingenuae quoque originis capite censos 
habere milites fastidierat. eadem cellis servilibus extracta corpora et a pastoralibus casis 
collecta mancipia velut praecipuum firmamentum exercitui suo adiecit.^'^^ There was, 
however, a more prosaic reason behind the minimum property qualification that had 
nothing to do with ideology. It is possible that the poor were also excluded, not because 
they were exempt from the requirement to defend the state, but because the Servian 
constitution originally required citizens to provide their own equipment:^"'' the poor could 
not afford to do this. This rationale was clearly undermined when the state started providing 
initial arms and equipment to those who needed them against the surety of a future 
stipendium:^*^ with state support, poor citizens previously excluded from serving in the 
army could now do so. The ideological prejudice against them serving in the army 
inculcated by the Servian constitution, however, was deeply embedded in the tradition of 
republican military service. It was, for example, still firmly in place in the middle of the 
second century BC when Polybius described the army, even though the state had, by that 
time, begun meeting the costs of equipment. The result was a citizen-militia which included 
all but the poorest in its ranks, and reflected the social status of its members.^''^ 
V.Max. 7.6. "The community that until then had scorned to have capite censi, even of free birth as 
soldiers, added bodies drawn from servants' attics and slaves collected from shepherds' huts to specially 
strengthen its army." This was during the Second Punic War, when Rome was attempting to quickly replace 
the catastrophic manpower losses during the early part of the war. 
" ' L i v . 1.43; D.H. 4.19. 
Plb. 6.39. 
Phang, 2008. p. 15. By its recruitment practices and organisation, the Roman military system necessarily 
mirrored "the social, political and economic hierarchy found in wider society among its members. For 
example, the richest members of Roman society, who formed the governing elite, also provided the generals 
who commanded the legions on campaign. Other officers, such as the military tribunes, also came from the 
upper strata of Roman society, and were gaining the ten years obligatory military experience they needed 
before considering a political career (Plb. 6.19). Conversely, for ordinary citizens, the rationale for serving 
was different. Whereas enough military service as a tribune or in some other official position opened the 
possibility of a political career for the sons of Rome's governing elite, service for the common soldiers met 
their civic obligation and no more. It was not a necessary step to anything beyond an accumulation of years 
served which counted toward eventual release from the obligation of active service. On the necessity of 
gaining military experience before starting a political career among the governing elite, see Millar, 1984, pp. 
12 ff. 
The Social War: Background and Causes 
The Social War was fought between Rome and most of her former Itahan allies in Italy 
between 91 BC and 88 BC/"*' It began in the years immediately preceding Sulla's march on 
Rome; the war was in its final stages in 88 BC when Sulla was besieging Nola in the south, 
mopping up the remaining vestiges of Italian resistance.'^" He was there when he was 
removed from command of the impending campaign against Mithridates:'^' leaving a small 
force to continue the siege, he began his assault on Rome from Nola.' '^ 
Modem scholarship on the historiography of the war is often contradictory;"' for example, 
Salmon argues categorically that the Umbrians and Etruscans did not join the revolt,'^'* but 
Nagle contends that they did, quoting the fighting between these peoples and the Romans in 
Livy and Orosius.'^' Clearly, however, it was a very significant war: its consequences for 
Rome and the Italian allies were profound. ' ' ' For the first time since Hannibal's invasion of 
Italy during the Second Punic W a r , ' " for example, there was major fighting in Italy, and 
with peoples who ironically had been integral for more than a century to the military 
Principal ancient sources include: App., S C 1.37 ff; Liv., Per. 72 ff; Oros. 5.18; Plut., Mar. 32; Plut., Sull. 
6; Diod. 37.2 ff; Flor. 2.6.5. For succinct summaries of the war, see also Dart, 2009, pp. 215 and 216; Roth, 
2009, pp. 96 ff; Salmon, 1962, pp. 107 ff; Salmon, 1958, pp. 159 ff. Note that there is disagreement on when 
the Social War actually started: some sources say late 91 BC, when the Roman praetor was murdered in 
Asculum (Dart, 2009, p. 215; Patterson, 2006(b), p. 614); some scholars argue 90 BC, when major fighting 
between the armies broke out (Roth, 2009, p. 96; App., BC 1.39). Both variations are seen. 1 shall use the 
murder of the Roman praetor as the starting point, and remain faithful to 91 BC - 88 BC. 
Veil. 2.17. 
App., S C 1.57. 
Plut., Sull. 9. 
For further discussion on this aspect of the historiography of the war, in particular, the often patchy nature 
of scholarship on the war, see Ridley, 2003, p. 51, and Dart, 2009, p. 216. Ridley's discussion is particularly 
useful in this regard, and provides an exhaustive summary of the various scholarly viewpoints going back to 
1738 (Ridley, 2003, p.31). See also Brunt, 1971, pp. 89 ff. for a fundamental analysis of the Italian allies and 
the Social War. 
Salmon, 1962, p. 115. 
Nagle, 1973, p. 372. The Livian tradition indeed records that the Umbrians and the Etruscans were 
defeated in battle after both regions revolted (Liv., Per. 74), as does Orosius (Oros. 5.18.17). It is thus hard to 
understand why Salmon made such a categorical assertion that the Umbrians and the Etruscans were not 
involved in the revolt in the face of Livy and Orosius; he may have relied primarily on Appian's list of the 
insurrectionist peoples which did not include the Umbrians and Etruscans (App., BC 1.39). Nagle argues that 
Appian glossed over the fighting in Umbria and Etruria (Nagle, 1973, p. 372, n.45). Interestingly, Salmon's 
view seems to have permeated some more contemporary scholarship on the war; Roth, for example, also 
doubts that the Umbrians and Etruscans remained loyal, but does not give detailed reasons for believing this 
(Roth, 2009, p. 96; see also Gabba, 1976, p. 72). I cannot explain the persistence of this view. 
" " Patterson, 2006(b), p. 614; Salmon, 1962, p. 107; Nagle, 1973, 367; Roth, 2009, p. 97. 
Plb. 3.56. 
success and imperial expansion of the Roman state It led to the extension of Roman 
citizenship to the Italians during the war, and in its immediate aftermath.'^' The Roman 
state was thus reorganised to incorporate the new citizens,'^" and, from this point on, what 
were formerly allied regions and Latin colonies became municipia populi Romani. The 
eventual effect of the incorporation of Italians into the Roman political system, and the 
opening up of political advancement to Italian elites, significantly enlarged the nature of 
Roman political discourse.'^' In 54 BC, for example, the contest for the aedileship was 
Italy-wide: the candidate Cn. Plancius from Atina^^^ mustered support from not only his 
native town, but also from Arpinum, Sora, Casinum, Aquinum, Venafrum, and All i fae. '" 
The unification of Italy also provided a stable heartland without which the later imperial 
expansion and longevity of the Roman state would not have been p o s s i b l e . M o r e o v e r , the 
scale of the war was enormous: both sides, for example, may have put into the field more 
than 100,000 troops,^" the equivalent of 20 legions each.^''^ The scale of the Roman 
mobilisation was comparable to the effort that they made during the height of the Second 
Punic War: in the tenth year of the war in 208 BC, for example, the Romans had 21 legions 
in the field, not including garrison troops.'^' Combined losses from the Social War have 
been estimated at up to 300,000 men.^^^ They included almost all of the Italian 
leadership;'^' at one point, casualty levels were so high that both Roman and Italian senates 
ordered the slain to be buried where they fell, in case the funeral spectacles of so many 
Plb. 6.26. On the contribution of the allies to the Romans state, see also Rosenstein, 2012, p. 76. 
" ' A p p . , S C 1.49, 53; Veil. 2.16,17. 
App., BC 1.53; Patterson, 2006(b), p. 614. The way the Romans incorporated the Italians into their tribal 
voting system is contested, and much of the source evidence contradictory and incomplete: for a summary of 
this discussion, see Salmon, 1958, pp. 179 ff. 
' ' ' It would also lead to future tension within the political system; the original Roman citizens attempted -
ultimately unsuccessfully - to limit the political and voting power of the new Italian citizens (Veil. 2.20). 
On the borders of Samnium and Latium. 
Cic., Plane. 22. 
' " S a l m o n , 1962, p. 107. 
' ' ' App., BC 1.39. See Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 157-158, for a more complete discussion on the scale of the war. 
In the end, he doubts the exact numbers that the sources present for the armies fielded by both sides, while 
acknowledging its undoubted scale (Mouristsen, 1998, pp. 157-158). He also says it is clear that in respect of 
experience, equipment and technical and strategic skills, both sides were on an equal footing (Mouritsen, 
1998, p. 157). In this, he has drawn the right conclusion (see my argument in Chapter Five below). 
Assuming the higher of Polybius' figures for the size of the mid Republican legion (Plb. 6.20). He stated 
that the normal size of a legion was 4,200 men, but could rise to 5,000 in times of danger. 
Liv. 27.22. 
Veil. 2.15. Ridley, 2003, p. 52. For more detail on the scale of the Social War, including its human cost, 
see Ridley, 2003, pp. 52 and 53. 
Ridley, 2003, p. 53. 
dead damaged the morale of new recruits.^™ Significantly, I argue that the Social War was 
also critical for helping create the conditions which led to the emergence of soldiers willing 
to risk civil war and intervene in political discourse.^'' 
The exact causes of the revolt are contested. For some scholars, it was the refusal of the 
Romans to extend suffrage to the Italian allies; this has traditionally made up a large part of 
the conventional rationale for the war."^ Indeed, this is the principle theme running through 
Appian's depiction of the conflict and its causes, our only surviving continuous narrative of 
the era of the Social War and its preceding decades In particular, it was the murder by 
political opponents in 91 BC of the tribune, M. Livius Drusus, which did most to convince 
the allies that they would never peacefully achieve full political rights or legal 
protections."" The death of Drusus was highly symbolic to the Italians attempting to 
achieve greater status under Roman suzerainty:''^ he promised to introduce a bill which, 
inter alia, extended full citizenship. His murder quashed that hope, and demonstrated the 
" " App . ,BC1.43 . 
At this point of the thesis, 1 will not dwell on the critical importance of the war as a factor in the emergence 
of politically interventionist soldiers: that particular aspect will be covered in detail in Chapters Five and 
Eight below. 
™ App., BC. 1.39; Veil. 2.15. For modem adherents to this view, see Ridley, 2003, p. 52; Salmon, 1962, p. 
107; Nagle, 1973, p. 367. According to the sources, the Italians, on the eve of the war, actually tried one last 
appeal to the governing elite. They sent ambassadors to Rome complaining that they had been denied full 
citizenship, even though they had made a very significant contribution to establishing the empire (App., BC 
1.39). The Roman senate refused to yield, and thus Italian mobilisation continued. 
Mellor, 2013, p. 478. Mouritsen, however, distrusts Appian's account, arguing that the theme of suffrage 
as the principal rationale for the Italian revolt may be a backwards projection from the imperial age when 
citizenship had become an absolute privilege (Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 109 ff.). Moreover, he argues that the 
citizenship question in Appian was actually referring to the Latin allies, not the Italian allies. This view fits 
neatly with Mouritsen's grand thesis that seeks to re-interpret the Italian war aims to one of separation from 
Rome, not integration. But Mouritsen is not consistent on his mistrust of Appian. In some places, he argues 
for a reinterpretation of Appian's text (e.g.; Mouritsen, 1998, p. 113.), but at other places in the same 
argument he is quite happy to accept Appian at his word (e.g.; Mouritsen, 1998, p. 131). In the end, it remains 
a plausible - but difficult to prove categorically - alternative theory. See Cornell for an argument on the 
accuracy of Appian as a source (Cornell, 1996, p. 112). See also Morstein-Marx for an argument that a deep a 
priori skeptism of Appian as a source for speeches to the army of 88/87 BC is unwarranted, given that he, in 
Morstein-Marx's view, presents themes consistent with late-republican contional oratory (Morstein-Marx, 
2011, p. 271). He is presenting an argument that these speeches by Sulla and Cinna contained in Appian 
include appeals to legitimacy, and thus is dependent on Appian being a credible source. With this in mind, 
Morstein-Marx argues that Appian must have been at least following a very good source for these events, and 
that these appeals to legitimacy are plausible. It is an argument I agree with, as I will argue below in Chapter 
Nine. 
™ Veil. 2.14; App., BC 1.38; Liv., Per. 71. 
The Italians that befriended Drusus, according to the literary record, made an oath to him: that they would, 
if they became citizens by his law, consider Rome their country, and good things would transpire. If they were 
frustrated, however, the opposite would occur (Diod. 37.11). See also Gabba, 1976, p. 74. 
depth of Roman opposition."® For other scholars, the 'franchise issue' is downplayed in 
favour of Italian anger at their subordinate political and legal status, and a concomitant 
growing desire to establish their own state completely independent of the Romans: in short, 
a 'seperation, not integration' argument. This view is carried most notably by Mouritsen," ' 
who, in 1998, presented a persuasive alternative argument to the conventional 'franchise' 
explanation. He argues that Italians had always preserved their ethnic identity and sought 
not integration with Rome, but independence in their own state, as a remedy to their 
marginalised political and legal ststus."® The immediate trigger for the war was the 
Asculan riots, but the strategic rationale for revolution becomes the establishment of a 
new Italian confederation which attempted to supplant the position of Rome.^^° Mouritsen 
also emphasises heavily Italian concerns about a planned re-distribution of Roman public 
land leading up to the Social War, and in which they stood to lose economically.^^' 
Whatever the exact reasons behind the Italian decision to rebel from Rome, by late 91 BC, 
Italian frustration at Roman intransigence, their continued vulnerability to arbitrary Roman 
abuses of power, and their inferior political and legal status, boiled over: the inhabitants of 
Asculum murdered the praetor, Q. Servilius, and hundreds of other Roman citizens living 
there.'^^ Incited by the Marsi,^" and encouraged by the Italian leader, Q. Poppaedius Silo, 
most of Rome's former allies revolted, set up a rival state,^^" established a senate, elected 
App., BC 1.35. For a more detailed discussion on the role of Drusus in exciting Italian expectations of 
citizenship, and a historical narrative of the events of Drusus' murder, see Salmon, 1962, pp. 114 and 115. 
But most recently, also including Rosenstein (Rosenstein, 2012a, p. 103.), who concludes that there was no 
reason to think that the Italian allies serving in Roman armies wanted to become Romans. I would not 
disagree with this thesis. In my view, the aim of the Roman military system was not geared toward producing 
political or legal integration or equality, rather tactical and cohesive integration for strict military efficiency 
reasons (see my argument below). 
Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 138-140 f f His argument is laid out in extensive detail in a Special Supplement 
(Number 70) to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 1998. 
™ Diod. 37.13. 
" " The key conclusion in Mouritsen's thesis is found at Mouritsen, 1998, p. 141: "The circumstances of the 
outbreak, in sum, all conform with the theory of the war as a straightforward rebellion against foreign 
domination." 
Mouritsen, 1998, p. 150. This is Drusus' agrarian bill of 91 BC (see below). Mouritsen also argues that the 
Latins, for centuries partners of Rome, were showing signs of increased agitation and anger with Rome, and 
this may have encouraged the Italian allies to continue with their rebellion (Mouritsen, 1998, p. 150). 
As Dart points out, this was a different man from Q. Servilius Caepio, the brother-in-law of the murdered 
tribune, Livius Drusus. Caepio was eventually killed by the Marsian leader, Q. Poppaedius Silo, during the 
war (Dart, 2009, p. 215). 
Veil. 2.15. 
For a recent reassessment of the Italian constitution established at the start of the war, including more 
detail on its political structures, see Dart, 2009, pp. 215ff 
consuls and 12 praetors, recruited armies, and began a war with Rome to secure their 
independence.^^^ 
The riots at Asculum, in combination with Drusus' murder, may have provided the spark 
which ignited the war, but underlying tensions had eroded the relationship between Romans 
and their Italian allies for decades. Allied expectations for full citizenship and concerns 
over land, for example, had been aroused - and frustrated - earlier. In 125 BC, the consul, 
M. Fulvius Flaccus, proposed full suffrage to Italians as a way to solve tensions over the 
Gracchan land appropriations;^^^ as it did in 91 BC, this attempt failed because of Roman 
determination to limit citizenship, and thus helped remind Italians of their inferior status.^^^ 
Even if the aspiration to full suffrage at this time was thwarted, however, there is no doubt 
that participation in the Roman state brought advantages at many levels for Italian 
communities. Like Roman citizens, their soldiers, and thus their communities, benefited 
economically from the increasing opportunities to profit from war that expanding empire 
produced; when booty was distributed, for example, no distinction was normally made 
between citizen and ally,^^^ and if it was, it caused considerable consternation and ill-
feeling.^^' Allied veterans also benefited from the rare occasions when the state made 
viritane allocations at the end of long wars. As 1 have shown above, up to 40,000 veterans 
of Roman armies stationed overseas were settled on ager publicus in southern Italy 
between 201 BC and 199 BC; given the high proportion of Italians serving in these armies, 
it is probable that they also received land. Italian civilians also benefited from the 
expanding empire, especially from the business opportunities that emerged in provinces.^'" 
Large numbers of them were involved in trade at Delos,^" in Africa at the end of the 
App., BC 1.39; Liv., Per. 72; Diod. 37.2. 
Some Italians, at least, were concerned they were going to lose land: as I have shown above, they 
approached their former military commander, P. Scipio Aemilianus, in 129 BC to advocate for their land 
rights in the senate (App., BC. 1.19). 
App . ,BC1 .21 . 
The Italian contribution to the war effort, as 1 will argue in Chapter Five below, was appreciated by the 
Romans: they may, for example, have even instigated a war against the Dalmatians in 157 BC to ensure the 
fighting skills of their Italian soldiers did not became too enervated by peace (Plb. 32.13). On the universal 
expectation of booty and donatives between allied and citizen soldiers, also see Chapter Five below. 
As it did in 177 BC, when, unusually, allied soldiers received half the booty of their citizen counterparts, 
leading to considerable ill-feeling, and a silent protest at the offending general's triumph (Liv. 41.13). 
Salmon, 1962, p. 109. Banking services appear to have been a particular area of Italian dominance (Cic., 
ad. Fam. 13.11; Salmon, 1962, p. 112). 
Strab., Oral. 14.5. 
second century BC,' '^ and in Asia in the first century BC.^' ' The wealth from the provinces 
flowed back into Italian communities;'"^ it was manifested, for example, in the extensive 
second century BC building program of monumental sanctuaries and town beautification 
projects. 
Nevertheless, there were also serious, structural strains in the relationship - particularly in 
regard to legal protections and the status of Italian land.^'^ Italians, for example, were 
legally marginalised:^'' they had no direct legal recourse to defend property rights, and had 
to seek legal remedies through the services of Roman patrons.''^ Italian communities were 
also at the mercy of Roman policies of forced migration; they could find parts of their lands 
summarily appropriated for ager publicus, with no recourse to appeal. In 180 BC, for 
example, 47,000 Ligurians were forcibly removed from northern Italy, and resettled in 
lands that had originally, in the previous century, belonged to the Hirpini . ' " Despite this, 
Italian land owners, especially the elite, were not completely powerless, even if they had to 
work through Roman citizens:""" in 129 BC, for example, at the urging of Italian patron, P. 
Scipio Aemilianus, the senate directed that the consul adjudicate an inquiry into land held 
by Italians."'" There was, however, no guarantee for the future: the inferior legal and 
political status of Italians meant laws could be introduced at any point inimical to their 
agrarian or business interests, over which they would have no say, and little recourse.""^ 
Moreover, Italians had minimal legal protection against the arbitrary use of Roman power, 
a fact highlighted when a peasant from the southern Latin colony of Venusia was beaten to 
death for making a joke about a Roman passing in a litter.""' The destruction of the 
Sal., lug. 26, 47, 66. 
Plut., SuH. 24; App., Milh. 23: Mithridates, for example, killed many Italians in his uprising against Rome. 
" " G a b b a , 1976, p. 76. 
Patterson, 2006(b), pp. 612-614. 
Indeed, Mouritsen emphasises Italian dissatisfaction at plans for the redistribution of parts of the holdings 
of Roman public land at the centre of their decision to revolt from Roman suzerainity (Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 
150-151). 
Mouritsen, 2006, p. 424. 
™ App., B C 1 . I 9 . 
Liv. 40.38. Mass deportations and land expropriations, in particular, accompanied Rome's expansion into 
Italy during the third century BC, especially in the region of Picenum (for more detail on these events, see 
Nagle, 1973, pp. 372 and 373). Nagle paints a picture of Roman encroachment and encirclement of Italian 
lands. 
•"'"Salmon, 1962, p. 110. 
""" App., BC \ .\9. The consul, however, decided to do nothing. 
This fear was manifest in the 90s in greater Italian anxiety and restiveness (App., BC 1.36). 
"""Gel., 10.3. 
rebellious colony of Fregellae by a Roman army in 125 BC,""" led by the praetor, L. 
Opimius,""^ must have been a further sobering reminder to the Italians of their fragile legal 
status, and of the brutal arbitrariness of Roman justice.""® More specifically, Italian anxiety 
over the lack of protection from arbitrary Roman power was fed by the behaviour of Q. 
Servilius at Asculum in 91 BC, and almost certainly contributed to his murder: he treated 
the Italians like slaves, and with the example of Fregellae before him, threatened them with 
dire punishments."*" Italian anxiety had been further heightened in 95 BC when the Romans 
decided to purge the citizenship rolls of Italians improperly enrolled as citizens in previous 
censues, and expelling not only Italians, but also Latins from the city.""^ It was clear Rome 
was not going to entertain Italian expectations of - or hopes for - citizenship, and was 
content to preserve the political and legal inequality inherent in Roman political 
dominance; this must have been galling to many Italians, given the major contribution they 
had made to the security and success of the Roman state. 
By the late 90s, mutual hostility thus dominated the relationship; a measure of how volatile 
it had become was found at a theatre performance in Picenum one day in the late 90s. The 
Romans in the audience summarily lynched a rebellious Italian comic actor; the Picentines 
resolved then to do the same to a Latin comic actor known to be admired by the Romans. 
The Latin saved himself, however, by making it clear on stage that he was no Roman, and 
was subject to the same Roman power that they were.""' Relations between Romans and 
their Italians allies were poor; regardless of whether some Italian peoples wanted it or not, 
the extension of full citizenship to the Italians thus was one solution to the arbitrariness of 
Roman power and the inferior status of the Italians. With it, they gained social mobility. 
Liv., Per. 60. The destruction of Fregellae was a potent symbolic act for the Italians; it was established as a 
Latin colony, but large numbers of Samnite and Paelignian families migrated there in 177 BC (Liv, 41.8), 
and, at the time of its destruction, its character was more Oscan than Latin. It was destroyed as Carthage and 
Corinth were destroyed for reasons that were not clear (Patterson, 2006(b), p. 614); it may have rebelled in 
protest at the Roman refusal to grant legal protections to its citizens (Liv., Per. 60). 
This was the same magistrate who would later lead government forces in Rome against C. Gracchus and 
his supporters: see Chapter Seven below. 
Salmon argues that the Oscan nature of the town explains why the Romans destroyed it so completely; 
they never would have done this to a Latin colony, as such colonies were integral to their hold over Italy 
(Salmon, 1962, p. 110). See also Mouritsen, 1998, p. 130, who argues that the example made of Fregellae was 
a clear indication to the Italians of the immense risks involved in rebellion against Roman suzerainity. 
Diod. 37.13. 
™ Salmon, 1962, p. 114. 
"" 'Diod. 37.12. 
political access, legal protection, and inclusion to the framing of Roman agrarian policy.'"" 
More importantly, they gained a measure of certainty and status at a time when the Roman 
political system had manifestly become more unstable, violent, and unpredictable.'*" As I 
have shown above, Italian discontent, frustration, and anxiety for various reasons grew to 
such intensity that continued Roman intransigence provided a casus belli, the murder of 
Drusus a specific impetus for revolution,"'^ and the riots at Asculum the spark for action. 
Despite the importance of the war, there was not complete ancient agreement on the list of 
peoples who subsequently revolted."" According to Appian, twelve groups joined the 
insurrection: the Marsi, Peligni,"'" Vestini, Marrucini, Picentines, Frentani, Hirpini, 
Pompeiians, Venusini, Apulians, Lucanians and Samnites;"" he does not include the 
Umbrians or Etruscans. Livy's list has seven peoples: he agrees with Appian, but excludes 
the Apulians, Frentani, Hirpini, Pompeiians, Venusini."'^ He later records, however, that 
the Umbrians and Etruscans also joined the revolt and were suppressed after heavy 
fighting;"'' nine groups in total were thus involved in the insurrection. Diodorus was less 
precise: he wrote that the Samnites, Marsi, the people of Asculum, Lucanians, Picentines, 
the citizens of Nola, and other cities and people of Italy joined the revolt."'^ Orosius, who 
also records heavy fighting against the Umbrians and Etruscans, takes his list verbatim 
from Livy."" Florus, in a significant departure from other sources, says that all Latium, 
Campania, Picenum, Etruria, and, finally, all Italy rose against Rome."^° Despite the 
incompleteness of the sources, there was nevertheless enough agreement to indicate a 
Ridley, 2003, p. 52. In his summary of the war, Ridley concludes that, for most Italians, what mattered was 
protection against Roman law for the political elite, it was the franchise, and, for a smaller radical minority, it 
was independence from Roman rule. 
On the decline of political culture at this time, and the emergence of political violence, see Chapter Seven 
below. 
More than a century of involvement in the Roman military system, and the obvious importance of the 
allies to it, changed allied perceptions of their place in the Roman polity. This made an important contribution 
to their decision to revolt: for a discussion of these changes, see Chapter Five below. 
The most detailed analysis of the Italian groups that revolted still remains the 1958 article by Salmon 
(Dart, 2009, p. 217); for a complete list of the leaders of the Italian revolt, see Salmon, 1958, pp. 159 ff 
Also known as Paeligni. 
' " 'App . ,BCI .39 . 
" " Liv., Per. 72. 
Liv., Per. 74. 
Diod. 37. 2. Diodorus' Nolans has been equated to Livy's Pompeiians (Salmon, 1958, p. 161). The point is 
that both are referring to Campanian rebels; we thus know that Campania was involved in the revolt. 
""Oros , 5.18. 
Flor. 2.6.5. With regard to Florus' statement, I agree with Salmon: Florus exaggerates wildly to impress on 
his readers the seriousness of the situation. This is "rhetorical rubbish" (Salmon, 1958, p. 160). 
geographically diverse, wide-spread - and thus serious - insurrection. There were two main 
centres of resistance: one - primarily Latin speaicing''^' - group of central Italian peoples 
centred around the Marsi,"^^ and the other - primarily Oscan speaking - group of southern 
Italians centred around the Samnites. If the references to Umbria and Etruria joining the 
revolt were accurate, there was a third, northern centre of resistance. Virtually all of Italy 
south of the river Liris revolted, including the southern Latin colony of Venusia: these 
regions provided the primary battlefields of the war. 
It is significant that the peoples that revolted had had a long military association with 
Rome."^' For more than a century, they provided major contributions to consular armies,"^" 
participated in the overseas campaigns that helped secure Rome's imperial expansion,''^^ 
and thus were thoroughly versed in the Roman way of waging war."*^^ The region around 
Picenum, for example, was fertile and productive, and one of the foremost recruitment 
grounds for the Roman army.'*^' Moreover, I argue that many of the soldiers and 
commanders in the Italian army had had recent experience in Marius' army defending Italy 
against the Cimbrian invasions; many knew their Roman enemies, and had served with 
them.'*^^ Against experienced and capable enemies such as these, the Romans had difficulty 
defeating the Italian confederation:''^' the war was bitter and hard-fought, with little 
sentiment, and much cruelty, on both sides."'" While besieging the city of Pinna,"'' for 
example, the Italians executed the children of the besieged townspeople in front of them in 
" " Salmon, 1958, p. 161. 
Another name for the Social War was the Marsic War. Diodorus, for example, refers to the war in this 
manner (Diod. 37.2). This may be a reference to one of the most skilful, successful, and notable leaders of the 
Italian armies: the consul Q. Pompaedius Silo, who was a Marsian (Diod. 37. 2). The other consul appointed 
by the Italians was C. Papius Mutilus, a Samnite, who operated in the south (App., BC 39). 1 argue, however, 
that by limiting the war to a reference to the Marsi, it does not adequately capture the broad and widespread 
Italian nature of the conflict. 
Diod. 37.22. 
For example, the Marsi, Vestini, Marrucini, Frentani, Lucanians and Samnites were recorded as Rome's 
halic allies, and furnishing troops, in Polybius' list of 225 BC (Plb. 2.23, 24). 
Dart, 2009, p. 224; Patterson, 2006(b), p. 610; Nagle, 1973, p. 372; Salmon, 1962, p. 118. 
For a full discussion of this important fact, and its implications for the emergence of politically 
interventionist armies, see Chapter Five below. 
" - 'Nagle , 1973, p. 372. 
Diod. 37.14. For the implications of this fact, including discussions of the characteristics of the Social War 
that made it feel like a civil war to the Romans soldiers fighting it, see Chapters Five and Eight below. 
They suffered many reverses and losses, and came close to being defeated (App., BC 1.42; see also 
Chapter Five below). They were also forced to enrol freedmen for the first time to make up for the manpower 
losses (App., BC 1.49). 
™ Veil. 2.16. 
™ This was a city of the Vestini which, unusually, stayed loyal to Rome, closing its gates to the Italian army. 
an unsuccessful attempt to force surrender;"^^ they also starved to death Roman officers 
who refused to join the Italian army when Nola was captured early in the war."*^^ The 
Roman inhabitants of the Latin colony of Aesemia, surrounded by the Italian army and cut 
off from Roman forces which tried unsuccessfully to lift the siege, ate dogs and animals to 
avoid starvation.''^'' When the Romans captured Asculum after a long siege, they scourged 
the men with staves and beheaded them with axes,''^^ emptied the town of its remaining 
population, having first removed their clothes and possessions, and comprehensively 
plundered it."" Gradually, after hard fighting, the war turned against the Italians; toward 
the end, they became so desperate that they invited the Pontic king, Mithridates, to invade 
Italy and overthrow the Romans; he declined."" By 88 BC, the revolt had largely been 
suppressed, the main Italian leaders killed, their armies defeated or dispersed, and the allies 
given citizenship: only the town of Nola still resisted."^^ 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described the origins, evolution, and characteristics of the Roman 
military system. I have explained the crucial timocratic principle that governed republican 
military service, particularly the concomitant assumption that linked a minimum amount of 
personal wealth to suitability for service in the army. The chapter has also explored some of 
the key pressures that acted on the army - and the changes they produced for expectations 
of service. Additionally, I have covered the background and causes of the difficult and 
bloody late-republican Social War between Rome and her erstwhile Italian allies which 
immediately preceded Sulla's march on the capital. I have argued that an understanding of 
the Roman military system, and its principal characteristics, was a necessary foundation 
upon which the subsequent discussion of the reasons for the army's first decisive and large-
scale intervention into Roman political discourse could proceed. 
Diod. 37. 20. 
" " App.,gC1.42. 
""•01011.37. 19. 
435 The Romans were clearly making a point here: this was a traditional way to execute political criminals and 
rebels using both parts of the fasces, the symbols of power of a Roman magistrate. 
Oros. 5.18. 
" " Diod. 1,1.2. 
Veil. 2.17; Diod. 37.2. 
Set against this background, Chapter Three will now focus the discussion on the central 
question of this thesis. I will present the view that has conventionally been advanced to 
explain the emergence of politically interventionist armies: soldiers committed sedition and 
risked civil war because of what they could gain materially. Pecuniary self-interest is thus 
at the heart of the conventional explanation for why Sulla's soldiers engaged in sedition, 
imposed a political solution on the state, and risked civil war. 
Chapter Three 
Theories of Intervention - The Conventional Explanation 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I examined the characteristics and evolution of the Roman military 
system. This chapter outlines the view that has conventionally been advanced to explain the 
emergence of politically interventionist armies in scholarship: that is, that soldiers 
committed sedition and risked civil war because of what they could gain materially from 
service. Pecuniary self-interest is thus used, for example, to explain why L. Cornelius 
Sulla's soldiers decided to accept his invitation in 88 BC to become involved in his 
personal inimicitiae, engage in sedition, impose a political solution on the state and, in the 
process, risk civil war. It occurred largely because C. Marius abolished in 107 BC the 
minimum property qualification traditionally needed to serve, undermining the timocratic 
ideal that underpinned service in republican armies, opening up legions to the previously-
ineligible poor, and infecting the army with a mercenary spirit - thus making it more 
receptive to the economic inducements of insurrectionist generals. Significantly, the 
conventional view argues that this was a new, vital ingredient of military service in late-
republican armies, set against a background of moral decay in society which helped create 
the conditions in which interventionist soldiers could emerge. 
As this chapter will show, it is the conventional view because these themes of pecuniary 
self-interest, and attendant notions of moral decay, dominated ancient explanations of 
intervention and civil war. They have also come to permeate modem interpretations of the 
army's political intervention, and its subsequent involvement in civil war. The chapter will 
demonstrate, for example, that much of modem scholarship seeking to understand the 
transition of the Republic to imperial state, especially the place of the army in this transition 
and the role of Marius's 107 BC recruitment reform, has reproduced ancient themes largely 
without alteration - and, in many cases, with a remarkable degree of conformity. Thus 
Cagniart, faithfully reflecting ancient perspectives, is able to write of the fundamental 
change wrought by Marius' recruitment reform to the citizen-militia: 
Consequently, from 107 onward, soldiers joined the army expecting their generals to 
provide financial rewards at the end of the campaign. In addition to the booty soldiers 
could gain from war, the anticipation of tangible benefits at the time of discharge 
became the motivation to serve, and this transformed the Roman soldier into a 
mercenary. Soon another consequence was to follow: soldiers understood that their 
future depended on their commander, the only one able to provide for them. This is at 
the root of professional and private armies."^' 
Ancient Explanations: Money, Moral Decay & C. Marius 
The Conventional Explanation: Pecuniary Self-Interest as Dominant Motivator 
When Sulla appealed to the army outside Nola to assist him in his personal inimicitiae, the 
reason given for the army's agreement to help him was that soldiers were afraid Marius 
would replace them, and they would thus miss out on the lucrative opportunities to amass 
booty promised by the eastern campaign against Mithridates.'*'"' A strong sense of pecuniary 
self-interest among Sulla's soldiers, manifested specifically in a desire not for land or 
donatives but booty,""' was therefore responsible for persuading the army to support him in 
his audacious plan to impose a political solution upon the state. The desire to profit from 
service may have been a factor working on the minds of Sulla's soldiers,""^ but this 
explanation admits no other nuance: the desire to improve their economic situation alone 
motivated soldiers to accept Sulla's invitation, and support his plan to march on Rome as if 
Cagniart, 2008, p. 82. 439 
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It is important to note here that it is the opportunity to amass booty in the east, not donatives from 
successful generals at the end of the campaign, or grants of land at the end of their service, that the soldiers 
want, and are prepared to support Sulla to protect. 1 argue that this emphasis on booty is in no way surprising; 
as a manifestation of pecuniary self-interest, booty is perhaps the most immediate, flexible, reliable and 
tangible reward that can motivate an ordinary soldier. Donatives, for example, rely on the generosity of 
individual generals, and as such, were inherently unreliable. Land grants, on the other hand, were not 
common, and anyway, contingent on there being large tracts of spare or appropriated land to allocate to 
veterans; in that they were usually handed out at the end of a soldier's service, they were a more uncertain and 
distant form of reward as far as the common soldier was concerned. A soldier might simply not survive his 
length of service to benefit from a land grant, and it he was, may have been injured so that he could not work 
the land to provide a living. Booty had none of these disadvantages, and could be allocated and converted to 
hard cash as the campaign progressed, thus benefiting the soldier in a more immediate way. 
In Chapter Four below, I place pecuniary self-interest in its proper context; it had a part to play at Nola, 
but, as later chapters below will show, it was not the only factor at work - nor even the most important. 
it were an enemy capital.""^ For this one ostensible reason, they violated centuries of 
tradition, interfered directly in civilian politics, and instigated Rome's first civil war. It is 
hard to overstate the importance of the implications that flowed from that decision of the 
army to underwrite Sulla's argument with his political enemies. Sulla may have rationalised 
that he was restoring the traditions of republican political culture, and curbing the power of 
political demagogues,""" especially the tribunate, but the republican system he restored was 
never the same again, and would not long survive his own death. 
The belief that the late-republican citizen-militia would engage in sedition, risk civil war, 
and support insurrectionist generals for material advancement, whether donatives, booty or 
land grants, permeated ancient attempts - during the late-republican period and the later 
imperial era - to explain and understand not only why Sulla's soldiers turned against the 
state, but the larger question of the Republic's descent into civil strife, and its eventual 
extinction. It was a view that appears to have been close in space and time to the events 
upon which it draws; it was largely set, for example, by the first century BC, when some of 
our most contemporary sources, C. Sallustius Crispus and M. Tullius Cicero, were writing, 
and followed implicitly by later imperial-era writers to a greater or lesser extent, some of 
whom, such as Appian, provide cogent narratives of the lead up to Sulla's march on Rome. 
In his explanation for the intervention of 88 BC, and more broadly for why late-republican 
armies followed their generals into civil war, for example, Appian""' was an exemplar of 
There is, however, some evidence, albeit inconclusive, that Sulla's soldiers may also have been concerned 
about the manner of his removal from the Mithridatic command; see Chapter Eight below for the analysis of 
this evidence and its significance. 
Keaveney, 2005, pp. 56 f f It is an irony, considering the irreversible consequences for the Republic of 
Sulla's actions in 88 BC, that Keaveney calls Sulla the "last republican". Sulla may have considered himself a 
republican, but the reality of his actions and the subsequent consequences for the state - transgressing the 
bounds of traditional political behavior as he did - was quite a different matter (see Chapter Seven below). 
For example, Flower argues that Sulla's actions meant nothing less than the end of republican government 
and its political culture, which had taken shape in the late fourth century BC (Flower, 2010(a), pp. 80 ff; 
Flower, 2010(b), pp. 92 f f ) . Traditional government came to an end with Sulla's march on Rome in 88 BC, 
and the subsequent civil war; as a political watershed, it was stark, and resulted in a political construction that 
was different from any that had come before. While I agree with Flower on the significance of the 
consequences of the events of 88 BC, I argue that the watershed in political behaviour, especially the 
emergence of political violence, occurred long before 88 BC (see Chapter Seven below). I also contest her 
exclusivist focus on the actions of the governing elite as an explanation for the emergence of civil war; 1 argue 
instead that any holistic analysis should also include the motivations of the soldiers, since nothing could have 
been achieved without their support (see Chapter Eight below). 
Nevertheless, Appian, the most expansive narrator for the events at Nola in 88 BC, and on the civil war 
period more generally, is conventionally regarded as one of the more reliable sources (for example, see de 
Blois, 2008, p. 170). An ardent admirer of Rome and a stout conservative, his contribution to our 
understanding of the events of 88 BC and the events immediately preceding it, stems primarily from his 
this perspective, and his explanation was entirely consistent with its key tenets. He believed 
that pecuniary self-interest, and the rise of material inducement as the principal factor 
motivating soldiers, not only undermined traditional notions of military service, but 
dominated the relationship between commander and soldier in the late-republican armies.'*'" 
In Appian's view, soldiers no longer served in the common interest to meet their civic 
obligation, but exclusively for commanders who enlisted them, and to satisfy their own 
desire to profit from war."*"*^  
Rather than a nuanced perspective which allowed for other influences, there was instead a 
persistent emphasis on a simple financial arrangement between commander and his men 
that explained how an unscrupulous general could corrupt the army and align it with his 
personal political agenda. It is present in the belief, for example, that the inducement of 
material gain was the dominant factor motivating M. Antonius' army in the civil war that 
followed the assassination of C. lulius Caesar in the middle of the first century BC: in hac 
tarn dispari ratione belli miserrimum illud est quod ille latronibus suis pollicetur primim 
domos - urbem enim divisurum se confirmat - deinde omnibus portis quo velint 
deducturum.'^*'^ The imperial-era Greek historian, L. Cassius Dio, also focuses on the 
transactional relationship between general and soldier; although not specifically referring to 
events of 88 BC, rather to the civil wars of the mid first century BC, he nevertheless 
follows a familiar pattern, and emphasises the larger dynamic that he believes existed 
between money, soldiers, and the preservation of power in the late Republic. These two 
attempt to choose and carefully organise his material from a number of Greek and Latin sources, in his 
continuous narrative of the civil war period, and in his preservation of social and economic information 
relevant to the events he was describing. 
In this chapter, I term this working relationship between soldier and general in the army the ' command 
relationship'. It encapsulates concepts such as the lawftil legitimacy of the commander to order, punish, 
reward and direct citizens while they were in service. There was also a pecuniary element of the traditional 
command relationship: Roman soldiers always expected their generals to provide opportunities for them to 
profit from war (see Chapters Four and Eight below). The conventional view, as I will show, distorts the 
pecuniary element of the traditional command relationship, elevating it in importance above all other factors 
as an explanation for the behavior of both commanders and soldiers in late-republican armies, especially those 
engaged in civil war and sedition. 
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Cic., Phil. 8.9; "In this quite different conception of war by the two sides, the most despicable aspects are 
the promises he [Antonius] is making to his cutthroats: first our town houses - for he assures them that he will 
divide up the city - that that he will lead them out of all the city gates and settle them wherever they wish." 
M. Tullius Cicero was writing of soldiers more than 40 years after Sulla's first march on Rome, at a time 
when any reluctance to fight fellow citizens had long gone. But his opinion is valuable as a reflection on the 
motivations that, he thought, impelled Antonius' men: consistent with the conventional view, it is entirely 
what they can get materially out of the arrangement. 
things - material rewards and soldiers - create, preserve and perpetuate the domination of 
individuals over the state, and they remain dependent on each other."*^" 
The moralising"^' first century BC Roman historian, Sallust, reflects these themes of 
pecuniary self-interest as the primary factor influencing soldiers of the late Republic when 
he analyses the actions of Marius in 107 BC; in that case, he considers that economic 
considerations were crucial in motivating the poor serving in the army. It was the anti-
timocratic act of acceptance into the army of previously-ineligible poor that represented the 
primary political danger: he warns of a nexus between the poor in service, the impulse to 
improve their economic condition which naturally followed, and the exploitation of this 
desire by unscrupulous generals seeking to suborn the army for their own political ends. An 
unscrupulous politician and ambitious general such as Marius, for example, was wise to 
cultivate the poor, for they would naturally and necessarily do anything for money: et 
homini potentiam quaerenti egentissumus quisque opportunissumus, cui neque sua cara. 
qiiippe quae nulla sunt, et omnia cum pretio honesta videntur.'^^^ Along with pecuniary 
self-interest, the leitmotif of military service, at least as it refres to Marius' army, is thus the 
presence of the poor. The poor were the new factor, and the consequences of their inclusion 
fundamentally changed the character of the army. Sallust believes, for example, that the 
demographic composition of the army changed at the end of the second century BC: during 
I note, for example, that Sallust's main theme in his works was dechne; for example: At contra quis est 
moribus, quin divitiis et sumptibus, non probitate neque industria cum maioribus suis contendatl "On the 
contrary, in these degenerate days, who does not vie with his ancestors in riches and extravagance rather than 
in uprightness and diligence?" (Sal. lug. 4). This is evident in his second work, Bellum lugurthinum, where 
Sallust depicts this period as the time when the arrogance of the nobility was first challenged. He has 
limitations as a historian; his themes of moral decline and decay are presented unsubtly. His fundamental 
conclusions are also open to query: he described, for example, the last decade of the second century BC as the 
time when the governing elite was first challenged. Yet, in my view, it was in fact in 151 BC, with the 
imprisonment of the consuls by an assertive tribune over the levy for the war in Spain, that the relative 
harmony between the senate, governing elite and ordinary citizens first started to unravel (Liv., Per. 48; see 
also Chapter Seven below). By the time of the Gracchi, there was outright disharmony and conflict, but there 
is no significant reflection of that in Sallust's works. Yet, despite this, he is still an important and influential 
source; it is largely through him that the Marian recruitment reform attains its historical status, and his detail 
on the operations of the late-republican army is valuable (for example, it is during Sallust's account of the war 
against Jugurtha that the use of triarii is last recorded in a Roman army: Sal., lug. 50; see Chapter Five 
below). Sallust also attempted to go beyond the simple recitation of events and to explain their meaning and 
larger consequences for the state. His comment at Sal., lug. 86 is a case in point. 
Sal. lug. 86: "For one who aspires to power, the poorest man is the most helpful; since he has none, he has 
no regard for his property, and considers anything honourable for which he receives payment." He may be 
referring specifically to Marius, but given that Sallust's stated aim at the start of his narrative about the war 
with Jugurtha was to illustrate the broader decline of standards and morals in society at the time (Sal. lug. 2-
5.), 1 argue he is also making a larger comment about the type of recuit that was responsible for the moral 
decline of the army. 
the bellum lugurthinum*^^ and specifically following the Marian recruitment reform of 107 
BC.'*''' From this point on, the presence of the proletarii was increasingly a fact of service 
life.'*^^ According to Sallust, this period, and the war against Jugurtha, was a catalyst for all 
the civil strife that followed. This began during the war, and it was the reason Sallust 
focusses his literary attention upon it: quae contentio divina et humana cunda permiscuit 
eoque vecordiae process it, ut studiis civilibus bellum at que vastitas Italiae finem faceret.*^^ 
According to this view, the emergence of pecuniary self-interest, something new in late-
republican military service, was thus both the reason insurrectionist generals could suborn 
the army, and the primary factor which motivated soldiers to support them in their personal 
inimicitiae. Its nexus with the influx of poor soldiers into the legions, also something 
unprecedented, created insurrectionist armies that could be exploited by their generals, and 
which had no fear of the civil consequences of their actions, particularly the risk of 
instigating civil war. Seditious generals and their opponents on the edge of momentous 
events might also include non-pecuniary factors in their appeals to soldiers, such as 
injustice, constitutional legalities, or the defence of the s t a t e . C i c e r o could thus argue that 
nos libertatem nostris militibus. leges, iura, indicia, imperium orbis terrae, dignitatem, 
pacem, otium pollicemur*^^ and the insurrectionist commander, L. Sergius Catilina, could 
invoke the public interest in pre-battle rhetoric to his soldiers in 62 BC at Pistoria: nos pro 
patria, pro libertate, pro vita certamus, illis supervacuaneum est pro potentia paucorum 
pugnare.'^^'^ By this time, however, sentiments like these were not the main drivers; 
according to the conventional view, inducement which appealed to the pecuniary self-
interest of soldiers dominated. 
An account of the difficult and protracted war fought in Africa between Rome and the Numidian prince, 
Jugurtha, in the last decade of the second century BC. 
1 will cover the significance of Marius and his 107 BC dilectus to the conventional explanation for 
intervention later in this chapter. 
" " Sal., lug. 86. 
Sal. lug. 5: "The beginning of a struggle which threw everything, human and divine, into confusion, and 
rose to such a pitch of frenzy that civil discord ended in war and the devastation of Italy." 
Such arguments, indeed, tell us much about what privileged and educated Romans believed motivated the 
ordinary soldier of the late Republic, especially those involved in civil war - or those armies about to risk it. 
Cic., Phil. 8.9: "We promise our soldiers freedom, laws, justice, law courts, dominion over the world, 
dignity, peace and tranquility." 
Sal., Car. 58: "We are fighting for country, for freedom, for life; theirs is a fijtile contest, to uphold the 
power of a few men." 
The Conventional Explanation: The Ancillary Effect of Moral Decay 
In the view of ancient authors, pecuniary self-interest as an explanation why late-republican 
armies engaged in sedition and civil war was in turn part manifestation and symptom of a 
broader civil malaise: moral and ethical decay which weakened and corrupted Roman 
public life. The feeling that the late Republic faced a deep moral crisis was invoked as part 
of the explanation to help rationalise the emergence of politically interventionist soldiers, to 
explain changes that occurred in the army - and as a broader reason for the endemic 
military violence of the late Republic. It was persistent in rationales of violence and civil 
strife that, I propose, probably reflected the anxieties of those who wrote them:'*''' the sense 
of the Romans themselves that decay of morals and public life played a part in the political 
and social turbulence of the late Republic. Significantly, the moralising attempted to 
establish a causal relationship between the rise of soldiers willing to risk - and engage in -
civil war, and moral degeneration, corruption, foreign luxuries in the army and society -
and the pervasive obsession with increasing personal wealth at all costs. 
For Sallust, the obsession with money and power, along with a concomitant decline in civic 
morals and increase in public corruption, underpinned his rationale for the emergence of 
interventionist soldiers, and the subsequent decline of the Republic.''^' He attempted to 
explain the emergence in 88 BC of the new factor present in the traditional pathways of 
power and position: the use of organised military violence by the army. He lamented that 
avarice, unbridled ambition and love of power were the dominant civic 'virtues' of the late 
Republic, adversely comparing morals at that time with traditional republican virtues: boni 
mores, minuma avaritia, ius bomimqtie, audacia in bello.*^' Sallust believed that the 
transition from noble to ignoble, good to bad in public life, and honour to dishonour, not 
only changed the nature of Roman society, but provided the circumstances in which civil 
strife could thrive: igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit; ea quasi materies 
omnium malorum fuere. Namque avaritia fidem, probitatem ceterasque artis bonas 
subvortit: pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, decs neglegere, omnia venalia habere 
For more on the subject of anxiety, and its manifestation in Roman texts, see Edwards, 1993, pp. 176 ff. 
Batstone, 2010. pp. 57 f f 
Sal., Cat. 9: "good morals, minimum avarice, justice and probity, boldness in war." For a full description 
of what Sallust considered to be traditional republican virtues, see Sal., Cal. 8, 9. 
edocuit. Central to Sallust's critique was the judgment that pursuit of money per se was 
the dominant corrupting influence, whether manifested by the poor serving in the army, or 
among ambitious members of the governing elite in public life. Returning to this key 
theme,"'" he reserved particular censure for Sulla and his mercenary soldiers, asking 
whether, with seditious generals and mercenary soldiers: ne illi corruptis moribus vidoriae 
temperarenl?'"'^ 
Sallust's critique of Sulla embodied themes familiar to the conventional view: Sulla secured 
the army's loyalty, now filled with the poor, by appealing to its pecuniary self-interest. 
There was also, however, a moralising element to the criticism: exposure to enervating 
luxury, easy victories, and foreign temptations, corrupted the army, led to a decline of 
spirit, morale and discipline, and made it easier for Sulla to suborn it to his political 
agenda."'"'' Sulla's army was not the first to indulge in rapacious sacking or insubordinate 
behaviour while on campaign:"" in 146 BC, during fighting for the Carthaginian harbour of 
Cothon in Africa, troops of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus stopped to sack the 
temple of Apollo, looting the gold, and ignoring the commands of their officers."''® Sallust's 
point, however, was unambiguous: the army had a special role in the moral turpitude 
infecting the Republic. Returning to Italy from overseas campaigns, it transmitted 
Sal., Cat. 10: "Hence, the lust for money first, then for power, grew upon them; these were, I may say, the 
root of all evils. For avarice destroyed honour, integrity, and all other noble qualities; taught in their place 
insolence, cruelty, to neglect the gods, to set a price on everything." 
For example, again at Sal., Cat. 11: "Avaritia pecuniae studium habet, quam nemo sapiens concupivit; ea 
quasi venenis malis imbuta corpus animumque virilem effeminat, semper infinita, insatiabilis est, neque copia 
neque inopia minuitur." "Avarice implies a desire for money, which no wise man covets; steeped as it were 
with noxious poisons, it renders the most manly body and soul effeminate; it is unbounded and insatiable, nor 
can plenty or want make it less." 
Sal., Cat. 11: "how then can men of corrupted character like this make a moderate use of their victory?" 
Sal., Cat. 11: Sed postquam L. Sulla armis recepta re publica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit, rapere 
omnes, trahere. domum alius alius agros cupere, neque modum neque modestiam victores habere, foeda 
crudeliaque in civis facinora facere. Hue accedebat quod L. Sulla exercitum quern in Asia ductaverat, quo 
sibifidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat. Loca amoena, voluptaria 
facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant. Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare; ea 
privatim et publice rapere, delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere. "But after Lucius Sulla, 
having captured the state by force of arms, from a good beginning brought everything to a bad end, all men 
began to rob and pillage. One coveted a house, another lands; the victors showed neither moderation nor 
restraint, but shamefully and cruelly wronged their fellow citizens. Besides all this, Lucius Sulla, in order to 
secure the loyalty of the army which he led into Asia, had allowed it luxury and license foreign to the ways of 
our forefathers, and in the intervals of leisure those charming and voluptuous lands easily demoralised the 
warlike spirit of his soldiers. There it was that an army of the Roman people first learned to indulge in women 
and drink, to admire statues, paintings and chased vases, to steal them from private houses and public places, 
to pillage shrines and to desecrate everything, both sacred and profane." 
For more on the army's record of insubordination and mutiny, see Chapter Six below. 
App., ft/n. 127. 
corrupting influences into broader society; for Sallust, this process began with the military 
campaign against the Carthaginians in 146 BC.'*'' Other ancient authors, although they 
disagreed on dates, also believed that soldiers, exposed to enervating foreign influences, 
could act as a conduit into society for corrupting morals when they returned to Italy, 
disbanded, and rejoined civic life. Livy, for example, dated the start of the decline in morals 
to the return of Cn. Manlius Vulso's army in 187 BC after defeating the Gauls of Asia,"™ 
while Polybius wrote that the army was first corrupted by eastern influences, such as Greek 
laxity, during the campaign in 168 BC to defeat the Macedonian king Perseus."" This topos 
reflected the belief that service overseas, and exposure to foreign influences, first corrupted 
the army, then weakened its discipline, and finally allowed the conditions for pecuniary 
self-interest to emerge as the dominate motivating factor of late-republican service. 
Sallust was not alone in moralising in the first century BC about moral decay, or linking it 
to the emergence of interventionist armies. The early imperial Roman poet, M. Annaeus 
Lucanus, believed moral decay was the direct cause of civil war. By his logic, excess of 
wealth corrupted public morality, and led to unbridled ambition, a sense that 'might was 
right', and a willingness to surmount traditional bounds of political behaviour, the law, and 
the interests of the state, to achieve financial and personal success."'^ The poet's moralising 
critique on the causes of civil war and the emergence of soldiers willing to fight it focussed 
not only on the influence of moral decay among the major actors of the governing elite, 
such as Caesar or Pompey, but also the effect it had on ordinary citizens, who manned the 
a r m y : suberant: sed publico belli / semina, quae poptilos semper mersere potentes.'^^^ T h e y 
too shared the blame for the emergence of late-republican civil strife. Lucan followed a 
familiar path:"'" others also blamed a deterioration of Roman character for the outbreak of 
""Sal. , Car. 10. 
™ Liv. 39.6. 
"" Plb. 31.25. 
Luc. 1.160-167: Namque, iit opes nimias mimdo fortuna subacto / intulit et rebus mores cessere secundis,/ 
praedaque et hostiles iuxum suasere rapinaej non aura tectisve modus, mensasque priores / aspernata fames: 
cultus gestare decoros / vix nuribus rapuere mares: feciwda virorum / paupertas fugitur totoque accersilw 
orbe / quo gem quaeque perit./ "For when Rome conquered the world and fortune showered excess wealth 
upon her, virtue was supplanted by prosperity, and the spoil taken from the enemy lured men to extravagance: 
they set no limit to their wealth or their dwellings; greed rejected the food that once sufficed; men seized 
garments to use scarcely decent for women to wear; poverty, that creator of manhood, became a bugbear, and 
from all the earth was brought the special bane of each nation." 
^ Luc. 1.158-159: "But the causes of war were hidden among the common people too; the causes which have 
always brought ruin upon the powerful nations." 
" " For an excellent summary of Lucan's conception of civil war, see Fantham, 2010, pp. 207 ff. 
civil war. Livy, for example, argued that empire and extravagance led to a relaxation of 
discipline at the personal level,"" a decline in public morals, and a concomitant descent 
into civil strife."*'® The early imperial historical writer, Velleius Paterculus, reflected 
Lucan's emphasis on the causes of internal moral decay found in imperial expansion and 
victory: potentiae Romanorum prior Scipio viam aperuerat, luxuriate posterior aperuit: 
quippe remoto Carthaginis metu sublataque imperii aemula nan gradu, sed praecipiti 
cursu a virtute descitum, ad vitia transcursum; vetus disciplina deserta, nova inducta; in 
somnum a vigiliis, ab armis ad voluptates, a negotiis in otium conversa civitas.'*^^ To some, 
adultery and neglect of religion amongst ordinary citizens of the late Republic also had a 
role in moral decline and societal collapse which manifested itself in armies willing to 
engage in civil war. The late first century BC lyric poet, Q. Horatius Flaccus, lamented that 
vice had, by his time, produced a degenerate and inferior generation, unlike their stout and 
morally upright ancestors who had defeated Carthage and won Rome its empire; this was 
the primary cause of the civil war and the turmoil which befell the Republic."'^ 
The Conventional Explanation: The Pivotal Role of C. Marius 
An important part of the conventional explanation for intervention is the role traditionally 
ascribed to the late second century BC general and military reformer, C. Marius. According 
to this view, firmly set through writers such as Sallust by the late-republican era, Marius 
transformed the army by discarding the timocratic property qualification for legionary 
service with fatal results for the Republic, allowing the poorest of society into the army, 
and thus infecting it with a mercenary spirit which unscrupulous generals subsequently 
exploited.''^' 
""" Velleius Paterculus also believed personal vices could have significant implications for history. For 
example, he blamed by name the corrupt tribune, C. Curio, for doing as much as anyone to start the civil war 
between Pompey and Caesar: Bella autem civili et lot, quae deinde per conlinuos viginti annos comecuta 
sunt, matis non alius maiorem flagrantioremque quam C. Curio tribunus plebis subiecit facem (Veil. 2.48). 
"It was Gaius Curio, however, a tribune of the people, who more than anyone else, applied the flaming torch 
which kindled the civil war, and all the evils which followed for twenty consecutive years." 
""Liv . 1.9. 
" " Veil. 1.17; "The first Scipio opened the way of world power for Rome, the second opened the way for 
luxury. When Rome was freed of the fear of Carthage, and her rival for empire was gone, the path of virtue 
was abandoned for that of corruption, not gradually, but in a headlong rush. The older discipline gave way to 
the new; the state passed from vigilance to slumber, from the pursuit of arms to the pursuit of pleasure, from 
activity to idleness." 
Hor., Carm, 3.6. 
" " Sal., lug. 86; Flor, Epit. 1.36; Plut., Mar. 9; Gel. 16.10. 
In 107 BC, during the difficult war against Jugurtha, Marius was elected consul for the first 
time and conducted a dilectus'^^" to raise new recruits to reinforce the army campaigning in 
Africa. The use of the dilectus to enrol new soldiers was routine, but, according to Sallust, 
Marius did something unexpected: ipse interea milites scribere, non more maiorum neque 
ex classibus, sed uti cuiusque lubido era!, capite censos plerosque."'^^ The core of Sallust's 
criticism of Marius was that with this single reform he introduced into the increasingly 
competitive arena of Roman politics the one weapon unscrupulous generals needed to 
dominate the governing elite and seize control of the state: a volunteer army of proletarii, 
their impecunious condition giving them little stake in the established Republic, and willing 
to fight other Romans in civil war to advance the political interests of their general in return 
for material reward.'*®^ The imperial-era Roman miscellanist, Aulus Gellius, also 
emphasised the unprecedented nature of Marius' abolition of the Servian property 
threshold:"^^ capite censos autem primus C. Marius, ut quidam ferimt bello Cimbrico, 
difficillimis reipublicae temporibus, vel potius, ut Sallustius ait, bello lugurthino, milites 
scripsisse traditur, cum id factum ante in nulla memoria extaret.*^* The early imperial-era 
Greek philosopher and biographer, L. Mestrius Plutarchus, however, was more expansive: 
Marius' act of enlisting many poor and insignificant men into the army was against law and 
custom, and had been rejected by previous commanders who were careful to arm only those 
whose wealth, it was thought, gave them an interest in the continued wellbeing of the 
republican state."'^ For Plutarch, abandoning the property qualification thus inverted the 
timocratic tradition, undermining the basis of the civic obligation to serve. 
According to the conventional view, Marius thus discarded centuries of precedent and 
tradition, and the transactional compact between general and soldier was consequently 
altered. A reflection of this change in the command relationship could possibly be read into 
Marius' priorities when he returned to Africa. There was, for example, a need to train 
Dilectus-. the traditional and orderly selection of recruits in the annual business of raising Rome's legions. 
See Chapter Two above for more information. 
Sal., lug. 86: "In the meantime, he himself enrolled soldiers, not according to the manner of the forefathers 
and not from the classes, but allowing anyone to volunteer, for the most part the proletariat." 
Et homini potentiam quaerenti egentissumus quisque opportunissumus, cui neque sua cam. quippe quae 
nulla sunt, el omnia cum pretio honesta videntur (Sal., lug. 86; also see above). 
See Chapter Two above. 
Gel. 16.10: "Gaius Marius is said to have been the first to have enrolled soldiers from the capite censi, 
according to some in the war against the Cimbri in a most critical time for our country, or more probably, as 
Sallust said, in the war against Jugurtha, since such an act was unheard of before that time." 
Plut., Mar. 9. 
recruits, integrate them into existing formations, and raise their confidence; this Marius did 
in a series of small actions designed to gradually expose and familiarise them to the 
experience of war. With the army now reinforced with the poor, however, he also needed to 
enrich them; one of the first things he did was to march them into fertile districts, rich with 
booty and where minimal resistance was expected, and gave to them all that was 
captured."^® The necessity of enriching soldiers was as important a priority as ensuring the 
recruits were adequately trained; to build their confidence, and to guarantee that there was 
booty to distribute, Marius was carefiil to attack only those towns and fortresses that were 
not well defended. 
Marius' act is thus important to the conventional explanation because of the fundamental 
change it introduced for participation in the military system. It admitted into service, for 
example, an influx of previously-ineligible volunteer poor, creating the conditions for 
pecuniary self-interest to subsequently emerge as primary motivator. I argue that at the 
heart of the conventional critique of Marius was that his reform changed the makeup of the 
army: from this point on, impoverished soldiers increasingly joined, and the army came to 
reflect less the propertied citizen, and more the proletarii. In this way, it could undermine 
the timocratic ideal that linked citizenship, and possession of a minimum amount of wealth, 
to assumptions of commitment and loyalty to the state in times of war. Moreover, it 
accelerated the evolution of the army into a vocational institution, concerned primarily with 
what it could gain materially from war, and which subsequently looked to commanders, not 
the state, for remuneration and opportunities for material gain. This necessarily changed the 
nature of the covenant between soldier and general, increasing the importance of the 
pecuniary aspect of their command relationship. The result was to make it easier for 
unscrupulous and seditious generals to use material inducement to align the army's interests 
with their own political ambitions. Marius, with his 107 BC recruitment reform, thus 
created the conditions in which politically interventionist soldiers were able to emerge. 
' Sal., lug. 87. 
Modem Interpretations of Intervention: Reflecting the Conventional View 
Modem Interpretations of Intervention: Pecuniary Self-Interest and Moral Decay 
Brunt wrote that "the historian of Rome can be likened to a man standing at the entrance of 
a cavern of vast and unmeasured dimensions, much of it impenetrably dark, but here and 
there illuminated by a few flickering candles.""^^ Like Brunt's candles in the vast cave of 
Roman historiography, modem explanations for intervention have attempted to cast light on 
the reasons why the army, after centuries of seemingly apolitical s e r v i c e , d e c i d e d to 
intervene in political discourse and engage in civil war. What is notable is the degree to 
which modem explanations in much of scholarship adhere to the ancient, conventional 
view: soldiers intervened overwhelmingly for pecuniary reasons. Martin, for example, 
argues that Sulla's men obeyed him, and marched on Rome in 88 BC, because of the 
economic benefits that Sulla could provide them; their economic relationship with Sulla is 
what both motivated them, and defined their obligation to him."^' This dynamic, according 
to Martin, is what largely delineates late-republican military service."'" 
Martin was writing in 2012, but the view he adheres to has long persisted. Syme, in a now 
dated analysis, argues nevertheless that the danger to the Republic came from poor soldiers 
recruited into the army, who looked toward service and their commanders for economic 
gain; this was the new factor of late-republican military service."" Brunt is more expansive, 
but still an exemplary proponent and shaper of the conventional view: for him, motivation 
of poor soldiers in late-republican service could be reduced to a simple pecuniary desire for 
material gain, primarily booty, money and land. For this, late-republican armies in general, 
and Sulla's army in particular, were willing to risk civil war with fellow citizens, intervene 
" " Brunt, 1988, p. 92. 
In Chapter Six below, 1 will argue that rather than being a politically disinterested institution, the evidence 
suggests instead that citizen-militia had a long tradition of political activism, rebellion against the state for 
non-pecuniary reasons, and a strong historical understanding of its own insubordination in civic cause. In 
short, 1 argue that it was unlikely that the army was ever completely disinterested in political or social themes 
running in broader society. 1 will argue that this tradition would be important outside Nola in 88 BC as a 
framework against which Sulla's soldiers could contextualise and rationalise his invitation to become 
involved in his personal poHtical inimicUiae (for more on the events at Nola, see Chapter Eight below). 
Martin, 2012, pp. 96 and 97. 
" '"Mart in, 2012, p. 92. 
" " Syme, 1939, p. 15. 
in the personal immicitiae of generals, and follow them into civil war, irrespective of the 
cause they professed to represent: 
These soldiers had 'no stake in the country'; they were ready to take any opportunity of 
enriching themselves. The prospect of booty induced them to join up with Marius in 107 
and obey Sulla's orders to march on Rome in 88; at all times they would seek plunder, 
donatives, rises in pay; but what they most desired was some assurance of a livelihood 
after discharge, and it was natural for them to look for this in the competency of a holding 
of land." ' -
Brunt's analysis of why late-republican soldiers engaged in sedition rests upon the 
perceived consequences of long-term financial decline and pecuniary hardship: it is, at its 
core, an economic argument. The inducement to act against the state was helped by an 
unsympathetic senate; the disloyalty exhibited by soldiers in 88 BC was encouraged by a 
senate which had done nothing to improve the economic situation of this class of poor 
soldier."'^ According to Brunt, however, the causes of insurrection were mainly found in 
the impoverishment of the rural poor who manned the legions. The decline of the fanning 
class was observable by 133 BC;"'" the increasing scarcity of public land to augment the 
incomes of small land holders, a rising population, and the growing economic power of the 
rich, placed the small farmer under increasing stress. The demands of expanding empire, 
and the concomitant need to maintain armies further afield for longer, sharpened divisions 
between the governing elite and ordinary citizens, especially the small land holder upon 
whom the legions had relied for centuries. The rich, for example, benefited from expanding 
empire, and the "profits of warfare, government and public contracting now furnished the 
rich with large sums to invest, which they preferred to put into the aggrandizement of their 
holdings of land.""'' Brunt notes that rural citizen-soldiers also benefited materially from 
increased opportunities for booty that expanding empire provided, but he maintains that far 
more were ruined by service overseas."'® He argues that two to three years in the legions, 
away from his fields, was enough time to ruin a small farmer; army service thus had the 
potential to reduce a man of some property to the same economic level as his proletarian 
comrades."'^ There were efforts to revive the farming class by giving them more land: for 
" ' -Brunt , 1988, p. 77. 
" " B r u n t , 1988, pp. 37 f f 
Brunt, 1988, p. 246. 
Brunt, 1988, p. 73. 
"""Brunt, 1988, p. 73. 
" " Brunt, 1988, p. 75. 
example, through the land laws of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 133 BC.*"® These efforts did 
not, however, remove the cause of their poverty: changed conditions of military service 
associated with longer overseas campaigns were inimical to the interests of the small 
landholder. As a result, there was a gradual impoverishment of the citizen-soldier serving in 
the legions."" By the start of the first century BC, this was so commonplace that the army's 
primary imperative became its own economic self-interest, a new factor in the late 
Republic.'"" The chronic economic condition of the soldiers was thus exploited by seditious 
generals to threaten and subvert the Republic.'"' 
Brunt does acknowledge the possibility of other factors acting upon the motivations of late-
republican soldiers, including political and constitutional issues.'®^ He points to the political 
slogans and themes of injustice found in rhetoric to soldiers as evidence of this.'"' In the 
end, however. Brunt downplays the influence of non-pecuniary factors in persuading 
soldiers to risk civil war by becoming involved in the personal inimicitiae of their generals, 
or as a rationale to follow them into civil war. He argues that political issues and slogans 
were not, for example, a wholly negligible factor in determining the attitude of soldiers, but 
they were rarely, if ever, decisive.'"'' Brunt remains a proponent of the conventional view: 
See Rosenstein, 2004, p. 169. 
" " On this point, see Adams, 2007, pp. 204-25, and Chapter Two above. 
In support of Brunt 's analysis, it has to be acknowledged that the sources reflect the idea of a soldiery 
under economic stress. In the second half of the second century BC, Ti. Gracchus drew attention to the 
apparently poor economic situation of the common soldiery by pointing out that it even wild beasts have a 
cave to live in, while soldiers who fight and die for Italy have the air to breathe, but nothing else; destitute, 
they wandered around with their families (Plut., TG. 9). Around the same time, there were other indicators of 
financial strain in the army. C. Sempronius Gracchus proposed a military law in 123 BC which forbade the 
state from making deductions for clothing from a soldier's pay (Plut., CG 6). The same law also made it 
illegal to recruit anyone under seventeen. For a further discussion on the significance of C. Gracchus' laws in 
relation to the question of the poor in military service, see Chapter Four below. 
Brunt, 1962, p. 84. 
Brunt, 1962, p. 75. 
" " For example. Brunt argues that L. Cornelius Cinna in 87 BC appealed to the army with bribes, saymg that 
his removal violated popular sovereignty. In 82 BC, Sulla guaranteed the rights of the new citizens and 
professed to stand for a compromised peace. Both Caesar and the Pompeians spoke, however insincerely, of 
their attachment to the Republic and the constitution, and addressed such propaganda to their armies (Brunt, 
1962, p. 76). In my estimation. Brunt is right on this point: generals trained and skilled in rhetoric presumably 
would not have used political or constitutional hooks in their exhortations, nor themes of injustice, if they did 
not think it would have had a persuasive effect on the audience. An almost formulaic style of address to 
troops, which has at its core a persuasive brew of injustice and constitutional rectitude mixed with naked 
appeal's to self-interest, becomes evident at critical moments in many of the exhortations made by powerful 
generals ultimately acting in their own interest. For a ftirther discussion on the place and significance of non-
pecuniary persuasions to late-republican soldiers, see Chapter Four below. 
Brunt, 1962, p. 76. 
the desire of the army to benefit materially was responsible for allowing seditious generals 
to use it for their own political agendas.'"^ 
Gabba, in English translation, also places pecuniary self-interest at the centre of his 
rationale for the behaviour of ordinary citizens in late-republican armies: the soldier was an 
economic creature attracted to service by what he could materially gain, and not much else: 
The impulses and sentiments of the masses must have been influenced only by 
considerations of an economic kind: stipendium, the booty which followed a war, and 
finally a plot of land as a reward for service. The last, though, was regarded not only and 
not always as a means of returning to a comfortable life in the country but as a piece of 
capital which could be readily realized. All these economic considerations would have 
exercised the strongest attractions for the masses.'"' 
Like Brunt, Gabba argues that the nature of military service changed during the late 
Republic, changes that were exploited by ambitious generals: a gradual impoverishment of 
the army's recruits occurred, so there emerged a concomitant need to provide for them 
during and after service. This elevated the importance of pecuniary self-interest as the 
primary motivator for the behaviour of soldiers: Gabba describes this new reality of late-
republican military service as the "veteran problem".^*" He claims that there was never a 
need to provide for soldiers at the end of their service under the timocratic system;^"* this 
changed when continuous service was gradually lengthened as a result of expanding empire 
and wars fought further from Italy. The consequences of this for the economic position of 
soldiers were severe. Gabba argues that an incompatibility, for example, rose between part-
time service, embodied by the foundational principles of the citizen-militia, and the needs 
of expanding empire, which demanded from ordinary citizens longer periods of continuous 
Brunt, 1988, p. 77: "They depended on their generals to provide for their interests. But the generals in turn 
depended on them to enforce their own will on the state. Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, the triumvirs, and Augustus 
himself all owed their power to their troops, and it was primarily by enriching them, and especially by 
promises and grants of land, that they secured their allegiance." 
Gabba, 1976, p. 25. 
Gabba, 1976, pp. 37 ff Gabba is, however, incorrect to argue that the timocratic system did not provide 
for soldiers after service. As I will show in Chapter Four below, the system had built into it a long-standing 
expectation that generals would provide opportunities for soldiers to enrich themselves while on service, and 
also to provide more direct material donatives to the army. Moreover, it was not the first time the timocratic 
system had encountered the necessity to provide for soldiers who had served for long periods overseas. Land 
distributions made to veterans at the start of the second century BC suggested that the senate at least 
acknowledged that extended continuous service abroad could weaken the economic status of the citizen-
militia, long before the problems of the late Republic almost a century later. It was a rare occurrence, but 
nevertheless, at the end of the long Hannibalic War, the state for the first time provided veterans who had 
served in Africa, Spain, Sardinia and Sicily two iugera of land for every year spent campaigning, mitigating 
the sharpest effects of continuous service and long absences from home (Liv. 31.4). See Chapter Four below. 
Gabba, 1976, p. 39. 
service.'"' The military system, which had always relied on small landholders of means to 
fill its ranks, could not adapt to the demands of empire without annulling one of the 
fundamental underpinnings of the citizen-militia: temporary, part-time service with the 
requirement to return the citizen-soldier home at the end of campaigning season. The 
consequence of this irreconcilability, according to Gabba, was a proletarianisation by the 
start of the first century BC of the small landholding class, and thus, of the army.' '" 
Soldiers who were poor at the start of their service, had nothing to fall back upon when 
discharged; '" faced with this reality, soldiers increasingly looked toward their generals to 
provide the economic security they needed: "This, together with the fact that their demands 
as soldiers were purely of an economic nature, had drained the army of all political 
character.""^ The overwhelming desire of poor soldiers to improve their economic 
condition was, in Gabba's view, the most significant consequence of the proletarianisation 
of the army: continuous military service and a proletarian army interested in material gain, 
together with the fact that generals changed less frequently, created bonds of an 
unprecedented nature, and joined general and soldier together in a relationship which was 
now inseparably connected with the military career of the general. ' ' ' 
An emphasis on the impoverishment of soldiers, the consequence of this for the command 
relationship, and the subsequent elevation of pecuniary self-interest as the major 
explanation for the behaviour of late-republican armies, is also found in the work of other 
scholars. Badian argues, for example, that a practical outcome of the influx of volunteer 
poor into service at the end of the second century BC was the creation of 'client' armies, 
where the interests of the men aligned perfectly with those of ambitious generals."" He 
Gabba, 1976, p. 23: "The continued service of soldiers under arms for long periods was fundamental here 
in that this was irreconcilable with the organisation of an army on the basis of a citizen militia." This is, by 
now, a familiar argument: Brunt also stresses the incompatibility of the needs of extended service with part-
time citizen-militia, as part of the rationale for the gradual impoverishment and decline of the rural class that 
formed the majority of Rome's armies. For a counter view, see Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 64 ff. 
Gabba, 1976, p. 23: "The composition of the citizen militia was radically altered in so far as its economic 
status declined along with that of the middle class adsidui (although in theory the soldiers always came CT 
classibiis) when, as 1 have already mentioned, the census minimum was reduced." 
For a perspective that argues against the demographic decline of the small landholding class during this 
period, see de Ligt, 2012, pp. 160 f f , and Chapter Two above. 
Gabba, 1976, p. 33 .1 fundamentally disagree with Gabba on whether the army was inherently a politically 
interested institution; for my argument, see Chapter Six below. 
Gabba, 1976, p. 26. 
Badian, 1970, pp. 15 ff. Badian's focus in his analysis of social, political and military relations m the 
Republic has at its core a well-published belief in the primacy, power and pervasive nature in Roman society 
of the client-patron relationship (for example, Badian, 1958, p. 2). Given that he sees political and social 
structures largely through the prism of the client-patron relationship, it is inevitable that he views the 
contends that this influx helped save the state in a series of military crises that could not 
have been met with the regular dilectus;^^^ but it also created client armies, and Sulla first 
saw its implications. According to Badian, the new armies had no stake in the res publico-, 
their subsequent sedition vindicated the timocratic system, and the importance of the 
transactional relationship meant generals, such as Marius, now had to provide for more of 
their soldiers.''® Beard and Crawford similarly believe that the emergence of a symbiotic 
relationship between poor soldier and ambitious general had critical consequences for the 
Republic. Most significantly, this nexus introduced into the political arena generals with 
armed forces that owed them personal loyalty; "a dangerous interdependence, which 
quickly turned explosive."' '^ Faithful to the conventional emphasis, this perspective rests 
on an assumption about the power of pecuniary self-interest to shape the actions of soldiers: 
the interests of soldiers could be aligned with unscrupulous generals because poor soldiers 
were overwhelmingly interested in material gain, and their loyalty could thus be secured 
with financial inducements. On a similar theme, Marin argues that the major change in the 
nature of late-republican military service was that soldiers increasingly looked to their 
commanders to provide financial rewards, such as donatives, booty and land.^'^ By 
satisfying this need, ambitious generals could thus rely on their troops when they felt their 
own personal ambitions were curtailed by other aristocratic figures, or to oppose a 
senatorial decision or manda te . ' " 
Hildinger also reflects ancient explanations closely, arguing that economic considerations 
alone persuaded Sulla's troops to support him. He argues that Sulla's troops were no more 
relationship between commander and soldier as part of the chent-patron dynamic (see also Lintott, 1999(b), p. 
182). Flower, writing in 2010, also uses the term 'client army' when referring to Sulla's legions (Flower, 
2010(b), p. 92. 
For a view which contests the idea that there was a decline in the effectiveness and frequency of the 
normal dilectus after Marius' 107 BC reform, see Rich, 1983, p. 329. Here Rich persuasively argues that 
Marius' approach appeared not to have been followed, and that large numbers of proletarii were thus not 
immediately recruited into the army. See also Chapter Four below. 
Badian, 1958, p. 205. As a case in point, Badian refers here to the nature of the new army that forced 
Marius in 100 BC to provide for more of his veterans by settling them in Africa. 
Beard & Crawford, 1985, p. 7. 
Marin, 2009, p. 173. I will examine more of Marin 's focus on this change in the command relationship 
between soldier and general as part of the discussion in Chapter Four below. For another, thoroughly 
conventional view on the importance of land and booty to late-republican soldiers, and the political 
consequences it had for the fate of the Republic, see Adams, 2007, p. 205. 
See Martin for a variation on this theme: he argues that this changed command relationship, based on what 
the soldiers could gain materially, created 'client armies' , loyal to their generals and not the state, and thus 
ready to obey the orders of their generals regardless of the wishes of the senate (Martin, 2012, 92). See also 
Flower, 2010(b), p. 92. 
happy than he was at the prospect of having the war against Mithridates taken away from 
him. War in poor countries, such as Spain, appalled citizen-soldiers, but the contrary 
prospect of losing a chance at war and booty in the richest part of the world had the same 
effect on the increasingly professional army. Sulla's legions saw themselves faced with the 
possibility that Marius would bring his own legions to Asia, and that the spoils would be 
theirs.'^" To safeguard its right to benefit materially from service, the army's support for 
Sulla's plan to impose a political solution upon the state was thus inevitable."' Meanwhile, 
Shotter argues that Sulla's rhetoric to his troops stressed an appeal to pecuniary self-
interest. In a conventional analysis recalling Badian's 'army of clients', Shotter argues that 
Sulla turned his army into a personal force by arguing that Marius would dismiss them, 
reinforced by the perception that the rewards under Marius' command would be far less 
substantial than under Sulla's.'^^ 
Unlike much of other scholarship, however, Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein soften the 
emphasis on pecuniary self-interest as a peculiarly late-republican characteristic of military 
service by noting that the desire to improve the economic condition was not necessarily 
n e w . " ' They also concede the possibility of a more complex set of motivations for the 
soldiers by arguing that the soldiers may have been equally animated by their 
understanding of where political legitimacy lay, as by material motives in their support of 
Sulla."' ' In particular, Morstein-Marx has argued recently that the issue of the consul's 
legitimacy in 88 BC, along with the desire to profit, was important to Sulla's soldiers, and 
Hildinger, 2002, p. 172. 
For a similar argument, see Santosuosso, 2001, p. 37. He argues that Sulla's soldiers were motivated out of 
a sense of safeguarding their financial interests; by the late Republic, the dominant cause of conflict for the 
army was material gain taken from anyone. 
Shotter, 2005, p. 41. As I point out in Chapter Eight below, according to Appian, Sulla did not actually 
mention the subject of booty or the replacement of the army at Nola, preferring instead to talk about the 
injustice done to his dignity and the constitutional crimes of his political opponents. I will argue, however, 
that he did not need to directly mention the subject of booty: the inference and threat was already clear to his 
men; Sulla's dilemma reminded them of their own precarious situation, although I will also argue that there 
were no real grounds for this fear. 
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, 2006, p. 632. Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein are somewhat unusual in 
scholarship as proponents of the conventional view in that they at least acknowledge that as an incentive, the 
desire to profit from war was not new in the late Republic. They do not, however, provide any new 
perspective on the motivations of the soldiers, nor do they extrapolate the implications of this 
acknowledgment. Instead, they simply repeat the ancient themes of the soldiers being afraid of missing out on 
booty, and that is why they followed Sulla into civil war (see Chapters Four and Eight below). 
For more on this important point, see Chapter Eight below. 
that they would have understood Sulla's appeals to them in these terms."^ In this context, 
Morstein-Marx adds useful nuance to the traditional view; using this context, an argument 
can thus be mounted that Sulla's soldiers were motivated in part in defence of republican 
traditions. In the end, however, pecuniary self-interest is still important to his and 
Rosenstein's explanation for intervention; they place the expectation of material bounty in 
the event of victory on equal footing with the legitimacy argument as an explanation for 
Sulla's soldiers following him into civil war."^ Even with the nuance of legitimacy, 
however, I argue that Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein are still taking too narrow a view of 
the motivations of the Sulla's soldiers, as I will argue below. 
Keaveney's analysis is also much more nuanced and less emphatic regarding the economic 
imperative, particularly because it is one of the few that shifts attention, albeit briefly, from 
the impulses of the major actors of the governing elite onto ordinary soldiers, and discusses 
their motivations in 88 BC. To be sure, he still remains faithful to the conventional view by 
arguing that Sulla's soldiers followed him out of hopes of economic enrichment; this is his 
core explanation for intervention. Like Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, however, he softens 
the link between the late-republican military service and pecuniary self-interest, and notes 
that the desire to profit was not unique in the late Republic." ' Keaveney also presents a 
different angle on most other modem explanations: whereas many of them emphasise 
change in the command relationship and growing interdependence between soldier and 
general by 88 BC, Keaveney argues that Sulla was in no way beholden to his men, and 
acted without reference to their needs: apart from expressing a fear that they would miss 
out on booty, his men were largely passive actors."^ In 88 BC, there was no change in the 
command relationship; for Keaveney, this came much later, in the second civil war period. 
Morstein-Marx, 2011, pp. 259 ff. For Morstein-Marx, the events of 88 BC demonstrate in part a crisis of 
legitimacy, and, along with a desire to profit from war, the soldiers' actions can be viewed as an expression of 
the reverence that they held the republican consulship (Morstein-Marx, 2011, pp. 277 f f ) . See Keaveney, 
2007, pp. 75-76: a scholar also to raise recently the issue of Sulla's legitimacy. 
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, 2006, p.632. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 94. The long-term presence of the desire to profit among Roman soldiers, as 1 shall 
argue, is important to my argument; see Chapters Four and Chapter Eight below for implications and detailed 
analysis of this issue. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 68. For example, Keaveney contends that there was no evidence of Sulla's soldiers, as 
a united group, expressing wants or a desire for land or money; they remain passive in the relationship, happy 
in the traditional way to receive whatever their commander may give them. The important point to be drawn 
from Keaveney's views, as far as my argument is concerned, is that the army in 88 BC was in no way 
different in an economic sense from those that had come before it: as 1 will show in chapters below, the 
economic rationale for intervention as the new, dominant factor of late-republican military service is thus 
weakened considerably. 
when soldiers learned to speak for themselves, take without asking, and seditious generals 
had to factor into their plans the economic needs of soldiers, such as land or m o n e y . " ' 
Meanwhile, Cagniart is much more an exemplar of the emphatic conventional view as it 
relates to the exclusivity of the economic imperative. He argues, for example, that the 
mercenary impulse motivating the late-republican army is the key to explaining why 
seditious generals were able to challenge the state. He contends that financial greed alone 
motivated Sulla's men to align their interests with his political ambition: for Sulla's 
soldiers, the war against Mithridates was less important for military glory than for the 
anticipated financial rewards."" Sulla was able to take the unprecedented step of marching 
on Rome because of the nature "of the new army, an army of mercenaries."'^' According to 
Cagniart, these same mercenaries would later find civilian life hard and unrewarding after 
discharge, and through bad luck or design, many would re-enlist to become professional 
soldiers.''^ He has no illusions about the motivations of soldiers engaged in sedition or civil 
war: overriding desire for economic enrichment. He argues that generals, therefore, needed 
to satisfy this demand by large donatives, allocations of land, and booty to keep their 
armies loya l . ' " Moreover, Matthew argues that pecuniary self-interest, elevated to 
prominence by the influx of impoverished soldiers,' '" shifted the loyalty from the state onto 
generals, and changed the sense of duty inherent in the pre-Marian soldier.'^' For Matthew, 
the desire to improve the economic condition of their men was the new late-republican 
factor of military service which ambitious generals could exploit to threaten the state. The 
consequence, for example, was that soldiers followed generals who could provide 
profitable, continuous service, regardless of foe or cause; this explained why the army 
became a political tool in the hands of seditious commanders. By Matthew's logic, this 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 67. The one political initiative that Sulla introduced to his army in 88 BC, according to 
Keaveney, was to place political issues before the army that had no place in the army: in short, he blurred the 
distinctiori between military and political contio (Keaveney, 2007, p. 95). See Chapter Six and Chapter Eight 
below 
Cagniart, 2008, pp. 82 ff. 
Cagniart, 2008, p. 82. 
Cagniart, 2008, p. 83. 
533 — As Pompey discovered during the second civil war period against Caesar (Plut., Pomp. 45). 
" " According to Matthew, this influx was caused by the enrolment of large numbers of previously ineligible 
poor - starting in 107 BC with Marius' abolition of the minimum property qualification needed to serve in the 
legions (Matthew, 2010(a), p. 20). See Chapter Four below. 
"^Mat thew, 2010(a), p. 21. 
consequence thus explained why soldiers were willing to follow Sulla to Rome, risk civil 
war, and intervene in political discourse. 
As I have shown above, despite some recent softening, modem interpretations largely 
reproduce the dominant themes of pecuniary self-interest inherent in ancient explanations 
of intervention. Some of them also reflect the anxiety evident in sources over the decay of 
public values and morals, and its connection with the eventual decline of the Republic. 
Late-republican society, for example, is described as a community in moral, ethical and 
spiritual crisis; in part, this is reflected in modem attempts to understand the emergence of 
politically interventionist armies. Typical is Cowell: he argues that during the late Republic, 
there was a "mad race" for luxury and enjoyment; religion lost any vital hold on life, and 
politics became a matter of personal ambition, rather than of devotion to the public 
i n t e r e s t . F o r Lind, Sallust's analysis of a state suffering from moral decline at the time of 
Sulla was accurate,"^ while Smith argues that it was a lack of idealism, "this moral 
deterioration, the selfishness","® which provided the key to understanding the Republic's 
last century. Blits argues that the Republic's demise was related to the corruption of 
republican life, declining public spirit and civic virtue.^^' Much of this moralising, 
however, is dated, and does not have the same prominence in much of contemporary 
critique. More common now is the approach taken by Adams; he argues that a moralising 
approach to the fact of Roman armies expecting service to provide opportunities for 
material advancement is unreasonable, for all armies engaged in the demand for booty and 
all expected reward for their service.^"" 
Above are examples of the modem orthodoxy for explaining the emergence of politically 
interventionist armies. Various explanations are posited for why the army came to be filled 
with impoverished soldiers: changed conditions of service, expanding empire and an influx 
of poor and previously ineligible citizens into the army at the end of the second century BC. 
In some modem interpretations, there has also been a reflection of the moral anxiety 
evident in the sources. All these explanations, however, have at their root an emphasis on 
Cowell, 1948, p. 227. 
Lind, 1965, p. 243. 
" ' S m i t h , 1955, p. 88. 
" ' B l i t s , 1981, p. 40. 
Adams, 2007, p. 209. For my counter-argument on this point of the uniqueness in late-republican armies of 
financial expectation from service, see Chapter Four below. 
the desire for financial gain: the assumption that soldiers supported their generals in their 
personal inimicitiae, engaged in sedition, risked civil war, and followed their commanders 
into conflict, because of the dominant influence of pecuniary self-interest. 
Modem Interpretations of Intervention: The Role of C. Marius. 
Modem interpretations of Marius' role in the emergence of politically interventionist 
legions also, in large part, reflect ancient perspectives: by allowing previously-ineligible 
poor into the army, Marius' 107 BC recruitment reform changed the nature of late-
republican military service demographically and socially, and thus created the necessary 
conditions for pecuniary self-interest to emerge as the dominant motivator. This reform has 
continued to be axiomatically associated with the decline of the Republic; for a long time, it 
has provided a convenient, ready-made explanation for the army's support of its generals in 
insurrection and civil war. Cowell is typical: 
The new model army created by Marius was largely composed of professional soldiers 
recruited for long-term service, drilled and disciplined but looking for their rewards to 
what their army service would bring them, and not to a return, as speedy as possible, to 
the homes and the farms which few of them now possessed. The army became a new 
power in the state distinct from the citizen body with which it had from time immemorial 
been identified.' '" 
Watson emphasised the link between the reform and the importance of the economic factor 
in the command relationship of late-republican armies, specifically those armies used by 
seditious generals to threaten the state. He argues that Marius changed military service from 
a civic obligation to a vocation, and allowed its economic rewards to assume greater 
importance.'"'^ Both these analyses are now dated, but the view persists that Marius' 
initiative was the pivotal event which fundamentally altered the nature of the army, and 
introduced into politics a dangerous new element. Hildinger, for example, argues that it was 
a revolutionary act: by opening up service to the ineligible poor in the absence of an 
emergency, Marius shifted the nature of military service away from a temporary militia 
toward a professional institution.'"^ This consequence was a danger to the Republic; a 
militia's first loyalty was to the state, but Marius' half-professional army naturally looked 
" " Cowell, 1948, p. 227. 
Watson, 1958, p. 120. 
" " Hildinger, 2002, p. 99. For another perspective that views Marms' reform as a revolutionary event, with 
critical implications for the army and the Republic, see Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 20-21. See also Chapter Four 
below. 
toward its general, and had a keen interest in his success.^"" Marin also argues that the army 
became a danger to the Republic because of Marius' reform. She contends that his 
recruitment of poor volunteers was responsible for shifting the personal responsibility onto 
the general to reward soldiers during and at the end of the campaign.^"^ This bound the 
army more tightly to its general; he could now call on his soldiers to threaten the stability of 
the state, force through legislation, and secure power over political rivals.'''^ 
Shotter's view, meanwhile, emphasises the economic consequence of allowing 
impoverished soldiers into the army. Marius' reform was critical in the evolution of the 
army: its real danger to the Republic became clear after the Cimbric wars when 
impoverished veterans needed land upon demobilisation."' This set a dangerous precedent. 
Adams is more nuanced: he acknowledges that anti-Marian biases in ancient texts may 
have overstated the effect of the reform."^ Nevertheless, he still argues that Marius' 
abolition of the minimum property qualification fundamentally changed the nature of the 
army by discarding its traditional timocratic underpinning.^'" Santosuosso argues that 
Marius' 107 BC reform effectively proletarianised the army; after this, the goal of soldiers 
was to reap the highest economic benefit possible from service.^^^ For Cagniart, the actions 
of Sulla and his soldiers in 88 BC were explained by the recruitment reform of 107 BC: "So 
both the consul and his legions marched on Rome to reverse the law that had deprived Sulla 
of his command, an unprecedented move made possible by the nature of the new army, an 
army of mercenaries. It was the logical consequence of the reforms of the draft Marius 
himself had made . " ' " Even Flower, who presents a more nuanced and complex account of 
the breakdown of the republican system by arguing that it was not functioning by the time 
Sulla decided to march on Rome,' '^ emphasises the political consequences of Marius' 
Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 20-21. For a similar argument about the transference of loyalty, see also Kildahl, 
1968, p. 76. 
Marin, 2009, pp. 38-39. For my argument contesting Marin's view, see Chapter Three below. 
See also Mackay, 2004, p. 104. 
Shotter, 2005, p. 38. 
Adams, for example, makes that point that anti-Marian sources would have us believe that the reform was 
crucial. But Marius was a pragmatist and was merely recognising the status quo', there is no reason to believe 
that there was a sudden rush to enlist among the landless poor, nor that the levy became obsolete (Adams, 
2007, p. 208). On Adam's point, see Chapter Four below. 
Adams, 2007, p. 208. 
" " Santosuosso, 2001, pp. 10 f f 
Cagniart, 2008, p. 82. 
Flower, 2010(b), pp. 92 ff. 
reform in 107 BC, and traces this as the point where veterans started looking toward their 
general for benefits at the time of discharge, altering the command relationship. ' ' ' 
These perspectives thus form part of the conventional view attempting to explain why the 
army supported seditious generals, intervened in political discourse, and engaged in civil 
war.""* It judges the role of Marius in 107 BC as crucial to changing the demographic 
composition of the army, ultimately making it more receptive to the material inducements 
of insurrectionist generals.'^' Largely reflecting ancient views, the conventional view 
attributes to the reform significant consequences for the nature of late-republican military 
service: the emergence of pecuniary self-interest as the dominant explanation for the 
behaviour of soldiers engaged in sedition, the growth of an exclusivist transactional 
relationship between soldier and general based primarily on material reward, and the 
transference of the army's loyalty away from the state to commanding generals. 
Modem Interpretations of Intervention: The Role of Professionalisation 
A sub-element of the contemporary criticism of Marius' reform, and of the consequence of 
allowing previously-ineligible poor to serve in the army, is the catalytic and hastening 
effect it had on the evolution of the army into a professional institution.'^' It is advanced as 
a part of the conventional rationale to explain how the traditional citizen-militia of the 
Republic came to threaten the state. Cagniart, for example, views the historical narrative of 
armies used by insurrectionist generals, such as Sulla and Caesar, as predominantly the 
story of a shift from a temporary, part-time militia to a professional institution, which 
largely began with Marius' reform, and found its final and most complete manifestation in 
553 Flower, 2010(b). p. 76. It has to be acknowledged, however, that Flower does admit at this point that 
Marius' reform did not mean all Roman soldiers were suddenly landless overnight; men of little wealth had 
been serving for some time. It is an important concession from Flower, and one which I will pick up 
extensively in Chapter Four below. 
" " Keaveney, 2007, p. 37: "Sulla 's march on Rome in 88 was unprecedented. Efforts to explain the behaviour 
of the troops tend to centre on their supposed status as a result of the reforms of Marius." 
For a short - but very recent - summation of the Marian 107 BC recruitment argument, see de Ligt, 2012, 
p. 183. De Ligt surveys the various arguments, but ends up concluding that the evidence does not definitively 
anchor the reform to any one specific demographic scenario. In other words, de Ligt does not come down 
firmly on any one side of the argument. 
For both 'professionalisation' and 'professional ' , 1 mean in the vocational sense, where service takes on 
the look and appearance of a livelihood, with soldiers considering the military their only career, source of 
remuneration and home, more distinct and removed from society. I do not refer here to 'professional' as a 
statement of the technical competency of the citizen-militia. 
the civil war army of Caesar." ' According to Cagniart, these soldiers became dissociated 
from civil society. They found in their comrades and army service a new world, a new way 
of life: the vocation of a professional soldier, and it was with these soldiers that 
insurrectionist generals, such as Sulla and Caesar, dominated political discourse. According 
to the conventional view, Marius' reform was critical to the process of professionalisation: 
Serrati argues that the abolition of the property qualification laid the foundation of the 
professional army."^ Matthew argues that by allowing the poor to serve, Marius' reform 
allowed the state to exploit a large pool of willing manpower, and thus set the foundation of 
the standing armies of the imperial period."' Moreover, the pressure toward 
professionalisation, and the emergence of large numbers of citizen-soldiers who saw 
service as a vocation, not just a civic obligation, is viewed as a unique factor of late-
republican military service. Gabba, for example, accepted that a professional army was the 
new ingredient in late-republican power equations, as well as an established fact.^ *^ " 
The implicit critique associated with the professionalisation argument is that Marius, by 
dismantling the timocratic recruitment system with his reform, hastened the process of 
change in the army from a part-time institution, intimately connected with - and 
sympathetic to - the society from which it was drawn, into a more permanent, self-
contained, self-interested institution, alienated from society, and unmoved by the civic 
implications of its own actions. Above all, the critique of professionalisation is associated 
with the importance of pecuniary self-interest as a motivating factor of service: professional 
soldiers necessarily wanted to make money. In its implicit binary logic, the conventional 
view assumes that a professional army, open to the poor, was per se a danger to the 
Republic, more likely to align its interests with the political ambitions of insurrectionist 
generals, while a traditional, timocratic citizen-militia was not. A strong sense of pecuniary 
self-interest was thus a prerequisite of a professional institution; such an institution is 
axiomatically equated with disloyalty to the state.'^' The accelerated process of 
Cagniart, 2008, pp. 84-85. 
Serrati, 2007, p. 496. 
Matthew, 2010(a), p. 25. 
Gabba, 1976, p. 117. 
Keaveney neatly summarises the conventional thinking (which he does not himselft support) on this point 
in his 2007 mongraph on the role of the army in the Roman revolution: "Once Marius, by his reforms in 
recruiting in 107, supposedly created a professional or revolutionary army then its characteristics were set and 
not to be altered. So Sulla's role is that of a man who saw what Marius could not, the potential of the new 
professionalisation is linked to the influx of impoverished soldiers into the army in the late 
second century BC. The conventional criticism incorporates the sense that a poor man in 
service, and thus a professional, would do anything for money: omnia cum pretio honesta 
videntur.^^^ Poor soldiers, with nothing to fall back on after discharge, naturally became 
attached to service and the economic opportunities it provided, and thus emerged as 
professionals: de Blois, faithful to the conventional perspective, outlines the 
consequences:^^^ 
The soldiers of the new type were not only in this sense more professional, they were also 
more often full-time soldiers; most did not have farms to return to. They began to 
constitute masses separate from the people, disciplined to their kind of work, exchanging 
their labour-capacity for bounties, booty and pay; to them military service was a 
livelihood or a necessary evil, not a natural and normal part of a citizen's d u t y . ' " 
Conclusion 
As 1 have shown above, ancient and modem explanations of the emergence of politically 
interventionist armies in the late Republic are dominated by the belief that soldiers engaged 
in sedition, risked civil war, and supported their generals in personal inimicitiae, 
overwhelmingly because of what they could gain materially. A strong sense of pecuniary 
self-interest, for example, explained the behaviour of Sulla's army in 88 BC: his soldiers 
supported him in sedition, marched on Rome, and instigated the first civil war, to safeguard 
their right to profit from service. The army's pecuniary self-interest is largely viewed as a 
new, crucial factor of late-republican military service; insurrectionist generals could thus 
use material inducements to exploit it, align the interests of the army with their own 
political agendas, and threaten the state. 
The conventional perspective emphasises the role of C. Marius and his 107 BC recruitment 
reform; the subsequent influx of poor volunteers into service was the primary catalyst for 
model army, and he was somebody who sought to use it for political advantage. Caesar simply followed 
Sul la 's example, but from different motives and to more deadly effect ." (Keaveney, 2007, p. 6). 
Sal., lug. 86. 
When he discusses the ' n ew ' citizen-militia of the late Republic, de Blois also refers to 'professional ' in 
the competency sense. For example: "After Marius 's army reforms, several armies, like those of Sulla, 
Pompeius Straho, Lucullus, Pompey and Caesar, were drilled in a more professional way, learned to use all 
kinds of tactics, and had to fight in the decades after 90 BC in all kinds of terrain against enemies using 
different battle techniques " (de Blois, 1987, p. 12). I contest this view. I would argue, for example, that the 
long wars of the middle Republic, and the wars against the Macedonians in the second century BC, produced 
armies as competent, skillful, or experienced as any of the late Republic. 
De Blois, 1987, p. 12. 
demographic and social change in the army, leading to a more vocational institution, 
changing the command relationship by raising the importance of financial rewards, and 
thus shifting the loyalty of soldiers from the state to commanding generals. More broadly, 
moral and ethical decay helped create the conditions in which politically interventionist 
soldiers emerged. Because preoccupation with pecuniary self-interest, with the Marian 107 
BC recruitment reform, with the dangers of allowing poor into service, and with moral 
decay, is so persistent, and pervades much of the ancient and modem effort to understand 
the factors leading to Sulla's march on Rome, and more broadly, the descent of the 
Republic into civil war and disintegration, I have termed it 'the conventional view'. 
How satisfactory, however, is this conventional view? The next chapter will examine this 
question. In doing so, 1 shall argue that while pecuniary self-interest did have a part to play 
in motivating late-republican soldiers, the conventional explanation exaggerates the 
importance and uniqueness of the desire to profit from war. It will thus contest the 
reductionist emphasis it places on pecuniary self-interest as the primary factor motivating 
soldiers to intervene in late-republican political discourse. 
Chapter Four 
Pecuniary Self-interest: Inadequate Explanation for Intervention 
Introduction 
In Chapter Three, I outlined the conventional explanation for the emergence of politically 
interventionist armies: it asserts that soldiers supported L. Cornelius Sulla, intervened in 
politics, and risked civil war because of pecuniary self-interest; they engaged in 
insurrection for what they could gain materially from the arrangement.^^' This chapter will 
contest the conventional explanation, in particular, the reductionist emphasis it places on 
pecuniary self-interest as the primary factor motivating soldiers to intervene in late-
republican political discourse. Much of the moralising evident in sources over moral decay 
and indiscipline in late-republican armies, and which forms a backdrop to the emergence of 
pecuniary self-interest, was confused and disjointed. 1 argue that it represents more of a 
literary topos than a serious, cogent and consistent attempt at an explanation for 
intervention.'®' Late-republican armies, for example, were patently not the first to exhibit 
signs of ill-discipline or insubordination; the long history of citizen-militia's mutiny, 
insubordination and rebellion against the state at all periods of the Republic, for example, 
suggests late-republican soldiers were no more ill-disciplined or morally compromised than 
their predecessors. ' ' ' 
In most cases, what they wanted was money, booty, or land: material reward for their service, as at Luc. 
5.246-248: praemia miles dum maiora petit, damnat causamque ducemque et scelere inbutos etiamnunc 
venditat enses. "Or was it greed for greater rewards that made the soldiers repudiate their cause and their 
leader, and again put up for sale the swords already stained with guilt." The poet reflects here a view 
emblematic of the conventional view: that ordinary soldiers during the civil war period of the late Republic 
were motivated solely by mercenary impulse; it was a powerful and pervasive urge and meant that armies 
could be bought by the highest bidder, in spite of any professed cause. 
As such, 1 do not propose to address the matter of moral decay further as an explanation for intervention in 
this chapter. 1 will instead concentrate on core beliefs of the conventional view for which there is evidence, 
and for which a cogent argument has been proffered: pecuniary self-interest, the Marian recruitment reform, 
and the critique of professionalisation. 
' ' ' For an extensive discussion on the record of the army's insubordination and ill-discipline, and its 
consequences for the question of intervention, see Chapter Six and Chapter Eight below. 
Instead, the conventional view is more firmly anchored in the idea of pecuniary self-
mterest. Certainly, the desire to profit from service had a part to play in motivating the 
army at Nola: it is the first plank of any holistic explanation which attempts to explain more 
comprehensively the emergence of politically interventionist soldiers. I will, however, 
argue that the desire to profit from service was not the only factor shaping the actions of 
soldiers, and certainly not the unique, decisive factor of late-republican armies that made 
Sulla's plan possible. Furthermore, 1 will argue that too much has been made of Marius' 
role in the emergence of soldiers willing to intervene in politics; I will thus place his 
recruiting reform of 107 BC into its proper context. This reform did not lead to armies 
filled with poor willing to do anything for financial reward. Rather, I will show that the 
poor had always been represented in Roman armies without it ever before leading to 
insurrection, or soldiers willing to support generals in personal inimicitiae. 1 will thus argue 
that pecuniary self-interest, in isolation and out of context, is ultimately an unsatisfactory 
explanation for the emergence of the politically interventionist legion. 
Financial Ambition: Late Republic Factor o f Service but Not Unique 
Pecuniary Self-interest: A Factor of Late-republican Service 
In 90 BC, in the first year of the Social War" '^'*, a spokesman for a unit of Cretan archers^®' 
approached one of the Roman consuls for that year, L. lulius Caesar, and offered to betray 
the Italians they were serving by switching sides. Caesar offered the Cretans citizenship and 
honour: the Cretan laughed off both, calling the offer of citizenship 'claptrap', and telling 
the consul that every arrow they fired was for the sake of money, and only a financial 
reward would induce them to defect.^'" While it might not have been as amoral as Caesar's 
Cretan archers, the desire to profit from war was still a factor of military service in Roman 
armies leading up to Nola. Opportunities for armies to amass booty in Italy existed during 
90 BC-88 BC. App., BC 1.39 ff.; Oros. 5.17 ff. 
Cretan archers are linked closely with the presence of Roman infantry; they were, for example, used as 
support and missile troops attached to consular armies (see Liv. 22.37; Val.Max. 9.3.7; Plb. 3.75). They were 
also used in the endemic political violence by the consul L. Opimius in 121 BC in Rome that accompanied the 
suppression of C. Gracchus and his supporters; see Chapter Seven below for more detail of their use in this 
case, and their traditional relationship with consular armies. 
" " D.S. 37.18. Caesar responded to this blunt mercenary request by offering the Cretans 1000 drachmas; the 
Cretans, looking to make money from the conflict, and having spurned the offer of citizenship, presumably 
accepted Caesar's more tangible enticement. 
the Social War, where Rome consistently stripped the wealth from rebellious towns and 
cities it captured." ' Consul in 89 BC, C. Pompeius, for example, plundered Asculum when 
he captured it;"^ most of the plunder probably went to the soldiers, as the senate noted with 
disappointment that none went into the public treasury when it was most n e e d e d . U s i n g 
the allocation of booty to help motivate soldiers to risk the dangers of military service was a 
tactic in use on both sides during the war. Italian commanders shared with their soldiers 
booty taken when they massacred Romans at Asculum in 90 BC precisely to give them a 
taste of the profits of war so they would more readily engage in it.^^" 
Like their Italian enemies and soldiers in other Roman armies, Sulla's men too benefitted 
economically from victory: in 89 BC, Sulla allowed his soldiers to plunder Aeculanum 
when it failed to surrender." ' At the end of the war, the expectation of profit from service 
continued to be a motivating factor for Sulla's army. At Nola in 88 BC, during the political 
crisis generated by the inimicitiae between Sulla, P. Sulpicius Rufus, and Marius,"^ Sulla 
did not mention the subject of booty when he requested the army's help to overcome his 
political enemies.^^^ It was, however, in the minds of his men;"^ they had a misplaced fear 
of being replaced by Marius and thus missing out on the lucrative campaign against 
Mithridates in the eas t . " ' A year later, after Sulla had left Italy with most of the army for 
the eastern campaign against Mithridates, L. Cornelius Cinna, bested by factional violence 
in Rome, disowned by a hostile senate, and forced to flee,'^° used the promise of financial 
Oros. 5.18. 
Asculum had some symbolic meaning for the Romans during the Social War: it was here that a praetor 
with pro-consular powers and all resident Roman citizens were massacred by the Italians at the start of the 
war; its inhabitants could expect little mercy when it was finally re-captured in 89 BC (Liv., Per. 72; Veil. 
2.15; D.S. 38.13). 
Oros. 5.18. Orosius noted that the treasury needed money to pay for food and supplies, and the senate 
hoped that the sack of Asculum would provide it. Pompeius, however, did not give any to the treasury; in the 
custom of commanders leading consular armies, he no doubt made sure his soldiers profited from the capture 
of Asculum. The senate was forced to sell some of its public holdings to raise funds. 
" " D.S. 37.14. The allocation of booty was deliberately made to motivate the rebelling Italian soldiers. 
App., B C 1 . 5 I . 
For a background to this conflict and its significance to the emergence of the politically interventionist 
legion, see Chapter Eight below. 
" ' A p p . , B C I . 5 7 . 
For a fuller discussion on how the pecuniary factor manifested itself at Nola, including the critical question 
of just how much influence the desire to profit from war played in their decision to support Sulla, see Chapter 
Eight below. 
I argue that it was a misplaced fear, and that many in the army must have known it; see Chapter Eight 
below. 
Veil. 2.20: "ex aucloritate senatus comulatus ei abrogates." "His consulship was abrogated by the 
authority of the Senate." 
gain to help persuade the legion left behind at Nola to accept him as consul and act against 
political enemies, spe largitionis!"^^ These men were part of the same army Sulla won over; 
money was still on their minds in 87 BC - perhaps more so, since they missed out on the 
lucrative eastern campaign.^®^ Cinna bribed the legion's authority figures, the tribunes and 
centurions.^^^ It was not enough only to secure the loyalty of the officers; he also made the 
effort to bribe ordinary soldiers, indicating that the expectation of financial reward 
permeated all levels of the army, and that soldiers had their own perspectives, independent 
of their commanders, worth cultivating.^^" 
Pecuniarv Self-interest: A Thoroughlv Traditional Incentive 
De Blois describes the type of pecuniary self-interest on display above as the defining 
characteristic of armies raised after the 107 BC Marian recruiting reform;^^' this new type 
of army, filled with landless poor and thus motivated by financial need, became a great 
Liv., Per. 79; App., BC 1.65; and Veil. 2.20: Turn Cinna corniptis prima centurionibus ac Iribunis, mox 
etiam spe largitionis militibus, ab eo exercitu, qui circa Nolam erat, receptus est. "Cinna was then received 
by the army at Nola, and first corrupted the centurions and tribunes, and then even the [private] soldiers, with 
promises of largess." Both Livy's and Appian's versions are truncated and do not have the level of detail that 
Velleius Paterculus provided. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 39. Keaveney makes the rather obvious, but fair, point that these soldiers must have 
felt a certain sense first of disappointment, and then subsequently of rejoicing, when Cinna's offers of 
pecuniary reward presented itself 1 would add that the desire for profit must have been strong: Cinna was 
Sulla 's enemy and by supporting Cinna, this legion was effectively switching sides. 
This is one of the few explanations of how to go about bribing an army, and what was required to complete 
a successful transaction. It was essential, for example, to first (prima) persuade the legion's authority figures: 
the tribunes and most importantly, the centurions; Cinna first approached them with bribes. Significantly, 
there is a sense of order and precedence contained in Velleius' account; once Cinna had persuaded the 
authority figures, he then {mox) approached the common soldiers. Thus, it was apparently important to ensure 
figures in authority, at the very least, were approached and persuaded first before going to the soldiers. By 
extrapolation, then, Sulla, or any other leader hoping to convince an army to support him, was likely to have 
first approached the authority figures; once they had been persuaded, it made sense that the common soldiery 
was likely to be influenced by the examples of their immediate supervisors. This offers an explanation of how 
it was possible for one man to convince an army of thousands; the key was to pick out the influential authority 
figures and attempt to persuade them first. 
I argue that this was an important insight; it shows that soldiers could not be taken for granted, and would 
not automatically follow their sub-unit commanders in matters of political violence; they were capable of 
independently working out what was in their best interests and acting accordingly. Why would Cinna, for 
example, bother wasting money and effort bribing common soldiers if he had already secured the loyalty of 
centurions and the tribunes, and that was enough to secure the cooperation of the army? No one under 
pressure ft-om enemies, and with limited access to resources, would presumably waste money or effort where 
it was unnecessary. I argue that the answer can only be that Cinna did not want to leave anything to chance; it 
was necessary. He considered the common soldiery a distinct element, and their good graces important 
enough for him to expend effort trying to secure them. For more on the question of the independence of 
soldiers in a civil war context, albeit in a later part of the civil war period, see Alston, 2007, p. 184. 
If we follow de Blois' logic, it is thus the nature of the armies that fought the Social War, and the nature of 
the army Sulla addressed at Nola in 88 BC in a contio. 
political risk.^^' Le Glay, Voisin and le Bohec argue the change led to professional soldiers 
who expected everything from their leaders: pay, booty, distributions of gifts during 
triumphs, and plots of l a n d / " This pecuniary element of the command relationship 
between general and soldier is described in contemporary leadership theory as 
'transactional l e a d e r s h i p ' . I t involves contractual agreements with followers to achieve 
objectives; there is an implicit or explicit understanding between leader and follower of a 
set of rewards and inducements for meeting the shared goal, and financial gain is the most 
common form of exchange. That it existed in Roman armies is beyond doubt; consul for 
357 BC, C. Marcius Rutilius, made an archetypal transactional deal with his men to 
sanction the plunder of Privemum if they promised to concentrate first on winning the 
battle.'^' Nevertheless, de Blois, le Glay, Voisin, and le Bohec have - in the manner of the 
conventional explanation for intervention - overestimated the significance of pecuniary 
self-interest as the vital, new ingredient of late-republican armies. That the subject of 
financial gain should be on the minds of soldiers during the Social War and outside Nola, 
and pecuniary inducements a factor in their considerations, is no surprise; mercenary self-
interest was always part of service in the citizen-militia.^'" The governing elite wanted to 
acquire wealth through expansion: twice consul during the First Punic War , ' " L. Caecilius 
Metellus, sought pecuniam magnam bono modo invenire.^^^ Like them, ordinary citizens 
de Blois, 1987, p. 19. It is by now a familiar refrain: this is so because these types of soldiers would 
necessarily do anything, including commit sedition against the governing elite, for what they could gain 
financially, and looked toward their general to provide them with opportunities to enrich themselves. 1 will 
say more below on the transactional aspect of the commander-soldier relationship in Roman armies. 
Le Glay, Voisin & le Bohec, 1996, p. 126. For more examples, see Chapter Three above. 
Howell & Avolio 1993, p.891. They explain that in transactional leadership, leader-follower relationships 
are based on a series of exchanges between leaders and followers; contingent reward leadership is viewed as 
an active and positive exchange between leaders and followers whereby followers are rewarded or recognized 
for accomplishing agreed upon objectives. Leaders can also transact with followers by focusing on mistakes, 
delaying decisions or avoiding intervening until something has gone wrong. 
Liv. 7.16. Castra mmc... vobis hostium urbemque praedae do, si mihi pollicemini vos fortiter in acie 
operant navaturos nec praedae magis quam pugnae paratos esse. "Now 1 will give you the booty of the camp 
and the town of our enemies, if you promise me that you will in battle play the part of men and be more 
prepared to fight than to plunder." Marcius' men responded as he hoped: buoyed by the prospect of enriching 
themselves, they entered the battle with high morale, emboldened by no uncertain expectations. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 94. Keaveney sees pecuniary desire in soldiers as a constant. The Roman soldier ever, 
regardless of what he owned, hoped to profit by war, and the needy, and perhaps less needy, now continued to 
think precisely as their ancestors had. There was nothing new here. 
264 B C - 2 4 1 BC. 
ORF. 6.fr.2. For still one of the best articles on the Roman attitude to luxury, wealth and morality, 
especially its intersection with the expansion of empire, see Lintott, 1972, pp. 626.ff For a detailed and 
persuasive discussion on the aristocracy's interest in gaining wealth through war, see also Harris' 1979 
monograph, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C. 
expected to profit from war to improve their economic situation."^ This was a factor not 
unique to late-republican armies of the Social War, in a contio at Nola, or during the civil 
war. I shall argue instead that soldiers interested in their economic prospects exhibited a 
thoroughly consistent and traditional concern noted as far back as 357 BC during the war 
against the Faliscans,^'"' and during the popular vote for war against Carthage in 264 BC.^'^ 
The link between military service and financial gain was established early in the minds of 
soldiers with the introduction of a stipendium-, '^^ ^ I suggest, however, that it was only ever 
meant to cover basic subsistence needs."' Real money in service came from victory in war 
and the opportunities it provided to amass booty; in this way, the economic future of 
soldiers was thus intimately tied to the personal success of their general. In 343 BC, for 
example, soldiers amassed booty when they were given a Samnite camp to plunder after 
winning a major victory."^ P. Scipio, who consistently won against his enemies, lavished 
large amounts of money and booty on his soldiers in Africa in 204 BC, attracting the 
objection of his quaestor, M. Porcius Cato. '" Cato, however, proved equally concerned that 
his soldiers gained economically from war when he was consul in 195 BC; at the end of the 
Raaflaub, 2006, p. 141. War was profitable and encouraged a sense of solidarity between Romans. It 
yielded booty and land, filled the public treasury, permitted the erection of monuments, sanctuaries, and 
public buildings, increased communal power and even made it possible to diffuse internal conflicts by 
focusing on external ones. Raaflaub's last point is worth emphasising; Plutarch remarked that the outbreak of 
strife between Marius and Sulla was suspended because of the start of the Social War in 90 BC. (Plu., Mar. 
32.) Moreover, external threats had once before postponed the inevitable clash between Marius and Sulla, and 
between the populace and the senate/nobles. Civil strife was, for example, suspended and inimicitiae put in 
hiatus by a peril which threatened Italy from the west: the Germanic invasion by the Teutonic and Cimbric 
peoples and their allies in 104 BC. (Plu., Mar. 11.) 
Liv. 7.16: Marcius exercitum in agrum Privernatem, integrum pace longinqua, induxit militemque praeda 
implevit. Ad copiam rerum addidit muniflcentiam, quod nihil in publicum secernendo augenti rem privatam 
milUi favil. "Marcius led an army into the territory of Privemum, unravaged during a long period of peace, 
and loaded up his troops with booty. This abundance he administered bountifully, and gave nothing to the 
public treasury, encouraging his men to augment their private fortunes." Another early example is from 396 
BC during the Roman campaign to capture Veii; soldiers captured a particularly well-stocked and wealthy 
camp, and obtained an enormous amount o fboo ty - much of which was given to the soldiers (Liv. 5.19.). 
Pi'b. 1.11. More examples of pecuniary self-interest motivating the actions of soldiers well before the 
Social War and Nola in the late-republican period, see Liv. 10.31; 24.16; 43.19. 
As 1 have shown in Chapter Two above, pay was likely introduced early in Rome's expansion; 1 favour the 
extended campaign against neighbouring Veii in 403 BC as the most likely point, when military service was 
first extended into winter. Payment to soldiers for service was a characteristic of the Roman military system' 
it applied to both citizen and allied soldiers (for more on allied pay, see Chapter Five below). 
Cagniart 2008, p. 81. For more discussion on the value of soldiers' slipendium, see Chapter Two above. 
Liv. 7.37. 
Plut., Cat. Mai, 3. Cato disapproved of how much money and booty Scipio was giving to his men, and 
complained that it was corrupting the native simplicity of the soldiers. Cato was being too parsimonious here. 
The army Scipio led was battle-hardened and contained soldiers who had spent many years on continuous 
service; this kind of experience was valuable to the Republic. Given the quality and experience of the enemy 
led by Hannibal, it is little wonder Scipio was keen to keep his soldiers happy. 
successful campaign in Spain, he gave each soldier a pound of silver, in addition to large 
amounts of booty, reasoning it was better to have many Romans go home with silver in 
their pockets, than a few with gold.*""" A tradition of the citizen body benefiting financially 
from the consequences of victory and conquest went a long way back; the descent of the 
Roman plebs on Veii in 396 BC to loot and plunder after its capture, in a manner described 
by Lintott as resembling a vast crowd at a bargain sale,^°' entrenched economic gain as part 
of the national rationale for war.^"^ Soldiers came to expect and depend upon booty; as well 
as arrears in pay, the advent of peace, and its concomitant lack of opportunities for booty, 
was an irritant and motivator for the men at Sucro to mutiny in 206 BC.^ "^ 1 argue that this 
pecuniary self-interest motivated soldiers well before similar considerations became the 
dominant motivator of armies in the first century BC. Soldiers were so used to using war to 
satisfy their economic needs that this practice became a dangerous factor during peace 
when they could no longer do so.^"'' Moreover, so strong was the lure of financial gain that 
it could be a strong incentive to enlist for difficult wars. Marius used the promise of booty 
in 107 BC to encourage citizens and allies to enlist for his campaign against Jugurtha; he 
appealed to pecuniary self-interest to help motivate recruits for the hardships to come.'"' 
Conversely, the lack of financial opportunities could be a disincentive. It was difficult in 
151 BC to fill the levies for the war in Spain against the Lusitanians and Celtiberians, not 
only because of its reputation for being a difficult conflict in an inhospitable location far 
from Italy, but also because the war's perceived lack of opportunities for booty.'"' The 
anticipation of financial gain could also be a powerful factor in combat. During the war 
against Jugurtha in 108 BC, the thought of booty at the rich and prosperous town of Vaga 
in northern Africa motivated soldiers of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus to overcome their 
™ Plut., Cat. Ma. 10. 
Lintott, 1972, p. 630. 
Liv. 5.21. The Etruscan city of Veii, long a rival of Rome, was particularly wealthy. There was, for 
example, more booty there for its Roman capturers than all the previous wars put together (Liv. 5.20). It is 
little wonder the Roman plebs, sanctioned by the senate, descended on Veii in such numbers. 
Liv. 28.24. It is, I contend, a good example of how ingrained were the expectations of the army for plunder 
while on campaign; the soldiers became restless in part because peace removed from them the opportunity to 
amass booty: e! non nihil quod in hostico laxius rapto suetis vivere artiores in pace res erant. On this 
incident, also see Plb. 11.25; App., Hisp. 32. For the incident's political implications, and what it says about 
insubordination in the citizen-militia, see also Chapter Six below. 
Gruen, 1974, p. 371. Gruen reaches the right, if rather obvious, conclusion: distribution of the spoils of war 
to soldiers by their commanders had a hoary pedigree by the late Republic; it already was an established 
institution in the fifth century - at a time when the state allegedly possessed only a citizen militia. And it 
continued throughout the republican period and beyond. 
605 ggi^  j^g 35 
App Hisp. 45 ff. Liv., Per. 48; Taylor, 1962. p. 21. See also Chapter Seven below. 
fatigue, and take the town.^"^ Sallust's jibe about economically-motivated soldiers willing 
to do anything for financial gain was apparently accurate in a battlefield context.'"^ 
The opportunity to amass booty was so important to soldiers, and their expectations of 
generals to provide opportunities so high, that commanders who failed to deliver, or were 
unsuccessful, could find themselves in trouble. Part of the reason that the army of P. 
Postumius Albinus Regillensis mutinied in 414 BC, was that he prohibited his soldiers from 
plundering the captured town of Bolae, and kept the booty for himself.'"'" Consul for 219 
BC, M. Livius Salinator, was condemned by citizens in assembly^'" because he did not 
divide booty equally amongst his soldiers during the Illyrian War.^" The expectation of 
largess extended beyond citizens doing military service; citizens, not soldiers, brought the 
injunction against Salinator in civic assembly, indicating expectations existed more broadly 
in society. The senate could even intervene when it judged that a general had not provided 
enough opportunities for his men to profit. In 168 BC, for example, it ordered L. Aemilius 
Paullus to allow his soldiers, who had just won the battle of Pydna against Macedon, to 
pillage the towns and cities of Illyria and Epirus because they had not been given the 
opportunity to amass booty.^'^ The soldiers ought to have come home wealthy; it was a 
major sack, with more than 70 settlements plundered and 150,000 slaves taken. So serious 
was the subject of booty that failure to meet the pecuniary expectations of citizen-soldiers 
could even lead to armies acting illegally in Rome. In 167 BC, soldiers gathered outside 
Rome for Aemilius' expected triumph marking the victory over Macedon were angry 
because they had not profited from the campaign as much as expected - despite the senate's 
intervention the year before."^ The army publicly accused Aemilius of being imperious and 
Sal., lug. 49. 
Sal., lug. 86. I am, of course, distorting Sallust's original meaning. He was referring to soldiers willing to 
intervene in politics and engage in civil war on their general 's behalf 1 contend, however, that his comment is 
more accurately applied to the motivational power of money to induce extraordinary feats in battle, and to 
attract volunteers to serve. 
Liv. 4.47-50. For the political significance of this insubordination by the army, and the subsequent death of 
Albinus at the hands of his troops - the first such instance and the last until 89 BC - see Chapter Six below. 
This assembly was probably the comitia Iributa, given its judicial function of hearing serious charges 
against magistrates (North, 2006, p. 261). For more on the roles and functions of the assemblies, particularly 
in relation to their effective powers, see Chapter Six below. 
Liv. 22.35; Fron., Sir. 4.45. See also Lintott, 1972, p. 630. Salinator, however, may also have been 
prosecuted for theft of spoils (de Vir. III. 50). 
Plut.,/fern. 29; Liv. 45.28. 
Plut Aem. 31; Liv, 45.35. As I have shown above, the soldiers should have returned to Rome wealthy, 
given the scale of ' the sack of Epirus and Illyria. Something - perhaps Aemilius' strict views on the subject -
prevented them from gathering as much booty as they expected; most gained only a modest amount. 
no 
harsh in command, and refused to ratify his triumph; a military tribune, Ser. Sulpicius 
Galba, became the soldiers' spokesman, declaring there would be no triumph until soldiers 
were satisfied. To emphasise its claims, the army seized the Capitol, the illegality of this act 
raising fears among the governing elite and ordinary Romans of violence and insurrection; 
it took a speech from an ex-consul to the soldiers shaming their disobedience to defuse the 
situation.®''' 
From a macro-economic perspective, the influx of large amounts of largess into the 
Republic was healthy for the financial system, and made for conspicuous displays that 
could not be ignored.®" De Ligt, for example, estimates that the consistent flow of booty 
from the successful wars of the early second century BC boosted elite incomes, making 
slaves more affordable."® The sheer volume and scale of booty and money won in 
successful wars in Africa, Spain and the east that made its way to Rome during this time 
was staggering. At the end of the Second Punic war, for example, P. Scipio deposited 123, 
000 pounds weight of silver into the treasury.®" At the end of his successful campaign, 
Cato brought 25,000 pounds of silver bullion, 123,000 silver bigati,^^'^ 540,000 Oscan silver 
coins, and 1,400 pounds of gold into state coffers.®" T. Quinctius Flamininus, after 
defeating Macedon at the battle of Cynoscephelae in 197 BC, publically displayed in his 
194 BC triumph 18,270 pounds weight of silver, 84,000 tetradrachmas, 3,714 pounds of 
gold, 14,514 gold coins and countless objets d'art!'^'' P. Cornelius Nasica in 191 BC, after 
defeating the Boii, displayed 2,340 pounds of silver, 247 pounds of gold, 1,471 gold 
torques, and 234,000 silver bigati!'^^ L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, in his triumph in 189 
BC, showed off 137,420 pounds weight of silver, 224,000 tetradrachmas, 321,700 
Aemilius, whose pecuniary rectitude, frugality, and honesty is a point of considerable praise for Plutarch 
(Plut., Aem. 4), may have taken most of it for the public treasury, leaving the soldiers with little. Whatever 
happened, the army was not happy. 
" " The army left the Capitol, gave up its claims, and eventually supported and took part in Aemilius' triumph 
over King Perseus. 
Raaflaub, 2006, p. 141. 
" ^ D e Ligt, 2012, p. 155. 
Liv. 30.45. 
A silver coin stamped with the image of a two-horse chariot. 
Liv. 34.46. 
" " Liv. 34.52. 
Liv 36.40. For detail on this particular triumph, and more for the scale and wealth of trmmphs at this time, 
see Jacobsthal's still influential analysis (Jacobsthal, 1944, p. 306 ff). 
I l l 
cistophori, 140,000 gold coins, 1,423 pounds of engraved silver vases and 234 gold 
crowns."^ 
In the presence of such wealth, paraded publicly in the triumphs of victorious generals, it is 
no surprise that expectations of pecuniary gain should become such an important focus of 
military service for ordinary citizens; in war lay the real chance of returning rich.^^' If, as 
de Ligt asserts, the influx of wealth boosted elite incomes, then it also did the same for 
ordinary citizens in the armies that won the wars, helping raise expectations. Volunteers for 
the war against Macedon in 171 BC, for example, were eager to enlist because soldiers who 
previously served in the east returned rich.'^'' It was also obvious that ordinary soldiers, as 
well as the state treasury and members of the governing elite, benefited financially from the 
triumphs, or from donatives at the end of successful campaigns. P. Scipio's soldiers got 400 
asses each,^^^ Cato's 270 asses and cavalrymen twice as much,'^^ Flamininus' infantrymen 
250 asses each, centurions 500 asses, and cavalrymen 750 asses^^^ while L. Scipio's 
soldiers got 25 denarii, centurions 50, and cavalrymen 75.'^^ Given that the daily rate of 
pay for an infantryman was three asses, these sums represented considerable windfalls; 
added to regular pay and booty already secured, donatives are likely to have increased the 
personal wealth of recipients.'^' There was, however, considerable variation in the level of 
remuneration that soldiers could expect, especially if a general was abstemious or sparing 
in his generosity; as well as the ability to win battles, much also depended on the 
commander's personality and his views on remunerating the army.' '" The desire to profit 
Liv. 37.59. 
On this theme, Keaveney argues that the lure of opportunities for wealth creation that soldiering provided 
did much to attract recruits, and he contends that it would have compared favourably with the drudgery of life 
on the land (Keaveney, 2007, p. 64). 
Liv. 42.32. See also Chapter Five below. For the significance of this example to Sulla's soldiers at Nola in 
88 BC, see Chapter Eight below. 
Liv. 30.45. 
Liv. 34.46. 
Liv. 34.52. 
Liv. 37.59. 
Given that most campaigns around this time were decided by a smgle battle (as it was in three Macedonian 
wars in the second century BC), I estimate that this level of extra remuneration would, in today's terms, be 
analogous to receiving almost half of a full year's salary for a single afternoon's work, on top of annual 
salary, any money raised from the sale of booty given to the individual, and exempt from any form of 
taxation. It is little wonder that Rome had no trouble filling its levies for the wars of this time, or that we see 
the emergence of true military professionals (for example, at Liv. 42.34). 
" " For example, as 1 have shown, Aemilius Paullus' attitude toward the subject was particularly severe, and 
although he could regularly win battles, his soldiers did not gain as much economically as they might have 
under a more generous commander. Scipio Africanus, on the other hand, also had a talent for winning 
victories, and providing many opportunities for his soldiers to profit; the antithesis of Aemilius, he was so 
from war could also be found among civilians travelling with the army supplying its 
victuals and performing its manual labour. Conspicuous displays of booty in triumphs also 
encouraged a desire among civilians to benefit from Rome's military success. The lixae^^' 
with the army in Africa during the war against Jugurtha, for example, generated wealth off 
its success in battle. They accompanied soldiers on raids on landowners, from which they 
seized cattle, slaves and goods, which they then sold to merchants for wine and other 
luxury items.®^^ 
To meet the expectations of ordinary citizens under sacramentum, the military system 
carefully regulated and systemised the collection and distribution of booty within consular 
armies to ensure a fair division. It was conducted on order of the commander, and everyone 
benefited, even the sick and those who had not taken part in battle.^" Special details drawn 
from each maniple collected the booty, while colleagues stood guard; military tribunes then 
distributed it equally among the army, including men who guarded camp, and those absent 
on special duties or from illness. Sometimes, the process of plunder was neither orderly, 
controlled, nor conducted for the benefit of all. In 189 BC, the army of Cn. Manlius Vulso 
captured the Mt Olympus refuge of the Tolostobogii, but lost the captured booty to a 
newly-arrived column of soldiers which spontaneously plundered the camp, taking for itself 
the spoils won by Vulso's men." ' ' In 146 BC, during fighting for the Carthaginian harbour 
of Cothon in Africa, troops of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus stopped to sack 
the temple of Apollo, looting the gold, ignoring the commands of their officers, and 
dividing it amongst themselves, before returning to du ty . ' " Such insubordination came at a 
generous toward his soldiers that his quaestor, responsible inter alia for the army's finances, complained. 
Scipio's soldiers could expect to become wealthy from service, as long as they continued to win (see also 
Gruen, 1995,p. 71). 
Along with calones, the lixae were civilians travelling with the army who sold ancillary goods to the 
soldiers, such as additional food, and attended to the detail of much of its administrative requirements. See 
Thorbum's informative analysis of the role of lixae and calones, civilians whose duties seem to have been 
connected with manual labour, looking after groups of soldiers, and attending horses and mules, for more 
detail (Thorbum, 2003, pp. 1-9). 
Sail., lug. 44; Thorbum, 2003, p. 2. 
Plb. 10.16. 
" " Liv. 38.23: Egresso conside C. Hehitis cum tertio agmine advenit. nec continere suos ab direptione 
castrorum valuit. praedaque eorum, iniquissima sorle, qui pugnae non imerfuerant, facta est. "With the 
consul gone, C. Helvius arrived with the third column and was unable to prevent his men from plundering the 
camp, and the booty, by most unjust fate, fell into the hands of men who had no part in the battle." Ziolkowski 
makes the point that Vulso could do little for his soldiers to reclaim the booty lost on Mt Olympus to Helvius' 
men: all he could do was recompense, as well as possible, his own soldiers for their loss (Ziolkowski, 1993, 
pp. 80-81). 
hpp.,Pun. 127. 
cost: Scipio gave his army several days to plunder Carthage except those units which 
sacked the temple at Cothon ." ' 
I have shown that pecuniary self-interest, so strong that it could induce soldiers to risk 
serious punishment by disobeying orders,''^^ and encouraged by lavish and public displays 
of largess won in war, was for centuries a consistent factor of military service. The desire 
and expectation to profit from war was powerful and persistent; as long as Rome continued 
to win wars, it was largely met. 1 argue that it was motivating soldiers long before Marius' 
recruitment reform or Sulla's appeal to the army at Nola; it was not the unique factor of 
service in late-republican armies, and thus is not the change we are looking for to explain 
the emergence of politically interventionist soldiers. The presence of pecuniary self-interest 
had never before produced armies more accepting of the idea of civil war, willing to 
intervene in political processes on such scale, or act on the personal inimicitiae of their 
commanders. Even land grants at the end of a campaign, the desire of which was 
supposedly one of the mercenary factors that animated the landless poor in armies of the 
late Republic, and especially during the civil war period,^^' to support their seditious 
generals, were not unique: the state had, on a few occasions in the second century BC, 
provided them before to veterans without incurring danger to itself. In 201 BC, for 
example, the senate, in a rare overt, deliberate display of provision for veterans at the end 
of a campaign, allocated newly confiscated ager publicus in Samnium and Apulia to the 
African veterans of P. Scipio.^'"' In 199 BC, veterans of long service in Spain, Sardinia and 
Africa were given allotments of ager publicus.^'^^ 1 argue that these allocations did not, for 
the majority of the Republic's existence, produce a widespread or normative expectation 
among republican soldiers of land grants at the end of a campaign, or, more importantly. 
Plb. 38.19-22; Liv., Per. 51. 
App. ,P«n. 133. 
The military oath, the sacramentum, required soldiers inter alia to obey the commands of their 
commanders; the penalty for not doing so invited a range of harsh sanctions, including death in extreme cases. 
For more detail on this point, see Chapter Six below. 
For more on the point made about motivation and land in the army by Le Glay, Voisin and le Bohec, see 
above and Chapter Three above. 
Liv. 31.4; 31.49. The districts of Hirpinia, the territory of the Caudini and Salento were identified as being 
settled by Scipio's veterans. For more on these viritane distributions, see de Ligt, 2012, pp. 150 f f 
Liv. 32.1. These veterans, who included the Cannae legions recruited in 217 BC and 216 BC, provided 
long continuous service; those in Spain had served for 15 consecutive years, and the Sardinian legions had 
served for 13 continuous years (de Ligt, 2012, p. 152). This length of service, and the fact that such length of 
time away from home probably produced additional hardship, was a possible consideration in their allotment 
of land from ager publicus. 
armies suddenly prepared to act unconstitutionally, or risk civil war with fellow citizens, to 
secure them. I suggest that what changed in 88 BC was not the desire to profit from war, or 
the emergence of strong pecuniary self-interest as the dominant motivator; rather, the 
willingness of ordinary soldiers to risk civil war, and intervene decisively on such scale, in 
the civil political process.''*^ 
Pecuniarv Self-Interest: Changed Command Relationship? 
Satisfying the innate pecuniary self-interest of the Roman army necessarily involved the 
question of who actually rewarded the soldiers. As I have shown, Marin argues that a new 
feature of service in late-republican armies was that soldiers stopped looking toward the 
state for financial gain, and instead turned to their commanders: "This would be a major 
problem in the first century BCE when soldiers began to look to their generals, and not the 
state, to reward them for their services."'"^ Brunt similarly argues that soldiers of the civil 
war period had no choice but to look to their generals to provide land allotments and other 
material benefits,^'*" while Cagniart contends that soldiers started looking toward their 
commanders for financial opportunities after the 107 BC Marian recruiting reform.'''^ 
According to this perspective, the transactional relationship between commander and 
soldier changed: where before soldiers looked toward the Republic for economic rewards 
for service, now they looked toward their commander. It allowed an insurrectionist general 
to align the interests of the army with personal political ambition; he could threaten the 
state with soldiers who owed him their economic wellbeing. By extrapolation, the army at 
Nola in 88 BC was different to its predecessors because it expected Sulla, not the state, to 
provide economic reward; this dependency meant it would necessarily support him. 
Keaveney makes the interesting point that troops would always seek to gain from a campaign, but that the 
objective of such a campaign might be different from what it traditionally had been (Keaveney, 2007, p. 42). 
This is fair, but it still does not explain satisfactorily why those troops would support their commander in a 
campaign which was manifestly different from any that had been conducted before. A plausible and cogent 
pathway to intervention is still needed; the following chapters set out just such a pathway. 
Marin, 2009, p. 38. Matthew also argues along these lines: the need to ensure economic survival of the 
poor now'serving in the legions post Marius ' 107 BC reform, shifted the soldier 's loyalty away from the state 
to commanders who brought them success and profitable service (Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 20-21). 
Brunt, 1962, pp. 79 ff. 
Cagniart, 2008, p. 82: "Consequently, from 107 onward, soldiers joined the army expecting their generals 
to provide financial rewards at the end of the campaign." Cagniart is referring here to the reform supposedly 
allowing into the army large numbers of landless poor, who looked toward service for financial gain. As I 
have shown, however, this was a thoroughly traditional, unexceptional motivation of citizen and allied 
soldiers in consular armies; there is nothing new here. 
This assertion, however, cannot be substantiated. I argue that soldiers had never looked 
toward the state for substantive economic reward; that responsibility had always rested with 
commanders. Late-republican armies may have relied on generals for economic 
advancement, but such reliance was in no way exceptional. Like the desire to profit from 
war, it was a thoroughly conventional practice. Longstanding tradition, for example, gave 
generals the responsibility and right to distribute booty, donativa, and other spoils of war as 
they saw fit.'"' Although military policy regulated and systemised the collection and 
distribution of booty,' '" there was no legislation governing it, nor any formal level of 
remuneration set.'"^ The variation evident in the amount given to soldiers under different 
commanders at the end of campaigns or during triumphs''*' was a manifestation of this 
informality. Variations indicated the prerogative of commanders to set their own amounts; 
as I have shown, the lack of standardisation meant some commanders were generous, 
others less so - and soldiers benefitted accordingly.'^" Of course, the state could intervene 
if it thought soldiers had not been given a fair chance to profit from victory," ' and it is also 
true that the state paid the army, through the office of the quaestor,^^^ its annual salary; 
soldiers were thus financially compensated for service by the state. I have shown, however, 
that the real money to be made from service did not come from stipendium,^" but success 
in battle, and the subsequent opportunities for booty and donativa. Substantial financial 
reward did not normally come from Rome: the rationale for instituting and enforcing a 
minimum wealth qualification for service was partly to obviate the need of the state to 
" " G r u e n , 1995, p. 71. 
See above. 
It must be noted, however, that the governing elite did attempt to place some controls on the distribution of 
largess by individual commanders early in the second century BC as a reaction to the sheer scale of the influx 
of wealth, and as an attempt to re-impose restraint on the power of commanders in the wake of the long 
Second Punic War, and various tools, including censure and the courts, were used. M. Acilius Glabrio, for 
example, was arraigned soon after his triumph in 189 BC by two tribunes on the charge that he kept a large 
proportion of the loot and did not hand it over to his soldiers or the treasury. The subsequent trial did not 
produce a result (Liv. 37.57). For an excellent summation of the senate's attempt to re-impose restraint upon 
its magistrates at this time, see Gruen. 1995. pp. 70 ff. For the purposes of my argument, however, it is 
enough to note that this restraint never amounted to any form of regularisation, and magistrates largely 
remained free to decide who got what when it came to plunder. 
See this chapter above. 
Scipio Afi-icanus was generous to his soldiers, as were M. Cato and L. Scipio; Aemilius Paullus, 
however, was less so. 
As it did in 168 BC, for example as 1 have shown above, when the senate ordered Paullus to allow his 
soldiers to plunder the towns and cities of lllyria and Epirus because it felt they had not been given the 
opportunity to amass booty (Plut., Aem. 29; Liv. 45.28). 
Liv. 22.49. 
In Chapter Two above and in this chapter, the point is made that the level of stipendium can only have 
barely covered the needs of subsistence. 
provide for its soldiers after discharge.^'" Apart from stipendia, logistic support, and rare 
grants of land to veterans the state generally left the business of rewarding soldiers to its 
generals; this was as true for the second century BC as it was for the civil war period of the 
first century BC. 
In the serious business of dividing up spoil, the role of the general was thus crucial; he 
decided whether a town or camp would be plundered, and what portion of the resultant 
booty would go to the state treasury. For example, in 189 BC, Cn. Vulso set aside a portion 
of the booty for the treasury to fulfil his civic responsibilities, before distributing the 
remainder to his soldiers: Consul armis hostium in uno concrematis cumulo ceteram 
praedam conferre omnes iussit, et out vendidit, quod eius in publicum redigendum erat, aut 
cum cura ut quam aequissima esset per milites divisit.^^^ The consul Vulso, not Rome, 
rewarded his soldiers, as Sulla did with his soldiers a century l a t e r , Q . Sertorius with his 
soldiers,^^^ and C. Pompeius Magnus with his . ' ' ' The magistrate allocating booty, of 
course, represented the state and acted under its authority. This nuance, however, was 
probably lost on ordinary soldiers far from Rome; as far as they were concerned, the 
general made the decision on when they could plunder and how much they would get. More 
fundamentally, it was the general's success in battle that determined how many 
opportunities for enrichment during a campaign there would be. The economic future of the 
army, whether it would return home rich or not, was thus dependent on the skill of its 
general. The personal success of L. Paullus over the Ligurian Ingauni in 181 BC, for 
example, provided the opportunity for his soldiers to collect booty;' '" the victory also 
allowed Paullus to be generous, and each soldier received 300 asses, a sizeable proportion 
The military system was devised in part so the burden upon the state was as minimal as possible. Soldiers, 
for example, who had a minimum level of property and wealth, could be expected to fall back upon their own 
resources when the army was disbanded. Under this system, the practical consequence was that the state did 
not have to provide any sort of financial reward; this duty could safely be left to the consuls and magistrates 
who commanded the armies; see Chapter Two above. 
' " F o r e x a m p l e , L i v . 31.4; 31.49. 
Liv. 38.23; "The consul, having burned all the enemy weapons in one pile, ordered his troops to bring in 
the rest of the booty and either sold that part of the booty which was his duty to convert to public use, or 
carefully distributed it to the soldiers as to secure the greatest possible measure of equity." 
Plut., Suit. 12. App., MY/). 38. 
Plut., Sert. 10. 
Plut.,/ 'om/). 19. 
I have shown above other examples of successful generals personally doling out financial rewards to their 
soldiers; in each case, the ability of the soldiers to profit from war was directly tied to its general's personal 
skill and success in battle, and conduct of the campaign. Soldiers thus naturally turned toward their generals 
to provide them with financial rewards. 
of a year's salary in one allocation that boosted the personal wealth of recipients.^" Despite 
the assertion of Marin and others, I argue that the transactional relationship between 
soldiers and their commanders in late-republican armies thus remained unchanged. The 
expectation of financial reward was a consistent factor of service: soldiers had always 
expected their generals, not the state, to reward them financially. It was not a special 
phenomenon of late-republican armies, and not the changed factor of service that explains 
the emergence of politically interventionist armies. 
Pecuniarv Self-Interest: Room for Other Factors to Work 
Brunt argues that the desire for plunder made soldiers of the late Republic, particularly the 
civil war period, readier to follow their generals in civil wars, irrespective of the cause they 
professed to represent.®^^ Brunt admits no nuance: pecuniary self-interest is the dominant 
motivator and reason for supporting ambitious generals. This emphasis is misplaced; I 
argue that the presence of pecuniary self-interest in an army did not stop other factors from 
influencing soldiers. There was room for late-republican soldiers, even those engaged in 
civil war, to be moved by other considerations; a holistic explanation for intervention 
should be alive to their presence.^'^ Even after Sulla had clearly demonstrated the political 
possibilities of a partisan army by capturing Rome, non-pecuniary appeals were still made 
to persuade troops. Marius, for example, offered Etruscans not money to join his army, but 
constitutional arguments and his record of service.'^" Sulla himself did not mention the 
subject of financial gain to his army, preferring to appeal to the inherited tradition of the 
army acting as the ultimate recourse for personal grievance.'^' Later, in Asia, Sulla and 
commander of an opposing army, Q. Flavius Fimbria, used claims of illegality and 
constitutional breaches against each other, not promises of largess to the men, to strengthen 
Liv. 40.34. 
"•-Brunt, 1962, p. 78. 
^^ As I will explain in the following chapters below, the army acted from various other motivations, and 
under the influence of other factors, besides pecuniary self-interest. Chapter Eight below will show that these 
other factors were as important, and in several instances, more influential, than pecuniary self-interest at Nola 
in 88 BC in explaining why Sulla's soldiers decided to support him. Here, it is important to understand that 
despite the emphasis of the conventional view on expectations of financial gain, the real picture was more 
nuanced, and room existed for other factors to exert themselves on the motivations of the soldiers. 
App., BC 1.67. After being chased fi-om Rome by Sulla, Marius was attempting to gather an army to 
counter attack after Sulla had left for the east. 
For more background on the army in this role and examples, see Chapter Six below. For a detailed 
discussion on how this role manifested itself in the specific conditions at Nola in 88 BC, see Chapter Eight 
below. 
the legitimacy of their position.^'' Even in the later civil war p e r i o d , w i t h all inhibitions 
of fighting fellow citizens gone, armies long interventionist, generals completely dependent 
on their armies to support their claims to power, and when soldiers' loyalties to 
commanders could thus be expected to be dominated by transactional arrangements 
involving financial reward, there was still space for other factors to assert themselves. In 40 
BC, for example, C. lulius Caesar Octavianus, was forced to postpone his argument with 
rival M. Antonius, because his veterans thought it more important to deal with the men who 
killed C. lulius Caesar, rather than fight Antonius' army."^ These were not the actions of 
men so dominated by pecuniary self-interest that they slavishly follow any order; there is 
room for other factors, such as a desire for revenge, to influence them. 
Moreover, appeals to pecuniary self-interest, when they did occur, were often accompanied 
by other reasons. Cinna in 87 BC, for example, bribed the remnants of Sulla's army at Nola 
to switch sides and become involved in his inimicitiaef^'^ but he also accompanied it with 
an argument outlining his legitimacy, the illegality of his removal, the tyrannical behaviour 
of his enemies, and the insult done to the sovereignty of ordinary citizens in assembly who 
elected him consul.''"' Cinna touched the civic sensibilities of the soldiers, as well as their 
desire to profit from service; like Sulla, he appealed to it as the ultimate recourse for 
personal injustice.^" That ordinary citizens had a sense of morality to which generals could 
appeal may not be at first obvious, but something like a sense of moral appropriateness 
existed - certainly amongst the more educated of society. Laelius, for example, defended 
App., Mith. 9.59. Sulla's army, for example, surrounded Fimbria's and demanded its surrender. Sulla did 
not appeal to the soldiers' mercenary self-interest with promises of largess or money to persuade them to join 
him. Instead, he used the illegality of Fimbria's position as a rationale for surrender. Fimbria countered with a 
charge of illegality of his own against Sulla. The constitutional argument used by Sulla, however, carried 
considerable persuasive weight with the men who watched this exchange play out in front of them. Fimbria's 
soldiers began deserting to Sulla, who used the argument of legitimacy because he knew it would resonate 
with the Fimbriani. Fimbria 's attempts at Cinna-like histrionics, theatrical displays of protestation, calling in 
favours and finally outright bribery, failed to stem the growing numbers of desertions, and he killed himself in 
despair, after which his army was integrated into Sulla's. Self-preservation no doubt paid a part in the 
decision of Fimbria 's soldiers to desert; Sulla's battle-hardened, larger army surrounded them. Yet, the legal 
and constitutional argument deployed by Sulla against Fimbria was also influential in persuading soldiers to 
desert. 
The civil wars of the second half of the first century BC, during the 40s, and after the death of C. lulius 
Caesar. 
App., BC 3.40. Alston explains that Caesar 's veterans were unwilling to back Octavian's attempted coup 
against Antony in 44 BC and refused to fight fellow Caesarians when Octavian and Antony confronted each 
other at Brundisium in 40 BC (Alston, 2007, p. 185). 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 39. 
" " A p p . , S C I .65. 
See Chapter Six below. 
Rome's acquisition of empire in the late Republic, arguing that it was acquired in just wars, 
in defence of Rome, and had been maintained largely by her correct observance of 
relationships with her allies, whether by legal treaty or morally on fidesf'^^ It is reasonable 
to think that ordinary citizens who manned the legions were also capable of being 
influenced by such a sense of morality. I argue, for example, that the tradition of the army's 
insubordination and mutiny in political, economic and social causes indicated a sense of 
collective morality that could be offended.' '^ That morality, and a sense of what was 
publically acceptable, was likely behind the defacing of the Temple of Concord erected in 
the aftermath of Gracchan suppression in 121 BC.^''* Under the dedication someone carved 
graffiti that suggested a work of mad discord had instead produced a Temple of Concord; 
ordinary citizens were angry at the extreme violence used by L. Opimius to overcome the 
Gracchans.^^^ Offended public morality was responsible for Opimius' later arraignment and 
public trial, where he attracted little sympathy from ordinary citizens because they recalled 
his violence and cruelty against the Gracchans.'™ The consuls who conducted the 'witch 
hunts' after the death of Ti. Gracchus in 132 BC, P. Popillius Laenas and P. Rupilius, also 
suffered popular disapproval at their public trials because of their actions; that disapproval 
came from a sense among ordinary citizens that the consuls had transgressed the bounds of 
what was acceptable in public life.^'' 1 have shown that when pecuniary self-interest was 
present in late-republican armies, there was nevertheless room for other considerations to 
work, even amongst soldiers long engaged in civil war. I argue that it was not enough just 
to appeal to pecuniary self-interest; legitimacy, cause, personal grievance, or other 
persuasions, were also important if a general wanted the best chance of persuading an army. 
This was especially so when he proposed acts with significant consequences or risks, such 
as supporting his personal inimicitiae, intervening in political discourse, or marching on 
Rome to impose a political solution on the state.^'^ 
Cic., Rep. 3.34 ff. For a fiill and recent discussion on the meaning and application of fides in the Roman 
context, see also Burton, 2011, pp. 38-64. 
For detail, examples and argument for this claim, see Chapter Six below. 
" " See Chapter Seven below. 
Plut., CG. 17; Flower, 2010(a), p. 77. 
Veil. 2.7. 
Veil. 2.7. 
The fact that there was room for other considerations to work on the minds of soldiers, in addition to 
pecuniary self-interest, will become highly relevant at Nola, and will be covered in detail in Chapter Eight 
below. 
Reinterpreting the Role of C. Marius 
In addition to pecuniary self-interest, the conventional view in its explanation for 
intervention as it manifests itself in much of the scholarship, places an emphasis on the role 
of Marius, particularly the consequences of his 107 BC reform of the dilectus."^ Seager, 
for example, argues that this reform created the republican armies of the first century BC, 
dependent on their generals for rewards, and thus ready to follow them against Rome. 
Marius, he contends, made possible the last precipitous stage in the fall of the Republic that 
began with Sulla's 88 BC march on Rome.^^° Matthew argues that the reform was a 
revolutionary event for the Republic; the implications of enrolling the poor were 
significant, especially because this step shifted the army's loyalty from state to general. 
Marius' reform was even invoked in later times as a cautionary example against the state 
establishing standing armies. Political theorists of the New Country Party in 1690s 
England, for example, thought the reform debased the constitutional foundation of Roman 
liberties, leading to military monarchy and tyranny, something England should avoid by 
rejecting a standing army, relying instead on a citizen-militia.'^" These views reflect ancient 
opinion: that the 107 BC dilectus fundamentally changed nature of service in the army and 
its demographic makeup.'^' 
I argue, however, that the conventional view unduly reduces the origin of politically 
interventionist armies down to a single event; it thus exaggerates the role of Marius, 
overplays the implications of the reform, and rigidly fixes a linear progression from the 107 
BC dilectus to the emergence of soldiers willing to intervene in politics.'^'* It was not one 
As 1 have shown in Chapter Three above, Marius was blamed for transforming the citizen-mihtia with his 
recruitment reform in 107 BC in preparation for his African campaign against Jugurtha. During the levy, he 
discarded the ancient Servian minimum property qualification up to that point necessary for legionary service; 
he opened up his legions to the poorest and landless of Roman society. For a recent analysis on why Marius 
implemented it, see Matthew, 2010(a). pp. 17-20. 
™ Seager, 1976, pp. 13-14. 
Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 20-21. 
Levillain, 2005, pp. 340-341. Levillain has made an interesting study of how the perception of the Roman 
Republic influenced political and social questions of late century England, including the debate over 
whether William I l l ' s standing army presented a threat to English liberties, and drawing parallels between it 
and late-republican politically interventionist armies (my term). Levillain was examining the standing army 
debates of 1697-9, and ends up characterising them as a clash between Dutch and English neo-Romanism. 
Sal., lug. 86; Flot., Epit. 1.36; Plut., Mar. 9; Gel. 16.10. See Chapter three above. 
Keaveney emphasises the exemplary role of Marius' supposed creation of the revolutionary army: he calls 
it the 'static view of the revolutionary army". By this, he means that scholars have assumed that once Marius, 
by his reforms in recruiting in 107, created a professional or revolutionary army, then its characteristics were 
event - and certainly not this event - which produced the necessary conditions in which 
such soldiers could emerge at Nola.'^^ I contend that Marius' reform was in fact not 
significant; an inveterate improver of the military institution, he took the logical step of 
abolishing a property qualification for his levy, which was almost meaningless by 107 BC 
as a barrier to the poor. There is little reason to think that it led to a sudden influx of large 
numbers of landless poor,^^' or that the traditional levy became o b s o l e t e . T o o much has 
thus been made of it as a revolutionary event which transformed the nature of military 
service by allowing volunteer proletarii to serve. Moreover, even with the property 
qualification in place, poor soldiers - most, it is reasonable to think, with a strong sense of 
pecuniary self-interest and alive to any opportunity to improve their impecunious condition 
- had always been represented in the army, long before 107 BC. The conspicuous influx of 
wealth and booty in the first half of the second century BC®^^  only accentuated the 
attractiveness of military service to the poor as one of the few institutions where their 
economic situation could be significantly improved. With that sort of wealth on display, I 
suggest that it was no accident that the first obviously professional soldiers, many of them 
poor, emerged around this time. Centurion Spurius Ligustinus, for example, who completed 
more than two decades of continuous service by 171 BC,'^' came from a small Sabine farm 
of less than two /wgera^'" below the minimum property qualification;^" thus, he was 
set and not to be altered. So Sulla's role is that of a man who saw what Marius could not, the potential of the 
new model army, and he was somebody who sought to use it for political advantage. Caesar simply followed 
Sulla's example, but from different motives and to more deadly effect. Keaveney's slant is informative, and 
the role of Sulla, and what he did with the army, as an exemplar is, 1 think, indisputable - although I would 
point out that, once again, Keaveney has focussed his attention on the individuals in command, not the 
ordinary soldiers, as the critical agents of change. As I have argued in Chapter Eight below, a proper focus 
would be on the ordinary citizens serving in the army; it was here that the biggest change occurred, without 
which no general could have been a threat to the Republic. Keaveney is right, however, to level criticism at 
the supposed formative role of the 107 BC recruitment reform. 
As I will show in subsequent chapters, there were other factors, in addition to the unexceptional desire to 
profit from war, which influenced the decision of the army to support Sulla, and which together more 
comprehensively explains its actions. 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 183. De Ligt, in his estimation, argues that this meant that the property qualification was 
still important post 107 BC (see also Rich, 1983, p. 329). 
Adams, 2007, p. 208; De Ligt, 2012, pp. 183-184; Lintott, 1992, p. 92. See also Rich, 1983, pp. 323 ff for 
a view that Marius' reform did not affect the future implementation of the property qualification; it was not 
until much later that it ceased to be observed by generals enrolling armies. 
See above. 
" " He may be a literary invention, although there is little evidence for this. 
This equated to well under a hectare; about an acre in the imperial scale of measurement. It was a small 
amount of land on which to support a family; perhaps more than enough for a hut and garden plot, but not 
much more (de Ligt, 2012, p. 183). I contend that it cannot have represented much wealth: one iugerum of 
arable land equated to around 1500 asses (de Ligt, 2012, p. 175). The total value of Spurius' home farm was 
thus under 3,000 asses. 
technically proletarius - though he must have found some way to enter the army by 
accumulating enough personal wealth, or exploiting a loophole.^'^ The presence of poor 
professionals, such as Spurius, and their desire to build wealth, did not lead to mercenary 
armies more willing to risk civil war, do anything for money, or engage in the personal 
inimicitiae of generals. The answer to why Sulla's soldiers interfered in political discourse 
thus lies elsewhere. 
The Lowering of the Propertv Qualification 
I argue that the abolition of the property qualification in 107 BC did not fundamentally alter 
the social composition of the army; it did not mean, for example, that from this point on, 
the poor suddenly began appearing in service. Instead, they had long been represented in 
the army: the threshold may originally have been intended to distinguish the poor 
unambiguously from propertied classes, but 1 argue that it was reduced over time, so that by 
107 BC, it was already so low that any distinction between assidui recruits and proletarii 
was almost meaningless."^ Every time it was reduced, large numbers of former proletarii 
were artificially elevated, without any material increase in wealth, into the assidui class, 
and thus became available for army service. It is true that the reduction in the minimum 
level of the fifth property class does not categorically represent a neat linear reduction, and 
the evidence is fragmentary;^'" 1 suggest, nevertheless, that it is likely.®' Livy, for example. 
Five iugera, or 4,000 asses, was the minimum property tlireshold at that time Spurius and his companions 
appealed to the tribunes to be admitted into the army at their former ranlcs. 
Liv. 42.43. He might have managed to scrape together enough wealth to meet the minimum property 
qualification, but from such a small holding, he was initially a poor man, and probably needed the booty and 
economic opportunities presented by service in the army to improve his financial situation. He was not the 
only veteran to present himself in 171 BC; 22 others who had been centurions also appealed to the tribunes of 
the people to be reinstated at their former ranks (Liv. 42. 32). It is reasonable to think that they, like Spurius, 
had also served for many continuous years, and were probably professionals. 
To recapitulate, the Roman census system recorded at regular intervals the population's individual wealth; 
it was used for placing citizens into one of a large number of centuries for voting units in the comilia 
cenhmata. These classes were also used to determine military service. See de Ligt, 2012, p. 100. See also 
Gargola, 1989, p. 231, and Chapter Two above. 
The fragmentary and inconclusive nature of the sources has attracted comment from scholars; Rich, for 
example, questions whether it is possible to deduce anything meaningful about the property qualification from 
the sources, given the paucity on the subject (Rich, 1983, p. 330). Matthew also argues that the figures in the 
sources are so open to doubt that any reduction to property qualifications cannot be confirmed (Matthew, 
2010(a), p. 16). 1 argue that, nevertheless, the attempt must be made, and that it is possible to build a 
circumstantial case for a linear reduction over time, that the level was low, and that the poor had been 
represented in the army long before Marius' supposed revolutionary recruiting reform - without this 
representation ever producing insurrectionist soldiers. 
See Keppie, 1984, p. 61. Also Gargola, 1989, p. 232. This subject has also been the topic of much debate, 
especially among those interested in the size of the ancient Italian population. De Ligt, Rathbone, Scheidel 
and Launaro have all produced exhaustive and recent (de Ligt's, with a 2012 publication date, is the most 
used Fabius Pictor's^'^ figure of 11,000 asses for the minimum property barrier for 
assidui.^'^'' He quoted Pictor's 579 BC-534 BC census figure*^'^ of 80,000 citizens being 
able to bear arms,'" and referred to the threshold when it was first established; it is thus 
reasonable to think that it represented the earliest time that Livy knew, well before the start 
of the first war against the Carthaginians in 264 BC.""' By the mid Republic, however, it 
had been reduced: Polybius, writing around 160 BC of the mid Republican army,'"' set the 
minimum threshold at 400 drachmae.^"^ M. Tullius Cicero, Aulus Gellius, and (the late 
imperial writer) Nonius Marcellus, writing still later, set it even lower, at 1,500 asses^"^ 
Given that settlers to Roman colonies in the first decades of the second century BC were 
recent) studies on population and census studies, and the issue of the reduction of the minimum property 
qualification has been covered in these debates because of what it indicates about the size of the proletarii 
class. 1 do not intend to add yet another voice to the vast and detailed body of work on Roman census figures 
and population densities. Suffice to say that when it comes to tracking the reduction of the minimum property 
qualification threshold, it is a difficult exercise. The evidence, for example, is fragmentary and there are only 
snippets in the sources that relate to this question. Moreover, it must be interpreted with specialist knowledge 
of the history of republican monetary devaluation, changing weights of asses over time, changing currencies 
and historical context. The best study on this question is thus Rathbone's, who in 1993 produced an article of 
clarity on the devaluation of the minimum property qualification; he brought a monetary and economic 
specialist's perspective to bear on the question, and ultimately concludes that it did occur (Rathbone, 1993, 
pp. 121 ff). He is quoted in such careful and exhaustive recent studies of Roman census figures, such as de 
Ligt's (de Ligt, 2012, pp. 101 fO, Scheidel's (Scheidel, 2006, pp. 48-49, where Scheidel quotes him verbatim: 
"I can do no better than follow his fundamental paper on this topic."), and Launaro's (Launaro, 2011, p. 92.). 
I too will draw on Rathbone where necessary. 
® ' D e Ligt, 2012, p. 41. 
Liv. 1.43: Undecim milibus haec classis cemebatur. Hoc minor census reliquam multitudinem habuit: inde 
una centuria facta est immunis militia. "The rating of this class was eleven thousand [aisei]. Those who were 
assessed at less than this amount, being the rest of the population, were made into a single century and exempt 
from military service." 
Fabius Pictor: the most ancient of historians, according to Livy (Liv. 1.44). 
Launaro offers one reason why Livy mentioned Pictor and the seemingly superfluous fact about citizens 
being able to bear arms: he was making a distinction between the census as it applied in the early Republic 
with his own time, when the census did register those not able to bear arms, such as women, children, and old 
men (Launaro, 2011, p. 19). There has apparently been a change in the way the consensus was recorded (see 
also de Ligt, 2012, p. 98). 
Brunt, 1971, p. 403. 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 169. 
Plb. 6.19; using the Greek measure. This equates to 4,000 asses. 
" " Cic., Rep. 2.22; Gel. 16.10; Non. 228. To illustrate with Gellius: Qui in plebe, inquit, Romana tenuissimi 
pauperrimique erant neque amplius quam mille quingenlum aeris in censum deferebant, 'proletarii' appellati 
sunt, qui vera nuUo aut perquam parvo aere censebantur. 'capite censi' vocabantur, extremus autem census 
capite censorum aeris fuit trecentis septuaginta quinque. "He said: those of the Roman commons who were 
the humblest and of smallest means, and who reported no more than fifteen hundred asses at the census, were 
called the 'proletariat', but those who were rated as having no property at all, or next to none, were called 
'capite censi', or 'counted by the head'. The lowest rating of capite censi was three hundred and seventy five 
assess." Note that Cicero's listing of 1,500 asses is contested; it is generally agreed that the original reading 
was 1,100 asses, not 1,500. As de Ligt points out, if it was changed by a late-antique corrector, which is itself 
not certain, then it places doubt on what Cicero actually wrote (de Ligt, 2012, p. 174, note 142). I will retain 
Cicero's 1,500 asses for the sake of completeness, and because I do not think it changes the essential fact that 
there is yet a further apparent reduction. 
allocated land plots of around 5 iugeraJ"*and the size of these plots must have made them 
eligible for legionary service/"' it is reasonable to think that Polybius' minimum figure of 
4,000 asses probably equated to the value of a four/five iugera plot.'"® Romans who served 
in the army during the First Punic War between 264 BC - 241 BC owned similar sized 
farms; M. Atilius Regulus, for example, owned a seven iugera plot worth around 5,500 
assesj"^ enough to support a family and make him eligible for legionary service.'"^ The 
reduction of the original 11,000 asses to around 5,500 asses thus likely occurred before the 
middle of the third century BC; it was slightly lowered again to 4,000 asses, probably 
during the Second Punic war in 218 BC, and remained fixed there until the middle of the 
second century 
Yet, Cicero's, Gellius' and Nonius' figure of 1,500 asses suggests it was lowered even 
further at some later point;"" Gellius makes an additional distinction among those not 
eligible for legionary service betweenproktarii and capite censij''^ although it is generally 
accepted that this was a mistake, and he referred to the same group of p e o p l e . T h e r e is 
nothing to anchor definitively the lower figure to the second half of the second century BC, 
after Polybius' figure, but I argue that the circumstantial evidence suggests it. If we accept, 
for example, that Gellius' capite censi and proletarii were the same group of people. 
This equates to about 1.25 hectares (de Ligt, 2012, p. 102). 
For example, at Liv. 39.55: settlers each got five iugera of land in the colonies which were placed at 
strategic locations, enough to make them eligible for legionary service. Between 199 BC and 184 BC, up to 
18 maritime colonies were established (de Ligt, 2012, p. 154). 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 102. Rathbone, 1993, p. 125. De Ligt believes that ownership of just 4 or 5 iugera (1 or 
1.25 hectares) of land was enough to meet the property qualification for legionary service when Polybius 
wrote (de Ligt, 2012, p. 169). I have no reason to doubt him on the conversion of iugera to hectares, and thus 
accept, and use, his estimate. 
If we use the five iugera land plot as being equal to 4000 asses in value, then seven iugera would equate to 
around 5,500 asses; here I follow Rathbone, 1993, p. 139. The conclusion is that for at least half of the third 
century BC, the minimum property threshold equated to 5,500 asses, or 1.75 hectares, and for at least half of 
the second century BC, it was set at 4,000 asses, or 1.25 hectares. This was enough to make a citizen eligible 
for legionary service, and separated the assidui class from the proletarii (see de Ligt, 2012, p. 102). 
™ V.Max. 4.4. 
Rathbone does not contest this point; rather argues that there was a reduction from 5,500 asses to 4,000 
asses in 212 BC which can be explained by the introduction of a new monetary system then which replaced 
the heavier pre-Hannibalic period asses with assess five times lighter (Rathbone, 1993, pp. 139-141. See also 
Rosenstein, 2004, p. I, and Gabba, 1976, p. 22). What is important to my argument is that there was a 
lowering in the threshold; the 11 000 asses have become 4 000 by the start of the second century BC; on this 
point, there is no conflict. 
" " Gabba, 1973, p. 6. There is little doubt in Gabba's view that a further reduction took place; the figure of 
1,500 asses is a reduction from the 4,000 assess of the Polybian period. I am not as certain as Gabba, but 
concede, nevertheless, that it was likely, as I will show. 
See note 130 above and Matthew, 2010(a), p. 14. 
" ^ D e Ligt, 2012, p. 174. 
Gellius may also have made a mistake using asses with the 375 figure; expressed as 
sestertii, this amount is the exact equivalent of 1,500 asses.^^^ Given that the correlation 
seems too exact to be coincidence, Gellius probably meant to refer to 375 sestertiiP'^ If this 
was the case, he must be using a figure after 141/140 BC, when Romans adopted sestertius 
as normal currency;^" this implies a ftirther lowering of the minimum threshold, and places 
it after Polybius. According to Gabba, there should be an accompanying spike in the 
recorded census figures"^ around this time to reflect the lowering. '" From 163 BC to 130 
BC, there is a fall in the census figures,"^ but in 124 BC, there is a significant jump in the 
numbers with 394,736 adult male citizens registered. '" Gabba interprets this as a sign that 
the minimum threshold was lowered during the early 120s BC, as there were more citizens 
who qualified for legionary service to be recorded in the census. His analysis, however, is 
not definitive, as it assumes that proletarii were not included in regular census figures, and 
this was unlikely to have been the case.'^" Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that the 
census still significantly under-registered the proletarii. The purpose of the census was to 
reveal the number of citizens available for army service, provide a basis for the imposition 
of tributum, and compile lists of voters for the orderly functioning of assemblies.'^' Given 
proletarii were not required to serve in the army or pay tributum, 1 contend that officials 
were always more careful registering propertied classes than proletarii, even if they were 
" ^ D e L ig t , 20 I2 ,p . 175. Rathbone, 1993, p. 146. 
" " De Ligt, 2012, p. 175. For an explanation of how easily such a mistake could be made, and affirmation that 
it was, see the discussion of Gellius' misreading of the minimum threshold by Gargola, 1989, p. 233. 
Rathbone, 1993, p. 144. Rathbone argues the new rating of 1,500 asses was probably introduced with the 
numismatic reform of 141/140 BC. De Ligt follows Rathbone closely on this point, and argues it is the most 
economical theory (de Ligt, 2012, p. 175). 1 find that there is nothing in the sources to contradict Rathbone's 
theory, or de Ligt's faith in the argument. 
Every five years, all male Roman citizens were required to declare themselves and their property before 
the censor 's iuratores\ citizens seem to have declared the names of their wives and sons in potestate, and the 
ages of their sons (D.H. 5.75). 
Gabba, 1976, pp. 1-19. Gabba's assertion seems logical. 
" " In 164/163 BC, there were 337,022 citizens recorded (Liv., Per. 46.). In 131/130 BC, there were 318,823 
citizens recorded, a drop of 18,199 (Liv., Per. 59). 
Liv., Per. 60. 
De Ligt, 2012, pp. 100 and 175. De Ligt convincingly argues that the census needed to have at least a 
reasonable picture of the size of the citizen class of proletarii: they were not required for legionary service, 
but they still could still be required to serve in the navy as rowers, (Plb. 6.19), and the censors needed to be 
able to accurately determine who met the minimum threshold, a factor which likely helped minimise the 
effect of under-registration among proletarii. He makes the further point that it is not too far-fetched to 
suggest that many proletarii pushed to be registered so they could give their votes to patrons in exchange for 
favours. I would add that the implication of all this is that the proletarii are likely to have been represented in 
the census figures, although there was still likely to be under-registration of the class as a whole, as censors 
would have been mainly interested in accurately capturing those groups which had property, and could 
contribute financially to the state and serve in the army. 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 100. 
expected in theory to register all adult male citizens. The figures probably reflected that 
fact: the sudden jump in numbers in 124 BC may yet be a sign of a lowering o f the 
minimum property qualification of the fifth Servian class7^^ 
There is another clue to support this hypothesis. At the same time as the sudden spike in 
numbers o f adult males registered, C. Gracchus introduced a bill which, inter alia, 
stipulated that the cost o f soldiers' clothing would in future be met by the s t a t e . T h i s was 
a change; since at least the start o f the second century BC, the state provided clothing to 
soldiers, as well as arms, equipment and victuals, but deducted the cost from their 
stipendiumP'^ 1 argue that it is no coincidence Gracchus introduced this measure at the 
Matthew questions why it appeared that only the threshold required for the fifth class was lowered, while 
there is no indication of the other classes being lowered; if one class needed refreshing, he contends, then it is 
reasonable to think that there probably existed a need to refresh all classes (Matthew, 2010(a), p. 16). Putting 
aside the fact that the absence of any evidence in the notoriously fragmentary sources does not necessarily 
mean it did not occur, if the measure was, as I believe, designed primarily to meet the army's need for more 
recruits, then it would have been enough just to lower the minimum property barrier, especially with the 
introduction of state support to pay for a basic level of arms and equipment. The original Servian determinant 
of role in the army, for example, was wealth, and what a soldier could afford to bring to service. By Polybius' 
time, however, age and experience largely determined role, although there continued to exist a residue of the 
Servian intention in the practice of placing poorest recruits into the velites (PIb. 6.21). With age and 
experience, not wealth, as the determinant of role, lowering the minimum property qualification of the fifth 
class could refresh all classes in the army over time; a fresh influx of youths from the former proletarii class 
moved through the various positions and roles as they aged and gained experience, eventually rejuvenating 
the whole army. This was possible because of the introduction of a system by which the state met the initial 
need for arms and equipment; without it, poor citizens elevated into the assidui class would have stayed as 
velites because, without any material increase in wealth, they still could not afford the minimum required to 
serve in the infantry battle lines of hastati, principes and triarii. With state support, however, and with rations 
and other essentials provided, it was possible for poor citizens to move from velites into the hastati, or go 
directly into the other main infantry battle lines depending on their age when they were elevated into the 
assidui. With such support, poorer citizens could meet their civic obligations year after year, transitioning to 
the next class as they aged. From a military perspective, it is possible to meet the needs of the military system 
by lowering the minimum property qualification only for the fifth class. 
Plut., CG 5. This occurred in 123 BC, at the same time as the census recorded a sudden jump in numbers. 
On Plutarch's language, Gabba goes further: he argues the prohibition against deducting from a man's 
stipendium the cost of clothing was Plutarch's shorthand for a prohibition against deducting anything for 
arms, equipment or victuals; the deduction of money for clothing would have been, in Gabba's opinion, the 
least onerous (Gabba, 1976, p. 10). In other words, the change is more significant; the state has now moved to 
provide free to the soldier all his necessary equipment; the soldier keeps all his stipendium. Matthew, on the 
other hand, takes a more literal reading; he limits the meaning of Plutarch's clothing stipulation strictly to 
clothing and rations, not to arms or equipment (Matthew, 2010(a), p. 24). If Gabba's view is the more 
accurate, this would be a very significant change from the system described by Polybius; I find, however, 
nothing to corroborate Gabba's assertion, and must conclude that it is speculation, and agree with Matthew 
that Gracchus only meant the reform to apply to clothing. As 1 will show, however, this does not reduce the 
significance to my argument of Gracchus' stipulation. 
PIb. 6.39. Matthew suggests this was a reflection of what the individual could afford to repay, as opposed 
to what he could purchase outright for service (Matthew, 2010(a), p. 3). This seems logical in my estimation; 
a system which deducted over time instalments from the soldier's pay would seem to have been the most 
economical and effective way of recovering the cost of the initial outlay. It is the system still in place today: 
the modem Australian army, for example, provides accommodation, food and other victuals free to soldiers. 
same time a sudden spike appeared in the census figures; it is reasonable to think that it is 
causally linked to the clothing stipulation. Gracchus's bill was an indicator of the presence 
of extremely poor soldiers in the army; it was manifestly intended to reduce the financial 
burden on citizens who found even the provision of basic clothing difficult/^^ The most 
likely explanation for its need was a sudden influx into the army of former proletahi 
elevated into the assidui class by a reduction in the fifth class threshold, but without any 
material improvement in their economic position. Gracchus' stipulation was necessary to 
help ensure they continued to serve, and enabled the state to benefit fully from the intended 
aim of the threshold reduction: an increase in the pool of manpower available to serve in 
the army. 
What matters is not to prove unambiguously the timing of a second diminution; rather, that 
a linear reduction of the minimum threshold of the fifth property class separating assidui 
from proletarii was likely over time. As I have shown, the evidence is circumstantial, but 
positive, that this occurred. De Ligt emphasises the artificial nature of the barrier; the 
number of proletarii could be reduced simply by lowering the minimum amount of 
property needed for the fifth class, because their number was determined by the 
threshold.'^" In the same way, the assidui class could be increased: each time the threshold 
was lowered, large numbers of former proletarii were artificially elevated into the assidui 
class without any material increase in their wealth,'^^ and thus became available for army 
service. In this way, and encouraged by conspicuous displays of wealth flowing into Rome 
as empire expanded, the poor came to serve in - and integrate socially into - Rome's army. 
but, like the Roman army, then deducts a fixed amount from the soldiers' pay to contribute to his uplceep. It is 
different with the provision of weapons and equipment; these are always provided to Australian soldiers at 
fiill cost to the state, although soldiers are free to - and regularly do - purchase extra personal equipment to 
improve or modify army issued items. The popularity of customised, privately purchased battle webbing and 
boots, often better quality or more comfortable than army-issued equipment, is a case in point (author's 
personal experience of more than a decade service in the Australian Regular Army). 
In other words, citizens who were almost destitute. 
™ D e Ligt, 2012, pp. 100-101. 
™ Using census figures, Gabba estimates 76,000 proletarii alone were transformed into the assidui class 
between 133-125 BC (Gabba, 1976, p. 22). 
That the state would lower the minimum threshold is not particularly surprising; there was 
logic to it.'^^ According to sources, the proletarii were so numerous that their century was 
as large as all others combined; they accounted for up to half the citizen body. '^ ' But this 
ratio is problematic: it is not clear to what historical period it applied or whether it was 
consistently true. Moreover, while many proletarii lived in Rome, ' '" such a ratio was less 
likely to apply to the countryside, where most citizens were farming assiduiP^ Yet, despite 
problems of interpretation, I argue that this ratio of proletarii to assidui may be a 
reasonable indication of the relative size of the two groups. It was in the state's interest, for 
example, to keep an accurate record of property-owning classes, and it was less important 
with respect to proletarii, given the burden of army service and taxes fell on the assidui. As 
a result, the size of the assidui group and its proportional relationship to the proletarii is 
probably relatively accurate; if anything, given the under-registration of proletarii that 
probably occurred, the group of citizens not available for service could be significantly 
larger. In any case, what is important is that proletarii obviously represented a large pool of 
untapped manpower; that the state did not use it to replenish their armies, especially in 
™ This was especially the case when Rome was under pressure to man large armies during the almost 
continuous series of expansive wars throughout the second century BC, starting with Second Punic War (218 
BC - 202 BC). 
™ D . H . 4.18; Cic.,/?e;7. 2.22. 
™ De Ligt, 2012, p. 99. 
For an argument that the citizen population in the countryside, if not the overall citizen population, at the 
start of the Second Punic War was dominated by farming assidui, see Rich, 1983, pp. 294 and 291. For a 
more recent and detailed discussion on the ratio of proletarii to assidui, and the breakdown of Roman census 
figures, see de Ligt, 2012, pp. 99 f f De Ligt, after all his analysis, forms the not very helpful conclusion that 
it is very difficult to ascertain with certainty the exact nature of this ratio, but he nevertheless believes that the 
view that the proletarii formed at least half of the entire citizen population is ' insecure. ' He argues, for 
example, that we cannot be sure the voting organisation of the comitia centuriata accurately reflected the 
social composition of Roman society, citing the fact that many country assidui would have been unable or 
unwilling to travel to Rome for the regular votes; in Rome, the urban proletarii would have probably 
outnumbered the free bom assidui at any voting assembly. This may have affected the ancient sources in 
reaching the determination that they equaled all the other classes put together. He consistently, however, 
makes the point that in the absence of any reliable information, it is difficult to determine in what proportion 
the proletarii were represented. In my view, de Ligt uses the voting arrangements to try to determine the ratio; 
this is problematic in itself 1 point out that voting and registering are not the same thing. With voting, 1 accept 
that there would have been many country assidui not present, and that the urban proletarii were probably 
overrepresented (see Chapter Six below). However, when it came to registering citizens, it was in the interests 
of the state to take a careful census of the assidui, and less so with the proletarii, given that the assidui could 
be levied with taxes and provided the bulk of the infantry. In this case, 1 argue that the proletarii were 
probably underrepresented, but the other classes more or less accurately recorded; the proletarii may well 
have been an even larger proportion of the citizen body. As a result, I am inclined to think that the proletarii 
ratio of up to half may in fact be an accurate description. Moreover, as I will show below, it is clear that the 
assidui class came under pressure during the Second Punic War; desperate measures, such as arming slaves, 
suggested Rome was running out of available manpower in the assidui class; if they were more numerous at 
the start of the war, then it is probable that the ratio of assidui to proletarii had shrunk toward its end. In the 
end, my point is that the proletarii was a large pool of untapped manpower; 1 argue that it is very unlikely the 
Romans did not access it, and lowering the threshold was the obvious mechanism to do so. 
moments of crisis, is - I suggest - not credible.''^ Desperate measures, for example, during 
the Second Punic War, such as arming slaves and recruiting youth, indicated assidui were 
depleted, and that normal manpower pools were under stress. '" In this scenario, it is 
reasonable to think that the Romans would not have allowed up to half their citizen base to 
remain untapped. It is likely they drew upon it; the most obvious way to do so was to lower 
the minimum threshold. Pressure on manpower continued into the second century BC, and 
not only on assidui', in 160 BC, Rome was no longer able to man as many ships as she had 
during the First Punic War. ' ' ' ' Given proletarii were used to help man the navy, the drop 
may indicate that their numbers were also depleted; a plausible explanation for this was a 
successive lowering of the minimum property qualification which transferred large 
segments of proletarii into assidui. 
If the state wanted to make full use of newly-promoted assidui, it was not enough to lower 
the minimum property qualification. This elevated thousands of former proletarii into the 
assidui class, increasing the pool of suitable recruits available to the state. By the mid 
Republic, the primary determinant of role in the army was not wealth, but age and 
experience, although the poorest recruits, alongside the youngest, were still made lightly-
On this point, see also Rich, 1983, p. 288. He argues that it did not malce sense for the Romans to be so 
unyielding in their devotion to principle that only men of property should serve in the army, that they allowed 
an entirely artificial manpower crisis to develop. Rich points out that if the Romans did behave in this way, 
they displayed a rigidity which was not only foolish but uncharacteristic. I agree with Rich on this matter; of 
course, the Romans did not slavishly adhere to the minimum threshold in the face of existential threat in war, 
such as that represented by Hannibal and his armies during the Second Punic War. 1 think it is unlikely that 
the Romans did not avail themselves of a pool of untapped manpower that may have represented up to half 
the total citizen population. 
For the arming of slaves, see Liv. 26.2: Octo iuvenum validorum ex servitiis prius sciscitantes singulos. 
vellentne militare, empla publice armaverunt. "They bought eight thousand young and stalwart slaves with 
treasury money and armed them, asking each first if he were willing to serve." For the recruitment of youth, 
see Liv. 22.57: Inde dictator ex auctoritate partum dictus M. lunius et Ti. Sempronius magister equitum 
dilectu edicto iiiniores ad annis septendesim et quosdam praetextatos scribunt. "The Senate then authorized 
the appointment of a dictator and Marcus Junius was named, with his Master of Horse Tiberius Sempronius; 
they proclaimed a levy and enlisted young men over seventeen and some who still wore the purple-bordered 
dress of boyhood." Moreover, the dilectus of 207 BC was conducted with particular care and strictness, as 
there were fewer men of military age available and new enemies to confront, and so additional recruitment 
pools were tapped: Itaque colonos etiam maritimos, qui sacrosanclam vacationem dicebantur habere, dare 
milites cogebant (Liv. 27.38). "Accordingly, they compelled even the men of the seaboard colonies, who - it 
was said - had an exemption that they could not be touched, to provide soldiers." All this, I contend, points to 
manpower pools under severe stress. 
™ Plb. 1.64. Fleets of between 330 and 350 ships, seen during the First Punic War, required up to 100,000 
men (Plb. 1.25, 1.36). For a further discussion on this point which emphasises the scale of the manpower 
needed during this war, and which concludes that up to 700 ships were lost during the First Punic War, and 
this equated to a manpower bill of up to 200,000 men (80,000 citizens, with the rest being from allies), see de 
Ligt ,2012, pp. 103-104. 
a r m e d velites to s e r v e in front o f t h e m a i n batt le l i n e . ' " W i t h o u t m a t e r i a l l y i n c r e a s i n g the 
w e a l t h o f f o r m e r proletarii, s i m p l y l o w e r i n g the thresho ld d id not r e p l e n i s h the a r m y ' s 
m a i n in fantry b o d y o f hastati, principes and triarii; the p o o r w e r e o f f i c i a l l y assidui, but 
t h e y w e r e sti l l u n a b l e to a f f o r d the b a s i c a r m s and e q u i p m e n t required for h e a v y infantry 
s e r v i c e . ' ' ^ T h e result w a s an e x p a n s i o n o f recruits su i table to s e r v e o n l y a s s k i r m i s h i n g 
velites, and w h o w o u l d h a v e s t a y e d velites,^^^ u n b a l a n c i n g the army, p e r m a n e n t l y o n its 
p e r i p h e r y , and u n l i k e l y to m a k e m u c h o f a contr ibut ion to its soc ia l c o m p o s i t i o n . 1 argue 
that w h a t m a d e the artif icial s w e l l i n g o f assidui v i a b l e f r o m a mi l i tary p e r s p e c t i v e w a s the 
in troduc t ion o f state support f r o m at least the start o f the s e c o n d cen tury B C that m e t for 
p o o r s o l d i e r s the initial c o s t o f arms , e q u i p m e n t , c l o t h i n g and v i c t u a l s . T h e state 
r e c o v e r e d t h e initial o u t l a y f r o m stipendium, but it cruc ia l ly a l l o w e d p o o r c i t i z e n s u n a b l e to 
a f f o r d t h e m the n e c e s s a r y a r m s and e q u i p m e n t to s erve in the a r m y ' s m a i n b o d y . Freed 
f r o m t h e l imi ta t ions o f p o v e r t y and perpetual s e r v i c e in the velites, t h e y w e r e thus ab l e to 
c o n t r i b u t e m o r e fu l ly . In theory , the c i t i z e n - m i l i t i a re f l ec t ed the t imocra t i c nature o f the 
s tate; '^' b y the m i d R e p u b l i c , th is w a s not the case . S o l d i e r s w e r e paid stipendium, the state 
p r o v i d e d all n e c e s s a r y e q u i p m e n t i f n e e d e d , and d i f f e r e n c e s in armour that o r i g i n a l l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d the S e r v i a n batt le l ine , had large ly disappeared.^'"' H a v i n g m a d e large 
Plb. 6.21. For more on the tactical organisation of the army, see Chapter Two above. 
For details on the basic equipment required by soldiers, see Plb. 6.22,23. 
™ Matthew argues persistently that reducing the minimum property qualification of the fifth class could only 
produce soldiers able to serve as velites. For example, he picks up the point that a reduction in the fifth class, 
if it is a sign of reducing Roman manpower for the army, can only have been a reduction in those able to serve 
as velites (Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 12 and 20). As shown above, however, the existence of some sort of state 
support for basic arms and equipment meant that many of these poor soldiers could serve in the main infantry 
battle lines, not just the velites. It was a system which thus encouraged the social mixing and homogenisation 
of the army's ranks. 
™ Plb. 6.39; Plut., Mar. 9; Plut., CG. 5. There is another reference from Polybius of recruits, after dilectus, 
told to assemble at a later date without arms, suggesting the state provided them at that time (Plb. 6.22, 23). 
For more on state provision of equipment, see Matthew, 2010(a), p. 2; Rathbone, 2007, pp. 159 and 167; 
Erdkamp, 1995, p. 188; Gabba, 1976, p. 9. In this chapter above, 1 have already placed the significance of C. 
Gracchus' clothing bill for the army into context. 
For example, under the original Servian system, wealth determined the position in the battle line: the 
wealthier citizens were able to afford better, more complete and different types of weapons, and thus were 
assigned specialised roles. As the classes descended in wealth, the armour and equipment changed 
accordingly. For an excellent summary of the timocratic nature of the early Roman army, see Potter, 2011, pp. 
518 and 519. 
™ With the exception of officers and centurions, the hastali are the only soldiers in the main battle lines of 
Polybius' army that now wore distinguishing armour in the ranks: a pectorale. Jhe principes and triarii wear 
loricae, and all the other weapons and equipment, except the long spears of the third battle line of triarii, were 
the same (Plb. 6.22, 23). 1 contend that this suggests that a standardisation in equipment, dress and arms had 
occurred; the most efficient way of ensuring a common standard across an army is for the state to stipulate 
requirements, and provide most of the equipment itself. The pila used by soldiers, for example, were distinct, 
and carefully built to ensure a particular affect in battle (Plb. 6.23). The easiest way of ensuring consistency 
for such a specific piece of equipment was not to rely on individuals to privately source them, which 
numbers of former proletarii theoretically available for service, the state now gave them a 
practical way to serve, and not just in the supporting and lightly-armed velites, but the main 
heavy infantry ranks of the army.' '" 
The Increasingly Meaningless Threshold 
Even with a property threshold in place, the use of proletarii in military service had been a 
reality for centuries. Not eligible for the legion, proletarii still had an obligation to defend 
the state. They served in the navy,'"*^ an important function when fighting major sea powers 
such as Carthage and the Hellenistic kingdoms.'''^ In emergencies, proletarii could also be 
armed at public expense on occasion, formed into infantry units separate from regular 
legions, and fight in support of the main army; they were used in this way during the war 
against Pyrrhus in 280 BC.'"" More fundamentally, however, I argue that the social and 
economic difference between a soldier of the fifth class worth just over 4,000 asses, and a 
citizen below the minimum property qualification, was minimal. Even without the influx of 
newly-elevated proletarii made possible by the successive lowering of the property 
qualification, the army was already drawing on assidui recruits that shared with proletarii a 
precarious economic position, and an equally strong desire to improve it. The threshold of 
4,000 asses, for example, did not represent much wealth; it probably equated to about 1.25 
hectares of land,"" the size of the plot of land given to settlers in the first decades of the 
second century BC,'"^ and enough for a dwelling and a few crops - but not much more. Its 
increased the likelihood of variation between items, but for the state to provide to ail soldiers a standardised 
and centrally produced javelin. For more on the issue of standardisation in the Roman military system, 
especially as an indicator of the homogenisation between allies and citizen soldiers, see Chapter Five below. 
Given the provision of state equipment, and the ability to pay it back over time, it is reasonable to think 
that only the richest first class still served at its own expense; most of the army probably took advantage of 
the state loan, although there was still a strong incentive for individual soldiers who could afford it, as there is 
today, to supplement state equipment with more effective or comfortable pieces. A member of the hastati, for 
example, nominally protected by a single chest piece of armour, and who could afford a mail shirt, surely 
bought and wore one. 
" - P i b . 6.19. 
™ Fabri, cornicines and tubicines, regardless of wealth, were obligated to support the main army in separate 
centuries in a role analogous to a modem army's engineers and signallers (Liv. 1.43). 
™ Oros. 4.1; D.C. 9.39. Marius' recruitment of the proletarii in 107 BC could be contextualised as a 
continuation of the tradition of enrolling poor citizens in times of crisis. In this case, Marius promised to 
defeat Jugurtha quickly and argued the state had suffered a series of misfortunes in prosecuting the war 
against him (Sal., lug. 85). Given this, it is reasonable to think that Marius and his supporters could have 
justified the abolition of the minimum property qualification, the acceptance of proletarii into the army, on 
the grounds it was a national emergency. 
About 4/5 iugera of land. Trafalgar Square in modem day London is about a hectare in size, so not much 
more arable land than Trafalgar Square. 
'" ' •Forexample, Liv. 39.55. 
value could be reckoned in the number of luxury dinners it bought: Sulla raised the amount 
of money that could be legally spent on dinners of certain holidays to 1,200 asses;'"*' the 
total worth of the assidiii could thus be as low as the amount need to pay for just over three 
of these dinners. M. Tullius Cicero, in his defence of Q. Roscius, reckoned in the 70s BC 
that the physical value of the slave, Panurgus, set at 4,000 sesterces, or 16,000 asses,'"® was 
a tiny sum compared to the value of his training;'"" even less so for a quarter of that 
amount. It is thus not clear if 4,000 asses worth of property was enough to enable soldiers 
to easily purchase outright the arms and equipment necessary for the heavy infantry role; 
the introduction of the repayment scheme suggested increasing numbers of soldiers could 
not. This was even more likely to be the case if we accept the threshold was lowered to 
1,500 asses after 141 BC. Representing the notional value of one iugerum of arable land, 
this meant that by the last decades of the second century BC, just a quarter of a hectare, 
barely enough for a small hut and a tiny garden plot, was enough to qualify a citizen for 
legionary service.'^" I argue that by 107 BC the distinction between poor assidui and 
proletarii, always artificial in any case and subject to the arbitrary movement of the 
minimum threshold, had lost most of its power to differentiate. In practical terms, there was 
economically little difference between the lower end of the assidui class and the proletarii; 
it made the continued insistence on a property qualification for legionary service 
increasingly archaic, and Marius recognised that fact by abolishing it for his levy. 
This led to a proletarianisation of the army well before Marius; very poor soldiers regularly 
served.'^' 1 have shown above that centurion Spurius Ligustinus in 171 BC was originally 
proletarius, and yet became a professional soldier, completing more than 20 years 
service.''^ His fellow volunteer centurions probably had similar careers, and were equally 
per; 
750 , 
™ 300 sesterces: Gel. 2.24. 
" " Using Nicolet's formula of 4 asses = 1 sestertius (Nicolet, 1989, p.l 16). 
Cic., Q.Rosc. 9. Furthermore, the amount that could be spent on dinners at certain holidays, stipulated by 
the Lex Fannia and Lex Licinia in 161 BC, was 100 asses (Lintott, 1972, pp. 631 and 632); the net value of a 
rson's entire property amounting to 40 of these dinners was, I argue, a very modest sum. 
Rathbone, 1993, p. 146; De Ligt, 2012, p. 175. 
™ Rathbone, 2007, p. 158. In his study of the remuneration of the Roman soldier, he concludes that large 
numbers of landless volunteers must have enlisted in the army from the late third century BC onwards. I note 
that Rathbone here is speculating, but 1 argue that it is speculation based on a solid rationale; as 1 have shown, 
the threshold mechanism existed to make proletarii available for army service, and then once available, the 
structural repayment scheme in turn made it possible for them to make a full contribution, and keep serving, 
while the prospect of booty and opportunities to improve their economic condition that service provided, 
worked to make the army a continually attractive institution. 
See this chapter above. 
poor. I have also shown that C. Gracchus' 123 BC clothing stipulation was best understood 
as a measure to alleviate the financial burden on extremely poor soldiers in service; the 
necessity to give it permanency through law indicated that poverty among soldiers was not 
a fleeting or isolated event, but a common occurrence. Similarly, I argue that the existence 
of a formal repayment scheme drawing on the promise of future stipendia - implemented 
from at least the start of the second century BC, if not earlier - to cover the initial cost of 
basic arms, victuals and equipment, was itself an indication of the presence of large 
numbers of poor in service. It suggested that the army accepted early on large numbers of 
citizen-soldiers increasingly unable to provide their own basic clothing, equipment and 
arms because they could not afford them. The most obvious rationale for the introduction of 
the scheme was the lowering of the minimum property threshold which produced a need to 
arm and equip thousands of poor and previously ineligible citizens who presented for 
service as a result of the change. 
In addition to these structural alleviations to assist poor soldiers, there are further 
indications of poverty among the soldiers in the army. The soldiers who mutinied in 342 
BC, during the first campaign against the Samnites, were very poor men according to the 
literary tradition; their impecunious financial situation, and a determination to relieve their 
social and economic condition, was a reason for their insubordination.'" In 133 BC, rural 
citizen-soldiers were so poor and burdened by poverty that many could not afford 
children.' '" The economic condition between citizens too poor to raise children, yet still 
able to meet the minimum property qualification to serve, and those unable to meet the 
threshold, was meaningless; in practical economic and social terms, these soldiers were 
proletarii. 
™ App., Sam. 3.1; D.H. 15.3. The soldiers who mutinied in Campania were in an insecure livelihood, lacked 
daily sustenance, could not discharge their debts to their creditors, and were in the army escaping poverty 
back home; by any measure, these were very poor men. For more detail on this incident, see Chapter Six 
below. 
" " App., B C I . I O , 14. As I have shown in Chapter Seven below, the poverty of the agrestes who formed the 
backbone of the army, constituted the backdrop to the turbulent tribunate of Ti. Gracchus. 
Volunteers and Professionals 
One cannot say that the acceptance of volunteers into the army in 107 BC was a practice 
which would ultimately prove dangerous to the Republic . '" In addition to troops raised by 
the traditional levy, Roman generals always had the option of asking for supplementum to 
accept volunteers into the army; it had occurred in the past without ever leading to 
insurrection, soldiers willing to intervene in politics on their commanders' behalf, or 
irrevocably changing recruitment patterns which weakened the importance of the traditional 
levy. P. Scipio, for example, used volunteers during the Second Punic War: he recruited 
7,000 for his expedition against C a r t h a g e . P . Sulpicius Galba Maximus in 200 BC 
recruited veteran volunteers from Scipio's African army to help fill his legions. '" In 199 
BC, the senate gave consul, P. Villius Tappulus, permission to supplement the existing 
army in Macedonia by as many men as he saw fit.'^^ L. Scipio in 190 BC recruited 5,000 
veteran Roman and allied volunteers for the campaign against Antiochus.'^' When the 
Third Punic War began in 149 BC, large numbers of citizens and allies volunteered, drawn 
by the prospect of booty.""" P. Scipio Aemilianus took 4,000 volunteers into the army that 
served under him in Numantia in 133 BC.'^' 
The practice of supplementum and taking volunteers into the army was thus well 
established; many of them were probably professionals. The presence of soldiers who 
considered the army a vocation has been conventionally associated with the emergence of 
politically interventionist legions. Cagniart, for example, considers the emergence of 
insurrectionist armies primarily a narrative of the evolution from citizen-militia to 
professional institution, which reached its final state in the professional armies of C. lulius 
For example, at Matthew, 2010(a), pp. 21 and 22. As well allowing soldiers with an overriding pecuniary 
self-interest into the army, Matthew's objection to accepting volunteers to man the legions is centred on it 
undermining the traditional levy: once volunteers began to be accepted, it was almost impossible to revert 
exclusively to the previous method of recruitment. As 1 have shown, however, volunteers had been serving in 
Roman armies for at least a century before 107 BC without it ever proving a problem, or undermining the 
traditional levy. For a view which locates the raising of bands of volunteer dependents in Rome's distant, 
semi-mythical past, see Potter, 2011, pp.518 and 519. 
™ Liv. 28.46. 
Liv. 31.14. 
™ Liv. 32.1. 
™ Liv. 37.4. 
™ App., Pun. 75. 
Liv. 29.1; App., Iber. 84. 
Caesar.'^^ The danger to the state lay in their transactional focus on fee for service, and its 
subsequent exploitation by unscrupulous generals. Professional soldiers, however, were not 
a unique discriminator of post 107 BC armies; they were a regular part of military service 
from at least the start of the second century BC. As 1 have observed above, Spurius 
Ligustinus was a professional soldier who completed more than two decades of continuous 
service;''^ it is reasonable to think that his companions were also professionals. P. 
Considius served successively in the armies of Sulla, M. Licinius Crassus and Caesar, and 
completed at least a quarter-century of service.'^'' M. Petreius first enrolled in 93 BC and 
was still serving in 63 BC against the insurrectionist army of Catiline. ' ' ' 
It is not known how many professional soldiers served alongside regular levies. Their 
numbers may only ever have been small; like Spurius, they may have occupied key 
positions in the army. There was, however, a tradition of taking veterans of experience and 
ability to reinforce raw levies; in 198 BC, T. Flamininus continued the policy of stiffening 
his levy by selecting soldiers who had served before in Spain or Africa.'^® In 171 BC, in the 
preparations for war against Macedon, recruiters took special care to select veterans and 
volunteers with prior service.'^' Under this policy, soldiers who gained experience and skill 
initially as regular levies, and then wanted to make the army their vocation, had a way to do 
it. 1 suggest that the conspicuous influx of wealth into Rome at the start of the second 
century BC only increased the attractiveness of the army as a career for poor citizens with 
the necessary e x p e r i e n c e . T h e important fact for my argument is that their presence did 
not lead to unusually disobedient armies, more willing to engage in insurrection against the 
governing elite in Rome, or risk civil war. Nor did their presence automatically entail 
Cagniart, 2008, pp. 84 and 85. As I have shown in Chapter Three above, the conventional view implicitly 
assumes that late-republican armies were more professional in a vocational sense than those of earlier times, 
and that a professional army per se was a danger to the Republic, more likely to align its interests with the 
political ambitions of insurrectionist generals. This process of professionalisation was the result of an influx 
into the army of poor citizens who failed to meet the minimum property qualification, had no wealth of their 
own, and subsequently looked toward military service as a vocation to meet their material and social needs. 
See this chapter above. 
' " C a e s . , 5 G 1.21. 
Sal., Cat. 59. 
Liv. 32. 9. 
Liv. 42.32. 
™ There were many citizens and allies with military experience at the start of the second century BC, 
produced by the experience of the long and difficult Second Punic War. 
disloyal armies;'^' professional soldiers could be as loyal to the Republic as citizens 
conscripted under the timocratic system. Spurius Ligustinus, for example, advised fellow 
veterans to submit to the authority of the state, regardless of the outcome of their appeal to 
be retained at their former ranks.''" M. Petreius, with thirty years of professional 
experience, defended the Republic against Catiline's insurrection in 63 BC, and aligned 
himself with Caesar's enemies in 59 BC, preferring prison rather than support Caesar's 
insurrection.'" I argue that the existence of professional soldiers was not a unique or 
particularly significant event of post-Marian service; thus, it is unable to satisfactorily 
account, per se, for the emergence of politically interventionist legions. 
Reinterpreting the Role of C. Marius: Little Real Change in 107 BC 
Given the above discussion, I argue that Marius' 107 BC recruitment reform did not change 
much. What he did do was recruit proletarii without the pretense of a minimum property 
qualification, and with senatorial permission."^ It made sense to abolish a convention 
which had ceased to have any practical effect. It did not, however, change the social 
composition of the army; as I have shown, there was nothing that Marius's reform did 
which could be considered revolutionary. It did not, for example, suddenly open up the 
army to large numbers of poor. On the contrary, the poor had always been represented in 
the army, and structural and legal initiatives that liberated them from the burden of paying 
for the initial cost of arms, clothing, equipment and victuals, suggests that they were 
present in large enough numbers, and for a sufficient length of time, to require a permanent 
Gruen, 1974, p. 366. Indeed, a steady increase in the army of poor and landless soldiers, who looked 
toward service as a vocation, could even be a force for greater societal stability, if it meant more of the 
proletarii had access to opportunities to improve their economic status. The citizen-militia offered such men 
more steady employment and a more lucrative prospect, and could thus act as a safety valve for large 
segments of the poorest of society, and reduce, rather than increase, any penchant for revolutionary activity. 
™ Liv. 42.34. 
D.C. 38.3.2. Even whole armies considered to have displayed the epitome of mercenary self-interest in 
their dealings with commanders, could be loyal to the established order. The 'Fimbrians', for example, are 
thought to be the closest example of a professional army in the late Republic (Gruen, 1974, p. 372. Keaveney, 
2007, p. 64). The core of their dilectus served successively under a variety of commanders from 86 BC to 
well after 67 BC, when they reenlisted with Pompey for another war against Mithridates. Yet, for all their 
infamous record of insubordination and mutiny, they could also be loyal to the established order. They 
obeyed, for example, a senatorial order to disband in 67 BC after their commander Lucullus was removed 
from his command, accused of prolonging the war against Mithridates - although fear of losing their 
accumulated booty if they did not comply also probably had a part to play in their obedience (App., MUh. 13). 
The senate, for example, authorised Marius to make a supplementum for the legions already in service in 
Africa (Sal., lug. 84). 
solution. These initiatives also ensured the poor were able to continue to serve, not just on 
the periphery, but as part of the army's main strength. 
Marius did not introduce a fatal mercenary spirit into the citizen-militia. The army after 107 
BC was not noticeably more interested in financial rewards;''^ a strong pecuniary self-
interest amongst soldiers already existed, and had done so for centuries. Roman soldiers 
and their allied counterparts always expected to profit from war, and looked toward service 
to improve their economic condition. Moreover, there were professional soldiers serving in 
armies long before 107 BC; their presence did not lead to disloyalty, insurrection or a 
noticeable willingness to risk civil war on behalf of their commanders. Nor did the reform 
alter forever the transactional relationship between commander and soldier at the expense 
of the state. As I have shown, it was thoroughly conventional for soldiers to expect their 
commanders, not Rome, to reward them financially. Generals in turn were expected to 
reward their men; the state could intervene on rare occasions to ensure this occurred. 
Moreover, soldiers expected their commanders to provide them with opportunities to profit 
while on campaign; in this way, the personal economic fate of soldiers had always been 
intimately tied to the capabilities, skills and fate of their commanding generals. 
Furthermore, the reform did not lead to the abolition of the traditional levy; the dilectus 
conscripting levies continued to be used for most of the first century BC.''^' In short, there 
was nothing new here; these characteristics, supposedly markers of the insurrectionist 
Keaveney makes the point, for example, that there was no evidence of a cohesive desire in Sulla's army in 
88 BC for any special economic reward, such as land or extra booty (Keaveney, 2007, p. 68). Instead, as long 
as their commander provided opportunities to gather booty, they acted in the traditional manner, making no 
special demands, and happy to receive whatever material benefit came their way. According to Keaveney, 
that would change later during the second civil war period, when the army learned to speak for itself and take 
without asking. 
™ For example, in 49 BC when Tota Italia delectus habentur, arma imperantur; pecuniae a municipiis 
exiguntur... "Levies were held throughout Italy, arms are requisitioned and sums of money are exacted from 
towns" (Caes., Civ. 1.6). Also at Caes., OV. 1.9; Cic., Mur. 42. For a contrary view to this, see Matthew, 
2010(a), p. 22. He argues that the infrequent mention of dilectus in the sources after 107 BC indicates it was 
frequently abandoned or not required (see Keppie, 1984, p. 62 for an opposing view to Matthew: "The 
compulsory enlistment of citizens continued during the first century BC, down to the time of Caesar and 
beyond."). In my own view, Matthew's position is controversial. I find it hard, for example, to so easily 
discount the above source evidence, nor do 1 think it likely in the difficult Social War, where manpower was 
desperately needed on both sides, that Rome did away with the traditional levy, and started relying solely on 
volunteers. In my view, this is simply not an effective way in an emergency - and the Social War was such an 
emergency - of making the most use of scarce manpower. That the Romans did so was, in my view, unlikely, 
and nothing in the account of that war suggested they adopted such a course of action. I also point out that the 
use of volunteers had not supplanted the regular dilectus in the second century BC; it is unlikely to have done 
so substantively during the first half of the first century BC. 1 contend that it probably remained as it had 
always been: a method of supplementing the normal gathering of troops. 
armies of the civil war period, had long been factors of pre-Marian service. The reform and 
the date, 107 BC, thus lose their validity as an explanation for the emergence of politically 
interventionist soldiers, and should be seen rather as an isolated event with little real 
significance. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that the reductionist emphasis the conventional view places on 
pecuniary self-interest as the primary factor motivating soldiers to intervene in politics is 
not justified; by itself, it cannot explain why Sulla's army decided to support him in his 
personal inimicitiae. That profit was on its mind was not surprising; it was a thoroughly 
conventional and unexceptional motivation. Roman soldiers had always expected to profit 
from service, and always looked toward their generals to provide them with opportunities to 
enrich themselves. Sulla's soldiers were no different; in its proper context, pecuniary self-
interest was a normal and conventional factor of service in late-republican armies. I have 
also shown that the role conventionally attributed to Marius and his recruitment reform of 
107 BC in the emergence of politically interventionist soldiers, is unwarranted. Rather than 
being a revolutionary event that led to the transformation of military service, the reform 
instead did not change much at all - and certainly did not lead to mercenary armies filled 
with the poor willing to do anything to improve their economic condition. They had always 
been represented in Roman armies, without this circumstance ever before leading to 
insurrection, or to soldiers more willing to risk civil war to support generals in personal 
inimicitiae. Neither pecuniary self-interest nor Marius and his dilectus led to Nola: 
ultimately, they are unsatisfactory explanations for intervention. 
Other, more influential, factors were also at work: if pecuniary self-interest and Marius' 
role are inadequate explanations for the emergence of politically interventionist armies, 
what then explains the decision of Sulla's soldiers to intervene? I argued in this chapter that 
even when pecuniary self-interest was present, there was room for other factors to influence 
and motivate soldiers. It is to these factors that I will now turn; the next chapter will discuss 
one of the most important: the role of the Social War against the Italian allies immediately 
preceding Sulla's march on Rome, and the long-standing policy of full integration of allied 
Italian units into Roman consular armies, as critical enablers of the events of 88 BC. 
Chapter Five 
Accepting the Risk of Civil War - Full Integration & Social War 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the inadequacy of pecuniary self-interest, and the role 
conventionally attributed to C. Marius and his 107 BC recruitment reform, as holistic 
explanations for intervention. This chapter turns to the decisive experience of the citizen-
militia in the Social War against a large number of its erstwhile Italian allies immediately 
preceding L. Cornelius Sulla's march on Rome. It deals with the second plank of my 
holistic explanation for intervention. I shall argue that it is no coincidence Sulla's troops 
agreed to support him at the end of this war; it 'desensitised''^^ the army to the idea of civil 
war, helping overcome any residual reluctance soldiers might have had to the prospect of 
fighting other citizens that their actions must have so clearly risked.''^ This was something 
new in the life of the Republic, and in turn it helped ambitious magistrates, such as Sulla 
and Marius, induce the army to support them. It was an experiential change for the citizen-
militia that, in combination with other factors, proved decisive. 
Lintott, in his study of violence in republican Rome, concludes that the Social and 
subsequent civil wars were inextricably linked." ' He does so, however, for what I argue are 
the wrong reasons: the war, and the concomitant presence of armies in the field, simply 
provided Sulla with a serendipitous opportunity and pretext to persuade his soldiers to 
march on Rome. The problem with Lintott's analysis is that, having discounted poverty as a 
By 'desensitised', I mean that by 88 BC, the citizen-militia had lost any residual fear it had of civil war. 
"•^All but one of Sulla's officers left him when it became clear he intended to march on Rome (App., BC 
1,57). From this fact, we can deduce that the potential implications of his action, including the prospect of 
civil war, must have been plain to the entire army. 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 187: "In retrospect, a man could with reason believe that, if the Social War had not 
occurred first, the civil war would not have followed." Badian also places the Social War in the sequence of 
violence that led to the first civil war (Badian, 1958, p. 234). 
sufficient reason for rebellion against the state/^^ he does not explain how soldiers could 
have arrived at the point where they were willing to support Sulla in his personal 
inimicitiae. 1 shall provide such an explanation. The reason the Social War could prepare 
soldiers for civil war was because the citizen-militia, for the first time in its history, fought 
an enemy that was almost identical to it in appearance and function, shared the same 
military ethos, and with whom many Roman soldiers shared personal bonds formed in 
recent battle and through ties of kinship. The Social War may technically have been a 
conflict between Latin Rome and ethnically-distinct Italian peoples - a conflict that 
resembled struggles from Rome's semi-mythical past to unite the Italian peninsula. As far 
as the ordinary Roman soldier was concerned, however, it carried all the hallmarks of a 
civil conflict, and we should resist attempts to artificially separate the two events. This is 
what 'desensitised' them: in their own minds, they had just fought a bloody civil war. 
The explanation 1 posit for this paradigm is "full integration theory": that Italian allied 
uni ts '" serving with Roman field armies gradually over time adopted Roman tactics, 
equipment, organisation, uniforms, and military culture under the imperative to maintain 
cohesion of the Roman whole on the battlefield, changing not only the way the allied 
soldiers felt about Rome but, crucially, how Roman soldiers felt about their allied 
counterparts. The process of assimilation was evident well before the start of the Second 
Punic War in 218 BC, continued during the wars of the second century BC and was 
completed by the start of the first century BC by Marius' military reforms. Its practical 
effect meant that allied units may have started out with a distinct and separate ethnic 
identity, but decades of service in the Roman military system meant they became fully 
integrated into the Roman military system, to the point that they were indistinguishable on 
the battlefield from their Roman counterparts. 
To argue that the Social War could be a perspective-changing event for Roman soldiers 
who took part, it is important first to understand how the Roman state felt about the allied 
military contribution. If it did not care about allied contributions, treated allies as an adjunct 
™ Lintott , 1999(b), p. 182. Lintott c la ims that loyalty to the general and some sort of mercant i le impulse, 
such as suppor t ing agrar ian r e fo rm, w a s needed to persuade soldiers to engage in political violence. It is an 
unconv inc ing c la im, lacking credibi l i ty ch ie f ly because of its lack of detail or explanat ion of the reasoning 
beh ind it. 
™ ' I ta l ian a l l ies ' refers col lect ively to a l l ies o f Latin descent and other Italian peoples allied unilaterally with 
R o m e , w h o were expected to p rov ide regular t roop contr ibut ions to consular armies . 
to the citizen-militia, and did not habitually place their own soldiers in a position where 
they could interact closely with their allied counterparts over a long period of time, there 
was less chance the Social War could have produced the change I argue must have 
occurred. I will thus start here, and draw inferences about the Roman view and what it 
meant for the way they designed their military system. I will then show how the Roman 
view of the importance of the allied contribution was reinforced by full integration. This 
was a process driven by the imperative of military effectiveness, which proved to be a 
strong homogenising force on allied units serving in the Roman military system, and which, 
I shall suggest, provided the opportunity needed to build strong tactical and social bonds 
between Roman and allied soldiers. Having made the case for the importance of the allied 
contribution to the Roman military system, and explained the significance of full 
integration, I will then show how this close association changed Roman and allied 
perspectives of each other, and why the Social War felt like a civil war to the Roman 
soldiers fighting it. 
The Al l ied Military Contribution: A Roman V i e w 
I argue that the ubiquitous and sustained presence of allied units serving in Roman field 
armies in numbers which usually surpassed Roman citizens, their normative placement in 
the battle line alongside citizen units crucial to its overall integrity, and the fact that the 
Romans took the trouble to officer these allied units with citizens, indicates that they 
considered the allied contributions to be an integral and crucial part of their military 
system. Indeed, Pfeilschifter neatly summarises the tactical challenge facing Roman 
commanders of integrated armies: 
He was expected to maximize the fighting strength of his army, requiring drill, tactical 
instruction, discipline and fighting experience, and especially he had to create a collective 
identity, one based on a comprehensive homogenization of the troops and thorough 
integration of individual soldiers no matter what part of Italy they came from.™" 
Pfeilschifter, 2007, pp. 27-28. Pfeilschifter goes on to say that the other challenge facing commanders was 
to maintain Roman superiority, given their political domination of Italy, and this required that the allies be 
slighted. Thus, argues Pfeilschifter, allied soldiers could not be treated in the same way as Roman soldiers. On 
this point, Pfeilschifter is partially correct: military integration did not equate to poltical or even social 
equality, and Romans were keen to maintain this separation (see below). However. Pfeilschifter, after having 
neatly summarised the tactical challenge facing Roman commanders, does not come to grips with what this 
meant tactically for the integration of allied soldiers into Roman battle formations. Nor does he deal with the 
imperative of cohesion to ensure all parts of the battle line were fully integrated, and which 1 argue meant that 
allied soldiers were treated functionally exactly the same as their Roman counterparts. This had important 
Moreover, the Romans may have jealously guarded their citizenship and the rights it 
bestowed, but what the allies could bring to the strategic military effort mattered to Rome 
because it conferred the advantage of large pools of manpower trained in the Roman way of 
war, upon which the state could draw. The Romans knew this. This importance was 
reflected in the way the Romans carefully administered the pools of allied manpower, and 
fashioned their military system: every part of it, from recruitment through to deployment, 
was designed to incorporate allied units as efficiently as possible - often in the same way as 
citizens. It was an inclusive system designed to eradicate, not accentuate, differences 
between allied and Roman soldiers. 
The Allied Military Contribution: Scale. Management and Advantages 
Roman consular armies from at least the mid Republic to the late Republic consisted of 
significant numbers of allied infantry and cavalry units;^^' these were recruited from 
communities that shared a common Latin heritage with the Romans {nomen Latinum) or 
from Italian communities with a unilateral treaty'^^ with Rome In battle accounts, 
these Italic allies were distinguished from non-Italic troops, such as auxiliary cavalry, 
infantry and missile units from foreign allies that sometimes accompanied consular 
armies.'^" Polybius, arguably the most reliable source on the Roman military system of the 
mid Republic,'^' described Roman consular armies as having the same number'^^ of allied 
implications socially and tactically with regard to relations between Roman and allied soldiers, and was an 
engine of homoginisation within consular armies (see my arguments below). Pfeilschifter does not deal 
substantively with this dynamic, and so misses these important implications, preferring instead to focus on 
evidence of political difference within Roman armies. 
For example, at the battle of Trebia in 218 BC against the Carthaginians, the combined Roman consular 
army had 16,000 citizen troops and 20,000 troops of Latin and Italian allies (Plb. 3.72). Rosenstein in a recent 
analysis of the scope of the overall allied contribution to Roman consular armies concludes that the allied 
contribution was very significant: from the mid-third century down to the later second century, perhaps 
between a quarter and well over half of allied men (i.e., hundreds of thousands) spent a period of years 
serving with the legions (Rosenstein, 2012a, p.88). 
Mouritsen, 2007, p. 142. Daly, 2002, p. 77. 
For more on this system of alliances, see Erdkamp, 2008, p. 99: "Annexation of defeated neighbours 
obviously led to an increase in Roman military manpower, but a characteristic feature of the republic was that 
Rome did not depend on direct incorporation to achieve the result. Rome conquered Italy by creating a 
complex system of unilateral alliances with other states that allowed the exploitation of their manpower." It 
should be noted that the Roman soldiers that also made up consular armies alongside the allied formations 
were citizens that came from Rome or from towns that had Roman citizen-status within the ager Romanus 
(the territory of Rome). It is the early first century BC war between Rome and some of the former Italic allies 
over the question of full Roman citizenship that gave the subsequent and decisive Social War its name and 
character. 
™ Such as at Liv. 37.25, 39. Also Erdkamp, 2008, p.98. 
Polybius had direct experience of the Roman military system: significantly, he saw it in action in the field. 
He was, for example, with P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus in Africa during the Third Punic War 
infantry and citizen infantry/^ ' but more allied than citizen cavalry: in the First Punic War 
in 262 BC/^^ the Second Punic War in 218 BC,'^' and generically in his detailed analysis 
of the Roman army in Book 6 of Histories?'^" In almost every major theatre of war during 
the second century BC, and leading up to Sulla's march on Rome, allied contingents served 
with Roman armies: '" against the Macedonian and Seleucid armies of the east,"^ in Africa 
against Jugur tha / ' ' and opposing invading Germanic tribesmen in northern Italy.' ' ' ' Where 
they have not been specifically mentioned at battles or as part of campaigning armies, we 
can infer from the narratives of reliable authors such as Polybius, who described their 
importance and place in the Roman system, that they were not only present, but were there 
as a major component of the Roman army."^ 
The Roman military system and the way it repeatedly drew upon Italian communities 
ensured that the level of allied contribution to Roman military success was neither trivial 
nor fleeting; for individual peoples, the involvement would have felt deep and sustained 
over decades.' '^ The experience of the Paeligni is a case in point. They fought for Rome 
during the Second Punic W a r " ' and are mentioned again over the next hundred years 
fighting in Roman armies, playing an integral role at some of Rome's most significant 
battles. They were, for example, at the victorious battle of Pydna against the Macedonians 
in 168 BC, and are listed among its casualties."^ Sallust mentions a cohors Paeligna 
accompanying Sulla when Marius sent him to King Bocchus during the Jugurthine War in 
and was at the siege of Carthage where he offered some advice to Scipio on how best to protect a mole. He 
would have seen the Roman army and its integrated allied contingents first hand (Plb. 38.14./19). He also 
made a claim that, unlike other commentators of history, he reported what he saw or heard accurately (Plb. 
19.12). On the credibility of Polybius, see Walbank, 1979, p. 12; Daly, 2002, p.54, and Chapter One above. 
As de Ligt points out, Polybius' list of 225 BC suggests a greater ratio of allies to citizens: 1:1.45 - each 
Roman legion of 5,500 men was accompanied by an allied formation of 8,000 (De Ligt, 2012, p. 69). This 
was in 225 BC, but by the time Polybius was writing in the middle of the second century BC, the ratio may 
have become standardised to roughly half for infantry. 
" " The allied formations also provided for each consular army a small group of troops picked from the main 
allied formations to act as a separate force for irregular duties, such as screening the army on the march. 
These were called extraordinarii (Plb. 6. 26). 
™*Plb. 1.16. 
^^ Plb. 3.109. 
" " Plb. 6.26 ff. 
Rosenstein, 2007, p. 238. 
Liv. 37.2; Liv. 44.40; Plut., Aem. 20;Plut., Aem. 15. 
™ Sal.,/»g. 105. 
" " Plut., Mar. 21; Plut., Mar. 18. 
Erdkamp, 2007, p. 47. 
'"Rosenstein, 2012, p. 76. 
' " L i v . 25.14. 
Liv. 44.40. 
106 During the campaign to defend Italy against Germanic invasion at the end of the 
2nd century BC, the Paeligni are not specifically mentioned, but they were probably there 
in numbers as part of the citizen-militia. 
If the Romans were serious about deriving the maximum benefit from their position of 
dominance over the Italian allies, we would expect them to have carefully managed the 
manpower pools available from those communities. They did just that. I argue it is an 
indication of how important the Romans considered the allied contingents to be to their 
strategic military effort that they established an administrative framework to precisely 
ascertain the scale of human resources available to them. I suggest that states do not bother 
allocating resources to gathering, recording, managing and using statistics unless it is 
important to them in some fundamental way. In the case of the Romans, numbers of 
available allied manpower were carefully tabulated and itemised, especially in preparation 
for conflict, and appear to have been supported by a formal administrative arrangement: the 
formula togatorum.^°° The lex agraria of 111 BC, for example, referred to the Italian allies 
or members of the Latin name, from whom Rome was accustomed to demanding soldiers 
ex formula togatorum^'^^ As Rosenstein points out, the significance of the formula 
togatorum was that through this mechanism, more Italians and Romans were brought 
together more often, and for longer periods of time, than in any other middle republican 
institution.^"^ 
What is important to my argument is that a list of available personnel was maintained by 
the Romans to determine the military contribution of allies,^"^ although its exact nature 
remains obscure and continues to be the subject of scholarly debate.^"" We can infer from 
the existence of the list, probably used annually at dilectus to determine specific allied 
contributions to Roman consular armies, that it was supported by a framework to gather 
Sal,,/Hg. 105. 
™ A formal list of available soldiers or men not yet enlisted, but available for service. See also Rosenstein, 
2012, p. 76. 
CIL 1.2.585. lines 21 and 50. 
Rosenstein, 2012a, p. 85. 
De Ligt, 2012, pp. 48, 63 and 64. Rosenstein, 2012, p. 76. 
See Baronowski, 1984, pp. 248-252 for a detailed analysis of the debate over whether (ne formula 
togatorum represents the military contribution demanded by treaty or whether it stated the number of allied 
soldiers the consuls demanded each year. Also de Ligt, 2008, pp. 116-117, and see also in his most recent 
analysis of demographics in republican/early empire Italy (De Ligt, 2012, p. 63 ff). 
and maintain the data.*"' Several references to the list in relation to allied military 
contributions, annual recruitment and demands made by Rome upon the allies, are 
contained in It may not, however, always been accurate or kept up to date. The 
Paeligni are recorded in 177 BC in the lead up to the war against Macedonia complaining 
that the formula togatorum used to calculate their military burden for that year had not 
taken into account recent demographic movements.*"' Up to 4,000 of their families had 
migrated to the Latin colony of Fregellae, reducing the pool of available manpower, yet the 
formula had not reflected this, suggesting the annual contribution set by the register was out 
of date, or that it was set and not easy to change - the solution to the problem was not, for 
example, to amend the register, but to compel the families to return. 
It is in Polybius, however, that we see one of the most complete and detailed examples of 
the formula in use.*"* It was officially recorded for the Roman state in what appears to have 
been the formula togatorum of 225 BC*°' and subsequently derived from the statistics of 
Fabius Pictor.*'" At that time, the Romans were threatened by Gallic invasion. Polybius 
indicates that the Romans were anxious to know the total strength available to them, and 
ordered the allies to complete lists of men of military age.*" It is a valuable window into 
Roman administrative practice because of what it indicates about the level of statistical 
detail gathered by the Romans on allied manpower, and thus the importance they ascribed 
to such detail. It showed comprehensively the number of allies serving and those available 
for call up in the event of war. Polybius' statistics indicate there were 49,200 Roman 
citizens serving in four consular legions, in four urban garrison legions and in two legions 
stationed in Sicily and Tarentum. There were 30,000 allied infantry serving with two 
consular armies and a further 120,000 infantry serving in their own units guarding the 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 63. 
Liv. 22.57;Liv. 27.9;Liv. 34.56; Liv. 29.15;Liv. 25.10. 
" " Liv. 41,8. 
" " Plb. 2.23. 
Depending on the type of alliance the allied community had with Rome, the allied communities were 
required to supply Rome with troops; the numbers were recorded in official lists gathered under the formula 
logalonim (Launaro, 2011, p. 39). On this subject, de Ligt postulates that the formula togatorum may have 
started life in 225 BC in specific response to the threatened Gallic uprising (De Ligt, 2012, p. 64). 
Baronowski, 1993, p. 181. De Ligt, 2012, p. 41. Launaro, 2011, p. 39. (Launaro assumes that Pictor, as a 
"contemporary eyewitness", would have gathered all the data from the formula togatorum.) 
Although the list was specifically referring to the gathering of statistics in response to a threatened 
invasion by the Gauls, Polybius indicates that he includes it for a larger purpose: to illustrate the size and 
depth of the Roman confederation that Hannibal attacked a short time later (Plb. 2.24 ff). 
borders under Roman command.^'^ They also indicate that there were 3,100 Roman cavalry 
serving with the legions and 8,000 allied cavalry serving with the legions in the field or 
with urban units.^'^ The register indicates there were a further 250,000 Romans and 
Campanians^'" available for service, and a total of 250,000 allies available for the levy. 
The accuracy of the numbers of allied contingents in Polybius' statistics is debatable;^'' de 
Ligt's argument is nevertheless persuasive that, although Polybius' figures were intended as 
approximations, there are no good grounds to reject them as completely u n r e l i a b l e . E v e n 
allowing for the possibility of inflation, misreporting or misinterpreting, Polybius' list still 
reflects an impressive allied contribution to the collective Roman military effort. On the 
base figures, for example, serving allied infantry are three times the number of their Roman 
counterparts and there is more than twice the number of allied cavalry. Recruitment pools 
are more even, although allied soldiers still represent at least half of all manpower available 
to the Romans. The allied contribution was evidently no ad hoc or auxiliary force, rather, it 
was the larger integral component of basic Roman military strength.^" The formula 
togatorum of 225 BC gives a statistical underpinning to the point Polybius makes in Book 6 
of Histories about allied contingents being a critical part of Roman field armies; the armies 
of the Republic were also the armies of her a l l i e s . T h e Romans appreciated this fact and 
acknowledged the weight of contribution made by their allies. In 204 BC, as punishment 
for 12 Latin colonies who refused to provide soldiers for Rome's consular armies, they 
doubled their annual quota of contributions, and compared their conduct with that of good 
Plb. 2.24. Also Baronowski, 1993, pp. 182 ff. Rosenstein, 2012, p. 77. 
Plb. 2.24. Baronowski presents a detailed analysis of the numbers serving and available for call up, and 
makes corrections to Polybius' figures in his final analysis. See Baronowski, 1993, pp. 183 ff 
The Campanians held Roman citizenship, so Polybius has grouped them together with the Romans (Plb. 
1.8). 
Baronowski, 1993, p. 182. Baronowski concludes in his analysis that, although the accuracy of the figures 
is open to question, he accepts that they must be reasonably accurate, as they accord in general with what is 
known about the estimates of the Roman forces mobilised in the period 218-168 BC. My analysis of the 
numbers of troops available to the Romans indicates this is the right conclusion to draw. De Ligt also 
conducts an extensive debate of the table in his latest analysis of Roman demographics to try to draw 
inferences about the overall size of the Roman and Italian population in Italy of the middle and late republican 
period. See de Ligt, 2012, p. 40 f f 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 77. Launaro also accepts the general reliability of Polybius' figures, noting there is not 
any consensus around the idea that Polybius and his source, Pictor, might have made a "crass error" by 
counting some men in the field twice. For more on this subject, see Launaro, 2011, pp. 42 and 43. 
As at Liv. 37.2; Daly, 2002, p. 76. 
Erdkamp, 2007, p. 47. 
and obedient allies who had continued to meet their obligations, although they had been 
exhausted doing so.^" 
The extensive Italian network of allied alliances and treaties,^^^ and consequently the size 
of the allied contribution to the Roman military effort, conferred an important strategic 
advantage on the Roman state: that of endurance in a conflict.^^' If this fact is obvious to 
us, it would have been obvious to the Romans, and the meticulous husbanding of their 
strategic manpower resource suggests it was. What this advantage meant to them was the 
difference between victory or defeat, even extinction - and the capacity to operate at an 
intensity few other comparable states could match.^^^ With this level of strategic reserve, 
Rome could soak up losses that would have been catastrophic to a state without these levels 
of resources, and recover from multiple tactical defeats to go on to ultimate victory.^^^ It 
goes a long way to explaining Rome's swift rise to dominance in the second century BC.^"'* 
The early years of the Second Punic War provide the best example of this advantage at 
work, but it is also evident during the last decade of the second century BC, when Rome 
was able to recover from a series of catastrophic defeats by Germanic tribesmen invading 
I t a l y . A t Cannae in 216 BC, the Romans suffered one of its worst defeats in battle. 
Polybius estimates the numbers of Roman and allied soldiers killed at 70,000;^^^ Livy 
proposed fewer, but still almost 50,000.^^' Before that, Hannibal had already destroyed 
sizeable Roman armies; at the river Trebia in 218 BC, killing and capturing up to 26,000 
soldiers,®^® and again at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC, killing or capturing up to 30,000.^^' 
Liv. 29.15. 
See Kent, 2012, pp. 79 ff., for a full discussion on the nature and scope of relationships between Rome and 
her Italian allies, focusing primarily on the state of relations before the Punic Wars. In this study, Kent makes 
an important point about the place of social and informal relationships, in addition to the more formal treaty 
arrangements, between the elite of Roman and Italian society in securing the support of allied contributions to 
the Roman military system. Romans, he concludes, relied heavily on these informal relationships to keep 
Roman armies supplied with Italian troops (Kent, 2012, p. 80). 
Rawlings expands on this point: it was at work from early on in Rome's ascendancy to dominance in Italy: 
"What appears striking about the Romans is how often they are presented as operating at a level and intensity 
that usually exceeded their rivals. Probably fi-om 338, and certainly from c. 312 BC, Rome frequently acted as 
a pan-Italian power capable of operating simultaneously in two or more theatres beyond the core of Roman 
territory" (Rawlings, 2008, p. 47). 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 91. 
De Ligt, 2008,p. 114. 
^-'De Ligt, 2008, p. 117. 
App., Afor. 11 ff; Veil. 2.8, 12. 
'='Plb.3.117. 
Liv. 22.49. 
Plb. 3.74. Polybius says the combined Roman army, including allied contingents, was 36,000 strong; only 
10,000 escaped the battle, the greater part of the remainder were killed (cf Liv. I I .60). 
That meant Rome in three years had lost more than 100,000 men. But the Romans not only 
refused all offers to come to terms with Hannibal, they promptly set about raising more 
legions.^^^ They even banished two legions of Cannae survivors to Sicily for the duration of 
the war rather than use them again in Italy.^" Rome's continued defiance despite these 
losses was in part due to an intrinsic national stubbornness. More practically, however, it 
was a stubbornness underwritten by large reservoirs of allied manpower available to 
replenish Roman losses; Polybius calculated that Rome had access to more than 700,000 
men of military age on the eve of the Second Punic War,^'^ an advantage the Carthaginians 
could not hope to match. The fact that allied communities generally financed the raising of 
their own contingents accentuated this edge.*'^ In the end, it proved decisive: Rome used 
these pools to recruit more armies, open and maintain multiple Ironts,^^'' and go on to defeat 
Hannibal. 
Allied Units in the Battle Line and Roman Officers: a Measure of Importance 
Allied soldiers were not placed directly into the citizen legions; this would not occur until 
the conferring of citizenship on the Italian allies at the end of the Social War dissolved the 
distinction. For most of the Republic, they served in their own formations.^^^ When allied 
units operated with Romans, however, they were placed alongside the citizen formations as 
an integral part of the Roman battle line,*'^ and were thus crucial to its overall integrity. At 
Cannae, for example, the allied infantry in the Roman battle line extended inwards toward 
the centre where they joined the Roman legionary u n i t s . T h a t means that they were on 
either side of the citizen legions holding the centre of the Roman line. The allied cavalry 
was deployed on the left wing and the Roman on the right, where the maniples were 
Plb. 3.84,85. Livy quotes 15 000 killed (Liv. 22.7). Interestingly, Livy urges us to believe his figures, 
reminding the reader that unlike some historians, he does not multiply losses on either side - and uses Fabius 
Pictor, the annalist also used by Polybius, as his source. 
™ Plb. 9.6. 
Liv. 25.5;Liv. 28.10. 
Plb. 2.24. Even if Polybius' census is not wholly accurate, such figures still illustrate the point: Rome had 
almost inexhaustible pools of manpower on which to draw. 
' " P l b . 6.21. 
In Africa, Spain and Italy. 
See Pfeilschifter's argument that explains why allied units served in separate formations to citizen legions: 
that it made sense liguistically to keep allied units in their own formations so that they could understand each 
other (Pfeilschifter, 2007, p. 31). This is, in my view, a plausible reason for allied soldiers to operate in their 
own formations, as well as maintaining a sense of Roman political separation between citizens and subjugated 
Italian/Latin allies. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 98; Daly, 2002, p. 78. 
Liv. 22.45. 
grouped more closely than normal.^^^ At the battle of Magnesia in 190 BC against the 
Seleucids, duae legiones Romanae, duae socium ac Latini nominis erant, quina milia et 
quadringenos singulae habebant. Romani mediam aciem, cornua Latini tenuerunt; 
hastatorum prima signa dein principum erant, triarii postremos claudebant.^^^ As at 
Cannae, the Romans held the centre with allied units on either flank. In the war against 
Jugurtha in 108 BC, Q. Caecilius Metellus' battle line advancing against the Numidians 
included the centre citizen legions, and then the allied formations, all flanked by the 
cavalry.^"" Recruits from both Latin and Italian allied communities provided the main allied 
formations serving on the flanks of citizen legions, as well as providing men for the 
consular army's extraordinarii unit.*'" Latin allies were specifically mentioned alongside 
citizen legions; from examples where we know other Italian allied peoples, such as the 
Paeligni and Marrucini,*'*^ operated in battle with Roman consular armies, we can infer that 
they too provided the men for the flanking allied formations of the battle line.*"^ 
Delineation like this of allied and citizen soldiers in the Roman battle line is rare; in most 
cases, infantry are simply described as operating as a Roman whole, with the Roman and 
Plb.3.113. 
Liv, 37.39:"There were two Roman legions and two of Latin and Italian allies, each consisting of 5,400 
men. The Romans held the centre, the Latins the flanks; the advanced units were the hastati, then came the 
principes; the triarii held the rear." 
Sal., lug. 46. 
PIb. 6. 26. The role of the extraordinarii is not clear. They were billeted separately from the rest of the 
allied troops in camp, and had a separate place during marches (PIb. 6.40.), suggesting there was some 
administrative reason to make them distinct from the rest of the army. Perhaps they served as a reserve or for 
special duties in camp, or during the march. But they don't seem to have had a separate task during battle, and 
may have simply joined the rest of the allied units in the battle line. See Daly for a further discussion of their 
role (Daly, 2002, p. 78). See also Pfeilschifter, 2007, p.34. Pfeilschifter argues that the extraordinarii were 
used as a kind of elite unit within the army; it is possible, although there is little evidence in the sources for 
such an elite status within the army. 
For example, during the Second Punic War (Liv. 25.14.), the battle of Pydna (Liv. 44.40), and the war 
against Jugurtha (Sal., lug. 105.) Even if some of the Italic allies in these battle accounts were operating as 
separate extraordinarii, the men of that unit in each consular army were taken directly from the main allied 
formations serving with the army alongside the citizen legions (PIb. 6.26.) But in these examples, I suggest 
that it is unlikely we are looking at examples of extraordinarii: the Paeligni in the Second Punic War (Liv. 
25.14), where a Paeligni unit seized a Punic camp, for example, were not operating separately to the main 
army; they were close enough to a Roman citizen unit that its tribune saw the Paeligni formation take the 
camp and admonished his men for allowing an allied unit the honour of being first into the enemy camp. The 
context of the battle accounts of the other examples suggests strongly the Italic allies were operating on the 
battle field not alone, but as part of a bigger formation. 
Another example is at Plut., Aem. 20: it shows Paeligni and Marrucini formations clearly operating as part 
of the Roman battle line against the Macedonian army. See also at Veil. 2.15 for confirmation that the specific 
allied peoples who revolted against Rome during the Social War in 91 BC had regularly provided a 
disproportionate number of infantry and cavalry to Roman field armies. 
allied cavalry on the w i n g s . W h e r e there are distinctions made, it generally has to do 
with function, such as skirmishers, heavily-armed infantry or m a n i p l e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I 
argue that we can still infer from battle accounts, and from Polybius' description of allied 
formations, that the normal position of allied units in the army was on the flanks of the 
centre citizen legions.^''' 
Maintaining the integrity of the battle line when it met the enemy was an important 
prerequisite for success on the battlefield.^"" For the Romans, this meant sustaining the 
integrated cohesion between allied and citizen formations, and preventing areas of 
weakness from appearing which enemy units could target; a fundamental preoccupation of 
enemy troops was to probe and discover weaknesses in the line to attack and then 
exploit.^"^ In turn, it meant ensuring units maintained their positions relative to each other 
so no gaps appeared through which the enemy could infiltrate to attack the flanks and 
rear.^"*' Polybius, in his detailed analysis of the reasons why the Roman military system 
defeated the Macedonian phalanx, makes this point.^^" It also meant protecting the ends of 
the battle line with cavalry to stop enemy horse from attacking its rear.^^' When gaps did 
appear, and the enemy exploited them to breach the integrity of the battle line, disaster for 
the whole army usually followed. The fate of the Macedonian phalanx at Pydna is a case in 
As at PIb. 3.113; Plb. 19.9; Plut., Aem. 20; Fron., Str. 2.16. There is a reason why our most accurate source 
on the Roman military system, Polybius, does not distinguish between allied and Roman citizen soldiers in 
the battle line. It has to do with full integration theory and will be discussed shortly. 
As at Plb. 3.115 ff; App., Hann. 7.19. 
^^ Plb. 6.26: Aiae sociorum. Occasionally, the order could be reversed, with allied troops in the centre and the 
Roman citizen legions on the flanks, as P. Scipio did at Ilipa in Spain in 206 BC to trick the Carthaginian 
army (Liv. 28.14.; Plb. 11.22). But the battle account makes it clear this was a reversal of the normal Roman 
battle line, and done precisely because it would surprise the enemy used to the citizen legions being in the 
middle of the battle line. Scipio may have wanted to do this in this case to place his most experienced troops 
on the flanks. Moreover, according to Polybius, these allied troops were Spanish and not Italian allies, so this 
may have made a difference to their placement in the battle line. 
Rosenstein also makes this point, although he uses the necessity of maintaining integrity of their tactical 
formations, inter alia, as one of the immutable requirements of battle that decided the outcome with little 
input from the commander. He is discussing the system of rotational command which was an important 
element of the Roman military system, and which hampered its efficiency by denying the opportunity for the 
army to benefit from the experience its commander gained during his year in office. The onus was thus on the 
soldiers to win battles; this included the maintenance of the all important integrity of their formations 
(Rosenstein, 1990, p. 262). 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
At Zama in 202 BC, P. Scipio was careful to plug the gaps he had deliberately left between the maniples in 
the front line to receive the Carthaginian elephants with skirmishers to make sure the battle line retained its 
integrity (Fron., Strat. 2.3, also at App., Hann. 7.23). 
'^"Plb. 18.31 f f 
As at App., Hann. 1.1. 
point, as is the Roman exploitation of the gaps.*^^ As long as the Macedonian army 
maintained the integrity of its battle line, it pushed the Roman army back. As soon as it 
encountered rough terrain, however, the cohesion of the shield wall could not be 
maintained, and intervals appeared in the front line. L. Aemilius Paullus saw them and 
ordered his maniples into the spaces, where they were able to attack the vulnerable flanks 
and rear and, in this manner, broke up the phalanx at close quarters.^" This happened 
earlier to the Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae when its battle line became disjointed, 
allowing a tribune and 20 maniples to attack the rear.^'" Like the Germanic tribesmen who 
labored to form a single cohesive front at Sextiae in 102 BC when pressed by Marius' 
legions,^^^ any general who wanted to win on an ancient battlefield tried to present a 
cohesive front toward the enemy, and stop gaps appearing by maintaining the integrity of 
their battle line. 
The fact that Romans deployed allied formations in critical positions of the battle line has 
important implications; they were placed in a position where, if they failed in battle, it 
would have ruined the integrity of the Roman whole, and opened gaps vulnerable to 
infiltration by enemy units. It is a manifestation of the importance the Romans placed on 
their allied contributions. They expected the same from their allies as they did from their 
own citizen-soldiers. It indicates that the Romans must have considered the allies not as 
auxiliaries separate from the main army, but as integral to its effectiveness; they were 
hardly going to place substandard, incompetent or units not fully inculcated in their way of 
fighting, alongside their own citizens in such a critical position of the battle line.^^^ In turn, 
such proximity in the battle line between allied and Roman units, and the fact that each was 
relying on the other, provided the opportunity for Roman and allied soldiers to get to know 
each other, forge close professional bonds, and gain a heightened appreciation of each 
other's worth, fighting abilities, and social idiosyncrasies.^^' 
Plut., Aem. 20. See also Sabin, 2000, p. 9. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 221. 
'^ ••Plb. 18.26. 
Plut. Mar. 20. They tried, but had trouble forming, a single united line, owing to the uneven ground and the 
discipline of Marius' more cohesive force, but eventually did so - only to be attacked from the rear. 
See Sabin for a Oilier analysis of the battle mechanics of Roman armies. He makes the point that the larger 
Roman field armies, with multiple lines, introduced great complexity into its management on the battlefield 
(Sabin, 2000, p. 2). In this context, the need for the military system to ensure all component parts worked 
seamlessly together as part of the whole, including the allied contingents, is paramount. 
This will become important later in my discussion about the shared experience of dangers and hardship on 
campaign acting as a catalyst for changing allied and Roman perspectives of each other. 
Another indication of allied importance to the Roman military effort was the officering of 
allied units serving in consular armies with Roman citizens.^^^ If allied units were operating 
separately as an army, they had a Roman in command, usually a praetor.^^' In the consular 
army, the praefectus sociorum^^ had its exact equivalent in the Roman legion: the military 
tribune, who was appointed by the consuls.^'' The allied cavalry serving with consular 
armies were also commanded by a Roman citizen: the praefectus equitum, although local 
commanders likely served under him.^'^ There were six praefecti sociorum for a typical 
consular army and it is likely they were divided among the two allied infantry formations 
that normally accompanied a consular army.^'^ Like their tribune counterparts, they were 
expected to share the dangers of their men. During an attack on a Carthaginian camp at 
Beneventum in 212 BC during the Second Punic War, for example, a Paeligni unit made 
the first breach of the enemy camp: 
Proxima forte hosti erat cohors Paeligna, cuius praefectus Vibius Accaus arreptum 
vexillum trans vallum hostium traiecit. Execratus inde seque et cohortem, si eius vexilli 
hostes potiti essent, princeps ipse per fossam vallumque in castra inrupit . '" 
Like any Roman maniple, the allied unit has a vexillum^^^ embodying its military identity. 
Moreover, the soldiers are infused with a martial ethos similar to that of their Roman 
counterparts; just like citizen-soldiers, the safety of the unit's standard was important to 
allied soldiers, or the gesture of the vexillum being thrown into the midst of the enemy to 
motivate them to battle does not make sense.'" At Beneventum, prefect Vibius Accaus may 
For a further discussion on the fact that their principal officers were Roman citizens, see de Blois, 1987, p. 
6; Rosenstein, 2012, p. 98; Daly, 2002, pp. 78 and 123; Pfeilschifter, 2007, pp. 33.ff. 
' ' ' As at Plb. 2.24. 
^ Plb. 6.26. 
Polybius advised that the organisation and command of the allied contingents is supervised by officers 
known as Prefects of the Allies, appointed by the consuls (Plb. 6.26). See also at Liv. 27.41. 
Plb. 6.39. See also Daly, 2002, p. 79. 
The number of allied prefects given by Polybius allows for only three per allied formation, in contrast to 
six tribunes normally allocated to a citizen legion. This may not have been an issue, as the allied formation 
was slightly smaller than the citizen legion due to having to provide men for the extraordinarii (Plb. 6.26). 
Although Polybius does not indicate a solution, if the Romans wanted the same number of prefects per allied 
formation as a citizen legion, the shortfall may have been made up by appointing non-citizen prefects to the 
allied formation to make the number six per allied formation in line with citizen legions. But 1 acknowledge 
there is no evidence for this. 
Liv. 25.14: "Nearest to the enemy there was a Paelignian cohort, whose prefect Vibius Accaus seized the 
standard and threw it over the enemy's earthwork. Then, with a curse upon himself and the cohort, if the 
enemy should get possession of that standard, he was himself the first to dash over the trench and wall into the 
camp." 
A standard around which a company of men organised themselves and under which they fought. 
It reminds us of the Roman standard bearer of the lO"" legion during the expedition to Britain in 55 BC 
who found his colleagues reluctant to leave their boats when the landing was opposed at the shoreline by 
have been a Roman in command of Paeligni, but he was no absentee commander. He knew 
his men well enough, and what motivated them, to attempt the dangerous tactic of throwing 
their banner into the enemy camp. More significantly for the prefect and his health, his men 
identified closely enough with their officer so that his tactic worked, and they followed him 
into the enemy camp to rescue the standard. This says something integral about the 
command relationship that existed between allied soldiers, their Roman commanders and 
their place in the Roman military system. I suggest that only close integration, and a trust 
bom of familiarity and shared hardship between allied soldier and Roman commander, 
could have produced this effect in battle. 
As well as giving Romans oversight of recruitment, training and performance, the 
placement of citizens in positions of power in allied formations indicates a concern to 
ensure that they were properly integrated into the command and control arrangements of 
the army - an understandable concern, given the crucial location they occupied on the 
flanks of the battle line. I argue that it is also evidence the Romans wanted their allied 
formations to operate within the consular army in the same way as citizen legions; having 
Romans officer these formations was an effective way of ensuring this occurred. This was 
not unreasonable: it would hardly have helped the integrity and cohesiveness of the Roman 
whole to have operating within it disparate formations, tactics and fighting styles. 
The Design of the Roman Militarv System: Integration and Incorporation 
I argue that the Romans considered the Italian allies so important to their overall military 
effort that they designed a military system which was as efficient as they could make it at 
integrating and incorporating them into its basic structures. It was one of the defining 
strengths of the Republic: from the holding of levies, formation of units, training of 
soldiers, and their placement in the battle line on the battlefield, the Roman military system 
handled its allied contingents in much the same manner as its own citizens. It was a system 
which worked to remove - not accentuate - difference, and it meant Romans and allied 
recruits from the very start of their service were not only in close physical proximity, but 
British Celts, and leapt into the surf with eagle, hoping to motivate the men to leave their boats to save their 
standard (Caes., Gal. 4.25). This type of tactic to encourage one 's soldiers, throwing standards into the ranks 
of the enemy, seems to have been common: more examples from throughout Rome's republican history are at 
Fron., Str. 2.8. 
exposed to the same military processes, structures and ethos, h was here - even if allies and 
Romans still retained their own formations - that the process of familiarisation began, and 
was encouraged by their shared experience. Over time, this would have important 
implications. 
The formation of allied units and their incorporation into Roman consular armies did not 
happen as a process separate from the citizen legions, nor did allied formations, already 
organised, armed and trained, simply join up with consular armies later on in the campaign, 
as occurred with non-Italian a l l i e s . T h e important point for my argument is that the 
Romans did not ask the allies to do that for them. Political alliance with the Romans meant 
the Roman state instead assumed responsibility for integrating allied formations into the 
army. From the start, the Roman system handled all the necessary administrative chores 
associated with forming allied contingents into the army as part of the same process, and at 
the same time they enrolled their own citizens. After armies had formed, the system then 
worked to achieve maximum integration between citizen and allied formations, short of 
merging formations. 
When consuls conducted the annual dilectus for Roman citizens, for example, they also 
sent instructions to allied communities with the numbers of allied recruits required, and 
directions as to when and where they should present themselves.^^^ The Roman military 
system used the same administrative processes to induct new allied recruits into the army. 
The allies were given the oath to obey their officers and commands, as were their Roman 
counterparts, and then sent to Rome in their detachments. When it came time to form the 
army for service, allied and Roman recruits assembled together in the same place and, 
under their Roman officers, were organised into their various formations. They then 
marched off together to pitch their first camp.*''' The system also treated allies and citizens 
similarly when it came to feeding the soldiers and their animals. Allied infantry formations, 
for example, received the same rations as their Roman counterparts, while the allied cavalry 
rations were slightly different to the Roman.^™ The important distinction was that rations 
were provided free to the allies, while Roman soldiers had deductions taken from their pay 
As at Liv. 37 .25 , 39. 
Plb. 6 .21. 
Plb. 6 .26. 
™ Plb. 6 .39. 
to cover the cost of food, clothes and any arms provided by the state. This helped ease the 
economic burden on allied communities." ' During service, Roman soldiers received a 
stipendium-, the amount depended on rank and function, with centurions and cavalrymen 
receiving more than infantrymen."^ Although it is not stated, we can infer that allied 
soldiers also received a stipendiuw^^^ allied detachments were allocated a paymaster 
before they were sent to Rome during the recruitment process.*^" The money levied from 
allied communities"^ was presumably used to pay allied soldiers serving with consular 
armies."" 
The system also standardised the training of allied and citizen soldiers. The delivery of 
common training to raw troops is the first step in building a collective sense of identity, 
individual commitment, and loyalty to the group, which can withstand the pressure of 
battle.^'' A crucial aim of this training was to inculcate among allied and citizen formations 
a commitment to the newly-formed army. There is nothing to indicate that allied and citizen 
soldiers were treated differently by training regimes - and much positive circumstantial 
evidence to indicate that training applied equally to both. In 134 BC in Spain, for example, 
P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus subjected his army, which included the normal quota of 
allied formations, to a strict training regime to prepare it for combat with the Numantines; it 
included forced marches, practice at entrenching, and the establishment of nightly field 
camps.*'^ P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, in Spain for the Second Punic War, also instituted 
a comprehensive training regime which put his Roman and allied formations through 
weapons training, marches and d r i l l . M e t e l l u s in 109 BC did the same for his army in 
Africa during the war against Jugurtha. He forced his soldiers to conduct weapons drills, 
practised making nightly camps and maneuvered the entire army, which we know included 
allied contingents,^^" around its standards to improve its battlefield m o v e m e n t s . M a r i u s , 
Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 77 and 107. 
Plb. 6.39. See also at Liv. 4.59; D.C. 7.20. 
As at Sal., lug. 36. 
' " P l b . 6.21. 
Liv. 27.9; App. ,SC 1.7. 
™ Lintott, 1993, p.70; Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 106 and 107. 
Marshall, 1947, p.l70; Gray, 1970, p.40; Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
App., Hisp. 6.86. There is some evidence that the Romans originally learned to make nighly camps from 
Pyrrhus in the early third century BC (e.g.; Front. Str. 4.1; Liv. 35.14). 
Plb. 10.8. 
™ Sal., lug. 46, 77. 
"" Sal., lug. 45. 
in the lead u p to h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i th G e r m a n i c t r i be smen at A q u a e Sex t i ae in 102 B C , 
spen t t w o yea r s t r a in ing the a r m y and exe rc i s ing the R o m a n bat t le l ine in va r ious ba t t le 
skills.*^^ T h e ex t ens ive t r a in ing r e g i m e pa id o f f ; the c i t izen-mi l i t ia w a s so wel l t ra ined and 
fit t h e y eas i ly o v e r c a m e the G e r m a n i c t r i b e s m e n du r ing battle.^^^ T h e con tex t o f these 
e x a m p l e s m a k e s it c lear that the t r a in ing app l ied t o t h e w h o l e a r my , no t j u s t par t o f it. T h e 
need to i m p r o v e the in tegr i ty o f the ent i re bat t le l ine e n c o u r a g e d c o m m a n d e r s to e n s u r e the 
al l ies w e r e as we l l - t r a ined and p repared as their o w n ci t izens . 
M a j o r Gene ra l A n g u s C a m p b e l l p rov ides c i rcumstan t ia l ev idence to suppor t th is 
hypo thes i s . H e a r g u e s that to genera te e f f ec t ive 'mass '^^" and cohes ion on the ba t t le f ie ld , 
all so ld ie rs n e e d e d t o b e t ra ined in the s a m e bas ic skill sets, and to the s a m e h igh level o f 
prof ic iency .^^ ' A c c o r d i n g to C a m p b e l l , a rmies dep loy the mos t advanced w e a p o n s s y s t e m s 
avai lable : w i th so ld ie rs o f l imi ted education,^^^ h o w e v e r , the a im w a s to k e e p skill sets 
n a r r o w to s i m p l i f y th ings , bu t to deve lop t h e m to the h ighes t poss ib le level o f p ro f i c i ency . 
C a m p b e l l ' s obse rva t ions , i n f o r m e d by his expe r i ence in A f g h a n i s t a n t ra in ing the n e w 
A f g h a n a r m y , h a v e r e l e v a n c e to the R o m a n contex t : 
Plut., Mar. 14. 
Plut., Mar. 26. 
™ 'Mass' refers to a military term, as explained by Campbell, used to denote the marshalling of a critical and 
decisive concentration of combat power on the battlefield with which to overwhelm the enemy. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
" " Campbell draws an intriguing link between the basic educational standards of soldiers and their ability to 
learn complex skills. He argues that the more highly educated a soldier, the greater scope there is to teach a 
wider variety of tactics. His experience in Afghanistan reinforced the link: Afghan soldiers, most of whom are 
very poorly educated and come from tribal backgrounds, are capable only of being taught by their Australian 
mentors the most simple of infantry basic skills. Anything more complex, such as sophisticated weapons or 
tactical skills, is very difficult. "The Afghan soldiers, who would have just been taught a basic skill, were, on 
many occasions, unable to demonstrate it for their Australian trainers a little time later. They would tell their 
trainers in a self-deprecating way: "My head is full of grass." They would say this to explain why they could 
not remember a basic drill they had just been taught. These are adult men who were completely functional in 
the tribal environment." Campbell says the trick was to keep the skill sets very narrow, but to train them to a 
high proficiency. He links the inability to learn complex skills to a lack of basic education. "Education 
literally changes the brain. The soldier himself has a greater capacity to comprehend, understand and apply 
more complex tactics and formations. It gives the commander and trainer greater scope to teach and apply a 
wider range of skills and knowledge." Campbell argues that a link exists between basic education, soldiers 
and changing tactics on the battlefield across time. "Higher general education among soldiers was the key to 
breaking armies out of their massed formations into smaller, more flexible groups. You see armies up until 
Napoleon operating in massed formations; between Napoleon and WWl is a time of transition as education 
standards start to rise, and armies start deploying smaller, more widely-dispersed formations, and then by 
WWl, formations are broken up and operated separately wherever possible. But note the Korean War: the 
Chinese used massed troops who were poorly educated to make human wave attacks. There is not much scope 
to do anything with these troops except give them a gun, tell them the enemy is to the front, and attack" 
(Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 Nov, 2012). The link between education and soldiers' ability in 
ancient armies to operate in complex ways is worthy of further scholarly investigation. 
It is important to the confidence, morale and cohesion of armies that training is 
standardised and everyone is at the same high level of proficiency. In battle, it is 
critical to soldiers' morale and confidence in the integrity of the whole battle line that 
they know the units beside them are as well trained as they are, or that the troops 
coming up to replace losses, are trained and equipped to the same high standard. The 
minute there is doubt among soldiers, they are going to want to retire under the stress 
of battle, compromising the integrity of the battle line. This is why everyone must be 
trained the same way and to the same standard.**' 
In Roman consular armies, the training of soldiers was one of the primary responsibilities 
of the commanding consul after it had formed, and as part of its preparation for combat. 
Significantly, it was conducted after allied recruits had joined the army in their formations; 
unless they had prior experience, these recruits needed to be inducted into the Roman 
method of fighting. I propose that the period immediately after initial recruitment, when the 
army first formed and marched to its first camp,*** but before it left to campaign against the 
enemy and engage in combat, was when this occurred - and it involved new citizen legions 
and raw allied formations. Q. Metellus, for example, invaded Numidia to attack Jugurtha 
only after he had properly trained his army and felt it was ready for combat.**' Marius 
advised the consul for 90 BC, P. Rutilius Lupus, during the Social War that his 
inexperienced troops would benefit from a period of intense training in their camps before 
the campaign against the Italian army.*'" 
A modem example helps inform our understanding of why it was likely a consular army 
prepared this way for operations. In preparing Task Forces for combat in Afghanistan, the 
Australian military assembles in one place people from up to 15 different units, and puts 
them through a grueling series of realistic exercises to standardise skills and raise common 
levels of proficiency:*" only then is the Task Force deployed for operations.*'^ Like a 
newly-formed consular army, these Task Forces comprise soldiers with varying levels of 
training and skills; some are recruits that need further basic training, others are returning 
veterans who require only re-familiarisation. All generally need training in critical mission-
specific competencies. Pre-deployment training brings everyone up to a common standard; 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Plb. 6.26. 
™ S a l . , / » g . 4 6 . 
Oros. 5.18. Marius' advice, however, was not heeded. Rutilius spumed it, did not train his army properly, 
and subsequently led his army into an ambush, where his untrained and inexperienced troops were quickly 
defeated by the experienced Italian soldiers: 8000 Roman soldiers were killed in the rout. 
This phase of training is called the mission rehearsal period, and its task is to instill the competencies 
needed (Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 Nov, 2012). 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
according to Campbell, this is also when a cohesive whole is forged out of the disparate 
parts making up the Task Force.^'^ The same dynamic, 1 argue, would have applied to 
consular armies. 
For the Romans, sometimes the time allocated for training was short, as it was for consuls 
in 216 BC waiting for the allied levies to arrive before setting off to confront Hannibal at 
Cannae;^'" occasionally it was longer, as it was with Marius in 104 BC waiting two years 
for the Germanic tribesmen to return to the borders of Italy. Either way, I argue that 
training was an important method of incorporating allies into the Roman system. This was 
where Roman doctrine was imparted to the allies, and regardless of regional or ethnic 
difference recruits brought with them into the army, one of its primary effects was to 
subordinate them to a Roman standardisation - a necessary outcome if the allied formations 
were to be trusted in the Roman battle line. 
The Consequence of Roman Military Policy: Full Integration Theory 
Full political or social integration between Roman and allied soldiers was not the aim of 
Roman military policy and the system it produced. Bilateral arrangements with each allied 
community established and managed Rome's manpower requirements; despite the 
importance Rome ascribed to her allied contingents, she continued to carefully husband the 
granting of its citizenship to the outbreak of the Social War in 90 BC.^' ' This was reflected 
in the formation of consular armies: the fact that the Romans retained their own citizen 
legions and placed them in the centre of the battle line, while allies fought in separate 
formations on either flank, may have indicated a political sensibility to retain some 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 Nov, 2012. Campbell makes the point that this method of 
preparing for war has a long history; it was also how the Australian troops forged a cohesive relationship with 
their New Zealand counterparts in the deserts of Egypt in preparation for the Anzac landings at Gallipoli 
during the First World War. This, therefore, is yet another example of how joint training and experience can 
transcend nationality and ethnicity; in this case, between Australian and New Zealand formations. 
Liv. 22.38. 
SuU. 6; App., BC 1.39. Marius discovered this fact when he incurred the wrath of his senatorial 
colleagues for granting citizenship to allied soldiers on the battlefield during the war with Germanic tribesmen 
in 102 BC (Plut., Mar. 18). Moreover, the tribune Sulpicius was seen as a villain because he sold Roman 
citizenship to freedmen and foreigners (Plut., SuU 8). 
separation between dominant Roman and subordinate ally.^'® As far as the Romans were 
concerned, and regardless of expectations of full suffrage that such service might have 
encouraged among the allies,^'' contributions to Roman armies did not equate to political 
equality.^'^ As 1 have shown above, the design of the Roman system and the integration of 
allied contingents reflected a broader Roman appreciation of the allied contribution to their 
strategic military strength, and a corresponding concern to ensure their allied contributions 
operated as effectively as possible within the Roman army. Its purpose, however, did not 
extend beyond the martial.^" 
Pfeilschifter argues in his 2007 study of allied service in Roman armies that allied 
participation in consular armies was not a force for the Romanisation of allied peoples in 
Italy. He argues that subtle mechanisms within the army, such as serving in separate units 
and their linguistic difference from citizen units, prevented their identification with Roman 
aims and their integration into the res publico. Furthermore, he argues that under these 
conditions, allied soldiers did not wish to associate themselves with the Romans any 
further.'"" Pfeilschifter's arguments regarding the political differences between allied and 
Roman soldiers are sound; political or legal integration of allied communities into the 
Roman polity was not the purpose of the Roman military system. He underestimates, 
however, the homogenising force that the imperative to build and maintain tactical 
cohesion within the Roman battle line placed on allied and citizen soldiers. His argument 
fails to deal with, in any substantive way, this dynamic and thus overlooks its critical 
implications for the tactical and social integration of allied soldiers serving in Roman 
armies. 1 shall thus argue that a consequence of the shared experience of war in a system 
that did all it could to eradicate difference and integrate, was a gradual homogenising effect 
over time on allied contingents serving with the Romans. The engine of this effect was the 
This picture becomes much less clear atter C. Marius' reforms: in the post Marian army, with its 
uniformity of function and form across the legion, it makes less sense - except for political reasons - to retain 
such distinctions between allied and Roman soldiers. I will discuss this below. 
1 suggest that the experience of long time service with Romans did have the effect of raising allied 
expectations of their right to the protections of Roman citizenship, which 1 will cover below (see also Chapter 
Two above). 
There is a sense of the need for Rome to maintain an image of its political superiority over the Italians, 
despite their importance to Roman consular armies, at the start of the Social War in 90 BC. Part of the 
rationale to fight for the Romans, for example, was a sense that it was a disgrace to appear inferior to their 
inferiors; a keenly-feh sense of distinction (D.S. 37.22). 
" " Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 136 f f 
™ Pfeilschifter, 2007, pp. 27.ff 
imperative to maximise cohesion in the army, and this meant that allied formations 
gradually adopted the Roman panoply of war: its uniforms, weapons, equipment, tactics, 
military ethos, formations - and probably the same command language: Latin.'"' Any study 
of the affect of allied participation in the Roman military system must, in my view, address 
these issues if it hopes to deal with the question of integration. The process was under way 
before the second century BC, but, by the time of the Social War, allied units such as the 
Paeligni would have looked and fought like Roman soldiers. It also produced a socialising 
effect. I contend that soldiers in close and constant proximity who experience shared 
hardship and danger, as Roman and allied units did, next to each other, in the battle line, 
tended to develop deep bonds of comradeship.'®^ I shall argue that, in all likelihood, Roman 
and allied soldiers knew each other well; the Roman system provided opportunities for 
them to develop these bonds, regardless of different ethnicity, and the fact they served in 
separate formations. This is full integration theory; the evidence for it is circumstantial, but 
- I shall suggest - persuasive. 
The Scale of Integration 
The Romans were concerned with improving and maintaining their military strength. Their 
ascendancy to empire and dominant position in Italy depended on military effectiveness 
against a range of traditional enemies, such as Gallic tribesmen and Carthaginians, and new 
ones, such as Seleucids and Macedonians. As a result, their citizen-militia was constantly 
evolving and being refined to improve its effectiveness under the pressure of battle. As I 
have shown,'"^ for example, they made fiindamental organisational and structural changes 
to the legions some time in the fourth century BC, replacing the phalanx with the more 
flexible manipular'"'* system arranged into three main battle lines, changing the equipment 
of the soldiers, and making the gladius and pilum the primary weapons of the 
During a battle with Marius and his soldiers, who were arranged in a defensive square formation and who 
included allied troops holding the left side, Jugurtha goes to the most hard-pressed part of the Roman square 
(the rear) and calls out to the Roman soldiers in Latin that he has killed Marius. Jugurtha cannot be sure in the 
confusion of battle which soldiers are holding which part of the square; for this ruse to work, he must be 
confident the enemy soldiers, including the allied troops, can understand him - so he uses the universal 
language. It 's not definitive; but may suggest circumstantially that the allied troops understood him (Sal., lug. 
101;Fron., S/r. 2.4). 
Gray, 1970, p. 89. Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. See Pfeilschifter for a 
contrary view (Pfeilschifter, 2007, pp. 34.ff.). 
In Chapter Two above. 
Manipuli, meaning 'handfuls ' . Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 96 and 97. 
legionnaire.'"' The manipular army, with its flexible interplay of maniples in the battle line 
operating as part of the Roman whole, was the basic tactical formation until the Marian 
reforms at the end of the second century BC. 
The adoption of the manipular army improved Roman military effectiveness.'"^ But it also 
exacerbated the problem of maintaining the integrity of the battle line under pressure; in 
particular, keeping order and maintaining the correct spatial relationships between multiple 
formations, and ensuring coordinated action in the chaos and confusion of battle. Armies 
using maniples were complex formations. It would have been difficult enough on the 
practice ground to perform the types of necessary maneouvres through gaps in the lines,'"' 
but to do so under stress, and in contact with the enemy, would have complicated the 
simplest of movements, especially the careful drills required to pass the hastati maniples 
through the second line of principes.'^°^ If adjacent formations lost their spacing, contact 
with each other, or unity of action, the result was added confusion, loss of control and 
dangerous vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the enemy. In 108 BC, this happened 
to Metellus' Roman army in a major engagement with Jugurtha. The result was a Roman 
battle line that could not maintain its order, nor units follow their standards to initiate 
coordinated attacks. The battle quickly degenerated into a confiised series of disjointed 
actions.'"' Metellus was lucky the Numidians were as equally disorganised, and could not 
take advantage of his loss of control. The answer to this problem was to improve the 
cohesiveness of the army by integrating and standardising its component parts. As I have 
shown, the Roman system was designed to do this as efficiently as possible; the Romans 
subjected the allies to the same training as their own citizens, placed them in an integral 
part of the battle line alongside citizen legions, and expected the same from them in combat 
as the citizen legions. 1 argue that this produced a level of integration of allied units into the 
Roman army that was very deep, and it manifested itself over time in form and function. 
Liv. 8.8; Plb. 6.21 ff. 
An analysis of the performance of Rome's armies after the defeat at Alha in 390 BC suggests the evolution 
to the manipular army improved the effectiveness of the citizen-militia. After 390 BC, Roman armies began 
to consistently beat their enemies, and, for the next century, Roman armies consistently suppressed rebellions 
or turned back invasions. For example, Livy tells us that the dictator, M. Furius, fought a battle against the 
Gauls on Alban soil in 367 BC and gained a victory (Liv. 6.42). In 360-1 BC, a third army of Gauls invaded 
Italy but was destroyed by Titus Quintius (Liv. 7.10). 
" " For example, at Liv. 8.8. 
"In war the simple things are the most difficult" (Marshall, 1947, p. 132). 
Sal., lug. 51. Also at Sal., lug. 98, 
Integration: Weapons and Equipment 
I argue that to meet the demands of integration, allied formations were armed with the same 
weapons, armour and equipment as citizen legions;"" this is what made them look like their 
Roman counterparts. The opportunity to make sure this occurred was at a specific point of 
the recruitment phase after the allied contingents had been sent to Rome and the citizens 
had gathered. As I have shown above, here tribunes gave detailed instructions to recruits on 
what weapons, armour and equipment they needed to bring to the army's assembly point 
before dismissing them. ' " This was how the system ensured equipment and weapons were 
standardised across the army; soldiers were told what to bring, and it is probable that 
tribunes also gave these instructions to the allied contingents, as they too needed to 
assemble with the citizen recruits ready in all respects to form the army."^ 
There is also persuasive source evidence that allied and Roman soldiers were armed 
identically during campaigns. Livy described the Roman battle line at Magnesia in 190 BC 
- which included allied formations '" - as uniform in arrangement, both in numbers and 
equipment."'* Interestingly, he calls this the regular battle line, and made a point of 
distinguishing it from the supporting Greek auxiliary units, which included 3,000 Greek 
infantry, cavalry and missile units."^ At Pydna in 168 BC, the commander of a Paeligni unit 
threw their standard into the ranks of the Macedonian phalanx to motivate his men to close 
with enemy; a bitter struggle occurred, with the Paeligni and Marrucini using their swords 
and shields to turn the Macedonian long spears."^ During the war with Jugurtha in 106 BC, 
" " Rosenstein, 2012, p. 98. Rosenstein concludes that the allies troops in consular armies were probably 
armed in a similar fashion to their Roman counterparts; I go further, and argue in this chapter that it was a 
virtual certainty (cf. Daly, 2002, p. 79; Zhmodikov, 2000, p. 72). 
• " 'P lb .6 .26 . 
Plb. 6.26. Polybius emphasised the point that once the allies and citizens had assembled to form the army, 
they were immediately marched off to form their first camp and begin their service. Thus, allies and citizens 
alike had to have had all their equipment they were going to bring with them at that point. 
' " L i v . 37.39. 
" " Liv. 37.34: Romana acies uniusprope fuit et homimim et armorum genere. 
Liv. 37.39; Extra hanc veliil iiislam aciem a parte dextra consul Achaeonim caetratis immixtos auxiliares 
Eumenis: tria milia ferme pedilum, aequata fronte instruxit: ultra eos equitum minus tria milia opposuit, ex 
quibus Eumenis octingenti, reliquus omnis Romamts equitatus eral; exiremos Tralles et Crelenses -
quingentorum utrique numerum explebant - statuit. "Outside this, which may be called the regular battle-line, 
on the right flank and in line with the legions, the consul placed the auxiliaries of Eumenes mixed with the 
Achaean targeteers, being about three thousand infantry; outside them he stationed less than three thousand 
cavalry. Eight hundred of whom belonged to the Eumenes, all the rest being Roman (Latin?) cavalry; on the 
extreme flank he placed the Tralli and Cretans, each contingent amounting to about five hundred men." 
Plut., Aem. 20. 
an allied infantryman was put in charge of a small detachment to infiltrate an enemy 
fortress on top of a mountain; they carried their normal swords and shields on their backs 
and used Numidian shields because they made less sound."^ To prepare the army, which 
included allied contingents, for battle against Germanic tribesmen in 105 BC, P. Rutilius 
Rufus introduced a training regime used in gladiatorial schools which involved 
swordplay."® There is no evidence that this training was only given to part of the army, and 
if allied formations also received it, it is reasonable to think that they must have used 
swords like their Roman counterparts. I argue that these examples indicate a 
homogenisation of weapons and equipment occurred across the army. 
There was also, however, a sound tactical reason for equipping all formations identically. 
Campbell explains that Roman commanders, like all commanders, would have wanted the 
best, most advanced weapons and equipment available for all soldiers, not just some: 
There is a simple reason for this: if one part of the army was well-equipped, and 
another part not so well-equipped with different weapons, the enemy was invariably 
going to attack hardest that bit of the line not so well-equipped. The enemy was always 
on the lookout for weakness; even if they were not initially aware of the weakness, 
they would soon discover it. When attacked, that bit of the army not so well equipped 
would give just a little bit more than the well-equipped formations, signaling to the 
enemy that here was a weak spot in the line on which to f o c u s . ' " 
Given that we know that allied formations were placed in critical flanking positions 
alongside their Roman counterparts in the battle line, the Romans would naturally have 
wanted to avoid the scenario described above by Campbell. The way to eliminate the 
possibility of weaknesses arising from mismatched equipment was to standardise all 
equipment across the army. 
Integration: Formations and Tactics 
Rosenstein argues allied units went into battle in different formations from their Roman 
counterparts.'^^" I argue, however, that this was unlikely: integration meant not only were 
" ' S a l . , / » g . 94. 
Val.Max. 2.3.2. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell , 21 November, 2012. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 98. He says offhandedly that 'cohorts ' were used; presumably while maniples were in 
use among Roman formations, but he does not go any deeper than this, nor give any reasons why this may be 
so. As I have argued above, the imperative to build cohesion along the whole battle line makes this unlikely. 
Moreover, the term 'cohor ts ' probably referred to an administrative or special grouping established for an 
unusual task: in Spain, a cohort comprised a slice of the battle line that included a combination of skirmishers. 
allied formations armed and equipped like their citizen counterparts, but that they used the 
same tactics and formations as Roman legions.'^' As 1 have shown, the imperative to 
achieve maximum integration and cohesion between Roman and allied formations was very 
strong; variations in expectations, training, equipment, tactics or formations introduced the 
possibility of uncertainty, misunderstanding and confusion under the stress of battle which 
could expose the battle line to vulnerabilities exploited by an enemy.'^^ If allied formations 
placed alongside their Roman counterparts were to contribute to the cohesiveness and 
integrity of the battle line, there needed to be a high level of interoperability and contact 
between them; the flanks were a critical part of any battle line, and ensuring that they were 
properly integrated into the whole was an important concern for any commander.'^' The 
obvious way to achieve this was to organise allied formations into manipular formations 
like their Roman counterparts, and train them to operate like citizen legions;'^" the 
opportunity to do this was during the training period after armies had formed and marched 
off to their first camp together. 
We cannot be certain that this occurred, but 1 argue that the circumstantial evidence for it is 
persuasive. According to Livy, Latin troops of the mid-fourth century BC fought in the 
same manipular formation as the Romans.'^' Maniples appear to have been in common use, 
not only in Roman armies, but also in the armies of Italians: Pyrrhus in the early third 
century BC used battle formations comprising Hellenistic phalanx units, interspersed with 
Italian maniples allied with his army.'"^ Campbell, moreover, argues that it was critical for 
cavalry and three maniples of infantrymen used for a special task in extraordinary circumstances, in this case 
the unusual arrangement of the Roman army at the battle of Ilipa in 206 BC (Plb. 11.23). This type of 
arrangement was not the normal battle arrangement, and we don' t often see troops used in this way. 
Daly also reaches this conclusion, although he does not posit a strong case for why this may be so (Daly, 
2002, p. 78). Nevertheless, his instincts are right. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November , 2012. 
Marshall, 1947, pp. 161 and 191; Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. Campbell 
talks about the absolute necessity in battle of protecting and securing the flanks of an army. He says the aim 
of every commander was to 'roll up the enemy ' s f lanks ' , and destroy the cohesion of their army. "The reason 
this is so critical is that with soldiers of limited education, all you can do is teach them a narrow set of skills, 
point them in the right direction, tell them the enemy is in front, and then urge them to attack. The minute a 
soldier doubts that the enemy is in front, or suspects that the enemy is behind him or on his flanks, cohesion 
starts to disintegrate. This is why the flanks and rear of an army are so important." 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell , 21 Nov, 2012. 
Liv. 8.8. The chronology fits: this is after the defeat of the Roman-Italic phalanx by the Gauls m 390 BC, 
which, 1 would argue, was instrumental in prompting the move to the more flexible manipular system. Of 
course, Livy may have been retrojecting a contemporary term onto his account, although I would suggest that 
the categorical nature of the statement suggests he inherited it from an annalistic or antiquarian source. 
'^•^Plb. 18.28. 
cohesion in armies made up of poorly educated recruits to standardise tasks, equipment and 
formations as much as possible: "to make all soldiers square pegs in square holes."'^' 
Differences in formations and tactics create problems for a commander. If an allied 
unit turned left instead of right, or advanced slightly faster than a neighbouring 
formation, it opened up vulnerabilities. You do not want this to happen, so you train to 
iron out discretion wherever possible and standardise procedures, and make sure 
everyone understands them. If you didn't do this, your first battle was going to be very 
messy . " ' 
Accounts of ancient battles underscore Campbell's point about the necessity of integration. 
The allied formations in Marius' army operating against Jugurtha were sufficiently 
integrated so that they could quickly form the left side of a defensive square alongside their 
Roman counterparts when attacked by a larger Numidian f o r c e . A t Magnesia, the Roman 
battle line, with its allied formations on the flanks of the centre citizen legions, was uniform 
in arrangement, numbers and equipment.'^" Moreover, Roman armies, especially the 
forward battle line, were often described in battle accounts being maneuvered as single 
entities.'^' I argue that this suggested a commonality of training, organisation and tactics 
across the army. The allied formations in T. Quinctius Flamininus' army at Cynoscephalae, 
for example, were wielded against the Macedonian phalanx as part of the whole battle line; 
the uniformity of tactics across the entire front battle line was demonstrated by the 
withdrawal of the lightly armed velites through gaps opened not only by Roman maniples, 
but allied formations. 
Furthermore, Polybius, our best source on the Roman army and well aware of the 
differences in Roman and allied polity, saw no difference between allied and Roman 
formations when describing the Roman military system, and its use on the battlefield. 
Rather than ignoring or underestimating the role of the allies, I argue that Polybius 
faithfiilly described what he saw; distinctions between allies and Roman formations were 
simply not important because little existed - and his narrative and language is a 
manifestation of that fact . '" At the battle of Cannae in 216 BC, for example, Polybius 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 Nov, 2012. 
^ Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 Nov, 2012. 
" ' S a l . , fog. 100. 
" " Liv. 37.34. 
A s a t P l b . l 5 . l l ; P l u t . , / ( e m . 19; Sal . , /»g. 50. 
' ' " P l b . 18.23. 
Erdkamp, in a study of Polybius' use of language to describe Roman and allied formations, reaches the 
same conclusion: Polybius didn't record differences between the formation and use of allied and Roman 
described the Roman army as a single homogenous w h o l e . W h e r e points of 
differentiation are made, they are limited to pointing out that the Italian cavalry was 
deployed in a different location from the Roman citizen cavalry on the wings of the 
legions.''^ Polybius' lack of differentiation amongst the Roman troops in this battle and 
others'^® cannot be explained by an inattention to detail or narrative sloppiness; on the 
contrary, he was painstaking in his description of the ethnic components, and their 
differences, in the Carthaginian army'^' - even down to the distinct types of arms they 
carried and the colour of their tunics.'^^ When he thought a distinction was important, he 
recorded it. In his use of language to describe military units, however, he minimised 
differences. The same word, stratopedon, is used to refer to citizen and allied formations; a 
consular army consisted of two Roman stratopeda and two of the allies.'^' For the legion's 
sub-units, he used the word semaia which can be translated as the Greek equivalent of the 
smallest infantry manoeuvre unit of the pre-Marian legion, the manipulus: Polybius used 
this term for describing both Roman and allied maniples.'"" I argue that the fact Polybius 
did not distinguish between allied and Roman infantry linguistically or descriptively was 
because he literally saw allied formations as identical to their citizen counterparts. 
formations because none existed (Erdkamp, 2007, p.51 ff). Daly agrees with the 'argument from silence' 
(Daly, 2001, p. 78). 
Plb.3.110. 
Livy in his description of the same battle echoes Polybius' lack of differentiation in the infantry but also 
makes a point of difference in the cavalry. Unlike Polybius, however, Livy does tell us once in his narrative 
that the allied foot in the Roman battle line extended inwards towards the centre where they joined the Roman 
legionaries (Liv. 22.45), and he does distinguish between allied and Roman infantry casualties. For example, 
45 000 infantrymen causalities, of whom half were allied (Liv. 22.49). 
Such as at the battle of Zama. Polybius described the Roman infantry in terms of function, as haslati, 
principes or triarii - but did not write of allied or Roman citizen-soldiers. This is not because of inattention to 
detail; on the Carthaginian side, there were Celtic, Ligurian, Balearian, Libyan, Mauretanian and veteran 
Carthaginian contingents (Plb. 15.11 fO. 
Plb. 3.114 ff. 
There were separate heavy and light Celtic, Spanish and Numidian cavalry units, as there were Spanish, 
Celtic and African heavy infantry. The Spaniards and Celts made up the Carthaginian centre while the African 
heavy infantry phalanx was stationed in the wings. The African heavy infantry was equipped with Roman 
swords and shields taken from the dead of previous battles, while the shield of the Spaniards and Celts were 
similar to each other. But their swords were not; the Celtic swords were more useful for slashing and required 
space to swing, while the points of the Spaniards' swords were as effective for wounding as the edge was for 
slashing. We even know Spaniards fought in linen tunics bordered with purple and that the Celts were naked 
(Plb. 3.114). 
' ' ' Plb. 10.16. For a more detailed discussion on this subject, see Erdkamp, 2007, pp. 55 ff. 
For example, at Plb. 6.30. Here Polybius refers to a semaia of allied infantry; that is, a maniple. 
Integration: Other Indications 
There are other indications that the Romans treated their allied contingents identically to 
their own citizens, and which were a manifestation of their deep integration into Roman 
armies. There was normally no distinction made between citizens and allies for the 
distribution of booty captured in war. ' '" In fact, when the consul C. Claudius Pulcher in 
177 BC did make a distinction between the amount of donatives made to his allied soldiers 
and Roman citizens, it caused enough of an upset among the allied soldiers that it was 
recorded in the literary record, suggesting it was far more normal for allied soldiers to 
receive the same amount as their citizen counterparts.'''^ The allocation of booty was not 
left up to allied communities to reward their soldiers materially for participating in Roman 
wars. Like citizen-soldiers, allied soldiers benefitted materially from service by 
participating in the Roman army, and the army rewarded them. The distribution of captured 
booty was carefully organised, disciplined and systematic,'"' and allies and citizens almost 
always shared equally.'"" In 189 BC, L. Cornelius Scipio was awarded a triumph for his 
victory over Anthiochus; his soldiers were given twenty-five denarii each, while centurions 
received twice that amount and cavalrymen three times as much.'"^ Soldiers were also 
given double their annual pay after the triumph; after the battle of Magnesia the year 
before, they had also been given more donatives.'"^ At no point in the distribution of 
Scipio's largess was a distinction made between allied and citizens: all were treated equally 
as one integrated whole.'"' 
Liv. 40.7; 43.7; 45.43. Rosenstein, 2012, p. 77; Rosenstein, 2012a, p.85. 
Liv. 41.13. The slighted allied soldiers remained silent during the consul's triumph, while their Roman 
counterparts sang and cheered as was normal. Pfeilschifter makes much of this episode, arguing the fact that 
citizen soldiers did not remain silent in support of their allied counterparts showed that they did not identify 
with them socially or politically (Pfeilschifter, 2007, p. 27). 
Plb. 10.16. Examples of where it was not are at App. 7.127; Liv. 38.23. 
For example, at Sal., lug. 85; Liv. 10.31; Liv. 24.16. The above example in 177 BC is the only known 
example of when the allies were specifically treated differently from their citizen counterparts. 
We know allied soldiers made up at least an equal proportion, if not the majority, of that Roman army 
celebrating a triumph. In the lead up to the war in 190 BC, Livy specifically mentioned the allies as the 
majority of the reinforcing army L. Scipio had assembled to take to Greece (Liv. 37.2). He also took with him 
five thousand Roman and allied veteran volunteers who had already earned their discharge for service under 
his brother - presumably in the Second Punic War (Liv. 37.4). 
Liv. 37.59. 
It is noted, however, that when it came to land distribution, the Romans could make more of a distinction. 
For example, in the doling out of land grants inside Italy, Romans could receive more than even their closest 
allies, such as the Latins, as was the case in the late 170s granting of land in the Ligurian highlands, when 
Roman citizens received 10 iugera of land as opposed to the Latins who received only three (Liv. 42.4). 
The Roman habit of laying out nightly camps while on campaign, with their neat streets and 
careful order, was also indicative of an institution which closely integrated its component 
parts. Their order and complex organisation amazed Pyrrhus as far back as 280 BC when he 
saw one.'''^ Along with their citizen counterparts, the boundaries of the camp enclosed 
allied infantry and cavalry formations as an integral part of its ftinctional structure.''*' The 
layout was complex; its erection each afternoon could only have been accomplished by a 
high level of coordination and integration between each component part of the army, 
including the allied formations. They had to be integrated to know where to go and what to 
do: the allies had their own set locations in camp like the citizen formations.'^" Their 
seamless integration into the structure of the camp was only achieved by training, and using 
common operating procedures which must have applied to all units.''' Furthermore, there 
was an important tactical reason why the Romans ensured all units were fully integrated 
into the procedure of establishing camp: it minimised the time it took to build. The moment 
location or task became an issue of choice for the soldiers, it added time and introduced the 
possibility of confusion.'" At the end of the day, when soldiers were tired and in hostile 
territory, a commander would naturally want to avoid this. The solution was to standardise 
procedures and integrate components to eliminate choice. 1 thus suggest that the 
establishment of Roman camps was a further manifestation of the integration into the army 
of allied formations.'^' 
Moreover, the recognition and punishment system operating in consular armies was applied 
uniformly without differentiation between allied or citizen-soldiers. Polybius described a 
scale of punishments for varying military crimes that applied to both citizens and allies."'* 
Scipio executed the Umbrian, Atrius, the Calenian, Albius, and 32 other ring leaders of the 
Plut.,/">•»•/•/;. 16. 
Plb. 6.27. 
Plb. 6.30. Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell. 21 November, 2012. 
' ' ' Rosenstein,2012,p. 102. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Polybius' description of the layout of a Roman field army in camp is backed up by excavations conducted 
by Adolph Schulten in the early twentieth century on Roman camps in eastern Spain dating between mid-150 
BC and the capture of Numantia in 133 BC. Called Lager 111, the excavations of the Roman camp generally 
mirror Polybius" layout; the main differences are where topographical necessity has forced an alteration, such 
as the quarters of some of the allied units along the western edge of the excavated camp rather than being 
between the legions' tents and outer wall as Polybius has it. But the archeological record confirms the 
complexity and order of Polybius' description, and that the location of units in the camp generally mirrored 
their place in the battle line. See Rosenstein for a fuller discussion of Lager III (Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 99-
103). 
Plb. 6.37. 
mutiny at Sucro in Spain in 206 BC; in admonishing the rebellious soldiers, Scipio was 
manifestly addressing the citizens among them,' ' ' but citizen and ally alike were subjected 
to the same punishment in front of the assembled army."® Similarly, when it came to 
rewarding conspicuous gallantry during battle, recognition could be given to all soldiers 
without reference to their citizenry status, and it could be won by soldiers for acts of 
gallantry that saved not only Roman citizen-soldiers, but also their allied counterparts.''' 
Like the involvement of allied formations in the establishment of Roman camps, this was 
an indication of allied integration into the Roman whole. 
Integration: Armv Reforms Complete the Process 
The consequence of shared experience in war, with a system that worked to reduce 
difference and integrate wherever possible, was a gradual homogenising effect over time on 
allied contingents serving with the Romans. As I have shown, the scale of the integration 
was widespread and its effect deep. The process began the moment allied contingents 
started serving with the Roman army during the third century BC, and continued 
throughout the second century BC. I argue, however, that reforms to the army at the very 
end of that century, driven by the urgency of failing manipular armies against Germanic 
tribesmen, brought the process to completion, and removed any residual difference that 
may have yet persisted between the Latin and Italic allies and their Roman citizen 
counterparts. 
Allied formations were integrated into manipular armies that were not completely 
homogeneous organizations: within legions, differences still existed in the roles of soldiers, 
the size of maniples, and weapons and equipment carried by the men. The rear-ranked 
triarii, for example, were the only soldiers armed with long thrusting spears, their maniples 
were half the size of the hastati and principes. and they were predominantly used as a 
tactical reserve to cover withdrawals."^ These differences could translate into 
vulnerabilities: the triarii, unlike their javelin-carrying counterparts in the first two ranks, 
had no way to attack the enemy beyond the length of a spear, making them vulnerable to 
For example, he asks a rhetorical question of the soldiers (Liv. 28.26): if they, as citizens, are rebelling 
against their country? 
Liv. 28.24 ff; V.Max. 2.7. 
Plb. 6.39. 
Plb. 6.23. See also Chapter Two above. 
missiles.'^' The Servian influence still lingered; age, experience, and, to some extent 
wealth, still accounted for these differences, and determined where soldiers were placed in 
the battle line, what arms they carried, what roles they performed, and the types of armour 
they wore. ' '" 1 argue that, to align with prevailing Roman military doctrine, integrated 
allied formations reflected these differences. 
At some point in the six decades between the end of the Jugurthine War in 105 BC and the 
start of C. lulius Caesar's Gallic campaign in 59 BC, the Romans introduced a major 
reform in the way the army was organised by replacing maniples with larger cohorts as the 
basic maneuver formation of the legion. ' ' ' The last time maniples are encountered in a 
Roman army is during the war against Jugurtha in 109 BC.' '" The next time detailed 
accounts of Roman armies and their battles emerge, it is the middle of the first century BC, 
and the cohort is used exclusively to describe tactical formations; the maniple has 
disappeared. In Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, for example, the cohort is the principle 
maneuver formation of the legion; commanders used it to create small taskforces or 
reserves when it was not part of a larger legionary army.'^^ The reformed legion now had 
For example, when Metellus' triarii were caught by Jugurtha's missile troops at the Muthul River during 
the Jugurthine War; they suffered casualties from the enemy's missiles but were unable to respond because 
they carried no javehns of their own (Sal., lug. 50). 
Plb. 6.22 ff. 
A cohort consisted of six enlarged centuries of eighty men each, giving it a strength of 480 men. The 
citizen-militia had long been familiar with the concept of the cohort. But its use appears to have been an 
exception, driven by specific local conditions. It is first encountered in connection with Scipio Africanus in 
Spain during the Second Punic War, where the fighting was dispersed and the enemy used guerrilla tactics 
(Plb. 1 1.23,33). Moreover, there are 17 references in Livy to cohorts, most being used in connection with 
various Spanish campaigns between 210 BC-195 BC (Cagniart, 2007, p. 85). There was something about the 
Spanish theatre which encouraged the use of larger tactical formations; a legion or army operating in the harsh 
terrain may have been too large to manoeuvre effectively against the guerrilla tactics of the Spaniards, but 
maniples too vulnerable to operate on their own. The solution was the cohort: small enough to operate in the 
harsh terrain by themselves but large enough to defeat the enemy when it encountered them. The Romans also 
use the cohort in Numidia during the Jugurthine War where the enemy also used guerrilla tactics; it is 
mentioned in connection with allied or lightly armed auxiliary troops. (Sal., lug. 50,94,99,100,103). The 
reference here to lightly armed troops, as pointed out by Matthew, may be a pointer to velites, the traditional 
screening force of the manipular legion (Matthew, 2010(a), p.32). 
Metellus, preparing to engage Jugurtha's Numidians, inter manipulos funditores et sagittarios dispertU 
(between the maniples dispersed slingers and archers); when Jugurtha engaged the rear of Metellus' 
formation, however, the Roman troops stationed there suffered casualties but were unable to close to sword 
distance or strike back at the Numidians, who were clearly keeping their distance. These troops, apparently 
without any missile capability with which to retaliate, must have been the rear triarii maniples of a manipular 
army, since both the hastati and principes carried javelins as standard equipment (Sal., lug. 50). 
The evidence is extensive: Caes., Gal. 2.25; 3.1,2; 4.32; 5.15,33,34; 6.29; 7.49; 8.2,19,43. 
ten cohorts: four comprising the front line and three each in the remaining two posterior 
lines.'^^ 
The significance of this reform to the process of allied integration into Roman armies was 
that when the cohort replaced the maniple, the Romans also abolished the old functional 
distinctions of hastati, principes and triarii, and with them, their specialised weapons and 
equipment. Their roles in the legions were replaced with the standard function of heavy 
infantryman, and the process to standardise the heavy infantryman role meant making 
weapons, equipment, and clothing uniform across the army. A complete homogenisation of 
form and function occurred inside the army; almost certainly, soldiers now looked the 
same, were armed, amoured and equipped in the same way, and organised in the common 
formation of the cohort. This uniformity increased the ways commanders could use cohorts 
and the army's flexibility; Caesar could thus remove them from his third line at Pharsalus 
against Gn. Pompeius Magnus in 49 BC without damaging the overall functionality of the 
legions, and make up a separate fourth line to counter the threat represented by Pompeius' 
superior cavalry numbers.'^^ 
I argue that it was this major reform, bringing uniformity to form and function across the 
army, which removed any remaining visual differences between soldiers; not only 
individually between citizen-soldiers, but between the citizen legions and their Italic and 
Latin counterparts.'^^ The imperative to retain cohesiveness and uniformity of the battle 
line, for example, meant it was unlikely that the Romans applied the cohortal reform just to 
their own citizen legions. 1 would suggest that they also applied it to allied formations. It 
has to be acknowledged, however, that nowhere is it categorically stated this is what 
occurred, and after the Social War, when citizenship was given to the Italian allies, the 
distinction no longer had any relevance.""' But I assert that Romans also reformed the allied 
formations prior to universal suffrage, based on what I have shown above about the 
imperatives of cohesion and the mechanics of maintaining integrity between formations. 
On the formation of the cohortal army, see Matthew, 2010(a). p. 31. 
' ' ' Caes., B Civ. 3.89; Fron., Str. 2.22. 
See de Blois for a succinct summary of the reforms around this time, where he makes the point that the 
Romans took a further step toward the complete standardisation of equipment in the army (De Blois, 1987, 
pp. 11 and 12). De Blois is talking only about equipment: I take it further, and argue that the standardisation 
necessarily occurred across almost all facets of military service. 
After universal suffi'age, all legions became citizen legions. 
Such a move was simply necessary. For a major reform of this nature to work, it needed to 
be applied to the whole army. It makes no tactical sense for the centre citizen legions to use 
cohorts, with standardised heavy infantrymen, but for flanking allied formations still to be 
arranged in maniples, using hastati, principes and trairii. This situation would have 
introduced a needless impediment to the interoperability of the components making up the 
battle line. I argue that the Romans, concerned with the effectiveness and efficiency of their 
armies, did not do that. If allied formations were used as supplementary troops in support of 
the main Roman army, then an objection can be mounted that the Romans may have 
reformed only the citizen legions. As I have shown that the allied formations were not 
treated as auxiliary troops on the periphery, but were placed in integral parts of the battle 
line, I therefore conclude that this objection is unfounded. 
The assertion that allies were reformed at the same time as the citizen formations also 
applies to the other reforms introduced to the Roman army around the same time. In 
preparing the army for its confrontation with Germanic tribesmen between 104 BC-102 
BC, for example, Marius introduced the eagle as the legion's dominant standard,'^* and an 
improved version of the army's heavy pilum carried by the infantry. ' ' ' He was also credited 
with making the soldiers carry on their backs much of their field equipment,' '" leading to 
the tag of muli Mariani, and improving the army's mobility and speed. '" He did this by 
obviating the need for a large, unwieldy baggage train by making soldiers carry much of 
Plin., iVor. 10.5. 
Plut., Mar. 25. For a well researched and exhaustive account of this particular reform to the army's heavy 
pilum, see Mathew, 2010, pp. 1-9. 
" " There is doubt, however, whether he was the originator of this reform. Polybius, writing fifty years before 
Marius of the middle republican army, stated that soldiers carried their own javelins, shield and stakes (PIb. 
18.18). Q. Metellus, when he took over an undisciplined and dispirited army in Africa during the war against 
Jugurtha in 109 BC, compelled the soldiers to carry their own arms, food and equipment as part of his training 
program to reintroduce discipline to the men and increase its fighting effectiveness. Marius' initiatives are 
similar to that of Metellus when it came to improving the mobility of the army, and it may be no small 
coincidence that Marius, having served in Metellus" army against Jugurtha, introduced reforms to the army in 
Italy that closely resembled those that Metellus originally made in Africa. Metellus, for example, enforced 
cross-country marches every day and forbade the soldiers to have a slave or pack animal in camp or while on 
march: ne miles gregarius in caslris neve in agmine senvm aut iumentum habere!. "No soldier in camp or on 
the march should have a slave or pack animal" (Sal., lug. 45). Like Marius' soldiers preparing by hard 
training for the confi-ontation with the Germanic tribesmen on the borders of Italy at the end of the second 
century BC, they also had to carry their own food, arms and equipment. Similarly, P. Scipio introduced 
discipline back in to the demoralised army in Numantia in 134 BC by dismissing a large number of camp 
followers, getting rid of equipment unnecessary for campaigning, compelling his men to endure forced 
marches and making them carry several days' worth of rations (Fron., Sir. 4.1). 
Plut., Mar. 13; Fron., Sir. 4.1.. Plutarch in the same paragraph suggests an alternative explanation behind 
the tag "Marius ' mules", indicating it might also have a slightly pejorative sense by referring to a man who 
was, like a mule, persevering, patient, and laborious. See also Matthew, 2010(a), p. 1. 
their own equipment and food; the soldiers previously used baggage animals or carts in the 
baggage train.'^^ Nowhere do the sources imply that only part of the army received these 
reforms. I argue that Marius applied them to the allied formations because, like the cohortal 
reform, it is implausible to think that he would only have reformed half the army when the 
integrity of the battle line depended on the component parts operating together as a 
cohesive whole. It would not have been practical, for example, to have Roman citizens 
carrying their equipment on their backs, while the allied half of the army still used a large 
baggage trains to carry its equipment. The point of the reform, aimed at improving the 
speed and portability of the army, would have been negated. Moreover, if only the citizen 
legions were equipped with the improved pilum, the allied formations using the 
conventional javelin alongside the Roman legions would have been less effective, building 
a potential vulnerability into the battle l ine. ' ' ' 
The timing of the shift to cohorts is important. I argue that it occurred during the last years 
of the second century BC, and complete homogenisation of allied formations had been 
completed before the Social War - and certainly by the time Sulla marched on Rome. The 
evidence for this timing is circumstantial, but positive. There is a reference to a cohort 
being used in connection with the reformed army that fought the Cimbri in 102 BC, one of 
the few times a sub-unit is mentioned during the campaign. The proconsul, Q. Catulus, 
tried to block the alpine passes and left one cohort to guard a fort at the Atesis River. ' '" It is 
a single reference, but if it accurately records the organisation of the unit, it suggests 
cohorts had already been introduced. Moreover, Marius' reforms were introduced to the 
army between 104 BC-102 BC to improve its fighting capacity as part of the preparation 
Frontinus, in his account of the reform, gives us a little more detail, including how the packs were actually 
structured: "Marius recidendorum impedimentorum gratia, quibus maxime exercitus agmen oneratur, vasa et 
cibaria mllitis in fasciculos aptata furcis imposuit, sub quibus et habile onus et facilis requies esset; unde et 
proverbium tractum est "muli Mariani'" (Tron., Str. 4.1.). "To limit the number of pack animals by which the 
march of the army was especially hampered, Marius had his soldiers fasten their utensils and food up in 
bundles and hang them on forked poles to make the burden easy and to facilitate rest, and from there came the 
expression 'Marius ' mules ' ." 
Marius' introduction of the eagle was also designed to improve the cohesion of the legion by giving it a 
single point upon which soldiers could focus their collective attention. To have left out the allied legions 
would have missed an opportunity to confer upon them the advantages of the potent symbolism that the eagle 
brought to esprit de corps; 1 suggest that no commander concerned with the effectiveness of his army would 
have done that. For a detailed expose on the implications for improving espirit de corps and binding troops 
together by giving them a clearly recognisable symbol upon which to focus their loyalty and attention, see 
Matthew, 2010(a), pp.51-61. It is a helpful study, usefully informed by the personal military background of 
the author himself, and a thesis with which 1 largely concur. 
Liv., Per. 68. 
for its confrontation witii the Germanic Tribesmen.' '^ I would argue that Marius - the 
major military reformer of the moment, an inveterate improver of the army, and in the 
midst of changing the citizen-militia in smaller ways'^*"- was also the most likely candidate 
to introduce the far bigger change of introducing the cohort . ' ' ' Marius had the time and 
motivation to do so; and he was fortunate that the tribesmen diverted to Spain, giving him 
two years time to properly prepare his army.' '^ This was enough time to introduce the 
cohort, and ensure the army was familiar with it, before using it on the battlefield." ' 
A good reason for the Romans to introduce a major military reform to improve the army's 
effectiveness also existed at this time. Leading up to 104 BC, Rome suffered a series of 
serious military defeats when invading Germanic tribesmen destroyed manipular armies.'^" 
Italy was under a real threat'^' and the defeat of successive Roman armies terrified citizens 
and allies.'^^ The seriousness of the moment was reflected in the fact that the state set aside 
the prohibition on electing a magistrate to successive consulships in absentia, and allocated 
Gaul to Marius while he was on his way back from Africa.'^^ Military disasters can be a 
potent impetus for change; almost certainly military disaster had produced change before, 
when the Gauls defeated the Roman phalanx in 390 BC and subsequently sacked Rome, 
providing the impetus for change to the more flexible manipular army, and the introduction 
of the sword as the primary weapon of the infantryman.'^" The series of defeats at the hands 
of the Germanic armies again provided the most obvious impetus to introduce such a major 
reform into the army. A lack of cooperation between consul and pro-consul on the 
Plut., Mar. 13; Fron., Str. 4.1.; Plut., Mar. 25; Plin., Nat. 10.5. 
™ Marius was the major reformer, but not the only one. P. Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 BC, introduced a 
method of training the soldiers in the use of the sword along the lines used in gladiatorial schools of the time 
(Val.Max. 2.3.2). But his contribution was apparently limited to this one initiative, whereas Marius' 
reforming influence was much wider, deeper and, 1 would argue, more significant. 
I am not alone in reaching this conclusion: see also Rosenstein, 2010, p. 295; Rankov, 2007, p. 31; 
Cagniart, 2007, p. 86; and Matthew, 2010(a), p. 29. 
™ Plut., Mar. 13, 14. 
Matthew argues that Marius made the cohortal reform (Matthew, 2010(a), p. 1). Although this is likely, 
however, there is actually nothing which categorically links him to this particular reform. 
Liv., Per. 63, 68. 
P\ul.,Mar. 11. 
'*-Sal.,/Hg. 114. 
Plut., Mo/-. 14;Sal.,/«g. 114. 
Liv. 5.38: Livy describes the reformed Roman army of 340 BC that attacks its Italian neighbours in 
considerable detail; he is describing a manipular army (Liv. 8.8). Sometime between the defeat of 390 BC and 
340 BC, the Romans have completely reorganised their army. Along with the need to introduce a formation 
more able to operate effectively in the central mountainous regions of Italy as Roman influence expands, 1 
would argue that the most the most obvious catalyst for change was the defeat by the Gauls and the sacking of 
Rome. 
battlefield at Arausio had led to a crushing d e f e a t , b u t there also seems to have been 
something fundamentally wrong with the fighting capability of the army at that time. 
Plutarch comments, for example, that the feeble resistance of large consular armies had 
encouraged the Germans to invade I t a l y . R u f u s ' initiative in 105 BC of introducing 
sword training for soldiers also indicates a concern to address a serious capability 
problem. ' " Here was the pressing reason for the structural move to cohorts, and evidence 
of Roman concern that something needed to be done. These reforms thus completed the 
process of integration that began well before the second century BC; while they may have 
still kept separate formations, Roman and allied soldier were now identical in form and 
function. 
Integration: The Social Dimension 
The Roman recognition of the importance of the allied contribution, a military system 
which treated allied soldiers like citizens, and the imperatives of war, provided an 
opportunity for allied and Roman soldiers to get to know each other, and build the close 
social bonds that would be necessary to influence each other's perspectives. Their close and 
sustained proximity, for example, at the time of recruitment, in camps, and in the battle 
line, allowed at least the conditions for fraternisation, and the possibility of the 
development of comradeship. As Gray remarks, loyalty to the group is the essence of 
fighting morale, comradeship is the result of loyalty to the group, and comradeship itself is 
dependent on being together physically in time and s p a c e . D e s p i t e this, direct evidence 
of allied and Roman soldiers socialising anywhere while on campaign is rare, and it is hard 
to prove categorically they did anything but stay in their own formations, and in their own 
allocated parts of the camp. Moreover, Roman camps, where many of the opportunities 
theorectically existed for getting to know soldiers of adjacent units, were strictly laid out, 
and disicipline strict, and this may have acted as a disincentive to move far beyond local 
989 groupings. 
Liv., Per. 67. 
Plut., Mar. 11. Plutarch wrote of many large Roman armies, with their commanders, being destroyed 
ingloriously, and suggested it was because of the feeble resistance put up by these Roman armies, that the 
Germanic tribesmen first considered the notion of destroying Rome and looting Italy: damning words indeed. 
Val.Max, 2.3.2. 
Gray, 1970, pp. 40 and 41. 
Pfeilschifter, 2007, p. 31. Pfeilschifter argues strongly against any sort of'Romanisation' of allied soldiers 
as a result of their service in Roman armies, preferring to emphasise evidence of difference and separation 
But I argue that for Roman armies to have performed successfully in battle, where the 
strength and unity of a whole battle line depended on the complex interrelations between 
neighbouring sub-units such as maniples or legions, the development of trust and 
familiarity between groups, even separate units, must have occurred. There is 
circumstantial evidence to suggest that it did - at least to the extent that social contact led to 
a feeling between allies and Romans that they could rely on each other, and trust each other 
in the battle line. 1 have shown, for example, that the Romans and their military system 
were concerned with the tactical cohesion and integration of their battle line; Marshall 
offers an explanation of the necessary underpinning to good cohesion: "All other things 
being equal, the tactical unity of men working together in combat will be in ratio of their 
knowledge and sympathetic understanding of each other.""" Given that basic human 
instincts and psychological imperatives of soldiers in combat are likely to remain relevant 
across time,''' Marshall's explanation, when applied to a Roman context, suggests that the 
cohesiveness of consular armies depended not only on standardised training, tactics, 
formations and equipment, but on individual soldiers getting to know and trust each other 
within their own formations - and between different formations operating alongside each 
other. Other writers who have examined the nature of combat also stress the importance of 
the human dimension in battle. Evans and Gray, for example, both emphasise the critical 
factor of human cohesion between individuals and units in combat."^ Gray argues it is the 
bonding together of individuals in disciplined formations that is the antidote to man's 
natural aversion to, and fear of, death, and the mechanism by which this fear is 
counterbalanced by the will of the primary group; that is why the Greeks and Romans 
fought in phalanxes and legions."^ 
1 suggest that placing soldiers together in time and space, and subjecting them to a process 
of deep integration, cannot help but produce the type of social contact necessary to develop 
between allied and Roman soldiers, including in camps. However, as I argued above, Pfeilschifter 
overemphasises evidence of differences, and underplays or ignores the social implications that flowed from 
the necessity to maintain tactical cohesion in the Roman battle line. 
Marshall, 1947, p. 150. Marshall here is talking specifically about soldiers within units, and in a modem 
context - although it is not clear whether he also meant it to apply to relationships between different units. 
But 1 argue that the dynamic, so important to cohesion within the whole unit, whether legion, army or sub-
unbit, also sheds light on what was important in relationships between various units in a Roman consular 
army, which needed to work as a whole on the battlefield (see below note). 
Sabin, 2000, p. 4. Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Evans, 2000, pp.41 f f Gray, 1970, pp.39 ff 
' " G r a y , 1970, p. 39. 
these critical bonds and feelings of trust; war always provided opportunities to build strong 
linkages."" During a battle against the Numidians in the war against Jugurtha, for example, 
enemy forces attacked the Roman camp behind the main battle line, and forty surviving 
Roman soldiers were isolated and in danger of being overrun. They were saved by an allied 
formation under Marius, which left the battle line to come to their aid."^ Sallust does not 
record the reaction of the Romans, but it is reasonable to think that they were grateful to 
their allied saviours, and that this episode subsequently helped build trust and respect 
between the two units. Sometimes the Romans came to the aid of allies, as in the war 
against invading Germanic tribesmen in 102 BC."^ The allied formation must have been 
gratefijl for Roman intervention, and it is plausible to think that they made a special point 
of thanking them later in camp. If not direct evidence of bonds between Roman and allied 
soldiers, I argue that these examples are evidence of the opportunities by which bonds of 
comradeship between saved and saviour could develop, and there must have been such 
opportunities during a campaign. ' " 
I argue that the experience of sharing danger and combat between allied and Roman 
soldiers altered feelings of obligation between them; the same psychological process is at 
work today building close bonds between soldiers of different ethnicity in the new Afghan 
army, and provides an insight into the Roman army. Campbell says that the shared 
experience of battle in Afghanistan against the Taliban"^ has produced very close social 
bonds between Afghan soldiers that cross ethnic divides. '" Like a Roman consular army, 
the Afghan army is made up of soldiers from different tribal, ethnic and linguistic 
backgrounds - Hazaras, Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Campbell argues that the shared 
experience of combat produces an alternative loyalty hierarchy among these soldiers which 
transcends family and tribal differences: 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell , 21 Nov, 2012. 
Sal., lug. 58. 
Plut., Mor. 19. 
De Blois makes the point that legions and allied auxiliary formations subjected to long periods of 
campaigning become like homes for their soldiers; living together for years, and doing things together on 
campaign, welded such groups into cohesive blocks (de Blois, 2008, p. 167). 
As 1 have shown, Maj Gen Campbell is in a unique position to comment: he was responsible in 2011 for 
Australian troops training and mentoring the new Afghan army as it is being formed and prepared for combat 
(see Chapter One above). 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell , 21 November, 2012. 
Alternative Loyalty Hierarchy in the New Afghan Army 1000 
2 
3 
4 
Those who you have fought alongside/shed blood with 
Those with which you have a financial arrangement 
Those of the same clan 
Family members 
The experience of combat manifestly alters the sense of identity and obligation; the 
experience of the Afghan army is that soldiers who have fought together develop a different 
set of obligations than they would normally hold. In this case, combat has produced 
between them bonds that are close and personal, regardless of the ethnic group or tribe to 
which they originally belonged; "they become indebted to each other."""" The experience 
of the new integrated Afghan army offers insights into the same psychological forces which 
1 assert must have been at work on Roman and allied soldiers. As it changed social 
obligations in the Afghan army, the experience of combat and campaigning together 
changed the relationship between citizen and allied soldier, producing close bonds. 
Campbell 's insights support this view. He argues that the nature of soldiers, and the 
psychological influences to which they are subjected, are enduring across time; as long as 
the context in which soldiers are operating is understood, what applies to soldiers today will 
have applied to soldiers in consular armies.'""^ 
1 would suggest that there are other relevant similarities between the condition of Roman, 
allied, and Afghan recruits. As 1 have shown above, the Afghan army is made up of 
different ethnic and tribal groups in the same way a Roman consular army comprised 
citizens, non-citizens and men from different Italian regions. Afghan recruits come 
primarily from rural locations,'""' just as agrestes formed the bulk of Roman armies. 
Moreover, Afghan recruits are mostly poorly educated;'""' used to a life on the land, 
Roman rank and file and their allied counterparts, were similarly basic men, and probably 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
""" Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
'""^De Ligt, 2012, pp. 150-154. Nicolet, 1980, p. 132. See also Chapter Two above and Chapter Seven below. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
as poorly educated.'®"^ This uncouthness and roughness was readily apparent: during the 
Social War at Asculum in 90 BC, Italian peasants of the type which manned Rome's armies 
massacred and abused Romans who fell into their hands, and scalped the wives of those 
who refused to join them.""" M. Tullius Cicero, speaking of citizen-soldiers, admitted they 
were rough countrymen, if they were in fact men, and not beasts. 
Sharing the same camp in close proximity, even if allocated different locations within it, 
also provided the opportunity for more relaxed social contact to occur between Roman and 
allied soldiers.""" The soldiers could probably communicate; Latin allies would have 
spoken the same language, and Italian soldiers, if they did not already have a working 
knowledge, probably picked up enough during service to enable basic communication.""" 
As Rosenstein points out, one of the advantages of recuiting allied formations from the 
same ethnicity or region was that they would have understood each other; but it is also 
likely that those who could not already understand Latin were given a 'crash course' when 
they arrived to form the consular army so they at least understand basic commands.""' 
Camps were places where social activities occurred, and this opened the possibility of 
contact with neighbouring u n i t s . A f t e r a victorious skirmish with Germanic tribesmen in 
""" D.C., Frg. 29,98. 
" " " 'C ic . ,PM. 8.9; 10.22. 
However, see Pfeilschifter for an argument that no social contact occurred in camps between allied and 
Roman soldiers (Pfeilschifter, 2007, p. 31). This is, in my view, improbable. As 1 have suggested above, 
Pfeilschifter consistently underestimates or overlooks the affect of tactical integration between allied and 
Roman soldiers, and the social implications of soldiers sharing combat and danger together. Moreover, to 
make his argument, Pfeilschifter must ignore, or downplay what evidence there is of social fraternisation 
between units, or arguments that stem from human nature. 
""" Daly, 2002, p. 142. 
"" ' Rosenstein, 2012a, pp. 92-93. Rosenstein goes on to argue that military service among the allies was 
likely to have been an important contributor to the spread of Latin throughout the Italian peninsula 
(Rosenstein, 2012a, pp. 93, 100). 
Rosenstein, in a recent study of the effect of service in Roman armies of the middle Republic on allied 
soldiers, concludes that years spent together in Romans camps furnished Romans and their Italian allies many 
opportunities for contact, even if they served in different formations (Rosenstein, 2012a, p. 100). As 1 have 
argued, he is right to make this conclusion. Rosenstein goes on to argue, however, that this level of contact 
did not necessarily lead to allied soldiers wanting to become Romans (Rosenstein, 2012a, p. 101). In short, 
Rosenstein, like Pfeilschifter (Pfeilschifter, 2007, pp. 27.), doubts service in Roman armies was a force for 
Romanisation of allied soldiers: it was integration without identification (Rosenstein, 2012a, p. 103). I do not 
disagree with this view. Rosenstein, however, is talking primarily in the context of political unity and 
equality. While acknowledging that allied units were in an equal partnership with their Roman counterparts 
when it came to plunder, valour and performance in battle, he fails, like Pfeilschifter, to say anything 
substantial about the implications of the needs for tactical cohesion on relationships between Roman and 
allied soldiers. Nor does he deal with the possibility that maintaining a superior political status over allied 
soldiers did not necessarily rule out the Romans nevertheless trying to integrate, functionally and tactically, 
allied soldiers into their military system as closely as possible. I argue that this is exactly what happened. 
102 BC, for example, Marius' men did not, as was the tradition after a successftil 
engagement, drink in the tents or engage in friendly conversation over a meal, but stood 
guard all night because the camp had not been fortified."" ' In this case, exceptional 
circumstances prevented what was normal in camp: social mixing in a relaxed atmosphere 
among the soldiers. Nor were the camps so segregated or rigid that soldiers from different 
units could not meet each other and swap experiences. When the two parts of Metellus' 
divided army came together again in camp after a day of battle during the war against 
Jugurtha, for example, the soldiers greeted each other, discussed their exploits, and listened 
to each other's stories.""'' This suggests that there was a general mixing of units in the 
camp after the two parts reunited; Metullus' army had its quota of allied contingents, and 
here was the opportunity for Roman and allied soldiers to mix, to get to know each other, 
and share their experiences. Moreover, in the early days of that war, encamped soldiers 
could spend most of the day fraternising with camp followers and wandering about;"" ' 
camp discipline here was not so strict that it prevented soldiers from intermingling with 
camp followers. If they could do that with camp followers, 1 argue that allied and Roman 
soldiers could - and did - intermingle amongst themselves. It is a hypothesis that Campbell 
supports: it is inconceivable that soldiers could be in the same camp and not get to know 
each other - even those of different ethnicity and formations.""^ His deep understanding of 
what motivates soldiers helps fill in some of the gaps in the sources: 
Soldiers with spare time on their hands have a long history of trying to find alcohol, 
better food, and trading and gambling with each other. Camp life provided the ideal 
opportunity for soldiers to seek each other out to pursue their favourite pastimes; they 
could not be in the same camp and not fraternise. Rivalry in competition, such as sport, 
would also have been encouraged by commanders, as it is important for building group 
identity and morale - as well as keeping men busy during idle periods between 
operations. This dynamic has not changed.'"" 
Once in battle, any social links and trust that developed between allied and Roman 
formations aligned alongside each other, acted as type of glue to maintain the integrity of 
the whole battle line. Part of that glue was the natural competitive spirit that existed 
between soldiers; ethnic rivalry, and competition between formations to prove they were 
not inferior to others, improved the fighting spirit of the army, and helped deepen bonds 
Plut., Mar. 20. 
""" Sal.,/«g. 53. 
"" 'Sal . , /«g . 44. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
between various formations.""^ Military thinkers have also long recognised that fear of 
disgrace, cowardice, and a heightened sense of personal honour, especially in the presence 
of fellow soldiers, is one of the most powerful motivating forces on the battlefield, and can 
surpass even the fear of death."" ' The Romans knew this and considered flight from danger 
and dereliction of duty in the presence of the enemy to be a disgrace; upon joining, allied 
and Roman soldiers swore in the presence of others, inter alia, not to quit the ranks by 
fear or force of flight, except to seek a weapon, strike a foe or save a comrade.'"^' 
Sometimes, commanders exploited the soldiers' fear of disgracing their units, abandoning 
their standards, and sense of personal honour, by throwing their standards at the enemy to 
force them into the enemy ranks, as occurred to the Paeligni at Pydna.'"^^ Both Roman and 
allied soldier shared the same fear of disgrace and cowardice, and felt the same social 
pressure on the battlefield to conform to expectations of military b e h a v i o u r ; s o c i a l 
contact between units would have heightened this feeling, and the determination not to be 
seen to fail in front of others.'"*'' 
Changed Perspectives: Allied and Roman 
The evidence indicates that the Romans felt their allied contingents to be a crucial part of 
their military effort, leading to a policy of integration; a military system which worked to 
remove, rather than accentuate, difference. This produced a homogenising effect on allied 
contingents, or, to use my phrase, full integration; by the start of the Social War,'"^' Latin, 
Italic and Roman soldiers were identical in form and function, and had probably established 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 78. 
Marshall, 1947, pp 148 and 149. Gray, 1970, p.112. Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 
2012. 
'»-" Plb. 6.21. 
Fron., Str. 4.4. 
Plut., Aem. 20: the reader is told that it was considered disgraceful for an Italian to abandon his standard 
in battle. 
For example, and to reinforce the above note, the abhorrence of deserting battle standards was common to 
allied and Roman units. 1 have shown how allied units were expected to follow their standards; the same was 
true for Roman units, and there are many examples of Roman commanders motivating their men, just like the 
allied troops, by putting the standard in danger to encourage soldiers to follow it. In Spain, the Roman 
commander, Decimus Junius, was operating against an enemy formation; when his men refused to cross a 
river, he seized their standard (presumably the legionary standard, or it may have been a maniple standard) 
from its bearer and carried it across. The soldiers were reluctant to desert it and followed across the river (Liv. 
Per 55). 
Interview, Maj Gen Angus Campbell, 21 November, 2012. 
Diod. 37.22. For a discussion on the background and causes of the Social War, see Chapter Two above. 
strong bonds with their citizen counterparts.'"^' This level of physical and social integration 
could not have occurred without leaving its mark on either the Roman or allied formations 
involved; both groups were changed by the common experience over time and perspectives 
shifted. Crucially, the process of integration brought the Romans to the point where 
fighting the Social War against erstwhile allies bore the hallmarks of a civil war. 
The Allied Experience: Monev. Citizenship and Frustration 
For the allies, a basic consequence of their association with consular armies was that their 
soldiers were fully inducted, physically and mentally, into the Roman way of waging war, 
and had social links with their Roman counterparts.'"^' But service under Rome also 
showed them that being part of Roman ascendancy and expansion into empire could 
provide considerable financial opportunities. As I have shown above, allied formations 
benefited materially from service with successful Roman armies. Whatever concerns they 
may have had about their subordinate relationship to Rome, the disproportionate military 
burden they routinely shouldered, and their vulnerability to arbitrary Roman power, allied 
perspectives to service could become indistinguishable from their citizen counterparts once 
the prospect of serious financial gain became a factor. The desire to profit was as strong a 
motivational force among Italian recruits as it could be among citizens. In 171 BC, for 
example, during the levies to raise consular armies for the war against the Macedonians, 
which we know included Paeligni and Marrucini,'"^^ there were many volunteers because 
recruits had seen that soldiers who served previously in the east had become rich.'°^' In 149 
BC, in the general Italy-wide dilectus to raise an army to send to Africa against Carthage, 
there was a general rush of allies and citizens alike to the recruiters, no doubt motivated by 
the same prospect of a lucrative war.'"^" Allied communities also benefited from colonies 
Rome established on land taken from defeated enemies; they were eligible to participate in 
See Pfeilschifter, 2007, pp. 21.ft for a contra argument. 
All strata of society from allied communities were involved in making contributions to the Roman war 
effort; it included not only rank and file infantrymen and troopers, but also members of the social elite. At the 
battles of Lake Trasimene and Cannae during the Second Punic War, for example, there were young 
noblemen from Tarentum serving (Liv. 24.13). 
Plut., Aem. 20. 
Liv. 42.32. 
""»App., Ham. 8.75. 
re-location programs, and this helped offset any losses they suffered, as well as providing 
an incentive to join Rome in fiiture conquests.'"^' 
The experience of allied peoples in Roman armies over time also fundamentally changed 
their perspective of Rome's suzerainty over them in one other significant way: a 
willingness to subsume their own political identity into the dominant Roman polity and, if 
necessary, become full citizens, both as a remedy to their marginalised l e g a l a n d 
economic status, '"" and as a symbol of full inclusion in the Roman s t a t e . T h i s 
aspiration grew out of a realisation of the importance and scale of the contribution they 
were making to Roman military s t r e n g t h ; e v e r y year, they furnished a disproportionate 
number of troops to Roman armies, defended the power of the state, helped fight its wars -
but had not been admitted to the full rights and protections of that state. The Marsi of 
central Italy, for example, saw themselves as full partners in Rome's expansion;'" ' ' they 
boasted that there was no triumph over the Marsi, and none without them.'"'^ The long 
association with Rome, and their place in its ability to project and sustain power, altered the 
view of the allies' sense of worth of their own civic status, and may have fed a perspective 
that desired full membership of the Roman polity, and the rights and legal protections it 
conferred, above individual political identity. Alternatively, as Mouritsen has argued, the 
Italian subordinate place in the Roman polity set against their obvious contribution to the 
success of the Roman state, and their concomitant vulnerability to arbitrary Roman power, 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 78. 
Mouritsen, 2006, p. 424. 
An example of the marginalised status of Italians is the fact they had no direct legal recourse to defend 
their property rights; they had to apply through the services of patrons. The experience of some Spanish 
victims of malfeasance by Roman magistrates illustrates the point; they had no direct legal avenue to appeal, 
had to seek legal remedies through patrons and were ultimately forced to accept long delays (Liv. 43.2). Also 
see App., BC 1. 3. for another example of Italians having to use a Roman patron, Aemilianus in this case, to 
make application for the protection of their land. 
""" App., BC 1.3.39; Veil. 2.15 f f For a more detailed discussion on Italian grievances, see Chapter Two 
above. 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that along with the recognition of their part in Rome's ascendancy to 
empire, the desire to protect their land in Italy from further expansion of ager publicus and dispossession was 
a major motivation behind the allies' aspiration to citizenship. Italians, especially the Italian aristocracy that 
was using public land for their own benefit, stood to lose from the laws proposing major land re-distribution 
at the end of the second century BC (App., BC 1.36). Howarth picks up this theme when he argues that the 
fundamental basis for the Italians' estrangement from Rome was their vulnerability to dispossession. For a 
detailed analysis of the Italians' claim to land, see Howarth, 1999, pp. 282 f f See also Chapter Two above. 
Veil. 2.15; Flower, 2010(a), p. 79; Scullard, 1963, p. 67; Martin, 2012, p. 93.. 
After being on friendly terms with Rome since the fourth century BC, they were one of the people who 
joined the revolt against her during the Social War (App., BC 1.45). 
App., BC 1.46; Liv. 9.45. Rosenstein, 2012, p. 78. 
fed an aspiration not to become Roman citizens, but to remove themselves completely from 
Roman dominance, break Roman power, and establish their own state as a remedy to this 
political inequality and subordination.'"^' Either way, it was a situation that had, by the 
early first century BC, become so insistent that continued Roman denial of the franchise, 
the murder of their patron in the Roman political system,'"'"' and a sense of continued 
vulnberability to arbitrary Roman power, could be such an issue to the Italian sense of 
entitlement and self-worth that it provoked war with Rome.'""' 
The Roman Experience: Social War as Civil War 
Roman perspectives were also altered by the long association with allied contingents in 
consular armies. The requirement for allied communities to provide regular military 
contributions to consular armies, and the policy of separate formations for non-citizens, was 
a constant reminder for the Roman soldier of their subjugation of allied peoples and of the 
Latin dominance in Italy. As I have shown, however, the Romans quickly came to 
appreciate the importance of their allied contributions,'""" and to make no practical 
distinction between citizen and ally regarding expectations of military performance. The 
Roman view of their allies could be discerning enough to differentiate the efforts of 
individual allied soldiers and units from the mass in battle: the Paeligni unit that captured 
the Carthaginian camp during the Second Punic War,'"' ' ' Scipio's speech to his army in 
Spain that acknowledged the allied contribution to his success,'""" the bravery of the 
Marrucini and Paeligni against the Macedonian phalanx at Pydna,'""^ the cleverness of the 
single allied soldier who discovered a route into the enemy fortress during the war against 
Mouritsen, 1998, pp. 137, 138, 140, 141. Mouritsen, in this important re-intepretation of Italian aims on 
the eve of the Social War, downplays the link between Roman citizenship and the Italian decision to revolt, 
arguing it is much more likely that the Italians wanted to establish their own state independent of Roman 
control, and in the process, break Roman power by destroying her dominance on the peninsula. Roman 
citizenship was not a primary Italian aim in the Social War (Mouritsen, 1998, p. pp. 136-137). As a thesis, his 
arguments are persuasive, but it is difficult to reconcile this perspective with the subsequent Roman 
successful war strategy of offering citizenship to former Latin and allied peoples as a way to bring them back 
into the Roman camp and undermine the new Italian confederation: if the Italians did not desire Roman 
citizenship as Mouritsen argues, why then was the Roman strategy of offering it to peoples who had revolted 
so successfiil (see Chapter Two above)? 
The tribune, M. Livius Drusus. (App., BC 1.35 ff). 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 187. 
For example, as at Liv. 29.15. On the importance of the allied contribution to Roman military strength, 
see also Rosenstein, 2007, p. 235. 
Liv. 25.14. 
Liv. 28.32. 
""" Liv. 44.4 0. 
Jugurtha,'"''® and the Maurusian soldier in Sulla's army during the Social War who slew a 
Gaul in single combat.'"'*' These speak to a Roman concern to ensure allied contingents got 
recognition for their contribution. Some Roman commanders found the experience of 
campaigning with allied contingents so perception-changing that they wanted them to 
become citizens, and conferred citizenship upon them regardless of official policy or peer 
censure. 
For the citizen-soldier serving in the reformed army at the start of the Social War, the point 
had been reached where he could barely distinguish allied formations from his own. As his 
predecessors had done for more than century, he relied on those allies in battle as he relied 
on the citizens in his own cohort, most recently in the Cimbric campaign a decade before. 
On campaign, he had the opportunity to build an appreciation of the value of his allied 
counterparts, especially those habitually stationed nearest to his own cohort, and socially 
around camp; the shared experience of danger and campaign life probably built close 
professional and social bonds. It must, therefore, have been a shock to Roman soldiers to 
find themselves facing erstwhile comrades across the battlefields of the Social War. For the 
first time in the Republic's history, they were being asked to fight an enemy that was 
identical to them in form, function, organisation and ethos - and with many of whom they 
shared social bonds. Thus, for the citizen-soldiers who fought it, the Social War was, I 
argue, like fighting a civil war. 
The war, for example, bore all the hallmarks of civil conflict. It was historically unique 
because there were many opportunities for Roman soldiers to meet former comrades in 
opposing formations; enemy armies were made up of peoples with a long military 
involvement with Rome. A quarter of the Italic allies in Polybius' list of 225 BC 
subsequently revolted in 91 BC and fought Roman armies;""" the Marsi, Vestini, 
Marrucini, Frentani, Lucanians and Samnites are listed and subsequently played major parts 
Sal., lug. 94. 
""" A p p . , S C 1 . 5 0 . 
Marius, for example, after the final victorious battle against the Cimbri, bestowed Roman citizenship on a 
thousand men from the central Umbrian town of Camerinum because of their bravery, arguing when criticised 
that he could not hear the law which forbade such an act because of the din of battle (Plut., Mar. 28). There 
was also a Praenestine unit during the Second Punic War that distinguished itself in battle and was offered 
Roman citizenship; it declined the offer (Liv. 23.19). 
For example, the Marsi at App., BC 1.45, and the Marrucini and Vestini at App., BC 1.52. 
in the Social War.'"^" Furthermore, we know that the Paeligni'"" and Romans fought: Ser. 
Sulpicious Paelignos proeliofudit.^"^^ The chances, therefore, of former comrades meeting 
during these encounters were high, and it is reasonable to infer that they did. This point is 
strengthened when it is remembered that the last major war fought by Rome before the 
Social War was the Cimbric campaign which finished in 101 just over a decade 
before the outbreak of the Social War. Given the Roman system expected men between the 
ages of 17 and 46 to be available for active serve in consular armies,'"^" most of the Roman 
and Italian soldiers who fought together in the major battles of the Cimbric campaign 
would still have been well within the recruitment band for the Social War, and it is 
reasonable to think that most were again called up. '"" 
Moreover, there is evidence of actual Roman discomfort at having to face an allied army 
which suggests they not only knew their enemies from previous service, but had kinship 
ties with them. When the Italian army of Pompaedius Silo advanced to meet the Romans 
under Marius, for example, both armies recognised many former comrades, personal 
friends and relatives, refused to fight, and called out to each other.""® Although the 
generals may have greeted each other less cordially,'"" there were, 1 argue, many such 
meetings between Romans and former allies on the battlefields of the Social War. On this 
occasion, there was no battle. But abstaining from conflict is rare; on most occasions, there 
was fighting, despite whatever personal links may have existed. To the Roman soldier 
App., BC 1.39; Plb. 2.23,24; Oros. 5.18. For the background of the Social War, and a complete list of the 
Italian peoples who revolted, see Chapter Two above. 
These people, as I have shown, were repeatedly singled out for special mention in more than a century of 
service in consular armies. 
Liv., Per. 73: "Servius Sulpicius routed the Paeligni in battle." 
Plut., Mar. 27. . ^ „ 
Plb 6.19. De Ligt, 2012, pp. 56 and 57 for a ftiller discussion of what 'fightmg age meant m the Koman 
system. See also Rosenstein, 2004, pp. 23-28, for a discussion on ages of service; he argues most men would 
have completed their service by age 30 or so. 
Roth also draws this conclusion, making the point that the Italian armies were made up of many Marian 
veterans (Roth, 2009, p. 96). On the fact that the Italian armies contained many Marian veterans, and soldiers 
and commanders who had previously served with Roman consular armies, see also Dart, 2009, p. 224; Ridley, 
2003, p. 46; Nagle, 1973, pp. 372 and 373; Salmon, 1962, p. 116. 
Diod 37.15: "The soldiers on both sides detected many personal friends, refreshed from memory of not a 
few former comrades in arms, and identified numerous relatives and kinsmen, that is to say, men whom the 
law governing intermarriage had united in this kind of friendly tie. Since their common bonds compelled them 
to give voice to friendly greetings, they called on another by name and exchanged exhortations to abstain 
from murdering men bound to them by close ties. Laying aside their weapons, which had been placed in 
hostile poses of defence, they held out their hands in sign of friendly greeting." 
Marius and Pompaedius swapped insults during their meeting (Plut., Mar. 33). 
placed in this situation - and I suggest that it must have occurred frequently - it would have 
resembled civil war. 
The course of the war also shows that Roman and allied armies were equally matched, and 
that the Italians came close to defeating Rome.'"'^ The Romans arguably achieved victory 
only by resorting to the tactic of undermining the Italian confederation by granting 
citizenship to the allies who stayed loyal, and offering it to enemies who would stop 
fighting.'®'' In the first two years of the war, for example, the allies inflicted serious defeats 
on consular armies and killed two consuls and, throughout the war, regularly bested Roman 
formations."""" I argue that this is a circumstantial pointer to two military systems very 
similar in competency and character, most obviously achieved by both sides employing the 
same tactics, formations, arms - and sharing a military ethos. Both military systems put 
roughly the same number of troops into the field; the Italian confederation had access to 
100,000 infantry and cavalry and the Romans deployed a similar number made up of 
citizens and allies who stayed l o y a l . B o t h sides took identical measures to protect the 
morale of new soldiers; the Romans decreed that those killed in war would be buried where 
they fell so the sight of dead bodies did not damage morale of recruits, and the Italians took 
the same precaution.""'^ The Italians came close to defeating Rome because they were not 
only strong in men and arms, but had generals whose daring and ability made them a match 
for the Romans."""^ I argue that the logical explanation for the competency of allied 
generals that could match their Roman counterparts, given the consequence of full 
integration over time, was prior service in Roman armies and, hence, full integration with 
the Roman way of waging war. Moreover, the ability to quickly incorporate captured or 
defecting blocks of soldiers into armies suggests a high level of integration and 
commonality between the two systems. Two thousand Roman soldiers, for example, were 
Veil. 2.16,17; App., BC 1.49; Plut., Mar. 32; Plut., Still. 6. 
Vel. 2.16,17; App., BC 1.41 ff; Scullard, 1963, p. 69. I could argue further that the Roinans, in fact, 
actually lost the Social War, even if they prevailed in the battlefield by persuading a number of enemies to 
stop fighting by giving them citizenship, and subduing the others who continued to fight. If the objective of 
the Italians was to achieve citizenship, then they achieved that in defeat; the Romans conceded it in victory 
and granted full suffrage to all their erstwhile enemies. 
'»'» Vel. 2.16; App., B C I . 4 2 . 
" " ' A p p - . B C 1.39. 
' " " A p p . , S C I .43. 
Plut., Mar. 32. Plutarch emphasises this point and makes an issue out of how equally matched the two 
sides were. 
captured at Nola by Gaius Papius,'"^'' who offered clemency if they would serve under him; 
they accepted and were promptly integrated into the Italian army.'"®^ Such an offer, and the 
quick integration of the Roman soldiers into the Italian army, only made sense if the two 
military systems were alike."""^ Finally, the idea of the Social War as catalyst for civil war 
also occurred to Appian, our only complete narrative source from the tribunate of Ti. 
Sempronius Gracchus in 133 BC to the victory of Caesar in 46 BC. As the only complete 
source of this period, I argue his interpretation of the significance of the war carries 
credibility, and strengthens my argument that it felt like a civil war to the citizen fighting 
it."""' Appian dates the start of the civil war period in Roman history not to Sulla or Marius, 
but to the outbreak of the Social War: this he calls a great civil war."""^ He believed the 
Social War was a threshold event: before it, violence in politics consisted of riots, murder 
and clashes between armed mobs; after it, contenders used armies.'"^' In this, he was right. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons I have outlined above, the Social War was a civil war in all but name to the 
Roman soldiers who fought it. This was possible because of the consequences of the 
process of physical and social integration of allied units into consular armies over time. The 
effect of flill integration was ultimately to eradicate any difference in form and function 
between allied and Roman soldiers; the army was probably completely homogenised by the 
end of the second century BC, and certainly by the start of the Social War. This would have 
important implications at Nola. By being exposed to this war, Roman soldiers become used 
to fighting men identical to them in form and function, and whom they knew intimately. 
Their perspectives toward civil war were changed by the experience; they were now more 
willing to accept its risk than any soldiers before them. This was the army that Sulla 
"'"App.,BC1.42 
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A p p . , O L l.tZ. • u J u 
•— It is reasonable to expect that if Roman organisation, weapons, command structure or tactics iiad been 
significantly different to those of the allies, the Roman soldiers would presumably have needed a period of 
training, re-equipping and familiarisation with Italian tactics before they were able to be integrated into the 
new army. This apparently did not occur. , • , , „ 
As de Blois points out in his discussion of the army and the role of the general m the late Roman 
Republic, Appian. although he could be prone to some exaggeration at times, is one of our better sources on 
the civil war period, using good information based on earlier works (de Blois, 2008, p. 170). 
App BC 1.40: "The Romans were led by the consuls Sextus Julius Caesar and Publius Rutilius Lupus, 
for in this great civil war both consuls marched forth at once, leaving the gates and walls in charge of others, 
as was customary in cases of danger arising at home and very nearby." 
App., BC\34. 
approached at Nola; it was a new factor at work on the motivation of the soldiers and, in 
conjunction with other influences, played its part in their response.""" 
Meanwhile, Sulla's appeal to his army to become involved in his personal political 
inimicitiae raises the question of its politicisation. I have assumed that the army's 
intervention into politics was unprecedented, and occurred for the first time at Nola. 
However, it may have always been a politicised institution which acted on occasion for 
civic cause, and to support its political convictions. If this was so, then it becomes possible 
to re-frame the army's response to Sulla's request not as an unprecedented act of political 
insubordination against the state, but as a rational response to a specific set of political 
circumstances. The next chapter will thus address the third plank of a holistic explanation 
for intervention: the question of the army's tradition of political insubordination in civic 
cause, and explore implications for the central question of this thesis. 
What the consequences of the Social War, and the effect of full integration, specifically meant for the 
question of intervention on the day at Nola in 88 BC, will be covered in Chapter Eight below. 
Chapter Six 
The Citizen-militia - Political Activism and Tradition 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I built the argument that the experience of the citizen-miHtia in the 
Social War, fighting former comrades identical in form and function, accustomed it to the 
concept and reality of civil war. This chapter explains the third plank of a holistic 
explanation for intervention: the army's tradition of political activism and insubordination 
which intersected with other influences acting on the motivations of Sulla's soldiers. I shall 
argue that the citizen-militia was always a politically-interested institution, willing on 
occasion to act on not only localised concerns such as incompetence, booty, or ill-
treatment, but more abstract notions such as a sense of justice, economic hardship in 
society, and political or social reform. This history of activism manifested itself primarily 
as iet/zr/o'"" and insubordination against commanders and, through them, against the state. 
It could also, however, appear as advocacy in the field for preferred individual political 
candidates in Rome.'"^^ 
Moreover, the tradition of disobedience was encouraged by a political system which 
allowed participation for the average citizen, but still had important limitations on their 
contribution, and was heavily weighted toward the interests of the governing elite. As a 
Chrissanthos defines mutiny as any breach of the soldiers' sacramentum\ this covered violent acts against 
commanders, but also non-violent protests, such as reftising to embark, demanding back-pay or attempts to 
change conditions of service (Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 11). 1 follow his definition in this respect, but also add 
the instances of political advocacy that exist as evidence of a politically-interested institution. 
The subject of mutiny, disobedience or political advocacy by republican armies has not received much 
attention from scholars. The notable exceptions are Messer (1920) with his now dated piece on mutiny in the 
Roman army (but still cited and referenced), and Chrissanthos' (2001) study of the history of mutiny and its 
causes. Among others. Brunt (1988) and Gruen (1995) both mention the phenomenon in much larger works, 
and Rich (2008) very briefly mentions the practice of extracting concessions from the governing elite. So does 
Nicolet (1980), who in his chapter on the army and the body politic briefly mentions the subject of mutiny as 
a manifestation of the tensions of command between commander and common soldier. But it is Keaveney 
(2007) who has one of the more nuanced and recent accounts devoted to the subject, although it is almost 
exclusively focused during the immediate events leading up to 88 BC. 1 will discuss the subject more fully in 
this chapter, especially as it relates as a manifestation of the citizen-militia's political activism. 
member of the citizen-militia, the act of seditio, insubordination or withdrawing of services, 
was one avenue""^ by which the ordinary citizen could bring pressure to bear on the 
governing elite regarding political issues of importance to him, especially when the state 
was dependent on the army. Furthermore, I shall suggest that this activism was well known 
among citizen-soldiers as an inherited tradition; it provided a crucial reference point against 
which they could legitimise and situate their own insubordination against the state. 
Crucially, it included stories of individuals with grievances appealing directly to the army 
as an ultimate source of legitimacy and authority. The implications of the tradition of 
political activism would later prove significant at Nola; in a climate of confusion over who 
represented the state, it helped create the conditions that enabled Sulla to tap into the 
tradition of insubordination inherent in the army with his appeal to justice, while at the 
same time exploiting the confusion with his claim to legitimacy. 
The Citizen-militia: A Tradition of Civic and Moral Activism 
When the citizen-militia marched on Rome, it was prima facie an abrupt and inexplicable 
act: an apparent volte-face from political disinterest, concerned with suppression of the last 
vestiges of rebellion in the Social War, to direct intervention in politics in Rome. For the 
first time in the history of the Republic, it seemed, the citizens arrayed in their legions 
under sacramentum, acted against the state; the ultimate expression of political 
insubordination against the governing elite, using force to underpin the political arguments 
of an ambitious aristocrat. If, however, the citizen-militia had always been a politically-
activist institution, willing on occasion to act for political and social causes that affected its 
members or for partisan political candidates, then it becomes possible to reinterpret the 
actions of Sulla's men, and propose more nuanced explanations for their decisive political 
intrusion - explanations that do not revolve solely around the fear of economic 
disadvantage.""'' 
For the ordinary republican citizen who met the minimum property qualification to serve, 
the army was a socially-inclusive institution, important not only for the defence of state, 
Albeit, an avenue that was risky and fraught with danger, given the seriousness with which the 
magistrates were entitled to deal with mutiny or insubordination in the army, and the array of legalised 
punishments available to them for that purpose. 
On the pecuniary motive, see Chapter Three above. 
expansion of empire, and the meeting of civic obligations, but also for the significant 
opportunities it provided for enrichment.'"'^ I argue, however, that it had always met a 
broader political need for ordinary citizens and marginalised members of the governing 
elite: an instrument by which attention could be drawn to specific grievances, an institution 
where ordinary citizens acting together could, far more effectively than within normal civil 
political discourse, place pressure on the governing elite to make concessions - and as a 
source of remedy to correct perceived injustices. As Raaflaub points out, service in the 
army made the ordinary citizen indispensable to the state, and this gave him leverage. '" ' ' 
Moreover, when other avenues failed or were not practicable, it could be the ultimate 
source of authority before which individuals with a grievance could argue in contio'"'^ for 
the legitimacy of their case, and appeal for assistance directly to the soldiers. In this sense, 
the army had always been an institution with a political, social - even revolutionary -
conscience. 
Gruen, however, discounts this possibility; the army was never a source of revolutionary 
emotion: "The Roman army consisted of individuals interested in profit and social 
betterment; it was not a source of revolutionary sentiment."""^ Homblower, too, cautions 
against exaggerating the ability of citizens to carry their civic habits with them into the 
legions for most of the Republic's history: "In Roman historiography there is not much 
evidence for democratic pressure exerted on commanders from below, of the kind I have 
noted for ancient Greece and even Macedon; nor is there much evidence for armies 
behaving like poleis. The big exception is the so-called triumviral period, when Mark 
Antony, Lepidus and Octavian struggled for supreme power in 40-30." '°" Moreover, in 
other recent discussions of the role of ordinary citizens in traditional Roman political 
culture, any analysis of the collective potential of ordinary citizens arrayed in the army as 
See Chapter Four above. 
Raaflaub, 2005, p. 196. 
For a more detailed discussion of tlie Roman contio, see Yakobson, 2010, p. 5. His discussion centres on 
the more formal contio in Rome presided over by magistrates, and in which, Yakobson argues, there were 
important limitations on the ability of the ordinary citizen to wield influence. I am referring to the more 
informal version that could be called by a magistrate, such as a commanding magistrate, or indeed, an 
individual, where impromptu issues of the moment could be discussed. These types seemed to occur regularly 
in the army, as 1 will show, and could cover a wide range of topics. For a fundamental discussion of the 
Roman contio, see also Morstein-Marx's 2004 monograph, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late 
Republic. 
Gruen, 1974, p. 384. 
Homblower, 2007, p. 37. See also n.l08. 
an extra-legal factor in Roman political power dynamics is largely missing; Yakobson, for 
example, discusses at length the political and power dynamic between ordinary citizens, the 
office of tribune, and the governing elite, but ignores the traditional place of the army as a 
source of extra-legal power in this equation.'"^® 
The army's intervention in 88 BC well before the triumviral period is, of course, an 
unambiguous expression of revolutionary intent and organised coercion. Moreover, Livy 
reports that the army acted constitutionally as Homblower's poleis at least on one occasion; 
citizens on service in the army enacted their civic voting responsibilities while on campaign 
in 357 BC. Voting as tribes in camp, and almost certainly at the instigation of the consul, 
they passed a new law concerning a five percent tax on those who were manumitted.'"^' 
The senate subsequently gave their approval to the law because of the funds it raised, and 
the civic assemblies ratified it. The civil tribunes, however, more concerned with the 
precedent it set than the money raised, quickly prohibited the practice in case a consul and 
his army made laws far from Rome inimical to the interests of ordinary people. Their 
concern was understandable; here was a politically-aware and interested army, personifying 
popular sovereignty, arrogating to itself the right to vote like a civic assembly, and passing 
laws ratified post factum by civilian authorities. The army may have again acted as a quasi-
sovereign body during the war against Jugurtha; in this case, it decided on the question of 
peace with an enemy, properly the prerogative of the civil assemblies, guided by the the 
senate.'"^^ The commanding consul, Q. Caecilius Metellus, met with senatorial ranked 
officers to deliberate Jugurtha's peace proposal; they agreed and levied a monetary fine, the 
surrender of arms and horses, and the return of all deserters.'"^' Roman armies acting in this 
manner, however, are exceedingly rare; they may be unusual and isolated events, or in 357 
BC, the last occasion that the army successfully asserted its archaic right to embody 
popular sovereignty. 
Yakobson, 2010, pp. 1-2 ff. Yakobson ends up allowing that the ordinary citizen had more power in the 
political system than is traditionally admitted, but still with important limitations. But beyond noting its place 
in destroying the republican system during the final civil war period (Yakobson, 2010, p. 8.), the role of the 
army as a potential avenue available to ordinary citizens in extremis to assert their political will is completely 
missing. As 1 will show, this is an important oversight, 
•o*' Liv. 7.16. 
'O"- Plb. 6.14. 
Sal., lug. 62. The Roman impromptu tribunal may have decided peace, but after initially acceptmg the 
conditions, Jugurtha pulled out of the deal and resumed fighting. What is significant in this case is that there 
was no sense of going back to Rome to confirm the decision for peace reached by Metellus, although 
commanders must often have met in the field with their officers to discuss peace terms. 
I contend that there are, however, other persuasive indicators of an earher history of civic 
activism for the citizen-militia; the manifestations of that activism are incidents in the 
army's long record of seditio, insubordination and political advocacy evident among the 
soldiers. In the search for an explanation for intervention, these stories of disobedience, as 
they come down to us from the hands of aristocratic chroniclers, must not be ignored, as 
they speak to the nature of dissent in the army, the relationship between state and army, the 
power dynamic between ordinary citizens and the governing elite in political culture, and of 
civil themes that could motivate common soldiers to act. It is a significant oversight not to 
include in any discussion of the citizens' role in the political dynamic, such as in 
Yakobson's recent analysis,'®^" the place of insubordination in the army and the potential 
role it could play in forcing political, social or economic change upon the state. The reasons 
for mutinies, for example, were varied, but I will show that some were political and social 
in nature; the conclusion is that the army acted against the state for causes other than better 
conditions and economic enrichment - withdrawing service was a weapon to extract 
concessions or reinforce certain rights and aspirations.'™' 
Violating Sacramentum: A Political Act 
I argue that the very act of disobeying the commands of magistrates lawfully appointed by 
the state, regardless of specific reasons, was itself a political act.'"^' When soldiers 
mutinied or were insubordinate, they broke the tenets of the military oath they had 
publically sworn to military tribunes when they initially joined the consular army. This, 
inter alia, included a vow to obey their officers and carry out their commands to the best of 
their ability.'"^' It was a serious thing to do, and exposed rebellious soldiers to a range of 
extreme sanctions, should the commanding magistrate decide to exercise his prerogative 
In particular, not to succumb to the temptation to see the army simply as the instrument by which the 
Republic was destroyed, as Yakobson has done (Yakobson, 2010, p. 12). 
Rich also points this out during his brief discussion of war and society in the early Republic, arguing that 
military service was initially the plebeians" principal political weapon (Rich, 2008, p. 19). It is a conclusion I 
confirm with my analysis of the reasons behind mutinies and their record of success below in this chapter. 
Rosenstein makes the interesting point that the oath was one important way that the state could 
compensate for the effects its system of checks and balances had on the military efficiency of the army. The 
requirement to limit terms of service and command for magistrates was a check on the potential for 
individuals to act in a way inimical to the interests of the whole, but it meant experienced commanders were 
not regularly assigned to the army, an important impediment on its overall efficiency. Rosenstein argues that 
requiring soldiers to take an oath and infusing it with inviolability, was a way to place the responsibility back 
onto soldiers to win battles: to stand firm in the face of the enemy, for example, and compensate with their 
bravery for the inexperience of their commander (Rosenstein, 1990, p. 257). 
'™'Plb. 6.21; Liv. 22.38; D.H. 10.18. 
under military law:'"®^ P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, while sparing the better part of two 
legions from decimation, nevertheless publically scourged and beheaded 35 ring leaders of 
the mutiny of his army at Sucro in Spain in 206 BC.'"^' The same fate had befallen 300 
survivors of a legion of Campanians who had mutinied and seized the southern city of 
Rhegium in 280 BC,""" while Scipio, again having trouble with his army, executed three 
centurions drawn by lot who commanded mutinous troops that refused to obey his orders to 
withdraw from Locha.""' 
The oath was the mechanism by which citizen and state formally entered into a contract of 
'consecrated service',""^ and by which the state bound the soldier to obey its 
magistrates.""^ It had the force approaching a legal contract; the state did not consider 
citizens lawful combatants until they had taken it.""" Its centrality in the contractual 
relationship it established between citizen and magistrate - and through him, the state - can 
be seen in the way commanders insisted on soldiers swearing a new oath of fidelity if the 
previous one was broken before they resumed service in the legions and could be used on 
operations. P. Scipio after Sucro, for example, summoned each mutinous soldier by name 
to swear a new oath to him before military tribunes and the assembled army, in order to 
atone for their sedition,""' and the mutinous soldiers of L. Cornelius Cinna at Capua in 87 
BC were not properly his until they had sworn a new oath after he secured their 
allegiance.'"'^ The oath was also the mechanism used informally by soldiers when they 
wanted to swear fidelity to each other in some enterprise; the Roman garrison that mutinied 
in 342 BC in Campania all swore oaths to each other before beginning their attempt to seize 
Campanian cities."" ' 
Liv. 25.5. See also Nicolet, 1980, p. 103. 
Liv. 28.29. 
PIb. 1.7; Liv. 28.28; Fron., Sir. 4; V.Max. 11.7. See again at Fron., Str. 2.7. for the example of the 
standard bearer who was executed because he refused to obey the commanding general to advance against the 
enemy, an example which cowed the rest of the army. 
App., Pun. 13; Liv. 29.34. 
As the dictator Papirius Cursor in 325 BC called the citizen's military obligation (Liv. 8.34). 
See D.H. 6.44. for fear of the citizen-soldier at violating his oath and deserting the standards. Once made, 
the oath was an element of constraint on the citizen and fear of violating it was an element of control of the 
army. 
Cic., De O f f . 1.36. See also Nicolet, 1980, p. 104. 
Liv. 28.29. 
""^App. , BC1 .66 . 
i®' D.H. 15.3. 
The soldiers taking tiie new oath in the examples above swore allegiance personally to the 
commanding magistrate, and not prima facie to the Republic.""^ Keaveney makes much of 
this point, arguing the sacramentum was purely concerned with maintaining discipline; 
there was no sense the oath was also meant to ensure allegiance to the state.""' 1 argue, 
however, that this is taking too narrow a view. Breaking of the oath was, by definition, a 
political act of insubordination - and, in its more serious manifestations, sedition - against 
the state, and therefore an abrogation of allegiance to the Republic as long as the mutiny 
was maintained.""" The magistrates to whom citizens swore fidelity were the lawfully-
appointed representatives of the state; an oath to such magistrates was an oath, through 
them, to faithfully serve the Republic. To break faith with them was to break faith with the 
state, and the severity with which commanders were able to legally punish such 
transgressions, the necessity of securing a new oath to atone for breaking the previous one, 
and the fact that oath-breakers placed themselves outside normal legal protections,'"" 
suggests the Romans also considered it more than a matter of simple discipline.""^ 
In Scipio's admonishment of his mutinous men from Sucro can be detected this broader 
expectation of loyalty and commitment, and a sense of the understandable""^ seriousness 
with which members of the governing elite normally approached instances of oath-
breaking. Scipio's opinion of the act of breaking sacramentum was simple: it was sedition, 
leading to potentially disastrous consequences for the state, including civil war. He asked 
the Sucro mutineers if they had sufficient reason to declare war on their country and revolt 
from the Roman people. This was only one of the potential consequences: Africam Italiae, 
Carthaginem urbi Romanae imperare velletis?™'^ He reminded them of the futility of their 
Livy, in the Scipionic example at Sucro, makes it clear that the soldiers swore the new oath to Scipio 
personally (Liv. 28.29). It is the same with Cinna (App., BC 1.66; Veil. 2.20). 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 72. In down-playing this aspect of the oath, Keaveney argues that it was collectively 
understood that the citizen was already a member of the civitas, and as such, it didn't make sense to swear 
allegiance to oneself "We also need to be aware the sacramenlum was not an act of fealty to the Roman state 
itself, but rather, as we have said, to one of its representatives" (Keaveney, 2007, p. 91). 
"""Nicolet , 1980, pp. 103 and 104. 
Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 9. Nicolet, 1980, p. 103. In another sign of the status of oath-breakers regarding the 
law, their punishments could be imposed without trial, as at Plb. 6.19; Fron., Sir. 4; Plut., Luc. 15. 
See Nicolet, who concluded that once a soldier had taken the oath, he was "linked by the strongest ties" to 
the Republic; the oath legitimised his status as a soldier (Nicolet, 1980, p. 103). In my view, he is right. 
1 mean 'understandable' as obvious: the foundation of the relationship between commanding magistrates 
and their soldiers fundamentally rested on the ordinary citizen performing his duty as expected. Without that, 
the magistrates were powerless, and the state vulnerable. 
Liv. 28.29: "Would you have wished Africa to rule over Italy, Carthage over Rome?" See also 
Chrissanthos' analysis of this incident (Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 101). 
cause; the state underwrote his lawful authority, and even if they had defeated him 
personally, other officers and Roman armies in Spain would have stepped forward to 
overcome them.""^ In this estimation, Scipio's speech as recorded in Livy, and which may 
be literary invention, nevertheless reflects a persistent, albeit more restrained, sentiment 
toward seditio that was common among the governing elite; it was possible to believe that 
members of the senate in 492 BC wanted to treat the mutineers as enemies of the state and 
wage war on them before more conciliatory views prevailed,""^ as did senators in response 
to the serious mutiny of an army in 342 BC during the First Samnite War . ' "" 
Such was the gravity of the oath that it had the force almost of a religious proclamation; 
soldiers who broke it were 'accursed',""^ and the standards which they had vowed never to 
desert were considered holy. '"" I suggest that this strong language, and the link with 
religious symbolism, infused the act of oath-making with a type of sacred inviolability 
which reinforced the larger nature of the pact the soldiers were entering into with their 
commanders, and the state." '" Every time the army rejected the authority of its magistrates, 
they made a statement of dissent which, if not directly motivated by a political cause itself, 
had to be interpreted by the governing elite as a threatening political act, often requiring a 
political - as well as disciplinary - response,"" as it did early in the Republic's history 
when the senate included in its discussion ways to alleviate the underlying social causes of 
the mutiny, as well as re-establish discipline in the army. '"^ 
' " " L i v . 28.29. 
' " " D . H . 6 . 6 5 . 
Liv. 7.40. 
They were 'sacer'. See also Nicolet, 1980, p. 103, and Keaveney, 2007, p. 90, on this point. 
D.H. 6.45. He makes the point that the Romans held their standards on campaign in the highest regard and 
like the statues of gods, were considered holy. For another example of the force of a military oath, see 
Polyhius' account of the freed Roman soldiers who voluntarily returned to Carthaginian captivity after 
appealing to the Roman senate to pay for their ransom because of the oath they had made to return (Plb. 6.58). 
" T h e very name: 'sacramentum' was infused with religiosity, and therefore, an indication of its solemnity. 
1 contend that it is significant that a word with religious connotations was deliberately used to bind in military 
service the citizen with the state: normal words for 'oath ' , coniuratio or insiurandum, were not. It helped 
convey for the ordinary citizen the seriousness of the pact being entered into. 
" " As can be interpreted by the senate's care on many occasions to be seen backing up the authority of their 
magistrates against soldiers who have either mutinied or were considered to have broken their oath by 
deserting in battle, as it did when it refused to intercede on behalf of the master of horse of the dictator 
Papirius accused of disobeying orders in 325 BC, in its treatment of the surviving legions of Cannae in 216 
BC (banished to Sicily for the remainder of the Second Punic War), and its indefinite cessation of annual pay 
to a legion who abandoned its consul also in 216 BC against the Ligurians (V.Max. 2.7). I will examine the 
political aspects of responses to instances of mutiny below in this chapter. 
D.H. 6.36; Liv. 2.24 ff They were responding to growing insubordination and frustration of citizens 
serving in the army over a range of social issues in 494 BC. 
Mutiny and Rebellion: Localised and Mercantile Reasons 
Beyond oath-breaking as a political act per se, I argue that in the army's history of mutiny, 
disobedience and political advocacy for preferred political candidates, there is the signature 
of a politically-aware, activist - and at times revolutionary - institution. The fact that 
citizens, alongside the governing elite, shared responsibility for the survival of the state 
proved decisive in the power relationship between citizen and the governing elite; 
insubordination was a reminder to the state of their indispensability."" The army's 
disobedience was not confined to any particular period of Roman history, nor was it limited 
to a specific geographical location. The best and worst of Roman commanders had to deal 
with it,'"" and it made little difference if the wars were defensive, offensive or civil. 
Between the foundation of the Republic and the start of the Social War, '"^ for example, 
there were sixteen recorded cases of seditio}^^^ while there were a further 30 during the 
Social War, the civil war period and down to the Pact of Brundisium in 40 B C . " " 
The reasons soldiers mutinied, were insubordinate or withdrew their services in passive 
protest, were varied. Instances were caused by localised conditions, events or the actions of 
local commanders that, if they remained localised or were quickly contained, did not have 
the potential to threaten the governing elite or represent a serious sedition against the state. 
During the Social War, for example, one of the common reasons soldiers mutinied or 
rejected the authority of the commanding magistrate was resentment against the imposition 
of military discipline,"'^ a localised factor that generally did not lead to serious sedition. In 
89 BC, the consul L. Porcius Cato tried to improve discipline in his unruly urban legions 
and was pelted with clods of wet soil for his trouble." " The soldiers, many of them elderly 
and unused to active service, were serious in their rejection of his authority; Cato would 
have been killed at the contio he called if the ground had not been wet and under 
" " R a a f l a u b , 2 0 0 5 . p . 197. 
Messer, 1920, p. 162. One of Rome's most capable commanders, for example, the vanquisher of 
Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, had to deal with seditio on several occasions, as we have seen. 
" ' ^ 5 1 0 B C - 9 0 BC. 
""Chr i ssan thos , 1999, p. 13. 
" " Chrissanthos, 1999. p. 11. 
See Keaveney on this point (Keaveney, 2007, p. 78). He downplays the political aspects of many of these 
seditions; 1 will argue in Chapter Seven below, however, that there was a direct correlation between the rise of 
political violence in Roman society and the increase of incidents of magistrates being targeted and killed by 
soldiers during this period. 
" " D . C . , F r . 3 1 . 
cultivation. The ringleader, C. Titinius, was arrested and sent to Rome for trial, but like 
many mutinous soldiers during this period, escaped punishment."^" That same year, the 
legate, A. Postumius Albinus, was less fortunate; he was stoned to death by his mutinous 
soldiers outside Pompeii when he called a contio.^™ The excuse his soldiers used was 
treason, but the real reason was hatred earned by excessive arrogance and cruelty to his 
troops. Like the instigators of the insubordination against L. Cato, the perpetrators were 
not punished and Sulla incorporated them into his army."^^ Excessive discipline also 
caused problems for consuls earlier in Rome's history. During the First Punic War in 252 
BC, for example, C. Aurelius Cotta's heavy-handed application of discipline in flogging 
and demoting several tribunes for poor performance, including a relative, and his demand 
that the equites do some sort of manual labour, caused his officers to mutiny"^" - an 
offence for which he later vigourously pursued them for remedy in Rome after he had 
suppressed their initial insubordination in camp. 
Soldiers mutinied over excessive length of service, a desire to return to Italy after 
campaigning, built up arrears of pay, or lack of opportunities to enrich themselves. All 
these factors, for example, featured in the reasons for unrest among Scipio's men at Sucro 
in 206 BC;"^ ' his illness merely provided a catalyst to initiate the revoh. Moreover, P. 
Sulpicius Galba's army in Macedonia in 199 BC included the remnants of 2,000 veterans of 
the Cannae legions who had been in continuous service for 17 years; being drafted for the 
Macedonian campaign was the breaking point and they mutinied. The replacement consul, 
P. Villius Tappullus, called a contio to discuss the soldiers' problems. Here they made an 
The fact that Titinius was sent to Rome for trial, and not dealt with in camp, suggests he was an officer, 
perhaps a military tribune. What is ominous about this event was that he escaped punishment, possibly 
because of his previous standing in the law courts (D.C., Fr. 31; Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 50), or through the 
intervention of the tribunes. This theme of mutinies not being punished during this period is significant. 
Liv., Per. 75. Ironically, this is the descendant of another Postumius who died in similar circumstances 
during a mutiny in 414 BC (Liv. 4.50). 
Oros. 5.18.22; V. Max. 9.8. See Keaveney for a slightly different view on Albinus' fate; he argues 
Albinus may have died while trying to make heavy-handed attempt to impose discipline on the mutinous 
troops to restore them to service (Keaveney, 2007, pp. 77 and 78). 
Sulla chose not to punish the ring leaders of this mutiny; instead, he asked them to atone for their crime by 
bravery in battle against the former Italian allies (Oros. 5.8.22). Significantly, these troops went onto kill 
tribunes, desecrate the symbols of republican office and march with Sulla on Rome the following year. The 
consequence of Sulla's leniency, and the correlation of rising violence in politics and the increasing tendency 
of armies of this period to attack the symbols of state power, will be discussed in Chapter Seven below. 
Fron., Sir. 4. 22; V.Max. 2.7. The relative was P. Aurelius Pecuniola. Cotta pursued remedy for the 
mutiny in Rome, convincing the censors to reduce the mutinous equUes in rank to aerarii, and secured an 
enactment so that their arrears in salary would not be paid (Fron., Str. 4.22). 
Liv. 28.29; Fib. 11.25; App., Hisp. 34. 
impassioned plea for discharge, arguing they had grown old in service, and had been forced 
by military tribunes to embark for Greece. Tappullus agreed their case had merit but that no 
excuse justified mutiny; they resumed service when he agreed to send a letter to the senate 
on their b e h a l f I n c o m p e t e n t commanders,"" material incentives''^^ and excessively 
long campaigns"^' also provided reasons to mutiny. None of the above cases threatened the 
state. 
Mutinv and Rebellion: Political. Economic and Social Reasons 
The citizen-militia, however, also mutinied for political and social reasons. Some instances 
of mutiny, or rejection of the authority of the commanding magistrate, as they were 
preserved in the literary tradition, show a link with broader civil themes in society, 
especially in the centuries following the creation of the Republic when there was wide-
spread friction between the governing elite and ordinary citizens agitating for greater 
political rights, economic reform and protections against the power of magistrates."^" In 
contrast to localised disobedience, the larger of these disturbances in the army were serious 
rejections of state authority; some developed into rebellion that threatened the governing 
elite's hold on power, and importantly for the tradition of resistance that would develop 
over the centuries, they were more often than not successful in forcing change upon the 
governing elite or extracting concessions."" In this context, service in the army was a 
political weapon in the hands of ordinary citizens to force concessions from an intransigent 
state, to draw attention to specific grievances or to ameliorate perceived injustices. 
In 492 BC, for example, we are told that the larger part of two consular armies broke their 
sacramenta. revolted after seizing their standards and refused, at the instigation of C. 
Sicinius Bellutus, to obey the senate's orders to march against the Aequians and 
Liv. 25.5; Liv. 26.21; Liv. 32.1. The result of their appeal is not known and they disappeared from history 
after this episode. 
" " In 294 BC, the army mutinied against such a consul: M. Atilius Regulus (Liv. 10.32). 
In 280 BC, soldiers mutinied against the consul, P. Valerius Laevinus, for this reason (Plb. 1.7; D.H. 
20.4). 
As in 139 BC, when part of the army mutinied against the proconsul, Q. Servilius Caepio (D.C., Fr. 78). 
This long-running social and political friction between the governing elite and ordinary citizens early in 
the history of the Republic has been referred to as the 'Struggle (or Conflict) of the Orders' (for the term, see 
Raaflaub, 2005, p. 4; Rich, 2008, p. 19). It refers to a period of agitation between the elite and ordinary citizen 
where many of the patrician's tradition political privileges were curtailed and economic reforms enacted to 
benefit the ordinary citizens, such as debt relief (Roth, 2009, p. 26). 
1 will cover this important point in more detail below in this chapter. 
Sabines."^^ This was very much a revolt by ordinary citizen-soldiers in their own interests, 
and to support marginalised elements in Roman society. Centurions were not part of the 
mutiny, and like the consuls, A. Verginius Tricostus Caeliomontanus and T. Veturius 
Geminus Cicurinus, were left to try and persuade the men to return to service after the 
mutineers had replaced them with their own popularly-elected centurions."" The 
immediate cause of the mutiny was the senate's reftisal to honour its promise to address 
economic hardship among citizens - a promise made to secure their service in a series of 
campaigns against invading enemies - and keeping the men in service after the campaign 
had finished."^'* But the broader context included issues of constant service, debt relief, 
state financial assistance to the poor, and heavy taxation"^' - all of which directly affected 
the citizen-soldiers at the t ime. '" ' It had been a growing source of fi-iction and unrest 
between themselves and the governing elite;"^^ the senate's obstinacy provided the catalyst 
for seditio. The tactic worked; mutiny, withdrawal of service, and threats of violence 
achieved what years of advocacy by sympathetic magistrates, and much debate in the 
senate chamber, could not."^^ The senate was forced to negotiate and make concessions; no 
one was punished. There was agreement to enable - by law - debt relief for soldiers, 
release debtors imprisoned or enslaved, establish clear legal rules for future lending 
arrangements, and a general amnesty for all mutineers."^' The soldiers also extracted legal 
protections for citizens against the arbitrary power of magistrates by establishing the office 
of tribune."'"' In this case, disobedience, mutiny and threats were successful ways for the 
citizen-soldier to force political, economic and social concessions from the governing elite 
disinclined to respond to less drastic approaches, such as debate and advocacy. It was 
Liv. 2.24; D.H. 6.45 ff. This sedition resulted in the first succession of the plebeians to the 'Sacred 
Mount' near the river Anio. 
" " D.H. 6.45; Liv. 2.32. 
" " D.H. 6. 43; Liv. 2.34. 
D.H. 6.26,27. 
We know the citizen-miHtia was directly affected by these issues because Sicinius makes a point in his 
negotiations with the senate envoys to illustrate the distress and dire economic situation of many of the 
mutineers (D.H. 6.72). 
It was also the reason why ordinary citizens were increasingly refusing to present for service during the 
levy, as when a levy was called to repel a Sabine invasion and suppress a rebellion among the Medullini 
(D.H. 6.34). 
As an example. P. Verginius, an advocate for the plight of ordinary citizens amongst the govemmg elite, 
spoke forcefully in one of the many senate debates on the issue of economic reform, and how to alleviate the 
hardship being experienced by many citizens at the time, arguing for measures that protected those citizens 
economically who had served in the recent campaigns. He was unsuccessfial in persuading the senate to 
respond in any substantive way (D.H. 6.37). 
D.H. 6.83. 
D.H. 6.88; Chrissanthos. 2001, p. 15; Messer, 1920, pp. 163 and 164. 
political in nature, undertaken for civil reasons, and ended in political and economic 
settlement. 
In the semi-mythical period before the sack of Rome by the Gauls, these themes of 
injustice, social and political inequity, economic reform, legitimacy and abuse of 
magisterial power' continued, on occasion, to impel soldiers to mutiny and disobey their 
legally-appointed commanders - alongside more basic concerns of harsh discipline, poor 
leadership and lack of opportunities to amass booty. When it was in support of broader 
civic themes, the mutiny or act of disobedience was almost always undertaken to pressure 
the governing elite to make concessions, adopt a particular course of action, or provide 
recourse to justice when other avenues had failed. Moreover, the army was invariably at its 
most powerfiil in this contest when the state was especially dependent on it in war;""^ 
Agrippa Menenius pointed this reality out to intransigent peers when he asked rhetorically 
what forces would be left to defend the city when they had refused to compromise and 
driven away all the citizens?"''^ Most mutinies that threatened the hold of the governing 
elite, and were successful in their aims, invariably took place against a background of war 
that threatened the state. 
In 488 BC, for example, political tensions and mistrust between the governing elite and 
ordinary citizens provided the backdrop for the army's refusal to defend Rome against the 
Volscian invasion and force the senate to open negotiations with the Roman exile, C. 
Marcius Coriolanus.""" When they discovered that C. Coriolanus led a Volscian army, 
ordinary citizens suspected the governing elite of treachery and waging war against 
them."''^ Threatening to leave the city and senate without protection in the presence of the 
Volscian army was an effective tactic; no one was punished, and given that the Volscian 
army was nearing Rome, it placed the senate in a disadvantageous negotiating position, and 
' " " Richard, 2005, p. 120. He produces a detailed analysis of the origins of divisions that separated patricians 
from plebeians, and of the underlying causes of the Conflict of the Orders. It is a useful study which 
emphasises the political nature of the dynamic and the inherent inequality and injustice which underpinned 
most of the early confrontations. 
The mutiny of 492 BC, for example, was conducted, and the negotiations held, against a general 
background of invasion and war against Rome 's neighbours. In this, the state was particularly at a 
disadvantage in the negotiations because it was especially dependent on the army at the time. 
D.H.6 .51 . 
D.H. 8.22; Liv. 2.34. 
D.H. 8.14. 
gave it no viable option but to cancel Coriolanus' order of exile, and open negotiations with 
him to peacefully resolve the conflict."'' ' Sometimes the army could support a civil issue 
by refusing to cooperate with its commander out of spite; in 481 BC, the army refused to 
obey orders in protest against its consul, Caeso Fabius Vibulanus, who opposed a public 
land distribution program to citizens."'*' The program had already caused divisions in 
Roman society when a tribune tried to prevent the levy until the senate had finished the 
allocation of land as promised. This action failed. But the citizen-soldiers were more 
successful. Once on the battlefield, they not only refused to attack the enemy, but 
spontaneously returned to Rome; in this case, they withdrew their services to prevent Caeso 
Fabius gaining the victory he needed to qualify for a triumph.""^ It was a deliberate attempt 
to deny him public glory because of the enmity he had earned amongst the soldiers through 
his opposition to the land distribution program. 
The literary tradition preserved themes of personal injustice, economic hardship and 
political repression that animated the mutiny, rebellion and occupation of the Aventine by 
the Roman army in 449 BC."^' Once again, it occurred at a time when the state was 
particularly dependent on the army: in this case, fighting a two-front war against invading 
Sabines and Aequi."'" The underpinning cause of the revolt was the political and economic 
repression of ordinary citizens by the authoritarian cabal of ruling decemvirs."" They 
suspended, inter alia, tribunician power, taking from ordinary citizens legal protections 
against arbitrary magisterial abuses, and removed the right of appeal for their decisions."^^ 
D.H. 8.23,24. 
' " " L i v . 2.41; D.H. 9.1 ff. 
"•• 'D.H. 9.4. 
Liv. 3.36 ff; D.H. 9.1. 
"™Liv .3 .36 . 
Ungem-Stemberg, 2005, p. 76. 
" " Liv. 3.36. Although it is part of the tradition of the 'Conflict of the Orders', Ungem-Sternberg is 
unconvinced of the historical validity of this event. He does not say it is completely fictitious, nor of no value 
to modem historians trying to peer into the murk of Rome's earliest centuries. But he comes close: arguing 
that the example of the tyranny of the decemvirs, particularly of the leading magistrate, Appius Claudius, 
represents a literary tradition in which a timeless simile for the emergence and fall of tyranny is presented as a 
kind of moral tale for later generations (Ungem-Stemberg, 2005, p. 87). He explains that the historians who 
preserved this event reformulated what was a timelessly valid insight in the light of the author's own 
contemporary experience (Ungem-Stemberg, 2005, p. 86). In essence, this is an attempt to detach the literary 
text from the historical events they recount. The underlying assumption behind Ungem-Stemberg's critique -
which is still valuable for its insight into the mindsets of individual historians, and as a waming to remain 
vigilant to bias in reading the sources - is that ancient historians were only capable of comprehending events 
in the remote past in terms of their own experiences. His view is contested: Toher, for example, states that 
while Livy's narrative of the early history of Rome may be inaccurate at specific points, the general picture is 
clear and trustworthy (Toher, 2005, p. 265). Develin argues Livy was alive to the distortive practices he found 
Ordinary citizens suffered most and had the most to lose; unlike their wealthier 
counterparts, they had little influence and were terrorised by the arbitrariness of the ruling 
clique, and many had their possessions seized."'^ Nor was there any prospect of restoring 
these rights and protections through conventional avenues; the decemvirs suspended normal 
voting arrangements by which their excesses might have been addressed, such as the annual 
consular elections, and it was widely believed among ordinary citizens that they intended to 
hold power indefinitely through a perpetual decemvirate. '"" This point is illustrative; as 1 
have shown above, the option to mutiny carried serious personal and legal risk for the 
mutineers. If legal avenues of redress were closed off, however, the levels of frustration 
among ordinary citizens, collectively or personally, were increased - as were the chances 
they would turn to the army as the ultimate authority to ameliorate their condition. 1 suggest 
that this was a recurring theme during most of the mutinies which have at their source civic 
grievances. 
In this case, the immediate cause of revolt by the army was a direct and urgent appeal to it 
by a serving centurion, L. Verginius, to help him avenge the death of his daughter at the 
instigation of one of the decemvirs ."" This provided the spark for revolt. It may have 
started as an attempt to help Verginius, but it quickly became an organised movement 
in his sources, and uses Livy's own words at the end of Book 8 where he mal<es critical analysis of the 
reliabihty of his sources to illustrate his argument (Liv. 8.40; Develin, 2005, p. 294). For another, more 
detailed counter perspective, which argues for the historical value of the literary tradition of this early period, 
and critiques the trend which denies any historical worth in the literary tradition, see Cornell, 2005, pp. 48-67. 
See also de Ligt, who recently reminds readers in his exhaustive study of the demographics and population 
counts of republican Italy of the danger of automatically discounting the historical validity of early accounts 
of Rome 's history. He argues that such an approach would lead to a void that can only be filled with an 
infinite variety of untestable theories, and that this approach should be avoided unless there are compelling 
reasons to discard the few pieces of literary evidence that have survived (De Ligt, 2012, p. 173). In the end, 
such debates are not relevant to my argument. I shall argue later in this chapter, for example, that what is 
important is not the historical accuracy of these literary accounts, but that they are what many Romans 
believed happened in their past, and, as such, constitute an inherited tradition that can be drawn upon to 
situate contemporary political events and actions. 
The decemvirs and their associates confiscated the possessions and assets of many citizens (Liv. 3.37). 
" " Liv. 3.36,37. Ungem-Stemberg, 2005, pp. 77 ff. 
The story, as it comes to us fi-om aristocratic historians, is that one of the leading decemvirs, Appius 
Claudius, tried to legally seize L. Verginius' beautiful daughter; her father, all recourse exhausted, killed her 
rather than submit to Claudius' will, and fled to the army for justice, chased by Claudius' partisans (Liv. 3.43 
fO. Chrissanthos, 2001, pp. 17-18. Lintott uses the episode as an example of the tradition of popular justice, 
and as an example of when popular justice met legal resistance. He focuses on the civilian aspect of the case, 
arguing the incident was an example of quiritare in which an injured or threatened person appealed to the 
crowd for assistance and protection. In this instance, the girl 's nurse called on nearby citizens to help them, 
but was informed it was no use appealing to the crowd because the claim to the girl had legal backing. The 
essential element of popular outrage and 'self-help' by ordinary citizens against abuses of magisterial power, 
however, is preserved in Lintott's account (Lintott, 1999(b), p. 12). 
against political and economic repression led by the army. According to the literary 
tradition, the army marched to Rome, entered the city and occupied the Aventine, urging 
citizens to revolt against the state of political repression and fight to regain their legal 
r ights ."" They were joined in Rome by the other consular army; their demands included 
the restoration of tribunician power, an end to political repression and punishment for the 
worst excesses of the decemvirs. Such a large-scale revolt, and the presence of the two 
consular armies which had elected their own commanders, gave the senate and decemvirs 
little choice but to acquiesce; the office of the tribune and the consuls were restored and the 
decemvirs resigned. 1 argue that here was the tradition of the citizen-militia as a wellspring 
of revolutionary intent and at the forefront of resistance; citizens arrayed not as members of 
the civic voting assemblies, but in their military formations and under their standards, 
entering Rome and occupying a part of it to give force to their grievances. The army had 
responded with mutiny, disobedience and rebellion to successfully force change on the 
state, where other avenues had failed; no mutineers were punished."" If it did not exactly 
march on Rome in the manner of an enemy capital, the tradition certainly had the army 
marching to Rome to confront the authorities and force a resolution. 
There were more instances in the literary tradition of mutiny and insubordination to support 
civic causes. In 414 BC, soldiers were unhappy with their commander, P. Postumius 
Albinus Regillensis, because he reneged on a promise to distribute among them booty from 
a captured town, instead keeping it for himself Societal issues, however, also influenced 
the behaviour of the men: Postumius also opposed a bill being proposed at the time in 
Rome to allocate captured land among ordinary citizens, and it was in the soldiers' 
economic interests for the bill to pass."^' When he threatened punishment for any of his 
soldiers who supported the bill, and began punishing individual soldiers, the army revolted; 
in the ensuing confrontation, Postumius was killed."'''' This was a 'grass roots' act of 
disobedience. The mutiny gained its strength from the ordinary ranking soldier who had 
most to gain from the land distribution; the centurions were not involved and 
unsuccessfully tried to suppress it in its initial stages. The mutiny was not successful; the 
Liv. 3.51. 
" " Liv. 3 .54. 
Liv. 4 .49 ; Zon . 7.20. 
Liv. 4 .48 . 
Liv. 4 .50 . 
death of a magistrate,"^' the first recorded case of a commanding magistrate being killed 
by his men,"^^ resulted in an investigation by consuls supported by the citizenry, and some 
soldiers were punished or committed suicide. 
In one prophetic ins tance, ' " ' a mutiny caused in part by heavy debt burdens among poorer 
citizen-soldiers led to a march on Rome, a standoff between two Roman armies, and a 
confrontation that could easily have ended with citizen fighting citizen; only the fact that 
both sides were not yet accustomed to fighting fellow citizens prevented an outbreak of 
civil war."®" In 342 BC, the Roman garrison in Campania mutinied, gathered a force of 
fellow mutineers and some freed slaves, and marched toward R o m e . " " These were poor 
men; the garrison comprised homeless and heavily-indebted volunteers who were happy to 
escape poverty and their creditors in Rome,"®® and the prospect of seizing the wealth of 
Campania animated the early stages of the mutiny. The underlying cause impelling the 
soldiers to disobedience and revolt, however, was their social condition: hardship caused by 
heavy debt in their civilian lives - and during fraternisation, they admitted as much to 
fellow citizen-soldiers in the army sent to confront them."®' It was, nevertheless, a serious 
attempt to place pressure on the state and force it to relieve their economic condition 
according to the literary tradition. The rebellious army intended to march to Rome, and was 
20 000 strong by the time it drew near on the Via Appia. It was ostensibly led by a former 
consul, T. Quinctius Poenus,"®^ and was battle-ready under standards."®' The state also 
thought the force was a serious threat; the senate declared an emergency, appointed a 
dictator, M. Valerius Corvus , ' "" and sent him out with an army to stop them. Valerius was 
earnest in his intention to suppress the rebellion: he called them 'enemies' and was 
prepared to fight if they did not back d o w n . " " Before that could happen, however, soldiers 
Postumius was a military tribune with consular powers (Chrissanthos, 2001. p. 18). 
It would be the last such incident until a relative of Postumius would be killed (ironically) in a similar 
fashion in 89 BC (Liv., Per. 75). See also above. 
" " I say 'prophetic ' because it anticipated, in some respects, the events of 88 BC: like Sulla's army, they too 
marched on Rome under their standards in a war-like manner and intended to enter it in political cause. 
According to Livy (Liv. 7.40). 
" " Liv. 7.38,42; D.H. 15.3; App., Sam. 1,2. 
' " ^ D . H . 15.3. 
" " App. ,5om. 2. 
App., Sam. 1. It has to be said that Quinctius, consul in 354 BC and 351 BC, was an unwilling leader. He 
had been forced to join the revolt by the mutinous soldiers (Liv. 7.39). See Chrissanthos, 2001, p.20. 
" ® L i v . 7.39; App., Sam. 2. 
'Corvinus ' in App., Sam. 2. 
" " Liv. 7.40. 
from both armies who knew each other - and in many cases were related - started 
minghng. Not accustomed to the idea of fighting fellow citizens, they looked for more 
peaceful ways to solve the standoff." '^ A deal was eventually worked out; it included debt 
relief and legal protection for insolvent soldiers ," ' ' immunity for the mutineers and a 
military reform which meant soldiers could not be discharged without their c o n s e n t . A 
crisis was averted, but the revolt succeeded. 
Besides mutiny, disobedience and rebellion, citizens - even when serving in the army -
could use advocacy for preferred candidates to influence the civil political process and 
bring about results. This type of activism manifested itself as overt political partisanship; 
serving members could (and did) have political favourites, and some were willing to act to 
influence events at home. During the war in Africa against Jugurtha, for example, when C. 
Marius agitated for his first consulship, some equites serving with Marius in the army, tired 
of the interminable nature of the conflict, had a clear preference about who should win the 
consular competition. They wrote home that there would be no end to the war in Africa 
against Jugurtha unless the people chose Marius as consul;"'^ he was subsequently elected 
in 107 BC. Later, Marius - by this time one of the Republic's most competent and 
experienced generals - was again the preferred candidate of some serving members for the 
consulship in 103 BC during the campaign to defend Italy against invasion. In this case, 
Marius displayed rectitude and fairness when trying a soldier who slew his nephew after the 
nephew attempted to seduce him. Marius acquitted the soldier in self-defence and rewarded 
him for his noble conduct; the soldiers approved and considered it a good omen. They 
wrote home about the incident with approval, and this approbation translated into a political 
advantage during the consular election. He was subsequently elected to his third 
Interestingly, Livy, informed by liis sources on the event, also included the possibility that the 
commanders were going to fight, and that the two armies actually started deploying for battle when they 
recognised friends and relatives in the opposing lines, and called to each other. It was this which demonstrated 
to the commanders that their men were not going to fight fellow citizens, so they called a halt and began 
negotiating. In the end, Livy wrote that it was hard to work out exactly what happened, except that there was a 
mutiny and that it was serious and organised (Liv. 7.42). 
" " A law was passed which protected insolvent citizens from seizure of property as long as they were serving 
(Liv. 7.41). 
Liv. 7.38; D.H. 15.3. Livy also states that there was a military prohibition enacted which prevented 
someone from serving as a tribune and then chief centurion in alternate years, a provision apparently aimed at 
a certain Publius Salonius who did this and earned the dislike of the soldiers because he would not take part in 
their mutinous schemes. There was also a provision to reduce the pay of the cavalry, who got three times that 
of a common infantryman, on the grounds that they had opposed the conspiracy. There may also have been 
provisions passed which limted the amount of interest that could be charged on loans (Liv. 7.41,42). 
"" ?\ul.,Mar. 7. 
consulship; helped ostensibly by his treatment of the soldier and his display of fairness,"' ' 
but more probably because the soldiers didn't want a less competent or experienced consul 
in command during the difficult and dangerous war against the Germanic tribesmen. Either 
way, the army acted to shape the outcome of the political process to their advantage. 
The Army's Civic Activism: A Tradition of Legitimacy. Success and Violence 
I would argue that the above examples demonstrate an unambiguous tradition in the army 
of disobedience - even revolution - against the Republic and its lawftil representatives for 
causes other than localised or mercantile grievances. It indicates that the army was no 
passive suppliant to the state,"'''' and was prepared to revolt against the governing elite, and 
plunge the state into crisis, to support political, economic or social ideals when other 
avenues of redress failed, or were not practicable. The examples also indicate that the army 
could be more subtle in its political activism; on occasion, soldiers out of self-interest 
advocated preferred political candidates in Rome, and this support could be influential in 
the outcome of elections. Given all this, I argue that here, long before 88 BC, is persuasive 
evidence of a politically-aware, habitually-activist, institution willing to act on its own 
convictions and in its own collective interests. 
Moreover, I suggest that despite the disapproval of the governing elite with regard to 
mutiny, and however assiduously they lawfully armed magistrates with harsh sanctions 
with which to discourage and suppress it, mutiny was nevertheless seen by ordinary citizens 
agitating for reform, including those in the army, as a legitimate act in extremis. This was 
evident in the language they used to justify their actions. The army's spokesman and main 
agitator in 492 BC, L. Sicinius, for example, used themes of injustice, state intransigence 
" " The citizen-soldier was frequently opinionated and pugnacious, and I argue that this fits with the picture 
of an activist citizen-militia. He was, for example, a difficult man to lead if he thought the general was 
making mistakes - and not afraid of saying so, even to the best of Roman generals. There are many examples: 
I only need to draw upon a few to make my point. Marius incurred the displeasure of his soldiers in the lead 
up to the battle of Sextiae against the Teutones. Marius pitched camp in a place where water was scarce, and 
the soldiers pointed this out to Marius, and were dissatisfied with the campsite. There was then an exchange 
of claim and counter claim between general and soldier; Marius arguing directly with his men. The soldiers 
did not like the fact that Marius had placed them in a tactical disadvantage. This type of direct complaining 
and agitating to the consul is hardly the signature of a subservient, slavishly compliant citizen-militia; it has a 
voice and it will be heard whether the commander likes it or not (Plut., Mar. 18). Moreover, in that same war 
against the Germanic tribesmen, in 105 BC, the soldiers of two consular armies forced their commanders to 
meet to try and cooperate against the enemy; clearly it was in their interests that the two bickering 
commanders worked together in the face of the size of the enemy army. It did not work (D.C. 17.91). 
and ingratitude, perfidy, economic hardship and broken promises to legitimise the revolt of 
the army." '^ Soldiers again spoke of political repression, injustice and revenge to legitimise 
their mutiny in 449 B C , ' " ' while the poor mutineers in 342 BC used extreme economic 
hardship and crushing debt to justify before peers and magistrates their march on Rome in 
battle array. Even the Cannae survivors who revolted in 199 BC against P. Sulpicius in 
Macedon, and were told nothing justified mutiny, nevertheless tried to legitimise their 
actions by arguing extreme length of continuous service and illegal coercion by 
t r ibunes." ' ' 
It was natural for soldiers, aware of the punishments associated with mutiny, to attempt to 
legitimise their sedition in any way they could. But the instances where grievances were 
subsequently ratified by the governing elite, albeit they often did so when faced with no 
other choice, suggests that there was something to them; in this sense, public legitimacy for 
insubordination could also come from the very targets of the mutinous soldiers. 
Sympathetic members of the governing elite, for example, could legitimise the army's 
recourse to disobedience and rebellion; when it happened, it was a powerful reinforcement 
of the soldiers' own sense of legitimacy, and strengthened their case. Some magistrates 
who negotiated in good faith with citizen-soldiers, and were subsequently undermined by 
peer or senatorial intransigence, helped plant the seeds of mutiny by publicly legitimising 
their grievances. M. Valerius told his citizen-soldiers in a contio that the senate had cheated 
and misled both him and the army when it refused to honour promises for economic reform 
and debt relief;"'^ the mutiny broke out immediately after this address. A. Menenius 
similarly legitimised the revolt of the army in 492 BC when he acknowledged in the senate 
that the revolt occurred in part because the citizen-soldiers felt deceived and the state had 
failed to honour its promises for reform." '^ The commissioners sent by the senate to 
negotiate with the mutinous army in 449 BC legitimised its actions by telling the soldiers 
that their demands were so right that they should have been conceded voluntarily in the first 
place,"*" and the dictator M. Corvus in 342 BC was so persuaded by the legitimacy of the 
D.H.6.77. 
""Liv.3.53;D.H. 11.48. 
" " Liv. 26.21; Liv, 32.3. 
" " D.H.6.56. 
Liv. 3.53. 
grievances of the rebellious soldiers that he became not their nemesis, but chief advocate in 
the senate negotiating a good deal for them once he understood their underlying reason for 
sedition. Chastiser of the mutinying Cannae veterans in 199 BC who told them nothing 
excused disobedience, P. Tappullus, nevertheless admitted in a contio that their demands 
had merit,"^^ and thus helped legitimise their claims. 
Significantly, within the army's record of insubordination and sedition was an established 
practice of individuals using the army as the ultimate source of authority from which to 
draw legitimacy to correct personal grievances. At times, according to the literary tradition, 
the army itself could be the sole point of authority and legitimacy for restitution, revenge 
and protection; in a the army provided a forum in which personal grievances 
could be aired, not only by fellow mutineers, but also by aristocrats temporarily ostracised 
or frustrated by the governing elite. Prohibited by the senate from celebrating the customary 
triumph, for example, P. Servilius Priscus appealed directly to the army for justice against 
his treatment, declared the only authority he needed was that derived from his own deeds 
and that of the army, and, with the soldiers behind him, celebrated a triumph without 
senatorial permission or peer a p p r o v a l . B y doing this, I argue that the tradition has P. 
Servilius in the contio blurring the distinction between personal, civil and military matters; 
he asked his soldiers' support for an issue traditionally addressed by the senate and peer 
consensus, and thus establishes a practice of appealing to the army for justice, legitimacy, 
and authority for unilateral action. 
According to the literary tradition, other instances of appealing directly to the army for 
justice followed. Like consul Servilius, centurion Verginius in 449 BC saw in the army the 
Liv. 7.41. 
" ' " L i v . 32.1. 
" " Here, I particularly wish to emphasise the 'face to face' nature of the Roman contio, as described by 
Yakobson in his recent analysis (Yakobson, 2010, p. S.ff). In its formal sense, it had important procedural 
limitations on the ability of the citizen to participate, but its tradition still required the speaker to face the 
audience in person. Under the contio, there was no sense of a magistrate sending a veto or expressing a view 
in absentia, as the US President may currently do. The speaker had to be present, and engage directly with the 
audience and, as Yakobson points out, it is this aspect of the contio that could make confronting an angry 
crowd a very unpleasant experience for a speaker, and which went a long way to overcoming its structural 
limitations as far as ordinary citizens were concerned. 1 would add that it is also this aspect the contio which 
enabled it to be such an effective forum in which to lay out a grievance before the soldiers, and then ask them 
directly for help. In the army, the nature of the contio, especially in its informal, impromptu sense, was tailor-
made for this purpose. 
D.H. 6.30; Liv. 2.26. 
ultimate authority upon which to draw legitimacy to help him correct a personal injustice 
when other recourses had failed or were not practical. In a contio, for example, he argued 
before his fellow soldiers for the righteousness of his cause, the injustice done to him, and 
to warn his fellow soldiers that if it could happen to him, no one was safe."^' Verginius 
then appealed directly to the army to help him; it agreed and marched to Rome with him, 
instigating what would become the second major secession. In 325 BC, Q. Fabius Maximus 
Rullianus, Master of Horse to the dictator, L. Papirius Cursor, appealed to the army in a 
contio to protect him from Papirius' punishment after he had disobeyed orders to engage 
the enemy in Papirius' absence."'" They agreed, a decision influenced no doubt by the fact 
that Fabius' attack on the enemy had been successful. When Papirius tried to punish him, 
the army mutinied, and asked the dictator to spare him. Fabius fled to Rome and Papirius 
continued the war against the Samnites without his Master of Horse."" No one was 
punished for mutinying on Fabius' behalf The practice of recourse to the army as the 
ultimate authority and legitimacy to help correct personal injustice, and the habit of 
appealing to it directly in a contio, would in time become part of the inherited story of the 
citizen-militia."'^ 
Success also reinforced in the minds of ordinary citizens the use of disobedience as a 
political weapon. Between the foundation of the Republic and the Social War, there were 
sixteen recorded mutinies;"'^ nine"'" were caused by political, economic or social reasons, 
were instigated solely by a personal grievance,"'^ or a combination of personal grievance 
and political factors."'® Of these nine, seven were successful: they achieved most or all of 
their aims, forced concessions from the state and no one was punished. Only on two 
occasions, in 471 BC,"' ' ' and 414 BC,"'^ did the mutineers fail to achieve their aims, and 
Liv. 3.50; Messer, 1920, p. 165; Chrissanthos, 2001, pp. 17 and 18. 
• ""Liv . 8.30. 
" " Liv, 8.37. 
This would have important ramifications in 88 BC when Sulla made a similar appeal to his army for 
justice, authority and legitimacy; that will be covered in Chapter Eight below. 
Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 34. Messer, 1920, pp. 163-166. 
In 494 BC, 488 BC, 481 BC, 480 BC, 471 BC, 449 BC, 414 BC, 342 BC, and 325 BC. 
In 325 BC, for example, when Master of Horse, Fabius, appealed to the army to protect him from 
punishment in his grievance against the consul (Liv. 8.37). 
In 449 BC, for example, when the centurion Verginius' grievance provided the catalyst for a much wider 
mutiny and rebellion against the state that had economic and political causes at its root (Liv. 3.50; D.H. 
' ' " ^ U v . 2.59. The mutiny against Ap. Claudius Crassinus, who opposed a bill that would have benefited the 
ordinary citizens, and treated his men harshly; his army refused to fight, but fought to defend the camp and 
commanders were able to suppress the mutiny, regain control over their army and punish 
mutineers. The other seven mutinies, all after 325 BC, had localised causes; harsh 
treatment, poor leadership, extended campaigns or lack of opportunities for booty. Most 
failed. 
Keaveney argues that the reason soldiers mutinied so often during periods of civil war was 
simple: they knew they could get away with i t . " " He is right to draw attention to the 
frequency of mutiny in periods of prolonged civil unrest; there were almost twice as many 
recorded between the Social War and the Pact of Brundisium than in the four preceding 
centuries.'^"" It is not accurate, however, to limit the observation about success only to 
periods of civil war. As 1 have shown above, for much of the Republic's history, successive 
armies had been getting away with it; successful mutinies were not limited to periods of 
civil strife. It makes more sense, rather, to divide successful from unsuccessful 
insubordination by thematic cause. I argue, for example, that for later generations looking 
back at this record of disobedience, the conclusion to be reached was that when the army 
could maintain a united front, disobedience mostly worked for serious, larger, social issues, 
but not for more isolated, mercantile or localised reasons, or where unity in the army could 
not be maintained.'^"' In particular, anyone aware of this history would note that the army's 
record of responding sympathetically to personal grievance was good; when there was a 
clear case of injustice, and other avenues had failed, it could be an effective forum in which 
citizens of all socio-economic classes appealed for help.'^"^ Furthermore, this record 
indicated a strong correlation between rebellion in the army and important political reform 
in the interests of ordinary citizens.'""' Political activism by the army produced durable 
was heavily defeated by the Volsci. But Claudius was able to punish the mutineers with decimation, the first 
recorded case (Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 17). 
Liv. 4.49: The mutiny against P. Postumius Albinus Regillensis in which he died, but which resulted in an 
investigation that punished several mutineers. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 80. 
See above this chapter. It was, of course, also a period of greater military activity, with larger numbers of 
soldiers than usual in the field. With more armies in the field, the potential for mutiny was naturally greater. 
Keaveney has not acknowledged this point. 
As it was not at Sucro in 206 BC when only part of the army mutinies and the other stayed loyal to Scipio 
(App., Hisp. 32 ff). 
Of course, we do not know how many times individuals appealed to the army and were rejected, or never 
had a chance to put their case in a contio. Only the major and successful accounts have reached us. But this is 
not especially significant; I contend that the important point was that the inherited tradition as known by 
ordinary Roman citizens included instances where individuals had successfully appealed to the army as an 
authority to correct personal injustice. 
Raaflaub, 2005, p.4; Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 39. 
solutions, for example, to most of the intransigent social, economic and political problems 
which had divided ordinary citizens and the governing elite, even though it had brought the 
state to the brink of civil war on several occasions. It led to a societal construct of a 
relatively cohesive and integrated citizen body with defined rights, protections and 
obligations; 1 argue that these powerful exempla from the history of insubordination would 
not be lost on soldiers of later generations. 
As is evident in the above examples, violence sometimes occurred as part of 
insubordination, especially in those driven by localised grievances later in the history of the 
Republic.'^"'' The threat of violence, however, was also part of the army's broader record of 
insubordination for civil causes in its interactions with the governing elite. Such a threat 
was used to improve negotiating positions by giving arguments extra weight, or to increase 
pressure on one side or another to make concessions. Cooler heads, however, normally 
prevailed, and large-scale violence - especially that associated with civil war - did not 
eventuate. The threat, nevertheless, existed. During the negotiations between the senate and 
army in 492 BC, for example, both sides used threats of violence; the army threatened 
violence against the governing elite to increase the force of their d e m a n d s , a n d there 
were those in the senate who advocated waging war against the m u t i n e e r s . V i o l e n c e was 
also expected by the rebelling army in 342 BC as it advanced toward Rome in battle-array; 
the soldiers entrenched and fortified their position when they met the opposing army.'^"' 
They would not have gone to the trouble of doing that if the threat of violence were absent. 
Members of the senate during this crisis also wanted to use violence to resolve the 
rebellion;'^"^ as 1 have shown above, the dictator was clearly prepared for battle if the 
mutineers did not back down,'^°' suggesting the senate gave him the authority to fight if 
necessary. I suggest, therefore, that violence also had its part in the army's inherited 
tradition of resistance to the state for civil issues. 
As we have seen, magistrates were attacked, for example, for trying to impose discipline on the army in 
the years preceding the Social War (D.C., Fr. 31; Liv., Per. 75), and a magistrate was killed by stones in the 
mutiny of 414 BC, although this may have been accidental (Liv. 4.50). 
For example, at D.H. 6.48. 
D.H. 6.65. 
Liv. 7,42. 
Liv. 7.40. 
Liv. 7.40. As 1 have shown previously, Livy also suggests an alternate scenario: that the opposing armies 
were about to engage in battle before mutual recognition among the soldiers, and distaste among ordinary 
soldiers at the prospect of fighting fellow citizens, forced the commanders to search for peaceful solutions to 
the standoff 
The Army's Civic Activism: A Known Tradition 
I argue that this history of insubordination and rebellion by the army for civic causes 
became, over time, an inherited tradition among ordinary citizens; an historical framework 
against which later generations of soldiers could situate their own actions, imitate, and draw 
inspiration. For this to happen, however, they first must have known of the tradition and its 
details. I suggest that they did. Soldiers knew that their ancestors had used mutiny against 
the governing elite, that the army could be the ultimate source of authority and legitimacy 
for individual grievances, and were aware of the army's record of success. It is plausible to 
think that they were also aware of the major themes:'^'" the historical conflict between 
governing elite and ordinary citizen, major mutinies of the army, the successions of the 
plebeians, the army's occupations of the Avertine, Mons Sacer and Janiculum - and the 
struggle to secure legal protections,'^" including the conflict that led to the establishment 
of the office of people's tribune. Raised in republican principles to have a proper respect for 
the gravity and nobility of the governing institutions and its magistrates,'^'^ the ordinary 
citizen nevertheless knew enough of the stories behind the people's liberty to retain a 
measure of inner psychological freedom that could guide his actions if it became necessary 
to act when serving collectively in the army.'^'^ As Cornell points out, the main outline of 
political and military events of the Republic's past was a matter of public knowledge; it 
was set out in the works of historians such as Fabius Pictor, M. Porcius Cato, and L. 
Calpumius Piso Frugi, all men who had made history and knew what they were talking 
about.'^'^ 
Cornell, 2005, pp. 52-53. 1210 
Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 30. 
Consider, for example, the potent symbolism that accompanied the leading magistrates of the Republic: 
the curule chair, the lictors, the insignia, and the practice of addressing the people while seated high above 
them. All this was public theatre designed to instil a proper respect for principes civitatis in the ordinary 
citizen. See Yacobson for a more detail on this process.(Yacobson, 2010, p. 3). 
Chrissanthos, 2001, p.33; MacMullen, 1984, p.455. 
Cornell, 2005, p. 49. Momigliano makes the point that the literary tradition was based on solid written 
evidence that was compiled relatively early in the Republic's history. For example, he points out that it is 
perfectly possible that an authentic record of the transition from monarchy to Republic survived in the 
chronicle of the Roman ponlifices, which was undoubtedly in existence before 400 BC. He argues that 
although the tradition in its present form dates back to second half of the first century BC when Livy, 
Dionysius and Diodorus were writing, the general lines of the Roman literary tradition were "already to be 
found in Fabius Pictor and other Roman historians who first put together an ordered account of Rome's past 
at the end of the third century BC" (Momigliano, 2005, p. 165). 
It was not even important per se if the stories of resistance that came down through the 
centuries into the public consciousness were especially accurate; the value was as an 
accepted literary and verbal tradition through which Romans interpreted the lessons and 
meaning of their past. Messer, for example, called the period before the sack of Rome by 
the Gauls in 390 BC "semi-mythical";'^'^ Raaflaub called these early centuries "dark 
centuries".'^" Livy himself admits this period was difficult to see with any certainty;'^" the 
era when many of the serious rebellions by the army for political or social causes occurred, 
and much of the story of resistance was first established. Chroniclers who compiled 
histories that dealt with the causes and anatomy of mutinies, such as Livy, had a body of 
information from a range of sources about the past to draw upon;'^'^ not least the Annates 
Maximi™^ which collated significant annual events in the Republic's history into one 
c o l l e c t i o n . T h e detail of the events, however, was problematic:'^^' both for ancient 
chroniclers writing histories and modem scholars trying to interpret them. In particular, the 
passage of time and the bias inherent in authors introduced uncertainties;'^^^ Raaflaub, for 
example, argues that the tendency of ancient historians to retroject contemporary 
phenomena and attitudes into the past was common to practically all Greco-Roman 
h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . T h e key point, however, is that these stories and issues recorded by 
' ' • ' M e s s e r , 1920, p. 165. 
' - " R a a f l a u b , 2005, p. 5. 
' - " Liv. 6.1. For another example of where Livy admits sources he used for an historical event have slightly 
differing accounts (in this case a mutiny), see Liv. 7.42. 
Forsythe, 1994, p. 71. 
' - " The Pontifex Maximus for 130 BC-115 BC, P. Mucius Scaevola, compiled a complete history of 
significant events (wars, reforms, triumphs, political doings etc) for each year from the white boards that were 
used to record memorable events (Forsythe, 1994, p. 68). See Chrissanthos, 2001, pp. 28 and 29 for more 
detail on the sources available to Livy and other Roman historians. 
Forsythe, 1994, pp. 54-59. Cornell, 2005, p. 47. 
Liv. 7.40. 
'"^According to Chrissanthos, for example, Livy was concerned with highlighting instances where conflicting 
parties in the past reached a compromise to contrast with his own time (Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 29). Livy may 
have been guilty of a certain simplification, but that doesn't necessarily follow that what he was recounting 
was distortion, invention, or without any basis of fact. 
Raaflaub, 2005, pp. 10-11. Raaflaub goes into detail on this point, and draws the rather obvious 
conclusion that the structure of Roman society may have been much more complex than a simple dichotomy 
between plebeians and patricians. While this is true, he also acknowledges that despite the inability to reckon 
consciously with the unfamiliar, ancient historians nevertheless knew there was something behind the picture 
that they could see, even if in barest outline, and that it represented the result of a long evolution - but they 
did not know exactly when this evolution began or how categorically it developed. For a contesting view, see 
Cornell, 2005, pp. 48-49. Cornell objects to the critique that Roman historians habitually abused accepted 
conventions and consciously distorted the historical facts to suit their own political agenda, and perpetuated 
lies and distortions on a large scale for reasons of entertainment and glorification. He points out that the major 
sources of the early Roman tradition, Livy and Dionysius of Halicamassus, may have been prejudiced, foolish 
or naive, and they may have been guilty of retrojecting into their accounts contemporary notions and 
language. But, according to Cornell, no one would seriously consider them to be downright dishonest. 
ancient chroniclers, and which constituted part of the folklore of the citizen-militia, are 
what the Romans themselves believed happened, and what they accepted and used as their 
inherited tradition. They were part of the wider corpus of exemplary anecdotes, stories of 
the origins and rise of the Roman people to greatness, and exploits of the past that every 
reasonably well-educated Roman had at their fingertips.It provided a carefully-selected 
pattern of perception by which society could articulate a set of defining characteristics, 
moral ideals, and as a way of unifying and emphasising common experience that existed in 
s o c i e t y . T h e struggle, for example, between ordinary citizens and the governing elite 
could draw a link between seditio and political reform as an especial part of the plebeian 
tradition, but at the same time emphasise solution and compromise in the collective interest. 
As I have shown above, the collective memory of the army's record of disobedience, such 
as represented by Livy, reflected why chroniclers thought acts of insubordination against 
the state had occurred, how they were organised, grievances, the outcome, and if anyone 
was punished. It was these observations, not their accuracy, that were useful to society. 
Importantly, they were not just confined to accounts of history enjoyed by those with the 
time and ability to read; they could never just be limited to antiquarian storage in archives 
or in the writings of learned specialists if they were to reinforce collective identity. As in 
many pre-modem societies, public memory in Roman society was achieved through a 
variety of media, not just fixed in canonical t e x t s : o r a l transmission, language, 
ceremonies, festivals, rituals and topographical spaces in which major events occurred, all 
helped the collective identity, encouraged ordinary people to remember, and kept the past 
alive in the present.'"^® The funeral processions of wealthy families, for example, were 
public displays of theatre designed to recall and celebrate the past: participants arranged in 
Furthermore, he argues that Roman historians were not in a position to impose a fraudulent version of Roman 
history on their contemporaries; the major events in history were a matter of public l<nowledge. Finally, he 
points out that if Roman historians were free to invent wholesale fabrications of historical facts, there should 
be much more inconsistency and disagreements in the surviving literature. In fact, the general narrative of 
events is remarkably uniform. Raaflaub remains skeptical; he allows for more interpretation of the basic facts 
by ancient historians (see Raaflaub's appendix to his chapter: The Conflict of the Orders (Rafflaub, 2005, pp. 
24-26). As I have pointed out earlier in this chapter, and above, none of this dispute matters to my argument. 
Holkeskamp, 2006, p. 478. 
Holkeskamp, 2006, p. 478. Holkeskamp provides a succinct and illustrative description of the purpose of 
the shared tradition as it was known in the middle/late Republic; he places particular emphasis on its practical 
purpose in society, and the connections it had with selected historical events of the past. 
See Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 34. 
Holkeskamp, 2006, p. 481. 
Beck and Walter, 2001, pp. 47-50; Cornell, 2005, p. 50; Holkeskamp, 2006, p. 491. 
chronological order of luminaries from the family's past, each dressed in the robes of 
previous curule appointments that mirrored the clan's history, the presentation of wax 
masks of ancestors, and the end point of the procession at one of Rome's prominent public 
spaces, such as the rostraP^^ Polybius wrote that this spectacle, and the speeches 
accompanying the funerary rites, made immortal the past deeds of the ancestors, and 
preserved as public heritage for future generations the historical exempla of sacrifice and 
s e r v i c e . P u b l i c monuments also helped keep alive the collective memory of past 
triumphs, significant events and individuals: the fornix Scipionis erected by P. Scipio, a 
highly visible monumental arch commemorating his achievements,'^^' the painting on the 
senate house wall of the victory of Valerius Messala at the start of the First Punic War,'^^^ 
the Maenian column which celebrated the achievement of the consul, C. Maenius, in 338 
BC who defeated the Latins, '^" and the cluttering of the forum and environs with physical 
evidence of past victories, such as the beaks of vanquished enemy vessels attached to the 
speaker's p l a t f o r m . A l l this kept the stories of the past alive for contemporary 
generations.'^^' 
The story of the murder of the demagogue, Sp. Maelius, and his attempted sedition early in 
the Republic's existence, is another case in point.'^'^ The rich equestrian was killed in 439 
BC by an impetuous youth, C. Servilius Ahala, after it was discovered he had pretensions 
for kingship. For those who read history, there was consistency in the literary sources 
concerning the basic outline of events. Maelius ingratiated himself with ordinary citizens 
by providing grain at his expense during a famine, leading him to make a bid for kingship; 
Servilius killed him because of i t . ' " ' The story of Maelius' demagoguery, plot, and his 
PIb. 6.53. 
Plb. 6.54. 
Liv. 37.3. 
'^ '^Pl ia .A'a/ . 35.22. 
Plin., Nat. 34.24. 
Liv. 8.14. 
Roller, 2010, pp.171 and 172. Roller discusses the function of demolishing houses and keeping the 
subsequent memory alive as a way of reinforcing or imparting moral judgments against the owners, and 
observed that it would trace the misdeed that occasioned the demolition in the first place. He, therefore, 
strongly endorses the link between cultural memory, moment, geographic location, and recalling moral fables. 
Liv. 4.13,14; D.H. 12.1-4; Cic., Cato 56; Zon. 7.20. 
Although in one version (Livy, Dionysius, Cicero) C. Servilius was acting in an official capacity as 
magister equitum to the consul; in the other version (Zonaras), he was not a magistrate, but simply a citizen 
acting on his own initiative for the good of the Republic. See Lowrie's insightful analysis of the link between 
Livy's version of Sp. Maelius' murder (Ahala acted as a state representative) and the need during the reign of 
Augustus for the state to be seen to act within constitutional mechanisms, such as the office of Dictator which 
murder by Servilius, did not exist just in the written record; Servilius' slaying of tiie proto-
tyrant was preserved for ordinary citizens four centuries later in language, physical relics 
and monuments at Rome. The ground formerly occupied by Maelius' house, razed on the 
orders of the senate after his death, was - even in Dionysius' day - left vacant among 
surrounding houses.'^^^ That meant the site was left continually vacant for hundreds of 
years: a permanent and conspicuous reminder for all who saw it that Mealius had once 
lived there, and that he had been severely punished for his crime against the R e p u b l i c . I t 
was potent symbolism, even four centuries later, of the fate that awaited anyone who 
contemplated kingship or tyranny.'^'"' While looking at the empty plot, citizens would have 
recalled the affair. Nearby, at the Porta Trigemina, the columna Minucia was erected, 
commemorating the man who first alerted the senate to Maelius' sedition;'^"' the column 
was also represented on coins in 130 BC minted by C. Minucius Augurinus.'^'*^ Moreover, 
language helped preserve the public memory of Servilius' deed. According to Dionysius, 
the ground formerly occupied by Maelius' house was called Aequimaelium, a conjunction 
of aequum and Maeliiini:^^'^^ this preserved in everyday usage Maelius' name, and 
connected it forever with a site of punishment.'^'''' The manner of his death was also 
set aside certain legal protections, when it sanctioned the killing of citizens that threatened it (Lowrie, 2010, 
pp. 717-182). See also Chapter Seven below. 
D.H. 12.4. He was writing and in Rome in the last decades of the first century BC, during the reign of 
Augustus: Roller, 2010, pp. 146, 167 and 168. 
Roller, in his detailed analysis of the practice of demolishing the dwellings of convicted malefactors, 
argues the destruction of Sp. Maelius' house also had a practical effect, as well as the symbolic effects. 
Practically, it removed the logistic base for the sedition Sp. Maelius was apparently planning; the destruction 
of the house disrupted the seditious networks and removed it as a base from which to mount a seditious act. 
The symbolic reason for demolishing the house includes that it functioned as a metonym for the destruction of 
its owner and his political aims. Furthermore, the physical destruction of the house served to eliminate the 
wails, roof and furniture which had been infused with the seditious sprit of Sp. Maelius; in this sense, a 
further symbolic dimension was added with the destruction of the house. Demolition, combined with the 
physical execution of the owner, graphically symbolised the civic community's judgment against the 
conspirator, and that the community had acted decisively to deal with the threat (Roller, 2010, p. 127). 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 176. Lintott argues that the examples of tyrannicide present in the historical tradition, 
such as Maelius, forcefully reproduced themselves in the minds of politicians of the late Republic; the 
message for those opposing the tyrannical aspirants was that once eliminated, the demagogues left behind 
neither policy nor a political faction. It acted as a legitimising framework to use against perceived tyrants. See 
also Roller, 2010, pp. 126-130. 
Roller, 2010, p. 126. 
'-"-Cornell, 2005, p. 51. 
D.H. 12.4. Dionysius understands the meaning of that word to be "The plains of Maelius." 
On a variation to my theme, Nippel argues that the recourse by the state to permanent reminders in the 
public space of the crime of individuals perceived to have been aspiring to kingship or illegal dictatorship, 
could also be understood as attempts by the authorities to emphatically confirm the tightness of their actions, 
or the actions of patriotic citizens defending the political status quo. He contends that this stabilised the 
consensus among the governing elite with regard to the legitimacy of the action, and helped prevent the deed 
from becoming famous among ordinary citizens by providing an example of the fate of the perpetrator. These 
are fair points (Nippel, 1984, pp. 26 and 27). 
believed to be preserved in the cognomen 'Ahala' awarded to the family of the Servilii; one 
of the meanings of 'a/a ' is 'armpit', the place Servilius reputedly concealed the sword he 
used to kill Maelius.'^"' 
The inherited tradition of the army and insubordination in civic cause provided a model 
which could be imitated, and historical exempla against which mutineers of later 
generations could help legitimise their own insubordination;'^"' as Yakobson points out, 
even sedition could be justified by respectable historical precedents, especially the 'struggle 
of the o r d e r s ' . I would suggest that we can see citizens, through the lens of Roman and 
Greek historians, using the tradition in this manner; the fact that insubordination occurred 
throughout the life of the Republic suggests it was something of an inherited practice in the 
army, not an aberration or unprecedented event. The practice retained legitimacy across 
generations as one way of responding to, and alleviating, serious grievances, and could be 
drawn upon by both sides to place a contemporary crisis into historical context. In 
particular, citizens will have used the tradition as a counterpoint to give specific arguments 
more persuasive force. We can see this process in the story of the dictator, M. Corvus, sent 
in 342 BC to confront a rebellious Roman army approaching Rome. According to Livy and 
Dionysius, he addressed the mutinous army which was battle ready under standards and 
marching on Rome. During his speech, as related by Livy, he referred to historical 
examples of mutinies and secession from the Republic more than a century old, and asked 
if they were prepared to do what their ancestors would not do in their sedition, and spill the 
blood of fellow citizens. He drew on the mutiny of 492 BC,'^"^ the sedition in 488 BC of 
the exile Coriolanus and the refusal of the army to defend Rome,'^'" and the seizure of the 
Aventine in 449 BC,'^ ^® to dissuade the mutineers from fighting fellow citizens. These were 
Nippel, 1984, pp. 26 and 27. See also Roller, 2010, p. 147: Roller makes the point that the families who 
were later connected with this event had a stake in ensuring the memory of the deed was not forgotten so it 
continued to add to their prestige. In this way, citizens reinforced the cultural tradition to ensure it was 
remembered. 
Holkeskamp, 2006, p. 481. Here Holkeskamp makes the point that the purpose of inherited cultural 
memory on a broader scale was to act as a kind of framework of right and wrong in which to interpret one's 
own contemporary social environment and world of experience. This purpose also presumably applied to the 
memory which applied to the feats and exploits of the army, including its tradition of seditio and political 
reform. 
" " Yakobson, 2010, p. 4. Here he is referring mainly to populist politicians and magistrates drawing upon 
examples to give weight to their own arguments, but the point is equally valid for ordinary citizens. 
Liv. 2.24,34; D.H. 6.23 f f 
Liv. 2.40; D.H. 8.14. 
Liv. 3.50; D.H. 11.2. 
historical counterpoints to place the actions of the mutineers into context, and the Corvus 
that Livy presents clearly hoped it would make them pause when they considered their own 
situation. For Corvus' examples to work in the tradition, and be as persuasive as he hoped, 
the mutineers must have been familiar with them, and the historical context to which he 
referred. They had to know, for example, that their ancestors revolted, succeeded from the 
Republic, and the outcome; otherwise, Corvus' pitch to the mutineers does not make sense. 
The preserved tradition also shows that ordinary citizens in the mutinous army could 
imitate the tactics of Corvus, and use examples from the tradition in their own interests: to 
secure better treatment, for example, in their negotiations with the governing elite. In this 
case, they included a demand to the governing elite that none of them of them be punished 
for sedition as part of the conditions for surrender. The reason they gave for this was that 
none of their ancestors involved in Corvus' examples had been punished: they wanted the 
same deal. '^" To have used the tradition like this suggests that the mutineers were well 
acquainted with it, or at least it was well known in the literary tradition that recorded these 
supposed 'historical' events. In particular, the tradition knew the details; that not only was 
insubordination successful in those instances, but that the soldiers in the second succession 
of 449 BC who seized the Avertine had not been punished. Whether or not we accept this 
account as strictly historical, we can imagine similar processes at work later in the 
Republic's history; 1 argue that here is circumstantial evidence that, according to the 
literary tradition, the army knew the history of insubordination for civic causes, including 
the detail, and used it when it was in their interests to situate their own circumstances, and 
as leverage. 
There are ftirther examples later in the Republic's history which suggest that the citizen 
body, from which the army recruited, was well aware of this specific tradition, in the words 
and actions of popular and high profile leaders. The reforming tribune, Ti. Sempronius 
Gracchus, for example, stood and acted in the spirit of the century-old tradition of C. 
Flaminius, in his agitation in the interests of ordinary citizens, his resistance to senatorial 
will, and the forceful passage of his agrarian bill . '"^ Ti. Gracchus' brother, C. Sempronius 
Gracchus, and followers in 121 BC emulated the popular tradition in a more direct way; 
Liv. 7.41. 
PIb. 2.21; Val.Max. 5.4; Liv. 21.63; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 182; Shotter, 2005, p. 33. 
they imitated the army of 449 BC and attempted to seize the Aventine hill in the hope the 
senate would come to terms with them.'^" Unfortunately for them, the senate in 121 BC 
was not in the same disadvantageous position as their ancient predecessors, and the tactic 
failed. I argue that it was a conscious effort, however, to draw a parallel with potent historic 
symbolism; as a piece of public theatre, the audience needed to recognise the symbolism, 
and, for that to occur, they must have been aware of the tradition. In 111 BC, the tribune C. 
Memmius in a contio addressed citizens about the progress of the war against Jugurtha; 
Sallust claimed that the text of the speech survived and that he faithfully reproduced it.'^^'' 
During the speech, Memmius drew heavily on the historical tradition of the army's 
resistance in political and social cause; the major themes of many of the historic cases of 
mutiny were present. He reminded citizens, for example, that their forefathers had twice 
succeeded and taken armed possession of the Aventine to assert their legal rights and 
sovereignty, and used this point to contrast unfavourably the efforts of contemporary 
citizens to spur them to action against corrupt members of the governing e l i t e . T h e 
army, in fact, seized the Aventine only once, in 449 BC;'""^ but, as I have argued, it was the 
symbolism and message of resistance, not the accuracy, that was important to Memmius 
and his audience. In legitimising his message, he used the language of political repression, 
corruption of the governing elite, and the necessity of struggle to preserve freedoms for the 
ordinary citizen.'^" But Memmius stopped short of inciting an uprising; he did not urge the 
people to take up arms against their oppressors as their fathers often had, and, on this 
occasion, there was no need for violence, and none of secession. Nevertheless, his speech 
linked the efforts of the army, and its rebellion against the state, with the protections and 
freedoms enjoyed by contemporary citizens. The consul in 99 BC, M. Antonius, used 
similar language and drew on the same historical examples; he told citizens gathered in the 
forum that insubordination in the army was justified and often necessary to secure political 
rights and reforms.'*'^ Like Corvus' reported use of history in 342 BC, and C. Gracchus' 
App., BC 1.26. Plut., CO 15; Roller, 2010, pp. 131 and 132. Roller emphasises the place of the home in 
the network of supporters that C. Gracchus was able to build up. He argues that Gracchus, as a pretend king, 
handles his visitors at his house in a different manner to normal: he divided them up into three different 
groups dependent on status, and treated them as a king saw visitors. Thus, Gracchus fosters his social network 
within his house and his support emerge from it to do violence on the streets. Demolishing or plundering the 
house after his death is necessary to extirpate physical traces of him from the state. 
Sal., lug. 30. 
Sa l . , /Hg.31 . 
'-^'"D.H. 11.48,50; Liv. 3.54. 
' " ' D . H . 11.48,50; Liv. 3.54. 
Cic., DeOr.l.m. 
piece of public theatre in 121 BC, Memmius' and Antonius' use of these exempla only 
made sense if they resonated with ordinary citizens; it was essential that the target audience 
believed they were historically reliable for this rhetoric to have effect. For that to occur, it is 
reasonable to expect that citizens must have been well aware of the ancient events 
described, and their historical context and meaning. Moreover, although this occurred after 
Sulla marched on Rome, and the first civil war had begun, the theme of drawing on the 
historical tradition of sedition and struggle for political freedoms and protections to frame a 
contemporary political issue is again clearly evident in the speech of the tribune C. Licinius 
Macer to ordinary citizens in assembly in 73 BC. He referred, for example, to the history of 
plebeians taking up arms to rebel against the state to secure their freedoms, and used it as a 
call to action to resist Sulla's dominance. 
Mutitiy and Rebel l ion: A Reaction to Political Inequity 
The use of insubordination by the army for civic causes was encouraged by a political 
system that imposed limitations on the power of ordinary citizens to influence their own 
destiny. As 1 have shown, a factor framing mutinies for civic causes was often the 
frustration ordinary citizens felt at grievances not addressed through other avenues, such as 
through conventional political processes or by an intransigent senate.'^'" I argue that the 
Roman political system, which in theory and practice included a role for ordinary citizens, 
but which institutionalised important structural limitations on the effectiveness of that 
participation, helped ensure that citizens naturally turned to the army and seditio as 
recourse in extremis to political impotency, and as a demonstration of collective will that 
could not be manifested under normal circumstances. 
Sal., Orat. Mac. 1 ff. 
As was reportedly the case, for example, in the lead up to the large-scale army rebellions of 494 BC (Liv. 
2.34.) and 449 BC (Liv. 3.50). In both cases, the senate repeatedly broke its promises to address grievances, 
refused to deal with the issues, or conventional political processes and avenues had little hope of correcting or 
alleviating the perceived injustices and hardship. 
Finley, 1983, p. 91. Finley argues that the ordinary citizen's most influential role in shaping political 
outcomes occurred not when they were formally engaged in the political machinery of the Republic, but when 
they were agitating in an extra-legal manner; for example, on the streets in riots and demonstrations. 1 would 
add to these methods available to ordinary citizens [of placing extra-legal pressure on the political process] 
seditio and insubordination when they were performing military service in the army. 
Ordinary Citizens and Politics: Influential in Theory 
I acknowledge, howeyer, that participation of ordinary citizens in politics was significant, 
at least in theory. For all their power and influence, for example, the goyeming elite could 
never manipulate the people enough for them to accept a genuine oligarchy, and they could 
not goyem the state without regular recourse to the people arrayed in their popular 
assemblies. '^" The collectiye will of the citizen body in the working political machinery 
appeared influential.'^'^ Citizens, arranged in their tribes or structural groupings in the 
ancient voting assemblies, such as the Comitia Ciiriata}^^^ Comitia Centuriata,^^^^and 
Comitia Tributa}^^^ gave their assent, for example, to the business of the Republic. The 
structural mechanism for allocating power in these assemblies was popular assent by vote; 
in 198 BC, for example, the citizens in assembly voted (and prorogued by the senate) T. 
Quinctius Flamininus another year of command against the M a c e d o n i a n s . T h i s was a 
feature of the political system; votes from citizens were not counted individually,'^''^ but by 
their various groupings: by curiae for the comitia curiata, by centuries in the comitia 
Yakobson, 2010, p. 1; North, 2006, p. 261. 
For a detailed thesis outlining a perspective along these lines, see Fergus Millar's influential argument 
that the Roman people wielded considerable political power in their own right, and were fully enfranchised 
members of the Roman political system (Millar, 1984, pp. 1-19). See also the statistical research conducted by 
Hopkins which concludes ordinary citizens had a real role to play in the political machinery (Hopkins, 1983, 
p. 114). Ever since Millar's thesis, there has been a lively scholarly debate on the role of the citizen in the 
political system. For a detailed response to Millar's thesis, and for an excellent summation of the traditional 
position of how Roman politics worked, with its emphasis on a narrow hereditary oligarchy controlling 
through a system of personal relationships and clientship the political workings of the voting assemblies, see 
North, 2006, pp. 269-275. For a survey of the debate, see Jehne, 2006, pp.14-25. For a very recent synopsis 
and discussion which comes out with a more balanced view, between the positions of North and Millar, see 
Yakobson, 2010, pp. 1-12. 
This assembly was the oldest of the assemblies and arranged into 30 subdivisions (curiae) of the most 
archaic tribes of Rome. By the late Republic, its importance was minimal, although it still formally ratified 
the election of magistrates from other assemblies (Nicolet, 1980, p. 228; North, 2006, p.261; Lintott, 1999(a), 
p. 49). 
This assembly decided the election of senior magistrates, passed laws and ratified (or rejected) decisions 
of war or peace, and I judge to be the most important of the popular assemblies because of the gravity of its 
responsibilities. It was originally organised, we are told, by the penultimate king of Rome, Servius Tullius, to 
arrange the citizens of Rome according to their wealth. It originally had a close association with the 
organisation of the Roman army, with the citizens arranged into 'centuries' on the basis of wealth - the 
original criterion which determined role in the army. It met outside the pomeriiim on the Campus Marlins and 
the citizens were arranged across the wealth bands in 193 centuries (North, 2006, p.261; Lintott, 1999(a), pp. 
55-57). See also Chapter Two above. 
This assembly comprised plebeians and patricians (as opposed to the concilium plebis which only had a 
plebeian membership) and voted on the election of lesser magistrates such as quaestors, curule aediies - and 
passed laws. The concilium plebis elected the tribunes. Both assemblies were arranged into 35 tribes on a 
regional basis; rural versus urban (North, 2006, p. 261; Lintott, 1999(a), pp. 50-51). 
' ^ " Z o n . 9 . 1 6 . 
For example, it was not a 'one man, one vote' system, where all votes had equal weight and influence. 
centuriata, and by one of the 35 tribes in comitia tributaP^'^ The function of the assembhes 
was to vote on decisions about issues placed before them;'^'" discussion and debate that 
accompanied the vote on a specific issue was conducted in a separate, formal meeting 
called a contio, summoned and presided over by a magistrate.'^'' 
Magistrates in turn exercised power on behalf of the polity as representatives of senatus 
populusque romams.'"^ Popilius Laenas in 168 BC handed Antiochus a senatus consultum 
as a representative of the Roman polity; his task was not to express personal views, but to 
remind the king of the decision of the senate acting for the p e o p l e . P o w e r was not 
dependent on hereditary lineage or divine right; it was invested by election in a process that 
drew legitimacy from the sovereignty of the people arranged in these assemblies.'^'" In 
them, the critical decisions of state were made; treaties with foreign powers and questions 
of foreign relations were ratified by the assent of citizens.'^' ' It was not the senate, but the 
populus Romanus, who gifted to Masinissa the cities in northern Africa he had captured in 
the Second Punic War as a reward for his l o y a l t y . T h e power to decide on war and peace 
rested with the popular assemblies: the declaration of war against Antiochus in 191 BC, '^ ' ' 
Perseus in 171 BC,'^'^ and the settlement with Aetolia in 189 B C . ' " ' Domestic business, 
such as passing or rejecting laws and bills, was conducted in the assemblies;'^^" they also 
controlled admission to Roman citizenship, and passed statutes which established the 
founding of colonies and distribution of public land.'^^' 
While popular assemblies often simply ratified what was put in front it them,'^^^ it is also 
true that their assent was not necessarily automatic. Rosenstein asserts that contiones were 
not places where citizens could hear issues being debated, likening them more to campaign 
Liv. 2.56. The term: 'Discedite, Quirites' was used to disperse the voters into their distinct voting groups 
in specially fenced-in areas called saepta (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 46). 
V.Max. 4,5.3. 
Lintott, 1999(a), p. 42; North, 2006, pp. 261-262. 
Lintott, 1999(a), p. 95, 
Plb. 29.27, 
' ™ P l b . 6 . 1 4 . 
For example, at Plb, 21.24; 17,30. 
' " ' L i v . 36.1. 
Liv. 42,30. 
' " ' P l b . 21.32, 
For example, the passage in the popular assembly of the Licinian Law in 367 BC (App. 1.8). 
' - " Liv. 25.5. Liv. 38.36. 
' - ' - A s a t L i v . 42.30; Plb. 21.32. 
rallies where magistrates whipped up enthusiasm to sway and manipulate the v o t e r s . H e 
is, however, ignoring the evidence; citizens sometimes clearly needed to be persuaded first 
in a contio, suggesting an interplay between citizen and the governing elite that was 
dynamic enough to include a measure of unpredictability. In 200 BC, the senate urged war 
against King Philip, but the comitia rejected it after a tribune made a speech against it in the 
contio-, it took a consular appeal to reverse the d e c i s i o n . I n 196 BC, Flamininus sent 
proposed peace terms to the senate to end the war against Philip. The senate agreed but the 
incoming consul spoke in assembly against them because he wanted a chance to fight; the 
assembly nevertheless ignored the wishes of the consul and agreed on peace, and the senate 
sent ten legati to enforce t e r m s . I t has to be acknowledged that contiones called to 
discuss bits of business, before they were put to the vote in the assemblies, could be places 
of real disputation. In 171 BC, a motion from former centurions to suspend the levy was 
debated, with speeches made by a former centurion, consuls and ex-consuls, before the 
appeal was rejected. 
The physical arrangements of these fora helped bring the governing elite into the presence 
of popular will. Even if they controlled the agenda and procedures, elite speakers could not 
avoid coming face to face with the will of the people, and could not totally ignore it. As 
Yacobson points out, it must have been an unpleasant experience to face an angry crowd to 
try to prevent it having its way on an issue close to its heart, especially where there was no 
police force to keep public order.'^^' Magistrates had to literally face the consequences of 
their stances on issues in a contio-, here was the opportunity for popular will to manifest 
itself and place pressure on elite speakers. The collective will of ordinary citizens could 
also defy the recommendations of the governing elite and other vested interests sent to the 
assemblies by the presiding magistrates. In 133 BC, Ti. Gracchus persuaded citizens to pass 
his controversial agrarian bill against powerful opposition from members of the governing 
elite, including a fellow tribune who spoke strongly against the m o t i o n . T h e outcome 
remained unpredictable in assembly until enough votes were secured; speakers on both 
sides deployed argument and persuasion to influence the voting. In 110 BC, in opposition 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 8. 
U v . 3 1 . 5 . 
Plb. 38.42. 
Liv. 42.32. See also Lintott, 1999(a), p. 45. 
Yacobson, 2010, p. 5. 
'^ '^App., 5 C 1 . 1 2 . 
to vested interests in the governing elite, a tribune persuaded the assembhes to pass a bill 
summoning Jugurtha to appear before them to investigate charges of corruption among 
Roman officials.'^^' 
The people had a potent advocate expressly created to act in their interests and for their 
legal protection: the tribunus plebis,™^ established in revolution with legal and political 
powers, '^" the tribune presided over the concilium plebis, the most effective medium in the 
Roman system for handling legislation.'^'^ The tribunician veto was extraordinarily 
powerfijl; a virtually unassailable way of obstructing magistrates and the senate, and an 
effective protection of the legal rights for ordinary citizens against the abuses and 
exploitation of the governing elite.'^'^ If the people's will could not assert itself directly, 
then it could manifest itself through the mediation of those who had the traditional right to 
interpret it, such as the tribune - as the people's demand for agrarian reform in 133 BC was 
asserted through the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus.'"'' ' Popular sentiment, manifested in the 
range of electoral decisions to which it was subject, was also considerable; the votes of the 
people in their groupings, for example, decided the major offices of the state. 
Moreover, the collective opinion of the citizen body was influential in its own right during 
the election of magistrates; for political candidates running for office, the vote of ordinary 
citizens appeared worth chasing. In 133 BC, Ti. Gracchus, lobbying for re-election and 
facing serious opposition to his agrarian reforms, solicited ordinary citizens for their 
vote . '^" P. Scipio Nasica, running for the curule aedileship as a young man, ruined his 
chances with an inopportune remark to a farmer about his work-worn hands while 
canvassing for votes more candidatorum.™'' I assert that this indicated that ordinary citizens 
Sal., lug. 32. 
Plb. 6.16. Polybius wrote that the tribunate was always obliged to carry out the people's decisions. 
D.H. 6.88. 
'^'^Lintott, 1999(a), p. 202. 
The fact that Tiberius Gracchus defended his extreme proposal to depose his fellow tribune in assembly 
by arguing he no longer represented the people's wishes (or opposed the bill), speaks to the normative nature 
and tradition of the tribunate (Plut., TG \ S). 
' - ' "Plut . , re 8,10. 
Plb. 6.14 f f See also Lintott, 1999(a), p. 200. 
' - ' ^ A p p . B C 1.14. 
V. Max. 7.5: "Cum aedilitatem cundem adulescens peteret manumque cuiusdam rustico opera duratam 
more candidatorum tenacius apprehendisset, ioci gratia interrogavit eum num manibus solitus esset 
ambulare. Quod dictum a circumstantibus exceptum ad populum manavit, causamque repulsae Scipioni 
attulit: omnes namque rusticat tribus, paupertatem sibi ab eo exprobratam iudicantes, iram suam adversus 
had some influence shaping pohtical outcomes; it would not have been necessary to solicit 
individual votes if their views were irrelevant, the outcome always predictable, or their 
participation wholly theoretical.'^'^ Polybius, who preserved the earliest systematic account 
of the Roman constitution,'^" concluded that the role of citizens in political processes was 
an important part of the system of checks and balance inherent in the c o n s t i t u t i o n . H e 
urged his readers to judge him by what he actually said and not by what he left out;'^"' 
unless Polybius had been deceived by his Roman patrons, seriously misread the system or 
allowed a bias for democratic institutions to distort the analysis,'^"^ his evidence cannot be 
easily dismissed. 
Ordinary Citizens and Politics: Important Limitations in Practice 
If, however, the citizen body could not be forced to vote in a way that automatically suited 
the interests and wishes of the governing elite, the essential point is that its actual ability to 
shape the outcome of events in its own interests, or even get an issue of importance on the 
conlumeliosam eius urbanitatem destrinxenint." "Standing for the curule aedileship as a young man, he 
gripped somebody's hand which had been hardened by farm labour rather tightly in the way of candidates, 
and asked him as a joke whether he walked on his hands. Bystanders caught the remark and spread it to the 
public and this resulted in Scipio's defeat; for all the rustic tribes thought he had taunted them with poverty 
and vented their anger against his insulting wit." 
Hopkins, 1983, p. 114. A detailed critique of Hopkins' analysis is found in North, 1990, pp. 3-23. 
Nicolet, 1980, p. 208. Polybius in Book Six of Histories preserves one of the most reliable accounts of the 
essential realities of Roman politics (Plb. 6.12 ff). It dates from 150 BC-140 BC, but purports to describe a 
system that was in place at the end the third century BC. In Lintott's view, Polybius' analysis of the 
functioning of the Roman constitution is 'unique' in our surviving sources (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 26). 
Plb.6.14 f f As part of the responsibilities of citizens in the assemblies, he included the power to approve 
or reject laws put to them by the magistrates, decide on questions of peace or war. ratify or nullify alliances 
and treaties with foreign powers, terminate hostilities and vote on the election of holders of public office. 
Having warned them that his account was also a simplification (Plb. 6.11). This does not present a 
problem for his credibility if we approach his analysis as one based on the centres of power and the 
interrelations between them. In this respect, Polybius' analysis is sound enough in that it deals with the reality 
of power (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 16). See North for a counter-view which downplays the conventional analysis 
of the realities of Roman power politics as described by Polybius as being a 'fi-amework' within which the 
dominant elite operated (North, 2006, p. 273). 
Lintott makes a persuasive argument that Polybius does not seem to have been hampered by a straitjacket 
of Greek constitutional thought in his analysis of the Roman constitution. He based his account on what the 
Greeks thought to be the basics of constitutional organs, but, in Lintott's analysis, Polybius' approach has an 
originality which is not mainstream Greek political thought, although he acknowledges that Polybius was 
influenced by things and ideas Roman. See Lintott for a detailed analysis of this position (Lintott, 1999(a), pp. 
24 ff). 
Millar certainly thinks it is 'first class' evidence (Millar, 1984, p.l9). Rosenstein, however, argues that 
Polybius got it wrong in actuality: there were limited checks and balance inherent in the system as described 
by Polybius (Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 4 and 5). 
political agenda, was subject to important structural limitations.'^"" The assemblies and the 
contiones had to be summoned by magistrates, for example, rather than being initiated by 
popular pressure;'^"^ they could only be convoked, presided over, addressed and dismissed 
by members of the governing elite, favouring the well-off and powerful.""' Furthermore, 
people could only vote on bills and motions put before them; the comitia itself could not 
initiate own motions without assistance from an elected magistrate, such as a tribune.""' 
The governing elite also managed state religion; interpretation of the requirements of gods 
was an aristocratic prerogative, and this could be used by the elite to negate popular 
sentiment if it threatened their interests. 
If the political machinery was to serve the interests of ordinary citizens, especially if it 
contradicted that of the governing elite, an advocate from the governing class was always 
needed to translate popular will into tangible action. Yakobson argues that the dependence 
on popular votes for election meant the people's will often found elitist c h a m p i o n s . B u t 
the limitations of this arrangement were obvious; it was hampered by the necessity of first 
finding an effective advocate willing to act,'^'" and then, once such an advocate was found, 
the partnership was likely to last only as long as the popular interests did not compromise 
those of their elitist advocate. Even tribunes, the traditional revolutionary advocates of the 
ordinary citizen, could act as often in concordance with the wishes of the governing elite as 
they could on behalf of popular interests.'^" During much of the first half of the second 
century BC, in war and peace, the tribunate worked closely with the senate, even on issues 
which had traditionally been a source of discord, such as the conditions of the levy. During 
Hannibal's occupation of Italy, for example, they agreed to the senate's request to enroll 
youth under the age of 17, and brought the unpopular bill to the p e o p l e . A f t e r the war in 
191 BC, tribunes acceded to senatorial pressure not to oppose an emergency levy, and 
Rosenstein, 2012, p.5. Rosenstein argues that the Republic had always been governed by the aristocracy 
since its inception, and until Julius Caesar overthrew it. Naturally, he is in opposition to the position adopted 
by Millar. 
As they were in Athens and Sparta (Homblower, 2007, p. 37). See also Lintott, 1999(a), p. 43; North, 
2006, p. 262; Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 9 and 10. 
North, 2006, pp. 262 and 263. 
But they could still agitate for measures in their own interests: for example, the popular agitation against 
the senatorial policy on Jugurtha that was a leitmotif to that conflict (Sal., lug. 30). 
Lintott, 1999(a), p. 198. 
" " 'Yakobson , 2010, p. 2. 
" ' "Lin to t t , 1999(a), p. 205. 
" " Examples are at Liv. 30.27; 39.19; 45.35. 
" ' ^ L i v . 15.5. 
suspended their investigation into requests from urban soldiers asking for dismissal because 
of length of service or illness.' ' '^ In that year, the maritime colonies addressed to the 
tribunes a request for an exception from naval service, but the tribunes referred the request 
to the senate for decision, and concurred with the subsequent refusal.'^'" The tribunate may 
have had its genesis in conflict and insubordination, but by the middle Republic, it had been 
drawn into mainstream politics, and lost much of its revolutionary c h a r a c t e r ; m o s t 
tribunes were still drawn from the elite of society and thus shared the same economic and 
social interests as the aristocracy.'^" This commonality of background, experience and 
interests was encouraged by the enrolling of former tribunes into the senate; it is first 
attested for 216 BC, ' ^ " and for ambitious ex-tribunes who wanted higher office or to found 
a senatorial family, was an essential step.'^'^ It is even possible to reinterpret the 
inviolability of the tribunate to always act in the people's interests ."" This may not have 
been, for example, a literal c o m m a n d , b u t more of a charter to confer tacit permission 
upon aristocrats so elected to act in the people's interests without the fear of being 
permanently ostracised from their own social class should they prosecute a bill inimical to 
the interests of the e l i te . ' " ' 
Moreover, the assemblies, made up of the people, were not truly representative; the 
effectiveness of participation for the majority of citizens in them was hamstrung by the 
voting system. While decisions in the assemblies were decided by voting, political 
participation and influence only lasted until a simple majority of votes was achieved. In 
the assembly which passed Ti. Gracchus' agrarian bill in 133 BC and voted to abrogate the 
magistracy of Octavius, for example, poorer citizens in the tribes at the end of the 
Liv. 34.56. 
Liv. 36.3. 
The big exception is, of course, the period of unrest and discord of the Gracchan tribunates of the second 
half of the second century BC, where the office of the tribunate re-asserted something of its old revolutionary 
character and was often at loggerheads with the wishes of the senate and other vested interests. Violence was 
used to quell the unrest caused by the calls for agrarian reform. This, and its implications, will be covered at 
length in Chapter Seven below. 
" " Lintott, 1999(b), p. 207 and North, 2006, p. 265. 
" " L i v . 23.23. 
Taylor, 1962, p.20. 
" " For example, Ti. Gracchus in 133 BC in a contio told the assembled citizens that a tribune was sacred and 
inviolable because he was consecrated to the people and a champion of the people (Plut., TG 15). 
PIb. 6.16. 
Lintott picks up this point and adds that it was important that an aristocrat elected to the office of tribune 
to be able to associate himself with bills that might damage the interests of his own social class without being 
regarded as a traitor (Lintott, 1999(a). p. 208). 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 9. 
sequential order did not have a chance to vote or express their political will; the issue was 
decided by the eighteenth sequential vote.'^^' This arrangement routinely excluded a large 
percentage of the citizen body from effective p a r t i c i p a t i o n . D i f f e r e n t assemblies also 
retained different representational and voting arrangements; citizens were not always 
present at the vote to enforce their will. In the comilia curiata, for example, the vote was 
taken by representation; only 30 lictors representing the 30 curia v o t e d . M o r e o v e r , 
Roman votes were not equal.'"® Even if ordinary citizens were present, the structural 
arrangements favoured richer and older c i t i z e n s . I n the comitia centuriata, for example, 
grouping was determined by the amount of declared property and by age; there were 
proportionally more centuries allocated to richer citizens, and the same number of centuries 
for older citizens as for younger." '^ Poorer citizens, proportionally much more numerous 
than their richer counterparts, were allocated into fewer, but larger centuries, with those 
without any property allocated to a single large c e n t u r y . C r u c i a l l y , the richer centuries 
voted first in this 'first past the past' system. As a result, the ability of poorer citizens to 
influence voting outcomes, those who made up the majority of the army, was severely 
limited. For the wealthier citizens, however, their domination of voting mechanics 
translated into significant influence; in practice, they were crucial in determining the state's 
higher magistrates, whether it went to war or decided on peace, and outcomes in capital 
tr ials. '"" 
Even in the concilium plebis, where patricians were excluded from attending, the 
mechanics of the system favoured richer, well-off citizens. Citizens in this assembly voted 
as members of tribes on laws proposed by tribunes, and elected tribunes and other minor 
magistrates; if there was one place where the popular will could find a voice to challenge 
the interests of the governing elite, it was here. All assemblies, however, were held in 
App . ,BC1 .12 . 
Although Lintott does rightly point out that in cases where the vote was close, all the groupings would 
have needed to cast their votes, involving the majority of the citizen body (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 204). 
North, 2006, p. 261. 
North, 2006, p. 262. 
Lintott, 1999(a), p. 204. 
Lintott, 1999(a), p. 204. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 10. There were, for example, 18 centuries allocated for knights, 100 centuries for 
first and second class wealth centuries, 70 centuries for third, fourth and fifth wealth centuries, and only 5 
centuries for all the rest, one of which included the mass of proletarii. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 10. 
Rome; as far as we know, there was no system for casting a vote outside the capi tal . ' " ' 
Citizens, therefore, still had to attend in person to make their vote count for the tribal result. 
The difficulty of poorer citizens in the countryside,'"^ where the army recruited most 
heavily, being able to afford the journey to Rome, or were occupied by other business such 
as gathering the harvest,'^^^ every time an assembly or a contio was called, meant that a 
small percentage of the overall citizen body actually participated. Only a small fraction was 
ever able to attend meetings to cast votes, and those who did attend were more likely to be 
able to afford to leave their holdings in the countryside.'^^"* Moreover, even though the 
people ratified treaties with foreign peoples, there is no record of embassies from peoples 
who were dissatisfied with treaties ever being brought to speak directly before the people; 
they had to send their embassies to persuade the senate. '"^ The senate, not the people, also 
controlled the dispatch of embassies to foreign powers with its terms, messages and 
decisions; the people arranged in their assemblies appeared not to be involved in this 
process, despite embodying the sovereign legitimacy to ratify or reject foreign treaties.'"® 
The power of ordinary citizens to influence the outcome of decisions on peace and war also 
appears to have been limited; on most occasions, the people simply ratified what the senate 
proposed in a senatus consultum.™^ 
1 argue that the reality of these limitations meant that the political system remained an 
inherently conservative institution that built into its structural processes a bias toward the 
interests of the governing elite.'^^^ It accommodated popular participation, most obviously 
manifested in the tribunate, and the citizen body did have a role in the state's polity. Much 
of the machinery of government, nevertheless, was designed to manage and limit the 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 11. 
Thus, Tiberius Gracchus was careful to make extra efforts to ensure his rural supporters caine into Rome 
in 133 BC to support his agrarian bill (App., BC 1.14). 
As occurred later when Tiberius Gracchus had to turn to urban supporters to help in his re-election 
because many of his rural partisans were occupied with the harvest and could not come to Rome (App., BC 
1.14). 
A conclusion supported by a consensus view: see Yakobson, 2010, p. 1; Lintott, 1999(a), p. 203; 
Rosenstein, 2012, p.l 1; De Ligt, 2012, p. 99. 
An example of this was the dispute between the contending Numidian princes Adherbal and Jugurtha, 
both of whom sent various entreating embassies to the senate to make their respective cases in the lead up to 
the war with Jugurtha in the last decade of the 2"'* century BC (Sal., lug. 13). 
For example, in 200 BC to Philip V (Plb. 16.34), and in 168 BC Antiochus IV (Plb. 29.27). 
As in Liv. 42.30 and Plb. 21.32. See Lintott for his analysis that the Roman people mostly accepted the 
principle of being led in peace and war by the governing elite: the aristocracy collectively possessed an 
authority which naturally encouraged deference (Lintott, 1999(a), p. 198). 
Yacobson, 2010, p. 7, 
effectiveness of that participation. Even in a contio, theoretically the forum of debate and 
disputation, a combination of cultural weight and procedural tools ensured it was dependent 
on elite speakers, subject to structural manipulation, and remained a hierarchical institution 
that strengthened the power and legitimacy of the policies of the governing elite. For 
ordinary citizens, this meant that the system was not truly representational, and not 
generally conducive to their interests; their capacity to manifest collective will against 
elitist opposition was not helped by a natural awe of the wealth, fame, social and religious 
privileges of the governing e l i t e . R o s e n s t e i n , for example, makes the point that 'soft 
persuasive power' wielded by the governing elite manifested itself as auctoritas,'^*° and 
when deployed by a personage with experience and standing in the community, was a 
powerful form of moral suasion very hard to r e s i s t . N a t u r a l l y , auctoritas could be used 
in partisan interests to advocate for or against legislation, and at trials, and if deployed 
collectively by a number of leading senators or magistrates, was virtually impregnable to 
overturning.'^'*^ All this added up to a system which - as a mechanism to address serious 
grievance or translate popular will into political, economic or social reform - was limited. 
Against this reality, I argue that it is reasonable to conclude that the army, with its public 
tradition of seditio for civic causes, and link to successful political reform, offered an 
alternative to political impotency for ordinary citizens, especially when frustration at 
intransigence or obstruction from members of the governing elite built up. Taking action 
collectively as members of the citizens-militia was a natural reaction to a system that 
marginalised and subordinated the interests of ordinary citizens to the governing elite. 
Lintott, 1999(a), p. 199. Yakobson, 2010, p. 1. 
In this sense, the term denotes much more than 'authority'; it implies more of advice so authoritative that 
it could not be easily ignored. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 15. 
The idea of social networks of patronage being used by the governing elite as an additional method for 
patrons to control their clients' political behavior was once fashionable (e.g. Scullard, 1973, pp. 12-25). This 
idea as a theory of political control in the voting machinery of the Republic, has been largely discredited in 
more recent scholarship, most comprehensively by Brunt (Brunt, 1988, pp. 382-442). The propensity of 
competition between aristocrats to distort patron-client social bonds, the eagerness of aristocrats to solicit 
votes from ordinary citizens, the relative impotency of individual voters in a system which recognised only 
the various group voting decisions, and voting reforms toward the end of the second century BC which made 
the vote of a client a much more private affair which could not be checked by patrons (i.e.; the 'secret ballot' 
laws of Lex Gabinia in 139 BC and Lex Cassia of 137 BC), made it likely that the patron-client relationship 
had minimal impact in the political arena as far as the ordinary citizen was concerned, especially by the end of 
the second century BC. See Rosenstein for a fuller discussion of this topic (Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 17 and 18). 
Conclusion 
I have shown that the army was always a politically-interested institution, willing on 
occasion to act decisively in its own interests for civic causes. The very act of violating the 
sacramentwn was a political statement, but the army's history of activism primarily 
manifested itself as insubordination and rebellion against the state. It could also appear as 
advocacy for preferred political candidates in Rome, and included stories of individuals 
with grievances appealing directly to the army as an ultimate source of legitimacy and 
authority. This history was well-known among generations of citizen-soldiers as an 
inherited tradition which linked army insubordination to successful political and social 
reform; it acted as a framework within which they could situate their own experience. The 
tradition of disobedience was encouraged by a political system which allowed participation 
for ordinary citizens, but had important limitations on their contribution, and was heavily 
weighted toward the governing elite. The army's insubordination for civic causes was a 
natural reaction in extremis to the limitations built into the Roman political system. This 
tradition would become a factor at Nola in 88 BC, when it intersected with other influences 
and circumstances acting on the motivations of Sulla's soldiers; it helped set the conditions 
in which Sulla could make his personal appeal to the army for justice.''''^ 
The next chapter will examine the pernicious rise of political violence in late republican 
politics and the decisive influence it had on the citizen-militia as a catalyst for direct 
intervention. This was a new, perhaps the most decisive, factor in the life of the Republic 
unknown to previous generations, which made itself felt in combination with other decisive 
factors at Nola in 88 BC. It meant Sulla could do what none of his ancestors could have 
done, and successfully call upon citizens formed in their legions to commit political 
violence on an unprecedented scale. 
" " Wha t the a r m y ' s inheri ted tradit ion of polit ical insubordinat ion meant practically for the quest ion of 
intervention at No la in 88 BC, and h o w it intersected with other factors, will be covered in Chapte r Eight 
be low. 
Chapter Seven 
The Decisive Influence of Violence on the Citizen-militia 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the army was always a politically-interested 
institution, willing on occasion to rebel against the governing elite for civic causes, and 
advocate preferred political candidates in its own self-interest. In this chapter, I turn to the 
pernicious rise of political violence in late Republican politics, and the decisive influence it 
had on the army as a catalyst for intervention. L. Cornelius Sulla's soldiers were not only 
highly effective against their enemies of the Social War; they also became something 
unprecedented: regular killers of Roman magistrates in a way no previous army had. By 88 
BC, the citizen-militia had learned to use and accept violence against traditional symbols of 
republican power and their office bearers. I will argue that this happened because of the rise 
of violence in the decades leading up to Nola as part of normative political expression in 
the conflict between the governing elite, a re-assertive tribunate, and their partisans. This 
evoked for soldiers the tradition of the revolutionary past of early-republican political and 
social reform, in which the army had played such a prominent role. Against this 
background, soldiers ingested the lessons that violence worked and, as political expression, 
had a kind of brutal legitimacy. 
I will show that the army learned these lessons on the streets of Rome. Soldiers were deeply 
involved in political violence well before 88 BC, both as protection and coercive muscle to 
underwrite political arguments of their benefactors, and in their own interests. It is also 
likely that elements of the citizen-militia were used formally to suppress factional violence 
in Rome. I will suggest that exposing citizen-soldiers to mob and large-scale factional 
violence made it easier for them to accept the idea of the army using force to influence 
politics when Sulla requested their help. This was a new - perhaps the most decisive -
factor in the life of the Republic, unknown to previous generations; Nola should thus be 
reinterpreted not as an unprecedented or revolutionary event, but as an inevitability that 
took to its logical conclusion the decades-long drift of the citizen-soldier into political 
violence. 
Genesis of Intervention: Politics, Violence and Transition 
To revisit an element of the question initially posed in Chapter One above, a key change in 
Roman political life in the intervening century between P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and 
the consulship of Sulla was the rise of endemic political violence in the physical 
confrontation between political enemies and their partisans to underwrite arguments, 
advance political agendas, and intimidate and destroy political opposition.'^'*'' Its emergence 
in the political discourse of the late Republic marked a seminal change in public life: 
political competition was different before - and irrevocably changed after - its 
appearance.'^"' This made possible the conditions under which the army could imagine 
itself intervening directly in Roman politics, and the rationale for doing so. The timing of 
the shift was obvious to Appian: he marked the change in political culture with the violent 
death of the reforming tribune, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, in 133 BC, and lamented that 
things had irrevocably changed from that point on.''"'' Others also used the turbulent 
tribunate of Ti. Gracchus as the watershed: Velleius Paterculus linked his death with the 
start of civil bloodshed,'^'" and M. Tullius Cicero wrote that his reform program split one 
people into two.''"*® I shall argue, however, that the change, if not the accompanying 
violence, came earlier: in 151 BC, the first signs appeared of a more confrontational 
attitude from the tribunes with the disruption of the levy, imprisonment of consuls, and 
defiance of senatorial will, indicating that the office of tribunus plebis was re-asserting 
something of its old revolutionary c h a r a c t e r , a n d that the relative concord'^'" in political 
" " Lintott argues violence was used to force measures through an assembly, to influence the outcomes of 
elections or trials and to intimidate or kill political opponents (Lintott, 1999(b), p. 204). 
On this change, see also Konrad, 2006, p. 170. 
App., BC 1.2. Lintott, too, in his influential study of violence in republican Rome, marks the change from 
peaceful dispute resolution to the period where violence was regularly used to 133 BC: "Before 133, most 
disputes ended in concord" (Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 1,6). 1 am not sure about Lintott's use of the descriptor 
'concord' , but it is true that large scale physical violence was largely absent; see discussion below. 
Veil. 2.3. 
Cic., TJep. 1.31. 
According to M. Cicero, the tribunus plebis was: 7 n seditione et ad seditionem nata' (Cic., Leg. 3.19). 
This is, of course, used as a relative term; as I will show, 'relative concord" in political discourse up until 
that point could still entail surprising amounts of dysfimction. hatred and disruptive competition, but without 
the use of large-scale violence. 
discourse, which had endured since the Second Punic war, had finally started to unravel.'^" 
I contend that the imprisonment of consuls by tribunes was itself a form of ritualised 
violence."" 
Important as these portents were of unraveling concord, however, it was not until the 
tribunate of Ti. Gracchus and his agrarian reform program that the physical emergence of 
large-scale violence as a normative part of republican political expression becomes 
impossible to ignore. Political competition in the late Republic, of course, did not always 
have to start or end with force. Q. Metellus Numidicus, implacable political enemy to 
Marius, left Rome for voluntary exile in the traditional w a y " " rather than provide a casus 
belli for his partisans opposing Marius;"^" so did L. Calpumius Bestia in 90 BC after 
political opponents threatened v i o l e n c e . B u t , by this time, examples of political rectitude 
are rare; it was more typical to arm supporters, adopt bodyguards and incite armed gangs to 
use force, intimidation and murder to overcome political opposition. Before 133 BC, 
however, or at least prior to 151 BC, endemic physical violence was absent from political 
discourse and competition for office. 
This is not to suggest that republican political discourse before 151 BC was conducted in a 
more genteel manner; as I will show, politics could be incredibly bitter, hatreds intense and 
competitive inimicitiae destructive to the collective interests of the state, even in times of 
war. The bitterness of the political attacks against P. Scipio in 187 BC, for example, 
became the epitome of state ingratitude."'' It made such an impression on public 
consciousness that officials twenty years on, according to Livy, invoked P. Scipio's 
treatment as an example of public shame to persuade citizens not to do the same to the 
conqueror of King Perseus, L. Aemilius Paullus, and to award him his triumph."" 
Moreover, isolated acts of violence which could be interpreted in a political context did 
" " T a y l o r , 1962, p. 19. 
Thus, this is a convenient date to use to divide the period where endemic violence was not a part of 
republican politics, and the period where it became a normative part of political expression. 
The use of exile as a means to escape political opponents or signal a withdrawal from political conflict 
had a long and distinguished history in Rome, and Metellus and others were following in a well-trod tradition 
(PIb.6.14). 
App., BC 1.31; Plut., Mar. 29. 
App., BC1.37 . 
See Chapter One above. 
Liv. 45.38: in 167 BC, soldiers, angry at the perceived stinginess of Aemilius, tried in the voting 
assemblies to deprive him of his triumph. 
occur during this period, and tiie threat of violence was always present as an undercurrent 
to political competition. Nevertheless, stalemate, compromise and concord, not large-scale 
butchery, were more often than not the results of the intense competitive process; 
contenders resorted to more ritualised and legalistic forms of violence, such as career 
sabotage, defamation, injunction, legal prosecution, or ex i le . ' ' ' ' 
Before 151 BC: Acts of Violence with Political Context 
In the private sphere, violence was a normative part of Roman life. As a ritualised form of 
self-help, there was a long tradition in jurisprudence of the principle of violence as a 
remedy to private grievance and self-defence.'^'" C. Marius, for example, acquitted and 
praised a soldier who killed a tribunus militum in self-defence when he attempted to 
indecently assault him;'^''' the soldier acted within accepted norms of behavior and there 
was no need for a civil trial. Moreover, statutes'^'^ accepted citizens killing thieves who 
came by night or used weapons,"'^ and the law allowed male adulterers or rapists to be 
punished by death or castration by the family of the victim. 
Aggression in private disputes was not political violence, but there were before 151 BC 
isolated acts of aggression and coercion which had a political context, and indicate that 
boundaries were not absolute. In 439 BC, as I have noted in Chapter Six above, an 
impetuous youth, C. Servilius Ahala, murdered a wealthy knight, Sp. Maelius, with 
pretensions for kingship, according to Roman cultural m e m o r y . T h i s was arguably an 
act of political violence that may have been orchestrated by the state; in a variation of the 
tradition, C. Servilius acted on behalf of the governing elite as Master of Horse to the 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 1. 
Flower argues convincingly that the very basis of republican political culture, which civil war 
subsequently threatened, was built upon the settlement of disputes by legal means in jury courts, through 
mediation and debate, and helped by mechanisms and public rituals of voting. This characterised orderly civic 
life which had been built up over generations of negotiation and compromise between patricians and 
plebeians (Flower, 2010(a), p. 74). 
For an excellent survey of this type of private violence, see Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 4 ff. 
Plut., Mar. 14; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 23. 
1 refer here to Rome's basic law code, the Twelve Tables, first promulgated in the fifth century BC 
(Rosenstein, 2012, p. 14; Alexander, 2006, pp. 236-255; Martin, 2012, p. 53). 
Tab. 8.12; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 24. 
V.Max.. 6.1. 
Liv. 4.13; 14; D.H. 12.1-4; Cic., Cato 56; Zon. 7.20. See also Chapter Six above. 
Dictator. If this was the case, Servilius' act was an isolated event; assassination for 
political purposes remained rare until 133 BC. Regardless of Servilius' true status, the story 
was contextualised through an overt political prism. Lowrie, in his analysis of the link 
between homo sacer and dictatorship, argues that the killing of Maelius preserved a 
tradition of the circumstances under which the state could justifiably kill one of its own 
citizens."®' In Livy's version, there is a state of emergency, a dictator appointed, and 
Servilius acted as an instrument of state within the constitutional framework of the dictator, 
which allowed the setting aside of normal protections in the specific circumstances where 
the state was threatened. The dictator then justified Maelius' death to the people in terms of 
the law; Maelius was killed lawfully because he disobeyed a dictator's summons and, 
fiirthermore, he had plotted to take over the state, abrogating the normal legal protections 
afforded to citizens. 
The benefit of preserving this specific emphasis was obvious: it could suit the state to be 
able to justify the killing of its own citizens within a constitutional framework, while 
placing victims outside legal protections."'' I argue, however, that it was also useful for the 
state if its own citizens were sufficiently civic-minded to act independently to protect it."™ 
Servilius' example, the spontaneous action of a private citizen acting to rid the Republic of 
a potential tyrant, was equally valid."" That was how cultural memory could also preserve 
it; the moral tradition evoked was that anyone who acquired tyrannical ambitions should be 
killed spontaneously by patriotic citizens in the national interest, magistrate or not."'^ It is 
plausible to think that P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio acted in this tradition by 
1366 ji^g^g versions: in one scenario related by Livy, Dionysius, and Cicero, Servilius acted in an 
official capacity as magister equitum to the consul, while in the other version (Zonaras), he was not a 
magistrate, but a citizen acting on his own initiative for the good of the Republic. Lintott favours the latter 
view, and 1 am inclined to agree (Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 56 and 57). 
" " Lowrie, 2010. pp. 172 and 173. 
Liv. 4.15. Lowrie, 2010, p. 176. 
For example, it was useful for Augustan ideology to have Livy's Maelius story emphasise the aspect that 
the state could liberate itself from internal threat through a state of exception, and could act through legal and 
constitutional means, while its opponents could be placed outside legal protections. See Lowrie for more on 
the specific link between this story and the purposes of Augustan state (LowTie, 2010, pp. 181 and 182). 
This is, I contend, exactly the wish of the senators in 385 BC when they lament that another Ahala was 
needed when they were trying to work out what to do about M. Manlius Capitolinus and his turbulent popular 
movement (Liv. 6. 12). 
Given the apparent spontaneity of the act, its rareness, and the fact that it was how the cultural memory 
preserved the tradition. But 1 acknowledge that it remains unclear exactly what motivated Ahala. and both 
versions serve cultural memory equally well. 
See the discussion in Chapter Six above regarding the physical evidence of Maelius's sedition preserved 
in Rome, and what that meant for Romans of later generations. 
spontaneously invoking the defence of the Republic when he led a mob which attacked and 
killed Ti. Gracchus and his followers in 133 BC; he was not killed under a state of 
emergency, nor had a dictator been appointed.'"' In this respect, the statement of P. 
Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus was instructive: asked publicly in Rome by a 
tribune if Ti. Gracchus' death was justified, Aemilianus said it was, if he had been aiming 
for k i n g s h i p . I n both versions, however, the message was the same: those who 
threatened the Republic could be, in extremis, justifiably killed. Although his act was 
political in nature, nevertheless, it was not the signature of endemic violence in political 
discourse. Moreover, Lintott cites the stoning of a quaestor and tribune in 414 BC during an 
army mutiny'''^ to point to the tradition of ordinary citizens resorting to public violence to 
defend fellow citizens from the arbitrary power of magistrates'"' - in this case, from 
punishment ordered by the consul, P. Postumius Albinus Regillensis, attempting to 
suppress the mutiny. Lintott is right to draw attention to the popular nature of this act; it 
involved ordinary citizens serving in the army. It was not, however, the signature of 
endemic political violence, nor was it public; it occurred in camp away from Rome. It was 
also an aberration; there was not another known instance of soldiers killing their 
commander until Sulla's troops stoned Albinus' descendent to death in 89 B C . ' " ' At most, 
these examples hint at the latent aggression always present in republican power dynamics, 
and that citizens and soldiers could, on occasion, act spontaneously from isolated private or 
civic impulse. 
Political discord in 385 BC, however, was said to have threatened an outbreak of large-
scale violence, even if it did not eventuate in reality. Against a background of social unrest 
caused by lack of economic reform, according to the literary tradition, a schism occurred 
over debt relief between the governing elite and ordinary citizens under the leadership of 
" " App., BC 1.16; Plut., re 20. Appian here in fact states that he was amazed that neither a state of 
emergency, nor a dictator, was called during the unrest caused by Ti. Gracchus' tribunate; it had proved 
useful in the past on such occasions. In any case, it is important to note that Nasica acted only after the consul 
rejected his entreaties to suppress Ti. Gracchus and his followers; there is spontaneity in this type of response 
which emulated the version of Servilius acting alone. In this case, and within the preserved tradition, a private 
citizen was then justified in acting with deadly force in the national interest to protect the Republic. 
' " "P lu t . , re21. 
Liv. 4.50. For more information on this incident, see Chapter Six above. 1 used it there as an example of 
the army mutinying for civic causes. 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 7. 
" " V.Max.. 9.8; Plut., Sull. 6; Oros. 5.18. 
patrician tumed-'demagogue', ' '^^ M. Manlius Capitolinus. Lintott argues that there may 
have been fighting,'^" but there is no evidence for this: it was settled instead by united 
tribunate and senatorial resolve, in the courts, and by popular vote in assembly. The literary 
tradition preserves an apparently serious incident: the senate declared a state of 
e m e r g e n c y , a p p o i n t e d a dictator, A. Cornelius Cossus, and summoned him to Rome to 
deal with the unrest.' '^' Personal violence was contemplated, at least informally; tribunes 
and senators mused that another 'Ahala' was n e e d e d . I n s t e a d , ritualised, state-
sanctioned forms of violence were used to resolve the crisis; there was no fighting,'^®' 
Manlius was incarcerated and, by popular vote in the comitia centuriata,^^** executed for 
t r e a s o n . " ^ ^ 
Prior to 151 BC, there were two other instances of actual violence during public assemblies 
with a political context: in 212 BC, tax farmers used force to prevent a vote during the trial 
of M. Postumius Pyrgensis in the comitia tribula,'^^'' and in 185 BC, a fight broke out 
during the consular elections in the comitia centuriata between the supporters of candidate, 
P. Claudius Pulcher, his consul brother, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, and their opponents.'^*' In 
the first case, Postumius faced judgment over a crime;"^^ he defrauded the state by 
Livy's term; the first instance, he says, of a patrician turning demagogue and throwing his lot in with the 
plebeians (Liv. 6.11). 
intott, 1999(b), p. 56. Lintott argues that the fact that the dictator settled the unrest may suggest there was 
a violent rebellion that was settled by force. In the absence of any evidence to this support this, and because of 
Lintott's failure to go into detail for his reasoning, 1 remain unconvinced. 
It is reasonable to think that the fact that a large-scale enemy attack on Roman territory occurred at the 
same time probably helped encourage the senate to declare the state of emergency. Cossus was recalled from 
his army after defeating the invasion (Liv. 6.12). 
Liv. 6.11.ff;Plut., Cam.36. 
This is an example of the literary tradition preserving a cultural memory being used to frame a crisis: it 
alluded to the tradition of C. Servilius Ahala (outlined above), who spontaneously murdered a would-be tyrant 
in 439 BC. In Livy's account of this memory, the senate and tribunes wish that a citizen would take matters 
into his own hands and kill Manlius in the national interest, saving them the trouble of having to resolve the 
matter. 
Livy tells us that the people had too much respect for the office of dictator to resist his imprisonment of 
Manlius, and tribunes too much common cause with the senate to exercise their ancient right of veto (Liv. 
6.16). 
Citizens arranged in their centuries in this assembly had the judicial role of trying capital charges, such as 
treason. The fact that Manlius was found guilty by the assembly, and that the tribunes sided with the senate, 
could suggest that Manlius' sedition was isolated and not widespread (North, 2006, p. 261). 
Liv. 6.20. 
Liv. 25.3. See also Lintott, 1999(b), p. 209. 
Liv. 39.32. 
The senate disapproved of Postumius' fraud but was reluctant to act against him because of the 
seriousness of the war against Hannibal that was being fought at that time. It was left to the tribunes, 
reflecting public outrage at the scale of the fraud, to prosecute Postumius. (Liv. 15.3.) 
falsifying insurance claims on ships supplying Roman a r m i e s . T h e assembly was 
suspended on the advice of a consul after tax farmers fought with members of the public; at 
its heart, this was a criminal matter, but the senate chose to interpret it as violence against 
the state because a formal assembly of the people had been illegally disrupted from 
discharging its d u t i e s . I n this respect, it was violence leading to a punitive political 
response from the state;'^" Postumius and his supporters were charged with sedition, and 
many chose exile rather than face prison or execution. 
In the second instance, Lintott argues that Ap. Pulcher resorted to vis Claudiana to get his 
brother elected; they used clients to beat up the opposition.'"^ If this were so, then it was 
an example of premeditated political violence in the style of the Gracchi. But my reading of 
the incident suggests there was more spontaneity involved; things may have just got out of 
hand. Ap. Pulcher, by actively canvassing for his brother, was not acting as a senior 
magistrate should,'^' ' but he was zealous in his efforts, and over-reacted, eliciting a 
response from opposition supporters. The competition in 185 BC was particularly close: 
there were four candidates for one patrician position, and this no doubt led to a high level of 
tension on election day. If Ap. Pulcher had acted in a truly subversive way, the tribunes 
could have been expected to react; neither they nor the senate objected to the election of P. 
Pulcher, and the results s t o o d . I argue that this was not a genuine case of political 
violence; rather, a scuffle between citizens that, in the tense atmosphere, rapidly escalated 
The state insured ships and cargoes of merchants supplying the army against loss when in public service 
(Liv. 15.3). This provided an opportunity for unscrupulous men to claim fictitious losses and receive state 
recompense. Postumius' case was a particular egregious example of this type of fraud; the scale of his crime 
was large enough to be discussed in the senate. 
Liv. 15.4; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 209. 
The state may well have over-reacted to what was essentially a criminal matter. But I contend that their 
reaction is understandable, given the strategic context within which they were operating at that time. Rome 
and her allies were in the middle of a serious war with the Carthaginians, the outcome of which was far from 
certain. The last thing the Republic needed was trouble with its logistic arrangements supplying the 23 legions 
then in service scattered throughout Italy, Sicily and Spain. A strong response was needed to re-establish the 
inviolability of state institutions, quickly suppress the unrest with the merchants supplying the armies, limit 
the bleeding of scarce state resources they could ill afford, and send a clear message to the merchant sector 
that fraud and unruly behaviour would not be tolerated. In this context, 1 argue, a political response was not 
only justifiable, but necessary. 
Lintott, 1999(b), p,74. 
Livy, in his account of the affair, asks why Appius should not be acting as an umpire in the elections or as 
a silent witness, rather than actively canvassing for his brother (Liv. 39.32). Vishnia interprets this incident as 
flagrant disobedience from Appius to senatorial will that he refrain from canvassing for his brother, a wish he 
pointedly ignored (Vishnia, 1996, p. 183). This was probably accurate; the senate was not pleased by the 
commotion. In the end, however, it did not seem to hurt Appius' career: he was appointed to head a 
delegation to Greece soon after he stepped down. 
Liv. 39.32. 
before subsiding as quickly as it had started. In the end, the contest was conducted with 
moderate partisanship, not Claudian violence. 
These acts of violence, or threats of violence, all have a political context, but they do not 
indicate a culture of endemic violence at work in political discourse prior to 151 BC. Where 
they can be said to have a clear political result, such as Servilius' murder of Maelius, I 
argue that they are isolated and rare events, and would not be repeated until after 151 
BC, '^ ' ' when violence did become an undisputed part of political discourse. They are, 
however, symptomatic of the inherent volatility and instability of the republican political 
process; they indicate its latent capacity to generate discord. Even without endemic 
violence, however, relations between individual competing magistrates, the senate, and 
governing elite and ordinary citizens were often turbulent and dysfunctional. 
Before 151 BC: Competition, Dvsfunction and Insubordination 
Rosenstein argues that the Roman governing elite enjoyed a remarkable period of stability 
over the course of the third and second centuries BC, despite intense competition.'^'® He 
contends that the outbreak of civil war in the late Republic should not obscure the ability of 
the senatorial class to contend vigoursly without it degenerating into self-destructive 
partisan strife. Raaflaub speaks of the period in terms of unity and "exceptional cohesion" 
which helped control the constant competition for the highest ranks and offices. '^ ' ' The 
Romans themselves, when they reflected on their political ideals, supposed early republican 
political discourse free from inimicitiaeP'^^ Even without the added dynamic of endemic 
political violence, however, this is far too sanguine a view of the way politics, competition 
for office, and relations between the classes manifested itself prior to 151 BC. I will show 
that the opposite was frequently true. 
In particular, after 134 BC when endemic violence breaks out in political discourse. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 241. Flower also remarks that there do not appear to have been any civil wars in the 
mid-Republic, a fact that every student of Roman history has been taught (Flower, 2010(a), p. 74). Flower is 
right in this, but she does not acknowledge the level of dysfunctional competition that operated in the political 
space as a normative standard below the threshold of civil war; this is an oversight, as 1 shall show below. 
" Raaflaub, 2006, p. 141. He remarks that the community as a whole developed a remarkable ability to 
forge compromises and emerge from conflict stronger and more unified. As I will show, the result of serious 
conflict was just as often destructive as it was unifying. 
Sallust, for example, thought his forefathers had fought, quarreled and feuded with external enemies, but 
internally, vied with each other to be virtuous (Sal., Cat. 9). See also Epstein, 1987, p. 14. 
Republican politics had always been intensely and intrinsically competitive; '^" the 
outcome of this competition could be dysfunctional and destructive. Passionate hatreds, 
frequent discord, and disruptive jealousies pervaded republican political culture, as bitter as 
anything seen in the late Republican political context, when it is supposed, from the 
accounts of Appian, Sallust and others, that political competition set a new standard for 
acrimony and discord.''""' Polybius even wrote that dissensions within the oligarchy during 
this period made it difficult to ascertain what really happened in accounts of events.''"" The 
reason for it was clear: most aristocratic and wealthy Romans aspired to consular status, 
and this could be achieved in the republican system of power only by ruthless competition 
and eliminating peers.''"'^ Rosenstein points out that, unlike traditional aristocracies that 
existed in Europe, Rome's highest honours were not automatic; even if family background 
and illustrious ancestors helped,'""^ the governing elite defined itself not by birth or 
inherited position, but by achievement, and that meant unremitting rivalry."""' In this 
environment, the political process inevitably generated much inimicitiae}*"^ 
Inimicitia could manifest itself competitively in many ways; the results introduced a 
surprising level of dysfunction into government, and were often ruinous for its smooth 
functioning, even in times of war.'""^ Inimicitiae between individual magistrates who 
refused to cooperate, for example, sabotaged war efforts. The tendency of Roman 
commanders to subordinate national interests to their own passions was so well known that 
enemies tried to take advantage of it.'"*"' Hannibal in 217 BC exploited the enmity between 
Q. Fabius Maximus and his impetuous Master of Horse, M. Minucius Rutus, by devising a 
battle plan that provoked Minucius to attack, and counted on the two men not cooperating; 
" " Epstein, 1987, p. 50 and Rosenstein, 2006, p. 371. 
For example, at App., BC 1.2; Sal., Cat. 10. 
""" Plb. 18.35. 
""-Epste in , 1987, p. 12. 
This was particularly evident during the public funerary processions of wealthy or noble families (Plb. 
6.53 ff; see also Chapter Six above). In the end, however, what mattered in terms of a successful public 
career, was the achievements and performance - also in the present - of the individual (Rosenstein, 2012, p. 
34). 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 30. For P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus' lament to Polybius about the unremittmg 
pressure to compete and succeed, see Plb. 31.23. 
Epstein, 1987, p. 63. 
Epstein, 1987, pp. 15 and 16. 
""" Epstein, 1987, p. 71: Epstein, in his analysis of the manifestations of inimiciliae here, cites the parallel of 
Spartacus trying to profit from the animosity between Pompey and Crassus. 
it led to near disaster.'""^ The presence of an enemy, however, was not necessarily needed 
to damage a Roman army. In 141 BC, Q. Pompeius was selected to replace his bitter 
enemy, Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, in Spain. When Metellus heard this, he made 
sure his political enemy would have trouble winning military glory; he sabotaged the 
Roman war effort in Spain by doing his best to ruin the fighting capacity of the army.'""' 
Metellus discharged all soldiers who wanted their service terminated, stripping the army of 
its most experienced and capable veterans. He granted leave for all who wanted it, without 
checking if it was valid or agreeing times of return, removed guards of storehouses (making 
them easy targets for looters), ordered the bows and arrows of the Cretan archers within the 
army broken and thrown into the river, and stopped feeding the elephants, trying to kill 
them.'" '" 
Competition for military glory between magistrates could also produce dysfijnctional 
relationships. Consul in 177 BC, C. Claudius Pulcher, rushed to his province of Istria 
without conducting the formalities required of a departing commander in Rome because he 
was afraid the proconsuls there would deprive him of victory and of the chance to use the 
army.''*" Resenting their victories, he ordered them out of the province; they refused, 
arguing he was not properly appointed due to his irregular departure from Rome. He then 
tried unsuccessfijlly to convince the army to arrest the proconsuls; their stubbornness forced 
Claudius to return to Rome to complete the formalities, where he bitterly denounced the 
proconsuls, and raised a new army to take with him.''"^ Furthermore, enemies in Rome 
could attempt to relieve commanders during the middle of a war. During the Second Punic 
war in 209 BC, enmity motivated tribune, C. Publicius Bibulus, to introduce a bill 
" " ' P l b . 3.104. 
V.Max. 9.3.7. 
""" Epstein catalogues a number of these feuds; in the case of Metellus and Pompeius in 141 BC, he made the 
point that Metellus suffered diminished glory for his petty actions, and did not triumph - no doubt partly 
because of his disgraceful actions prior to his handing over of the army to Pompeius (Epstein, 1987, p. 16). In 
my view, the decision ot to award a triumph to Metellus was well justified: he placed his own jealousies far 
above the interests of the state. 
M. Junius Brutus and A. Manlius Vulso (Liv. 40.59). Both had been consuls in 178 BC, and had won 
victories over the Histrians. See Epstein for a full account of the many and varied causes of inimicitiae in 
private and public life (Epstein, 1987, pp. 50-63). 
abrogating the command of M. Claudius Marcellus,""' and Fabius tried to have P. Scipio 
removed from his command during the same war.''"'* 
Moreover, the constitutional right to declare war was vested in the comitia centuriata;''"^ 
that did not stop C. Cassius Longinus, consul of 171 BC, from stepping outside normal 
conventions and trying on his own initiative to invade a foreign state with which Rome may 
technically still have been at p e a c e . H e appears to have embarked on a private war with 
Macedon, left his allocated province of Gaul without permission, trespassed on his 
colleague's province and, in doing so, left north-eastern Italy exposed.''"^ He tried to reach 
Macedon by marching through lllyricum, all without authority from the senate or the 
assembly. Vishnia characterises this act as a grave infraction, and argues Longinus' 
lackluster military achievements motivated the harebrained scheme.''"^ Vishnia's epithet 
seems appropriate. Longinus' actions were potentially very serious; a senior magistrate of 
the Roman state planned a war on one of the most powerful states of the ancient world 
without any direction, authority or knowledge of the state. If this is what Cassius did, then I 
suggest that such a move is analogous to the US commander in Afghanistan unilaterally 
deciding to use the army to invade Russia without Washington's knowledge or authority. 
Longinus compounded his infraction by trespassing on the province of his colleague; this 
sort of 'province grabbing' ninety years later would, in another context, play a major part in 
producing the spark which ignited the war between Marius and Sulla.""' The senate was at 
first dumbfounded then outraged, when it discovered what Longinus was doing; it moved 
to swiftly reassert its authority to determine the limits of individual ambition.'"^® Longinus 
was severely criticised for entering his colleague's province without permission, exposing 
Liv. 27.20; Plut., Marc. 27. He was unsuccessful; Marcellus defended himself so well that he was 
subsequently elected to his fifth consulship. 
""" Liv. 29.19; Plut., Fab.Max. 26. 
PIb. 6.14; North, 2006, p. 261. This assembly was guided by consular and senatorial advice in this task. 
It is true that the third war with Macedon began in 171 BC; but it is not clear if Cassius acted in 171 BC 
before the official declaration of war or after it. Why did the senate remind him strongly that he could not 
initiate a war unless the senate had decided on war (Liv. 43.1)? This suggests thast Cassius acted before the 
technical outbreak of war, yet it seems ft-om the flow of Livy's narrative that fighting had already begun with 
Macedon. It remains unlear; either way, Cassius acted beyond his responsibilities and this amazed and 
enraged the other senaters, who moved quickly to stop him. 
" " L i v . 43.1. 
Vishnia, 1996, pp. 187 and 188. 
" " A p p . , B C 1 . 5 6 , 5 7 . 
It found out what he was doing only when an embassy fi-om Aquileia, worried by the reaction of 
surrounding peoples to Longinus' expedition, arrived and complained that their colony was new and weak 
and had not yet been sufficiently fortified. 
Italy and his soldiers to unnecessary danger - and envoys were sent to remind him that he 
must not engage in war unless it had first been authorised.'"^' 
Conflict between the senate and other magistrates also generated discord; it was ubiquitous 
enough to suggest that politics after 151 BC had no monopoly on unconstitutional, 
unconventional or insubordinate behaviour. A serious and prolonged dispute, for example, 
paralysed the Republic in 173 BC. M. Popillius Laenas, the same praetor who defied the 
senate in 176 BC,'"^^ again refused its orders; this time to restore liberty and property to the 
Statelliates of Liguria when they complained about the severity of Popillius' treatment after 
their unconditional surrender to his legions.'"^' It was a remarkable example of discord. 
Decrees were passed condemning his actions; Popillius in turn responded by strongly 
criticising the senate in person, fining the praetor who first raised the i s s u e , a n d 
returning to Liguria to persist in his policies, ignoring the senate. The senate, beyond using 
peer censure, was powerless to force him to comply, but worse friction and turbulence 
followed. His brother, C. Popillius Laenas, was elected consul in 172 BC, and prevented 
the senate from re-introducing a new senatorial decree restoring the Statelliates.'"^^ The 
senate, in retaliation, refused to authorise the annual levy to raise new legions; the consuls 
refused to conduct any state business or leave for their provinces. 
North argues that this produced constitutional deadlock;'"'^ Vishnia says it is unclear if 
constitutional, personal or factional rivalries were ultimately responsible.'''^' It was clear, 
however, that the smooth functioning of the Republic was paralysed. 1 suggest that not only 
did it indicate the level of turbulence to which republican political discourse could descend 
This was the same Longinus who by dubious means tried to have a fellow consul disqualified from being 
allocated Macedon (see Liv.42.32). He really wanted to get to Macedon. There was no war involving 
Longinus and Macedon that year. The other consul, Licinius was campaigning in Greece at the time, so 
presumably the envoys succeeded in their task. As for Longinus, he apparently got himself elected as a 
tribune of the soldiers immediately after his consulship and continued to serve abroad in an attempt to avoid 
returning to Rome to answer for his actions the year before. We last see him being positioned to be prosecuted 
in the courts as a private citizen by those who had suffered at the hands of his armies during his attempt to 
march to Macedon; and this is probably what happened (Liv. 43.5). 
See accompanying table below. 
Liv. 42.8. 
Liv. 42.9. 
This was necessary because Popilius, who had refused to enact the decree in the first instance, was no 
longer consul. After 173 BC, he is a proconsul, and it is in this office that he continues the aggression against 
the Ligurians in defiance of the senate. Standing procedure meant that the senatorial decree needed to be re-
introduced by one of the new consuls. 
'"-"North, 2006, p. 271. 
Vishnia, 1996, p. 190. 
without violence, but it demonstrated the senate's structural weakness in effectively 
responding to real insubordination from a determined source. It took the intervention of the 
tribunes on the senate's side, for example, to break the deadlock: they threatened to fine 
magistrates who refused to do their duty, and established a special procedure to try 
Popillius. He was afraid to return to Rome to answer for his disobedience; under the threat 
of trial in absentia, however, Popillius did what Sulla and Caesar refused to do, and 
o b e y e d . ' ^ ^ ^ 
The temptation for senior magistrates posted far from Rome to behave in this manner was 
explicable; imperium gave them enormous latitude and p o w e r , i n i m i c i t i a e the passion to 
dissent, and distance the freedom to follow their own convictions.'"^" What is more 
surprising, however, is that insubordination against senatorial will was not confined to 
senior magistrates; it also occurred frequently among magistrates with lesser imperium: 
praetors and aediles. Of six instances of insubordination and conflict between the senate 
and individual magistrates between 200 BC-151 BC surveyed below, four involved 
relatively junior praetors, and one a curule aedile: 
Indicative Survey of Conflict between Magistrates and Senate 
200 B C - 1 5 1 BC 
Date Magistrate Details Source 
200 BC Praetor L. Furius 
Purpurio 
Purpurio used a consular army without permission 
to defeat a Gallic army, left his province without 
permission and returned to Rome to demand a 
triumph. The senate reprimanded him for his 
unprecedented conduct, but supporters in the senate 
argued for, and won, a limited triumph for him.'"^' 
Liv. 31.10 
D.C., Frg. 57 
190 BC Propraetor M. Lepidus left his allocated province without Liv. 37.47 
Liv. 42.22. It is not clear what happened to Laenas, the instigator of so much trouble in this fascinating 
incident. He was arraigned before the senate and verbally assailed by colleagues for his actions, and the senate 
got its way regarding the release of the Statelliates and restoration of their property. Laenas is last mentioned 
as a defendant being ordered to appear before the magistrates on the fifteenth of March; I assume he was, by 
the custom, prosecuted in the courts as a private citizen. 
" '^ 'P lb .6 .12 . 
Plb. 6.12; Vishnia, 1996, p. 181. 
Vishnia emphasises the senate debate that subsequently occurred to discuss Purpurio's insubordination. 
She argues convincingly that Purpurio had strong support in the senate, and that the case was evidence of a 
'generation gap' present at the end of the Second Punic War: the older 'Fabian' generation reprimanded him 
and was against a triumph; the younger 'Scipionic' senators supported him and argued for a triumph. 
Evidently, a compromise was reached: he triumphed, but without soldiers, spoils or captives (Vishnia, 1996, 
p. 182). 
Aemilius Lepidus senatorial permission to compete in the consular 
elections of 189 BC. Amid great anger, his 
candidacy was accepted, but he lost. 
184 BC Curule aedile Q. 
Fulvius Flaccus 
Flaccus refused to obey a senatorial and consular 
order not to apply for the urban praetorship left 
vacant after the death of C. Decimius. His 
intransigence, with considerable popular support, 
turned into a bitter debate and conflict between the 
senate, consul, tribunes and Flaccus, with Flaccus 
arguing that the senate and consul were trying to 
deprive him of the gift of the people. A stalemate 
occurred; the solution was for the consul to suspend 
the election of the office for that year. 
Liv. 39.39 
176 BC Praetors M. Popillius 
Laenas, P. Licinius 
Crassus, and M. 
Cornelius Scipio 
Maluginensis 
Three praetors, in an unprecedented manner, 
refused to leave for their designated provinces: 
Laenas argued he could not go to Sardinia because 
his predecessor was about to conclude the war 
there, and it would be unwise to transfer command 
at that point. The senate eventually agreed. Crassus 
refused to leave for Spain because he had 
obligations in Rome on certain dates which 
prevented his leaving; the senate ordered him to 
swear before the people's assemblies that he could 
not go; he did and was excused. Scipio, when he 
heard Crassus do this, also refused to go to Spain, 
and asked to do the same thing. He was excused.'"'^ 
Liv. 41.14,15 
178 BC Consul A. Manlius 
Vulso 
Vulso, without authorisation from either the senate 
or the comitia centuriata, invaded Istria and 
conducted a war against the lllyrians; his actions 
prompted a harsh response from the senate and 
several tribunes, who wanted to know on what 
authority he had waged war. His imperium was, 
however, prorogued when a friendly tribune 
intervened and ensured its success. 
Liv. 41.1 
Liv. 41.6 
167 BC Praetor M. luventius 
Thalna 
In blatant contravention of traditional process, and 
without consulting the senate or the consuls, Thalna 
appealed directly to citizens in assembly to declare 
war on Rhodes; he hoped the command of the war 
would fall to him. Two tribunes, however, 
interceded; they argued inciting the people to war 
without consultation set a dangerous precedent, and 
abrogated the traditional advisory role of the senate. 
His motion was defeated.'""' 
Liv. 45.21 
This is one of the few times magistrates refused to depart for their provinces. As Vishnia points out, there 
must be much more to this story (Vishnia, 1996, pp. 186 and 187); the reasons given are unconvincing. 
Vishnia concludes that the actual reasons must remain shrouded in mystery, but I suspect that the lack of 
opportunity for booty or military glory had something to do with it. Spain was always a notoriously difficult 
province to campaign in; there was little opportunity for booty and the inhabitants were fierce fighters. I 
contend that the two praetors allocated Spain probably realized their opportunity for plunder and glory was 
limited. In the case of Sardinia, the praetor allocated this province probably calculated that his predecessor 
had almost finished the war there, and there would have been little for him to do except mop up. The 
economic consideration no doubt influenced the decisions of these praetors. Nevertheless, it was an 
exceedingly bold thing to do to defy the senate and refuse to leave. It is worth noting that Laenas would have 
another serious argument with the senate several years on when he was made consul; as praetor, his obstinacy 
was on display relatively early in his career. 
Vishnia points out that the tribunes themselves were breaking protocol by intervening before arguments 
for the motion could be heard (Vishnia, 1996, p. 188). Irregular events often require irregular remedies. 
These examples demonstrate that under pressure to compete, perform and win glory, many 
magistrates, even junior ones, were willing to exceed their authority, defy the senate, and 
place their own interests above those of the state. Insubordination was clearly endemic, 
reflecting the turbulent nature of republican politics prior to 151 BC. 
Conflict, however, was not confined to the governing elite, or between the senate collective 
and individual magistrates; discord was also present before 151 BC between ordinary 
citizens and their advocates, and the governing elite. In 232 BC, for example, there was 
serious friction between the tribunate and the senate; apart from the absence of large-scale 
violence, it shared similarities with the turbulence caused a century later by the agrarian bill 
of Ti. Gracchus, and evoked memories of the earlier Conflict of the Orders. The tribune, C. 
Flaminius, carried against senatorial opposition an agrarian law under which a large 
number of Roman citizens'"'^ were settled on land captured from the Senones on the 
Adriatic coast ."" ' The governing elite were so serious in their opposition to Flaminius' bill 
that they threatened violence, and considered levying an army to stop him;'"^^ he was hated 
for this, and for another tribunate bill he alone among the governing elite supported, 
limiting the size of cargo ships owned by senators or their sons.''*'^ In the absence of any 
detail concerning his proposal or the nature of the senate's objections,'""' Flaminius' 
actions, and his dispute with the governing elite, have nevertheless invited inevitable 
comparisons with the reform program of Ti. Gracchus. He was portrayed as a democratic 
leader agitating to alleviate the economic hardship of ordinary citizens, and a champion of 
the rural plebeians, re-connecting them with the land.''^'^" Whatever his motivations, 
Flaminius' actions endeared him to ordinary citizens; he secured the favour of plebeians, 
and probably obtained a second consulship because of it.""" The senate's resistance may 
have been anchored more in strategic concerns than opposition to a social program which 
however, and the conflict this generated, and the precedent it potentially set for the authority of the senate and 
the consuls, probably warranted the unorthodox intervention in the minds of the tribunes. 
" " Vishnia, 1996, pp. 188 and 189. 
Up to 19 000 immigrants may have been involved according to Vishnia (Vishnia, 1996. p. 20). 
Plb. 2.21; V.Max. 5.4; Liv. 21.63. 
V.Max. 4.5. 
Liv. 21. 63. 
This detail is missing from the sources: it is only clear that the law passed and that it caused much 
consternation and hatred among the governing elite so that it followed Flaminius' disastrous career into the 
Second Punic War (Liv. 22.3). 
For example, Jacobs, 1937, p. 141 and Vishnia, 1996, p. 35. For a detailed survey of the range of views, 
most now dated, see Vishnia's comprehensive summary (Vishnia, 1996, pp. 25-37). 
Liv. 21.63. 
alleviated economic hardship among the poor; in Polybius' judgment, Flaminius' policy of 
settlement of the ager Gallicm Picenus subsequently caused a war with the G a u l s . T h i s , 
combined with public defiance of the senate, would have been enough to attract the enmity 
of most of the governing e l i t e , a n d make compromise and cooperation in the national 
interest difficult. 
Lintott called Flaminius' actions in 232 BC seditio:^*'^ * the fact that the senate considered -
but discounted - using the army against him suggested the argument was indeed serious. 
But Lintott's term goes too far. In defying the senate in 232 BC, the animosity and 
turbulence generated by Flaminius' agrarian program are perhaps surprising in an era when 
there was supposed to be comparative harmony between the governing elite and ordinary 
citizens.'""^ I argue that Flaminius acted within the tradition of the tribunate agitating for 
the interests of ordinary citizens, not as a revolutionary transcending the bounds of political 
culture. In 223 BC, however, during his first consulship, Flaminius was undeniably 
disobedient and overtly provocative. He refused a senatorial decree abrogating his 
consulship and summoning him to Rome,'"*^^ won a victory anyway against the Insubrian 
Gauls, and obtained permission to triumph by a direct appeal to the people, rather than from 
the senate according to custom - a triumph which it had already refused.'"'" Flaminius's 
appeal to the people emulated the example set more than a century before by P. Servilius 
Plb. 2. 21. According to Polybius, they saw the settlement program as evidence that the Romans were 
intent on total expulsion and extermination of the Gauls. Vishnia postulates that at the heart of the dispute was 
not the allocation of public land to Roman poor, but the political matter of colonising an area of land to 
unsettled Gallic tribesmen who might have reacted negatively to the provocation, thus risking war. She rightly 
points out that the senate should have been supportive of the allocation of land to large numbers of poor 
Romans, who would have then been eligible for service. This would have increased the available manpower 
pools during a period in which war with the northern tribes threatened. In the end, however, she also concedes 
that the reasons remain unclear (Vishnia, 1996, pp. 30 ff). 
""" The fact, however, that Flaminius, after his problematic tribunate, subsequently went on to hold the 
consulship twice (Cos. 223 BC and Cos. 217 BC), and the censorship in 220 BC, suggests he was not entirely 
isolated, nor without aristocratic supporters. 
"""Lintott , 1999(b), p. 68. 
For example, Taylor argues that the century and a half period between the generally accepted end of the 
Conflict of the Orders, the Lex Horlensia of 287 BC (the law determined that decisions made in the plebian 
assembly would be binding on the state), and the start of the turbulent tribunate of Ti. Gracchus in 133 BC, 
was a time when tribunes were in accord with the senate and agents of its rule. She does, however, make an 
exception for the tribunate of C. Flaminius (Taylor, 1962, p. 19). Raaflaub also characterises this period as an 
era of cohesion and unity (Raaflaub, 2006, p. 141). My analysis of the relationship between the tribunate and 
the senate during this period does indeed suggest a period of relative cooperation and concord, helped by a 
series of military expeditions against Macedon, Carthage, and in Spain, to unite in common cause ordinary 
citizens with the governing elite. 
The official reason was unfavourable auguries, but the enmity caused by his tribunate was probably the 
real cause (Liv. 21. 63.) 
Plb. 2.32; Liv. 21.63; Plut., Marc. 4.2. 
Priscus, who also celebrated a triumph without senatorial permission after he appealed 
directly to the army for justice.''*''^ In 217 BC, during his second consulship, Flaminius 
again disobeyed the senate because of their shared enmity:'"'" he refused to return to Rome 
to consult, and properly inaugurate his consulship with the necessary religious 
c e r e m o n i e s . A formal letter from the senate and a team of commissioners failed to 
persuade Flaminius; he brushed off any objections. But this time he was less fortunate, 
leading his army and himself to destruction at Lake Trasimene.'"^' Flaminius' feud with the 
governing elite, as a tribune and twice consul, was public, serious and protracted; his 
behavior was manifestly provocative and insubordinate to the traditional authority of the 
senate. In all these ways, it was not unlike the relationship Ti. Gracchus had with the 
governing elite of 133 BC, and the strong opposition he faced.''*" Unlike the passage of 
Gracchus' agrarian bill, which was characterized by bitter conflict, there was no 
accompanying political violence. Nor did the enmity both sides obviously feh for each 
other lead to large-scale f i g h t i n g ; F l a m i n i u s ' confrontation with the senate, his agitation, 
and his insubordination, was conducted, if not within the norms of traditional behaviour, 
then in a non-violent manner. 
Public attitudes toward inimicitiae in the political sphere were complex and ambivalent. 
The destruction of enemies was widely accepted as a necessary component of acquiring 
dignitas, virtus, status and nobility,'"'" but individuals could gain from rising above 
personal enmity. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus'"" benefited from this form of selflessness.'"'^ 
He was a bitter political enemy to the Scipio brothers during their trials but, as tribune, 
refused to allow the imprisonment of L. Cornelius Scipio because he thought it would be 
D.H. 6.30; Liv. 2.26. See Chapter Six above. 
D.H. 6.30; Liv. 2.26. 
Vows, inter alia, at temples had not been made, and the senate not consulted; the senate did not consider 
him properly or legally appointed until these obligations were fulfilled. Surprisingly, Flaminius brushed off 
these concerns (Liv. 21.63). 
Liv. 22.6; Plb. 3.84. 
" " Vishnia, 1996, p. 29. 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 68. Lintott describes the unrest surrounding Flaminius' tribunate as being no more 
than a non-violent demonstration. This underplays the obvious seriousness of the matter; consideration of 
using the army indicates no ordinary dispute. But Lintott is right to draw attention to the non-violent nature of 
Flaminius' defiance of the senate. 
Epstein, 1987, p. 28. 
The father of the famous tribunes. 
Epstein, 1987, p. 15. 
unseemly for the Republic to incarcerate a Scipio'"" - although he stated that the enmity 
had not ended. Senators admired Ti. Gracchus for placing the interests of the Republic 
before his own h a t r e d . I f individuals could thus determine when the interests of the 
Republic were better served by compromise and temporary suspension of inimicitiae, the 
governing elite collectively could also recognise the danger unrestrained inimicitiae posed 
to the res publica. Although not always successful, they tried where they could to soften its 
effects when it threatened national interests. In 207 BC, for example, it realised feuding 
magistrates would weaken the war effort, and insisted on reconciling the consuls about to 
take the field against the Carthaginians, M. Livius Salinator and C. Claudius Nero.''*'' In 
187 BC, the senate requested that P. Scipio betroth his daughter to Ti. Gracchus to improve 
the likelihood that their reconciliation would endure.'"'" In 179 BC, the senate, along with a 
deputation of concerned citizens, persuaded feuding censors, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and M. 
Fulvius Nobilior, to suspend their argument because it had reached such proportions as to 
risk the smooth running of the state. Their acrimonious rivalry had played out in the senate 
and assemblies. They agreed to suspend their differences for the sake of the state, and 
exchanged hand-clasps and pledges to seal their newfound concord, to the approbation of 
the senate.'""' 
Before 151 BC: Position. Courts and Exile as Political Weapons 
As 1 have demonstrated above, there were acts of violence in a political context prior to 151 
BC, but they did not indicate a culture of endemic political violence. There was, however, a 
crucial difference: an absence prior to 151 BC of endemic physical violence that pervaded 
political discourse in the late Republic. Instead, enemies turned to other methods to 
advance their interests, and to attack, marginalise and eliminate rivals. They used, for 
example, the power or authority vested in magisterial offices to attack opponents. In 204 
BC, censors and bitter enemies, M. Livius and C. Claudius, deprived each other of their 
state horses. C. Claudius then disenfranchised M. Livius; Livius responded by demoting 
Liv. 38.53; V.Max. 4.1; Gel. 6.19. 
Liv. 38.53. Gruen attributes Gracchus' hesitation to jail L. Scipio to the best traditions of the creed of the 
nobiles: the placing of state interests above that of the personal. If we are to take Gracchus' own explanation 
at face value, and there is nothing to seriously doubt it, then it would seem to be a genuine case of selflessness 
(Gruen, 1995, p. 77). 
Liv. 27.35; V.Max. 7.2. Claudius' testimony had sent Livius into exile in 219 BC, and they had been 
enemies since (Liv. 27.37; V.Max. 4.2). 
Liv. 38.57; Plut., TG 4.4; V.Max. 4.2. 
Liv. 40.45,46. 
Claudius. M. Porcius Cato also used his censorship in 184 BC to deprive L. Scipio of his 
state horses; this was attributed to his implacable hatred of his dead brother, P. Scipio. 
Men of influence used their informal position of authority in the senate to speak against 
others.''*" The opinion of P. Scipio Aemilianus, for example, prevented the squabbling 
consuls of 144 BC, Ser. Sulpicius Galba and L. Aurelius Cotta, from being allocated 
command in Spain against V i r i a t h u s . E x i l e , either enforced or voluntary, was a 
respectable way to avoid further political attacks, or atone for public disgrace;'"^' 
Praeneste, Tibur and Naples were known destinations for exiles, and Polybius praised this 
institution as an example of moderation in Roman political discourse.'"''^ 
As a tool of inimicitiae and political competition, however, the law was especially 
employed to marginalise, discredit and punish. Extraordinary commissions could be set up 
to try cases,'''^' but the courts in particular provided an effective and convenient outlet for 
conducting inimicitiae}'^^^ This was because conviction could be disastrous: damaged 
reputation, fines, exile, or execution in capital cases. The senate and tribunes, for example, 
decided the legal path was the most effective way to neutralise Manlius in 385 BC, and 
prosecuted him in the courts and comitia centuriata, executing him for sedition when he 
was found guilty.'"^' Toward the end of the Second Punic War, the tribune, Cn. Baebius 
Tamphilus, prosecuted the above feuding censors, Livius and Claudius, for their public 
squabbling, but the senate managed somehow to stop the trial, probably wanting to avoid 
further reputational damage.' '"" Tribunes in 187 BC authorised a special senatorial tribunal 
to try L. Scipio;' '" ' his adversaries, in the Roman practice, used the legal system to attack 
Plut., Car.Mji. 18. 
" " Rosenstein points out that there was a hierarchy when it came to speaking in senate; the leading men often 
spoke first and thus framed the subsequent debate. The consequence was that, in many cases, more junior 
members did not get a chance to influence the debate (Rosenstein, 2006, pp. 371 and 372). 
V.Max. 6.4. 
For example, Liv. 42.3; Plut., Mar. 29; App., BC 1.37. 
" ^ ' P l b . 6.14. 
" " F o r e x a m p l e , Liv. 38.54. 
Epstein, 1987, p. 96. Lintott, 1992, p.43. Lintott points out that for magistrates who had left office, 
prosecution in the law court was a real threat, but one which that could be frustrated at times: S. Galba 's 
escape from charges of brutality in 149 BC in relation to de repetundis (the recovery of money illegally 
extracted from allies) as a case in point. 
Liv. 6.20. 
Liv. 29.37. 
Liv. 38.54. For a full account of the Sciponic trial, see Gruen's account (Gruen, 1995, p. 59 fO. See also 
Chapter One above. 
him.""^ Corruption and embezzlement of public funds while in office was a common 
charge. The praetor, M. Titinius Curvus, was arraigned three times in the courts by political 
opponents in 171 BC for peculation, but was acquitted. ' ' '" In the same year, former 
Spanish governors, P. Furius Philus and C. Matienus, were charged with peculation by a 
special commission, but chose voluntary exile rather than face further legal attacks.*'"'' M. 
Cato, paragon of Roman frugality and moral rectitude, and inveterate enemy of the Scipios, 
was especially skilled at using the law against political opponents. He brought many 
convictions himself, assisted allies in their cases, and persuaded others to start their own 
proceedings; Cato considered legal action worthy of his most zealous efforts. '"" 
The law also provided a remedy to extract revenge: in 140 BC, the tribune, Ti. Claudius 
Asellus, brought charges against Aemilianus.""® Aemilianus, while censor in 142 BC, 
attempted to disenfranchise and demote Ti. Asellus, ' '" ' and Asellus never forgot the 
slight;""^ his enmity for Aemilianus was probable motivation for the attempt to charge 
him.'""' Legal attacks also originated from outside Italy; between 160 BC-153 BC 
representatives from provinces brought successful cases against several praetors in Rome 
charged in the courts or by special commission with peculation.'"^" Even an unsuccessftil 
prosecution could damage the career prospects of a defendant. In 189 BC, for example, a 
charge of peculation, supported by the testimony of Cato, was brought against M. Acilius 
Glabrio; it was successfully defended, but still destroyed his prospects for obtaining the 
censorship.'"^' 
Liv. 38.54. 
Liv. 43.2. 
Liv. 43.2. 
Plut, Cat.Mai. 14. 
Cell. 2.20; Cic., De.Or. 2.258. 
" " Gell. 2.20; Cic., De.Or. 2.258. D.C., Fr. 76. 
Epstein, 1987, p. 113. 
Gruen, however, argues Asellus may have been pursuing a broader political agenda (Gruen, 1968, p. 31). 
But as Epstein rightly points out, there is no evidence that any more complex motive was involved (Epstein, 
1987, p. 113). 1 thus agree with Epstein that revenge for the slight in 142 BC seems the most logical 
explanation. 
Liv., Per. 47. 
Liv. 37.57: Postremo in huius maxime invidiam desistere se petitione Glabrio dixit quando, quod taciti 
indignarentur nobiles homines, id aeque novus competitor intestabiliperiurio incesseret. "Finally, in order to 
chiefly make Cato unpopular, Glabrio said he would drop his candidature, since, while the nobles kept silent, 
though indignant, it was attacked with detestable perjury by one who was as much a new man as h imse l f " 
Epstein points out that Livy suggests that Glabio withdrew because he wanted to embarrass Cato, the new 
man, and thus expose him to the collective anger or the aristocrats (Epstein, 1987, p. 154). But Glabrio, an 
ambitious man, was hardly going to withdraw his candidacy from one of the Republic's most senior and 
The New Discourse: The Emergence of Endemic Violence 
From 151 BC onwards, something altered in the fabric of Roman political life. 
Dysfunctional competition and insubordination between magistrates in the normal way 
continued to cause friction and occasionally produce disasters for the Republic; most 
spectacularly in 105 BC when the senate and soldiers failed to intercede effectively to 
control the inimicitia between Cn. Mallius Maximus and Q. Servilius Caepio, leading to 
decisive defeat by invading Germanic tribesmen at Arausio.'"^^ They did not escape 
punishment; Servilius's command was terminated, a penalty that had not been imposed 
since the early Republic, and he and Mallius were convicted of treason, imprisoned, but 
released into exile by a sympathetic tribune.'''*^ Intense competition for glory continued to 
encourage disobedience to state authority and unilateral action from magistrates serving in 
provinces. A desire for money and fame, for example, motivated L. Licinius Lucullus in 
151 BC to declare war on, and invade, the Celtiberian Vaccaei in Spain without the 
authority of the senate or the comitia centuriata}'^^ These dynamics persisted.'"®' 
respected magisterial positions; the reputational damage done to liim by the charge of peculation seems the 
more likely cause. 
Liv., Per. 67. The two rivals refused to cooperate on the battlefield: proconsul Servilius was jealous 
because the consul Mallius had primary authority, and was eager to monopolise the glory. According to Livy, 
up to 80 000 soldiers and 40 000 camp followers were killed: this is probably an exaggeration but the point is 
Rome suffered one of its worst disasters since Cannae in 216 BC. Servilius was prosecuted for his inability to 
cooperate, and for cowardice (Rosenstein, 1990, p. 263. See also Sherwin-White, 1956, p. 4). Keaveney sees 
the inimicitia between the Mallius and Caepio, and the refusal to cooperate, as an extension of broader 
political tension between poputares and optimates, and as being anchored in that contemporary struggle 
(Keaveney, 2005, p. 23). 1 think, however, that Keaveney has read too much into what I argue was primarily a 
personal dispute about honour and the opportunity for glory that I have shown above was an all too common 
aspect of competition between the governing elite, and not at all confined to the late Republic. 
V.Max. 4.7. The tribune, L. Cassius Longinus, also passed a bill in 104 BC which automatically expelled 
from the senate anyone who had had his command abrogated; this was aimed directly at Servilius, who was 
largely blamed, and indicates the depth of fury felt about the fiasco. 
' " " A p p . , / / « / ) . 51,59. 
The treatment by the state of Caepio in 105 BC stands in contrast with its treatment of another consul who 
lost a seminal battle for Rome through incompetence and by bickering with his colleague, C. Terentius Varro. 
Varro lost the battle of Cannae against the Carthaginians in 216 BC; both men were fighting in times of 
extreme peril against competent enemies, and much was expected. Not only was Varro not punished for his 
leading role in bringing about one of Rome's worst and most dangerous defeats when he lost against 
Hannibal, but, unlike Caepio, he actually received a vote of thanks from the senate and the Roman people for 
his service and because he did not despair of the state (Fron., Str. 4.6). Caepio was operating in an 
environment which had much less tolerance for failure, especially when it had resulted in so many deaths, and 
was caused largely by his bickering and jealousy. Plutarch, however, puts quite a different spin on the 
behaviour of Varro in his life of Aemilius Paulus (Plut., Aem. 2). He contrasts Varro's flight from Cannae, and 
the fact that he survived the battle, unfavourably with the conduct of the other consul (and ancestor of 
Aemilius), Lucius Paulus, who decided to remain with his men when it became clear the battle was lost, and 
subsequently died fighting. Varro does not fare well by the comparison. In hindsight, this suggests that 
although the state may have publicly thanked him, there were those who nevertheless considered his conduct 
less praiseworthy. 
Significantly, political discourse also changed during this period. After a long period of 
relative concord,'"*^® against the background of a series of unpopular and unprofitable wars 
in Spain, the tribunate started to reassert something of its original revolutionary character. 
Ordinary citizens would turn to it in its new role as long as it remained effective in its 
representation of their interests. From the start, the army was at the centre of this growing 
schism; tribunes acted initially to disrupt the levy for Spain, and legislated on conditions of 
service for citizens serving in the army. As a result, discord between ordinary citizens, the 
tribunate and the governing elite increased. By 133 BC, it had reached a point where 
political discourse resembled the earlier revolutionary period;''**' obstructionist and 
revolutionary tribunes in conflict with the governing elite and individual magistrates, and 
increasingly willing to defy the wishes of the senate. But the new period of disharmony 
differed from the old in a significant way: this time, endemic violence emerged as a 
normative form of political expression. From this point, political violence becomes not the 
exception or an inexplicable outlier, but the new norm of political expression. By the 
emergence of this new element into the political life of the Republic, the Roman state had 
taken its first firm step on the road to Sulla, an interventionist army, and civil war. 
151 BC- 133 BC: First Signs of Increased Sedition and Political Disharmony 
In 151 BC, the period of relative solidarity in Roman political life ended; the first indication 
occurred that the tribunate was prepared to act in a more obstructionist and revolutionary 
manner. There was war in Spain against the Lusitanians and Celtiberians.'"*** The distance 
from Rome, their intractable and difficult nature, the length of service, and the lack of 
opportunities for booty, made these wars unpopular; men did not want to go and it was a 
This period of relat ive conco rd is, of course, marked by the notable except ion of the tr ibunate of C. 
F laminius in 232 B C (Plb. 2 .21; V .Max . 5.4; Liv. 21.63). For more on the argument o f relat ive concord as it 
related to a speci f ic rea lm of senate- t r ibunate relations, see Taylor , w h o argues that be tween 2 1 6 B C (Cannae ) 
and 167 BC (the start o f the Span ish wars) , the t r ibunate compromised with the senate or accorded with their 
wishes when it dealt with issues re la t ing to mili tary service condi t ions (Taylor , 1962, pp. 20 and 21). In this 
aspect o f the relat ionship, 1 a m incl ined to agree. The senate and tr ibunate more of ten than not, for example , 
found c o m m o n purpose and ag reemen t in mili tary issues dur ing this period, such as the enrol lment o f youths 
under seventeen (Liv. 25 .5) , acquiesc ing to the sena te ' s wishes regard ing the release of urban legions (Liv. 
34 .56) and leaving it up to the senate to dec ide the issue of ve te rans ' re lease condi t ions in the army in Spain 
(Liv. 39,38). 
Ross Taylor , 1962, p. 19. Lintott , 1999(b), p. 175. Raaf laub , 2006 , pp. 139 and 140. The revolut ionary 
per iod of Conf l ic t of the Orde r s w a s tradit ionally measured f rom the early fifth century BC to 287 BC when 
the Lex Hortemia was enacted . F rom this point on until 151 B C (except ing the t r ibunate o f C. Flaminius) , and 
especial ly af ter defea t at C a n n a e in 216 BC, there was relat ive concord be tween ordinary ci t izens and the 
govern ing elite. 
App. , Hisp. 45 f f 
struggle to recruit.'"®' As a result, consuls for 151 BC, Lucullus and A. Postumis Albinus, 
pursued the levy with great thoroughness. The tribunes forcibly interceded in the levy on 
behalf of ordinary citizens who complained of unfair t r e a t m e n t ; w h e n the consuls 
refused to grant exceptions, the tribunes imprisoned them.'""' The cultural history of 
citizens refusing to present for the levy in civic cause went back to the earliest 
revolutionary period, and the establishment of the office of tribune; against the governing 
elite, it was one of their principal, most effective, weapons.''"^ In early fifth century BC, for 
example, citizens refused to attend the levy to repel a Sabine invasion and suppress a 
rebellion among the Medullini because of senatorial intransigence over political and 
economic reform.''*'^ Never before, however, had it resulted in the seizure of the consuls 
and their imprisonment.""" In 138 BC, it happened again: tribunes C. Curiatius and 
Licinius imprisoned consuls, P. Scipio Nascia and D. lunius Brutus, over another difficult 
levy for S p a i n . T h e unpopular Spanish war was again at the root of tribunate 
interference; citizens were deserting, and men refused to go ."" ' Tribunes interceded on 
behalf of ordinary citizens seeking exemptions; the consuls remain implacable, and were 
imprisoned. '"" 
Liv., Per. 48; Taylor, 1962. p. 21. For example, no one could be found in 151 BC to perform the office of 
military tribune; P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus famously provided the example of volunteering for the war 
which encouraged other aristocrats to serve (Liv., Per. 48). 1 would point out that, in contrast, there was 
generally no trouble recruiting levies, volunteers of officers for the army for the more lucrative second 
century BC series of campaigns in the east against Macedon, and against Carthage in Africa during the Third 
Punic War. 
They tried to persuade the consuls to exempt a number of recruits from service, although it is not clear 
why they specifically wanted to avoid the draft (Liv., Per. 48). 
Liv., Per. 48. Their imprisonment, however, cannot have lasted for long: Licinius subsequently went off 
to Spain to invade on his own initiative a people not at war with Rome, and without the state's authority 
(App. , / /« / ) . 51). 
" ' = D . H . 6 . 8 8 . 
D.H. 6.34; Liv. 2.23; Raaflaub, 2006, p. 139. See also Chapter Six above. It was not long after this event 
that the plebeians succeeded in a major show of dissent, and the office of tribune was established. They were 
entirely successful in forcing compromise upon the governing elite. 
Taylor, 1962. As far as we know, this had never occurred before. 
Liv., Per. 55; V.Max. 3.7. 
Fron., Str. 4.1. There is a rare and specific reference to the consuls in 138 BC scourging and selling into 
slavery deserters from the army, so military service must have been unpopular enough at the time for men to 
risk extreme punishment. The most likely cause of this was the war in Spain. 
M. Tullius Cicero's brother, Quintus, in a work composed by Cicero himself, called the imprisonment of 
the consuls by the tribunes in 138 BC an act "quod ante factum non era!" (Cic., Leg. 3.20). Of course, this 
was not the case: it had happened before in 151 BC, as we have seen. The comment, nevertheless, effectively 
transmits the unprecedented nature of the act, and that it was far from being normal practice in political 
discourse up until that point. 
The tribunes' interference in the levy was not directly revolutionary, but their imprisonment 
of consuls was an unprecedented and undoubtedly seditious act. It was also a form of 
ritualised violence. I argue that it was an indication that the concord between the tribunate 
and senate was unraveling. Given that the tribune was bound always to act in the interests 
of the people,""^ it was also a marker of a widening schism between the governing elite 
and ordinary citizens, especially those serving in the army. The war, for example, created 
hardship, the people complained to the tribunes,"" ' and the tribunes acted by interfering in 
the levy to aid citizens in distress. The imprisonments did not last long;'^"" they were more 
symbolic than real violence. The fact that tribunes acted in this manner, however, was a 
harbinger of things to come; imprisonment explored the limits of extra-legal coercion,' '"' 
and was a warning that the will of the tribune, and through him the people, was sacrosanct 
- or unprecedented methods would be used to enforce it. Public discourse started to take a 
grimmer, more unforgiving tone; history was repeating itself 
Other indicators of a more militant tribunate, and of conflict with the governing elite, 
appeared during this period. There was, for example, an increased legislative focus on 
conditions of military service that encroached on the authority of the senate.''"^ I have 
shown that attempts to seek exemption from the Spanish levy were frequent. The law to 
limit overseas service to six years probably belonged to this period also: its effect, for 
example, was conspicuous on the army serving in Spain during 140 Moreover, the 
law which extended rights of appeal for soldiers was passed before 134 BC, and likely 
attributed to the Spanish wars. ' '"" This legislative focus was concerned with improving 
conditions of service for ordinary citizens serving in the army; I argue that it was a further 
manifestation of an increasingly assertive tribunate,""^ operating this time within a judicial 
Plb.6.16. 
This was easy to do. Tribunes for their year in office were required to spend the time in Rome, and to 
always have the doors of their houses open day and night so people could easily approach them (Gel. 3.2). 
See also Taylor, 1962, p. 20. 
App.,Hisp.5\. 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 176. Lintott argues that the imprisonments brought with them the theoretical 
possibility of unlimited coercitio, and threatened more drastic action. 1 am inclined to agree and emphasise 
the heavy portents of further conflict that invest these acts. 
""-Taylor, 1962, p. 22. 
App., Hisp. 78. 
The third Lex Porcia deprovocatione: Liv., Per. 57; Plut., CG 9. 
There were more obscure laws passed during this period; Taylor's discussion on two further laws that, she 
argues, were also controversial is instructive and adds to the feeling of militancy that we get; the middle 
second century BC Lex Aelia and Lex Fiifia. Both laws seem to have been providing capacity for magistrates 
framework in accordance with the ancient precept of ius auxilii, the right to aid citizens in 
distress. During this period, tribunes were also active more broadly, extending protections 
to citizens discharging civic voting responsibilities: secret ballot laws were passed in 139 
BC and 137 BC,'^"'' and attracted strong resistance from vested interests within the 
governing elite. 
Between 151 BC and 134 BC, then, the tribunate, and through them the ordinary citizens, 
became more militant, willing to defy the will of the senate, and reassert its old 
revolutionary character. It legislated into areas which impinged on the interests and 
authority of the governing elite. Significantly amid this period of change, the limits and 
possibilities of power and extra-legal coercion were tested. In particular, the citizen-militia 
was from the outset exposed to the growing militancy and reassertion of the power of the 
tribunate. The old harmony was unraveling, and in imitation of the Rome's revolutionary 
past, contenders were thrown back upon the two centres of power in the constitution: the 
people, through the office of the tribune, and the governing elite, through the magistrates 
and senate. But it required the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus to make obvious the consequence 
of that change. This was reflected most starkly in the example of his personal fate. 
From 133 BC: The Outbreak of Endemic Violence in Political Discourse 
In 133 BC, Roman political discourse made the transition from growing tension and the 
promise of civil strife to outright violence. Ti. Gracchus introduced directly into the tributa 
plebis^^"^ a lex agraria r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g a l o n g - i g n o r e d l im i t o f 5 0 0 itigera^'^^ o f ager 
other than tribunes to obstruct the passage of laws as they were being legislated by the tribunes for religious 
reasons (obmmtiare) (Taylor, 1962, pp. 22 and 23). The ability of a law like this to create controversy by 
expanding certain powerful powers to magistrates other than tribunes, who already had the power to veto 
laws, was obvious; Taylor posits that these laws may represent an attempt by the governing elite to limit the 
militancy of tribunes focused especially on conditions of military service at this time. It seems a reasonable 
suggestion, given the obvious increase in activity from the tribunate in this area. 
Cic., Leg. 3.35; Liv., Per. 54; Cic., Brut. 97. 
Taylor, 1962, p. 22. See also Yakobson's exhaustive textual analysis of the sources behind the ballot laws, 
and their effects in the late Republic (Yakobson, 1995, pp. 426-442). 
Placing a bill directly into the comitia tributa, and not through the senate first, was not a revolutionary 
thing to do for a tribune: it was neither against mos maiorum nor illegal. But it did signal to the governing 
elite that Ti. Gracchus was going to go directly to the people whenever possible, and it did not allow those 
senators who might have supported the bill to show it in the senate. 
The equivalent of about 125 hectares (Konrad, 2006, p. 167). 
publicus that could be farmed by any one i n d i v i d u a l . T h e bill was not revolutionary, nor 
drafted in isolation. It re-affirmed what already existed in law, was drafted with the help of 
a number of leading senators, such as consul, P. Mucius Scaevola, and princeps senatus, 
Ap. Claudius Pulcher, and enjoyed considerable support in the senate.'^" It did not lead to 
violence per se: the civil strife that arose was more the result of a direct visceral reaction 
from members of the governing elite provoked by the revolutionary manner in which 
Gracchus conducted his business, defied the senate, and encroached on its a u t h o r i t y . B y 
removing by popular vote a fellow tribune who obstructed the agrarian bill, ' ' '^ for example, 
Ti. Gracchus established a precedent by which a troublesome colleague could be removed 
by appeal directly to the people, upsetting the principle of limited power in one individual 
which formed the basis of the republican system of government.'^"'' By seizing the legacy 
of Pergamum to finance the land commission,'^'^ sidestepping the senate's obstructionist 
tactic of starving the bill of funds, Ti. Gracchus impinged upon the traditional authority of 
the senate to decide matters relating to finance and foreign affairs. The final straw was the 
attempt to secure by violence a highly unusual second consecutive tribunate;'^'^ his 
supporters seized the Capitol and used force to suppress opposition to his re-election.'^" 
Although Konrad points out that it was in the interests of the governing elite to cooperate 
with Ti. Gracchus because the agrarian reform he proposed helped forestall political 
instability by improving the economic condition of the poor,'^'^ the bill nevertheless hurt 
the financial interests of many infiuential and wealthy men in the governing elite who 
App., BC 1.9; Plut., TG 1. Public land had for centuries been available to Romans and Italians to farm and 
graze their flocks; the 500 iugera limit by 133 BC was notional, and many plots were much larger. The state 
would reclaim the excess to re-distribute in family-sized plots among the plebs rustica, and those of the plebs 
urbana who wanted to farm (Konrad, 2006, p. 167). 
Plut., TG 9. The bill had a direct precedent: around 140 BC, the consul C. Laelius had introduced a similar 
agrarian bill, but it had been withdrawn because of the opposition Laelius encountered in the senate. Clearly, 
the subject of agrarian reform was a controversial one (Plut., TG 8). 
Shotter argues that Gracchus' behavior became progressively more extreme; a sign of the importance he 
placed in retaining the support of the people (Shotter. 2005, p. 33). Gracchus, by basing his legitimacy in the 
traditional power of the people 's assemblies, certainly pursued an unconventional path. But it was hardly 
extreme; the assemblies allowed for this type of power and Gracchus broke convention, not judicial precepts. 
Nevertheless, I agree with Shotter's intent, if not the letter, of his point: the tribunate of Gracchus was 
manifestly revolutionary in that it challenged the established convention and authority of the senate. 
Plut., ro 10; App., S C 1 2 . 
Konrad, 2006, p. 169. 
'^'^Plut., TG 14. 
For example, Gracchus and his supporters armed themselves with spear shafts and rods during the final 
confrontation on election day (Plut., TG 19). 
" " A p p . , B C 1 . 1 6 . 
' " " K o n r a d , 2006, p. 168. 
probably had large amonts of their wealth tied up in land use . '^" Resistance was inevitable: 
from the outset, it attracted serious opposition from vested interests concerned with seeing 
the status quo preserved."^" Tribune M. Octavius, in a radical departure from convention, 
repeatedly vetoed Ti. Gracchus' bill in the assembly, escalating the standoff to a 
constitutional crisis.'^^' When the bill passed, the senate reacted by starving the 
commission allocating the land of funds. On election day, members of the governing elite 
reacted to the use of force by Ti. Gracchus' partisans with force of their own; the pontifex 
maximus, P. Scipio Nasica, led a counter-attack, and in the subsequent riot, Ti. Gracchus 
and hundreds of his supporters were k i l l e d . T h e senate followed up in the aftermath with 
a series of repressive measures to apprehend and punish those who had conspired with Ti. 
Gracchus; many more were subsequently put to death. 
Flower argues that it is not helpful or accurate to describe Ti. Gracchus' death as an act of 
civil war: he was killed without the use of weapons or troops on the authority of a private 
citizen acting spontaneously. '"" This may be so, but it is hard to overestimate the 
significance of the violence and proscriptions which accompanied his death and immediate 
aftermath. It may not have been civil war, but it was a significant step on the path toward it. 
For the political life of the Republic, it was a seminal moment: the first time deadly 
violence had been used in a political contest. '"^ Some aspects of the strife were familiar. 
As in the confrontations of 151 BC and 138 BC, for example, the army was at the centre of 
the reform, which was framed in terms of replenishing rural recruiting pools - and Ti. 
Gracchus in it argued directly for the interests of soldiers.'"^ But the nascent reassertion of 
the revolutionary character of the tribunate first evident from 151 BC onwards, and the 
nature of the tension between it and the governing elite, had matured. In response to the 
" " App., BC 1.10; Plut., TG 9. For a discussion on the challenge to the traditional interpretation of the 
Gracchan agrarian bill, and its assumption of demographic and agrarian decline in the late second century BC, 
see Chapter Two above. 
'^ -"Shot ter ,2005,p .31. 
There was no precedents for a repeated obstruction of a tribune's bill to the people; the situation had never 
arisen before. Gracchus solved it in an unprecedented manner by removing Octavius from office with a vote 
from the people. 
App., BC1.16 . 
V.Max. 4.7; Plut., TG 20.3; Konrad, 2006, p. 170. 
' " "F lower , 2010(a), p. 76. 
App., BC 1.16; Plut., TG 20. Nasica acted only after the consul rejected his entreaties to suppress Ti. 
Gracchus and his followers; there is spontaneity in this fact of the private citizen acting in the national interest 
to protect the Republic. See this chapter above. 
' - ' = ' P l u t . , r e 9 ; App., « C 1.10. 
challenge from Ti. Gracchus, the governing elite too had resorted to violence: the 
implication was that it would not tolerate the tribunate or ordinary citizens acting this way, 
and would respond with deadly force. As the traditional advocate for the interests of 
ordinary citizens, the tribunate in 133 BC was suppressed. 
From this point on, endemic violence became a normative part of politics; as Shotter points 
out, once blood had been shed in political feud, there was no going back. '"^ In 121 BC, 
there was a second major outbreak of political violence immediately following the 
reforming tribunate of C. Sempronius Gracchus. Unlike the program of his single-issue 
brother, C. Gracchus' reform program in 123/122 BC was diverse and attempted to 
ameliorate many problems making themselves felt at the time, including the emerging issue 
of the status of the Latin and Italian a l l ies . ' " ' He introduced, for example, legislation to 
stabilise the price of grain in Rorne,''^" reaffirmed appeal to the people in capital cases and 
made transgressing magistrates liable for prosecution,'^^' introduced a franchise bill giving 
citizenship to the Latins and Latin rights to the Italian allies, '^" passed a law establishing 
tax farmers in Asia and introducing new centralised contract arrangements,'^'^ enacted laws 
for major public works programs throughout Italy,"' ' ' and probably re-enacted the agrarian 
law of his brother. '"^ The army also featured; C. Gracchus introduced a law to provide 
clothing for soldiers at public cost and which forbad the recruitment of youths under the 
™ Wiseman, 2009, p. 8. Wiseman persuasively argues tliat the governing elite automatically equated the use 
of 'unorthodox methods' (read: using the latent power of the people's vote in the comilia tributa to pass 
legislation without advice or influence from the traditional limitations on that latent power, the magistrates 
and the senate) with attempts to establish a tyranny over the state. As an explanation, it is credible; the 
language used by Nasica indicated he and his partisans saw the threat posed by Gracchus in these terms, and 
the senate would later formalise, in similar language, its request to magistrates to suppress other assertive 
tribunes in the form of a state of emergency. From their violent reaction to Gracchus and other tribunes, it is 
clear that the governing elite indeed perceived a threat to the status quo, and rationalised this as a threat to the 
state. 
Shotter, 2005, p. 34. Shotter makes the right conclusion: "It was inevitable that, in the post-Gracchan era, 
it would be easier as a result to settle political issues by resorting to violence: that was the legacy both of 
Tiberius Gracchus and of the contemporaries who supported and opposed him." 
Shotter, 2005, p. 35. For a detailed analysis of the individual pieces of legislation attributed to C. 
Gracchus, see Stockton (Stockton, 1979, pp. 161 fO. 
' "»Cic . , Sest. 103; Liv., Per. 60; Veil. 2.6; Plut., CG 5. 
Plut., CG 4. 
Veil. 2.6; Plut., CG 5. This bill pleased no one and failed (Shotter, 2005, p. 36). 
Gel. 11.10. This law established that the contracts for tax farming, a lucrative enterprise, would be 
auctioned among the wealthy non-senatorial class. 
" " Plut., CG 6. 
Plut., CG 5; Liv., Per. 60. See Stockton for an analysis of the agrarian aspects of C. Gracchus' legislation. 
He argues that C. Gracchus' intention was to continue the work that his brother started; in addition, Stockton 
argues C. Gracchus added two other innovations: he gave commissioners the power to distribute public land 
outside Italy and the power to plant colonies and make individual assignments (Stockton, 1979, p. 132). 
age of His most controversial laws'^^' replaced senatorial members of juries with 
e q u e s t r i a n s . B o t h Plutarch and Appian wrote that these laws did more than any other to 
curtail the authority of the senate; '" ' they gave power to equestrians to sit in judgment and 
pronounce punishments over the senatorial class, something which infuriated the governing 
e i i t e . ' ^^" 
Like his brother's program, C. Gracchus' reform program generated strong opposition from 
vested interests in the senate and among the governing ehte, deepened divisions already 
present in public life. It also introduced new tensions between wealthy equestrians, who 
benefited legally and economically from the reforms, and the senatorial elite, who had their 
authority curtailed in traditional areas of dominance.'^'" It was inevitable that the governing 
elite interpreted it as a direct assault on their authority and as demagoguery: his grain law, 
for example, which required the state to purchase large amounts of grain to sell below 
market rates, was attacked as a demagogue's mass bribe to the urban poor."'*^ The lex 
iudiciaria ended the monopoly of senators acting as single judges in most civil cases and in 
the criminal courts, and replaced them with equestrians in the extortion courts.''''^ It was, 
however, the perceived re-ordering of power in the republican system of government, and 
the use of insurrection to achieve political ends, which provided the catalyst for violence. 
Along with former consul, M. Fulvius Flaccus,'^"" C. Gracchus was voted a second year as 
tribune and attempted, but failed, to secure a t h i r d ; t h i s , and his popularity with ordinary 
citizens, were interpreted as threats to the political s y s t e m . H e set, for example, a 
precedent for personal dominance as a way of holding onto political power, and in doing 
so, went beyond the limits of what most members of the governing elite considered 
' " ^ D i o d . 34.25;Plut. , C G 5 . 
' " ' S t o c k t o n , 1979, p. 141. 
P l u t . , C G 5 ; A p p . , B C 1 . 2 2 . 
' " ' P l u t . , C G 5 ; A p p . , B C 1 . 2 2 . 
Stockton, 1997, pp. 141 and 142; Shotter, 2005, pp. 35 and 36. Appian summed up the consequence by 
pointing out that the law placed the senators on the level of ordinary citizens and gave power to the knights 
(App., BC 22 ff). 
Diod. 35.25. This was especially the case regarding legislative change to the judicial system: it 
effectively, for example, pitted the knights against the senatorial class in the extortion courts. See Konrad for 
a neat summation of the effects of Gracchus' legislation (Konrad, 2006, pp. 171 and 173). 
Liv., Per. 60; Konrad, 2006, p. 171. 
Quaeslio de repetundis. 
The only instance known of a former consul becoming tribune of the plebs. 
Plut., CC 12. 
The senate, for example, perceived that C. Gracchus had become too powerful as a politician and with the 
people behind him, might become invincible (Plut., CG 8). 
acceptable political behaviour." '" When supporters of M. Flaccus and C. Gracchus seized 
the Aventine in armed insurrection in reaction to the dismantling of parts of the reform 
program, and fortified it,"''^ the state declared a civil emergency and empowered consul, L. 
Opimius, to suppress it. 
The violence which followed was an increase in order of magnitude to that which 
accompanied the suppression of Ti. Gracchus a decade earlier. By declaring a civil 
emergency, the state admitted that there existed a threat to society of such magnitude that 
magistrates could take whatever steps they considered necessary to defeat i t . ' ' " ' L. 
Opimius, while consul, thus killed without trial 3,000 citizens, including C. Gracchus and 
Flaccus, who had celebrated a triumph while consul . '"" Unlike 133 BC, the suppression 
was officially sanctioned; the state paid a reward for the heads of C. Gracchus and 
Flaccus, '" ' and, as in the case of the demagogue Sp. Maelius in 439 BC, '"^ the property of 
C. Gracchus and Flaccus was sold and proceeds paid into the public t reasury. '" ' The 
outbreak of civil strife in 121 BC reinforced a pattern of political violence established by 
the death of Ti. Gracchus: coercion was an effective response to political obstructionism. In 
particular, the governing elite reacted to the challenge of a revolutionary tribune acting in 
the interests of ordinary citizens by once again suppressing it with violence, this time 
accompanied by the correct formalities. For ordinary citizens, it looked much more like 
civil war: preparations for the suppression were not i n s i g n i f i c a n t ; t h e r e was fighting in 
the streets, the consul commanded the official response and deployed troops - and the state 
""" Stockton, 1979, p. 185. The revolutionary tenure of C. Gracchus' tribunate is reflected in Diodorus' 
account. He describes C. Gracchus as calling for the abolition of aristocratic rule and its replacement with a 
system of democratic representation (Diod. 35. 25). 
App., BC 1.26; Plut., CG 14. The parallels between this seizure of the Aventine and its seizure by the 
plebeians during the Conflict of the Orders were obvious. I argue that this was no coincidence: the supporters 
of Gracchus and Flaccus were consciously emulating the earlier act to give their insurrection legitimacy, and 
to draw strength from the traditional link between successful extra-legal action by ordinary citizens and 
political reform. 
Stockton, 1997, p. 199. Stockton offers a detailed analysis of the last moments of C. Gracchus and his 
supporters. It is a useful and forensic examination of the chronology of the emergency in 121 BC. 
Plut. CG 17. 
Plut. CG 17; Flower, 2010(a), p. 77; Flower, 2010(b), pp. 82 and 83. 
Liv. 4.13;14. D.H. 12.1-4; Cic., Cato 56. See Chapter Six above. 
Plut., CG 17. 
Lintott, 1999(b), p. 184. Lintott emphasises the formalities the senate conducted, and the unity it achieved 
among its own members in the face of the Gracchan insurrection; a loss of popular support for Gracchus may 
have encouraged the senate to respond as it did. He calls the state preparations considerable because of the 
troops used and the planning that went into the suppression. The nexus between the violence and the use of 
troops is an important issue that 1 will expand upon below in this chapter. 
treated its own citizens as e n e m i e s . I argue that the outcome could well convince any 
future reformer that C. Gracchus had failed because he was not sufficiently ruthless, or that 
he lacked the necessary power to check the inevitable violent response from the senate. 
Either way, the state's handling of the insurrection embittered many ordinary citizens: 
when Opimius erected a temple dedicated perversely to Concord after Gracchus' death, 
someone in the night carved graffiti under the dedication that suggested instead a work of 
mad discord produced a temple of Concord. 
In 101 BC, there was yet a third outbreak of major political violence. During tribunician 
elections, L. Appuleius Satuminus used violence to secure his second tribunate by 
murdering a rival candidate ."" In 100 BC, with the passive assistance of consul, Marius, 
and praetor, C. Servilius Glaucia, Satuminus forced the passage of a program of popular 
legislation'^'® over the veto of his colleagues, against an attempt to suspend the comitia 
tributa on religious grounds, ' '^ ' and in defiance of physical opposition from urban 
plebeians resentful at the amount of public land in the bill reserved for Italian a l l i e s . I n 
99 BC, Satuminus was elected to his third tribunate; it was claimed that he attempted to 
illegally gain control of the government by conspiring to get C. Glaucia elected consul by 
murdering his rival, suspending consular elections indefinitely, and seizing the Capitol. 
The senate declared a civil emergency, and empowered consul, Marius,' ' '^ to suppress the 
insurrection: Satuminus, Glaucia, his quaestor, C. Saufeius, and supporters were killed in 
the subsequent violence.' '^' In this case, it was significant that the senate authorised 
Flower, 2010(a), pp. 76 and 77. Nippel, 1984, p. 26. 
Plut., CG 17, 
App., BC 1.28; Plut., Mar. 29; Liv., Per. 69. 
It included a lex agraria for settling Marius' veterans in colonies in Gaul, Greece, Macedon and Sicily, 
and for dividing up land recently taken from the Cimbri. 
Thunder was heard by the city crowd in the assembly passing the legislation; by law, when this occurred, 
the business of the assembly was not allowed to continue. L. Satuminus ignored this provision (App., BC 
1.30). 
App.; BC 1.29; Plut., Mar. 30; Liv., Per. 69. Appian reminded his audience that L. Satuminus' legislative 
package had been passed by violence and after thunder had been reported, and thus, was not legitimate. 
Konrad discusses the details of the package (Konrad, 2006, pp. 176 and 177). Lintott says the laws L. 
Satuminus passed by violence were treated with caution, and while not openly declared invalid, were either 
abandoned in application or limited in scope (Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 185 and 186). 
App., S C I .32; Plut., Mar. 30. 
Lintott argues persuasively that Marius, freed from the wars to protect the Italian peninsular, would 
countenance no more violence; the flagrant murder of C. Memmius was the catalyst which united the senate 
and consul in the adoption of extreme measures (Lintott, 1999(b), p. 185). 
" " L i n t o t t , 1999(b), p. 185. 
violence not against private c i t i z e n s , b u t against serving magistrates. As it had in 133 
BC and in 121 BC, the governing elite responded to a popular movement in Roman society 
with violence to suppress it. 
By the end of the second century BC, armed militias were now pervasive in Rome; as 
Flower points out, political assassination was just one more tool to control the outcome of 
elections to high off ice. '"^ This new political discourse was characterised by elements of 
behavior unknown prior to 151 BC. Political candidates or magistrates involved in 
controversial matters used groups of armed bodyguards to accompany them as they went 
about their business; Ti. Gracchus had one to protect him from o p p o n e n t s , a s did his 
brother, C. Gracchus . " ' ' A guard of urban citizens carrying daggers surrounded Metellus 
when he travelled the streets in 100 BC.'^'^ Politicians now armed gangs of supporters in 
the anticipation of violence at gatherings of citizens in voting assemblies to secure the 
passage of b i l l s : t h e tribune, P. Sulpicius Rufus, maintained a standing force of 3,000 
men armed with swords with which to threaten political opponents and conduct murder and 
violence.'^'" Rivalries and inimicitiae between magistrates, especially at election time, 
could be settled by force, or opponents could be targeted with violence and intimidation to 
suppress or sweep away political opposition in assembly. '" ' Most of the violence involved 
tribunes in conflict with each other or with the senate, and their assemblies were places 
where fighting frequently occurred: a contio called in 111 BC by the tribune, C. Memmius, 
for example, to question Jugurtha was suspended by the consul, P. Scipio Nasica, after a 
violent crowd threatened a fellow tribune who tried to veto the questioning.'^'^ The 
following year, tribunes, P. Licinius Lucullus and L. Annius, tried to secure re-election in 
assembly against resistance from colleagues; this led to r io t s . ' ' " The tribune, Titius, in 99 
As in C. Gracchus's case; he was technically a private citizen when killed, having failed to secure election 
for the third time to the tribunate. 
Flower, 2010(a), p. 77. 
'^"^App., S C I . 12. 
App., BC1.25. 
App.,SC1.31. 
' ' ' ' Such as the violence and unrest that accompanied the passage of bills and voting in public assemblies 
while Ti. Gracchus was tribune (App., BC 1.15). 
Plut., Suli .8. 
For example, at Plut., Mar. 30. 
Sal.,/«g.34. 
Sal.,/«g.37. 
BC provoked riots trying to pass his agrarian legislation in assembly,'^'" and in 92 BC, 
there was a riot at an assembly held by the tribune, Cn. Carbo.'^'^ In 91 BC, the tribune, M. 
Livius Drusus, used his Italian supporters to carry by force much of his legislative package 
through the comitia tributa;^^^^ his viator choked a consul in public who was obstructing 
him and possibly threatening religious sanct ion. ' ' ' ' 
The use of political violence may never have been wholly legitimised, nor fully accepted by 
the body politic; the magistrates who suppressed the revolutionary tribunates and their 
popular programs all had their political careers terminated in one form or a n o t h e r . I n the 
case of Opimius, he was condemned at public trial and attracted no sympathy from ordinary 
citizens because they recalled his violence and cruelty against the Gracchans.'^" Moreover, 
the consuls who conducted the proscriptions in the aftermath of the death of Ti. Gracchus in 
132 BC, P. Popillius Laenas and P. Rupilius, also suffered popular disapproval at their 
public trials because of their actions."^" Regardless of the level of public acceptance, 
however, violence was now entrenched in the political process. 
Political Violence: Rural Interests & Symbolism 
The nature of political violence also evolved during this period: in respect of who was 
involved and what was targeted. Conflict which accompanied the passage of legislation in 
the assemblies occurred between political contenders and their armed supporters, during 
elections and between competing magistrates. But something structural also crept into the 
strife: a struggle between rural and urban interests. Violence was not only the manifestation 
of a schism between the ruling elite and populist tribunes, or the result of inimicitiae 
between rivals, but also between city-dwellers and country-dwellers: as Lintott points out, 
the former were interested in benefits such as grain doles, and the latter were interested in 
land distribution.'^^' In this way, country people were involved centrally from the outset in 
Cic., de. Oral. 2.48. 
" " C i c . , L e g . 3.\9. 
Liv., P e r 71. 
Flor. 2.5.8; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 186 
Flower, 2010(a), p. 77. 
' " ' V e i l . 2.7. 
Veil. 2.7. 
Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 178 and 179. 
the violence of political discourse; their presence manifested itself most obviously in the 
locations from which partisans were recruited to form the gangs conducting the violence. 
One of the primary issues that motivated Ti. Gracchus, for example, was the decline of the 
small-scale Roman and Italian farmer, caused in part by estate owners preferring to use 
slaves on their estates rather than employ free rural workers. Slaves were exempt from 
military service, whereas free labourers were liable for military service, and could be drawn 
away from agriculture into the citizen-militia.'^^^ Much of his support base was thus 
amongst rural populations who bore the burden of military s e r v i c e , a n d stood to benefit 
from his agrarian reform. It was in their direct economic interests: land rezoning and 
reallocation was an effective way of reducing the number of rural poor, and 
correspondingly increasing the number of those eligible for service in the army.'^^" Ti. 
Gracchus therefore summoned them to Rome from the fields to help him win the 
tribunician election for 133 BC against urban opposition, and to support his agenda."®^ A 
decade later, the agrarian and colonisation elements of the legislative package of his 
brother, C. Gracchus, also would benefit country dwellers, and those who had the skills to 
succeed at f a r m i n g . I t offered hope and opportunities to small farmers and ex-farmers, 
and although C. Gracchus' support base was broader than his brother's, it included 
representation from the c o u n t r y . M o r e o v e r , during the campaign to elect Marius to his 
first consulship during the war against Jugurtha, artisans and fanners were an enthusiastic 
App . ,BC1 .7 . 
" " An example of the link between the countryside and the army was to be found most specifically in the 
origins of the veteran centurion, Spurius Ligustinus. By 171 BC, he had completed 22 years of active service 
in Roman armies all over the Mediterranean. He was originally bom just before the Second Punic War on a 
small Sabine peasant holding (Liv. 42.34). For more on the link between the rural population and military 
service, especially the importance of land distributions to veterans who had served many consecutive years 
and the effect this had on their farms, see de Ligt's excellent discussion (De Ligt, 2012, pp. 150-154), See 
also Chapter Two above. 
De Ligt, 2012, p. 170. Both aims were primary goals of Ti. Gracchus' tribunate. See Stockton for the 
persuasive argument that the lex Sempronia agraria was aimed at improving the wealth of not only Roman 
farmers, but also Latin and Italian peasants. He makes the point, for example, that Ti. Gracchus thought his 
reform would benefit all of Italy, and was aimed at the regeneration of the entire Italian race (App., 3 C 1.13). 
See also Stockton, 1979, pp. 42 and 43. 
App., S C 1.14. 
Plut., CG 4. It is true that the land distribution and colonial assignations were also available to urban 
dwellers. But this would not have been especially attractive to most of them; few had the agrarian skills 
needed to succeed at farming, and those that did, had probably been forced to find other employment, or learn 
new trades, to survive in the city. As I have shown, urban dwellers were much more interested in grain doles 
and tangible material relief 
For example, when he returned from Africa, large numbers of people living outside Rome and in Italy 
travelled to Rome to solicit his aid and support him. Their numbers were so large that it prompted the senate 
to instruct the consul to evict from the city all those not Romans (Plut., CG 12). 
support base whose help proved decisive in the consular competition, defeating more noble 
c o n t e n d e r s . A g r e s t e s were also influential in making sure Marius was assigned Numidia 
as his province; the senate gave it to Metellus, but the tribune T. Manlius Mancinus usurped 
the traditional role of the senate in allocating provinces, and used a plebiscite to give 
Numidia to Marius so he could lead the war against Jugurtha.' '^' 
In the political violence of 100/99 BC, the rural-urban divide was again evident; a personal 
bodyguard of urbanites provided protection for Metellus as he went about the streets of 
Rome, suggesting the opposing interests were similarly uniform in representing the 
c o u n t r y s i d e . C o n f l i c t i n g rural and urban interests clearly animated the strife that 
accompanied the passage of Satuminus' controversial agrarian bill. As I have shown, 
agrestes benefited heavily from the law dividing captured Cimbric lands, and urbanites -
less able to take advantage of the opportunities it presented, excluded because they were 
not veterans, or angry at the amount set aside for non-citizens - opposed it in coalition with 
members of the senate. In particular, Satuminus proposed the distribution of part of the land 
to Marius' veterans of the recent Cimbric w a r s ; ' ' " these veterans were agrestes,and 
because they had fought for Marius and benefited directly from the land distribution, 
Satuminus relied on them especially to come to Rome and physically support the passage 
of the b i l l . ' ' ' ' Subsequently, there was fighting between urbanites armed with clubs, and 
Satuminus' supporters rallied from the countryside; the agrestes defeated the urbanites, and 
the law was passed by pure violence. '" ' ' When Marius finally acted against Satuminus 
under a state of emergency to suppress the insurrection on the Capitol, he sent his t r o o p s " " 
against a gang of armed men gathered from the countryside. '" ' Moreover, the inimicitia 
between Sulla and Marius was not only framed as a personal struggle, but also a contest 
between agrestes and the urban population of R o m e . ' " ' 
Sal., lug. 73; Lintott, 1992, p. 44. 
''''Sal, lug. 73. 
App.BC1.31. 
Which is surely one of the reasons why Marius formed the alliance w ith Satuminus in the first place: to 
help ensure his veterans would be looked after in regards to land. 
App., BC 1.29; Plut., Mar. 29. 
' ^ " G a b b a , 1976, p. 24. 
' " • 'App. , BC 1.29,30. 
Ironically, these troops were very possibly the same men who had, as individuals, earlier supported 
Satuminus when he needed physical coercion to help pass his agrarian law in the teeth of urbanite opposition. 
'"'App., BC\.32. 
Plut., Sull. 7. 
An element of symbolism also emerged in the political violence after 131 BC. Violence not 
only targeted individual political opponents or their supporters; nor was it framed entirely 
by the contest between urban and rural interests and their advocates. It also occasionally 
targeted the representatives and symbols of republican office and power: the magistrates 
and their accoutrements of office. Ti. Gracchus' partisans, for example, assailed their rivals 
during the violence accompanying his re-election in 133 BC; but they also attacked the 
lictors, and pointedly broke the symbols of consular power: the fasces and s t a v e s . I 
argue that this was a highly symbolic act of violence which had become anti-establishment 
as much as it was anti-factional. It anticipated what the soldiers of Sulla would do more 
than 30 years later on their way to Rome when confronted by two praetors: insulting them, 
breaking their symbols of office and stripping them of their senatorial t o g a s . I t was not 
the first time the supporters of Ti. Gracchus had physically manhandled a magistrate or his 
officers. In front of the assembled citizen body, they physically dragged the deposed 
tribune, M. Octavius, from the rostra after Ti. Gracchus controversially removed him from 
office by popular vote; he was saved from injury only by a group of wealthy men who 
rescued him from the agitated crowd. 
There were other instances of violence or threats targeting official representatives of 
republican power; it was not common, but it occurred enough after 133 BC to suggest that 
this type of attack on republican legitimacy was part of the new language of political 
violence. When Satuminus and his colleagues were killed in the violence of 100-99 BC, for 
example, a serving tribune, praetor and quaestor, all wearing the insignia of office, died.'^"' 
Furthermore, as we have seen, the viator of the tribune, M. Drusus, in 91 BC attacked the 
consul Philippus and nearly choked him to death for obstructing Drusus' controversial 
legislative package."'"^ Political opponents of Drusus in turn conspired to murder him in 
office over his support for a bill which extended Roman citizenship to the Italian allies. 
App., BC1 .15 . 
"^""Plut., TG 12. 
App., BC\32. 
Flor. 2.5. Lintott suggests Philippus may have threatened religious sanctions to halt the passage of the 
bills, but it is unclear if that occurred (Lintott, 1997, p. 186). Either way, it is sufficient for my point to record 
that a minor functionary physically attacked the highest magistrate of the Republic in public; a sign, I argue, 
of changing norms of behavior and attitudes to the role of physical violence in politics. What was unthinkable 
in public life 50 years before was now acceptable, at least in some quarters. 
They succeeded.''"^ The following year, equestrians surrounded and publically threatened 
with daggers a number of tribunes assembled in the comitia tributa who vetoed a 
colleague's bill which made it a crime to support Italian claims to citizenship. The threat of 
violence against serving magistrates worked; they carried the bill.'^"'' 
Lintott, in his discussion of violence in the late Republic, tabulates in detail instances of 
violence against serving magistrates after 133 BC, but missing from his analysis is an 
acknowledgement of the potent symbolism of this trend.'^"^ This is an important oversight; 
I argue that specific assaults on representatives of republican power evident amongst the 
broader landscape of political violence after 133 BC was a noteworthy sub-trend within the 
broader background of political violence. It meant that magistrates and their symbols of 
office were no longer exempt from violence or its threat; the traditional behavioural norms, 
anchored in the inviolability of magisterial office, had broken down. This fact was 
significant: if the army ever needed an example to encourage its denigration and destruction 
of the symbols of republican power in 88 BC, it could find it in the tribunate's defiance and 
obstructionism of the governing elite after 151 BC and, most particularly, in the targeting of 
representatives and symbols of republican power evident in the endemic political violence 
from 133 BC onwards. 
The Use of Soldiers in Political Violence: A Fatal Nexus 
The consular army that Sulla persuaded to accompany him to Rome in 88 BC was alike in 
most ways to armies that came before. Like the one P. Scipio used to defeat Hannibal at 
Zama, or the armies that subjugated Macedon, Sulla's army was highly efficient and 
effective against Rome's enemies. It had been formed to fight the Social War by the normal 
citizen levies in the traditional manner and, by 88 BC, the pressure and exigencies of war 
had hardened it. As with all consular armies, it contained its quota of allied contingents: a 
" " A p p . , BC1.36. 
"•"App. , BC1.37. 
For example, he draws out the above example of M. Drusus' viator attacking a consul. But the example is 
used as part of a broader discussion on how the senate responded to the use of force in single instances when 
they did not formally outlaw it. The significance of a minor functionary attacking a consul in public, what that 
said about the use of violence against representatives of the republican system of government, and what 
example it might have set for the future, is missing. 
Maurusian soldier serving in Sulla's army slew a Gaul from the opposing Italian army.'^"^ 
Like all citizen and allied soldiers before them, Sulla's men expected to profit from war.'®"' 
In all these ways, Sulla's army was unexceptional. 
Yet it was different in one significant way: Sulla's army also become regular killers of 
magistrates as no previous army had. On three different occasions, in the space of little over 
a year, his soldiers attacked the symbols and representatives of Republican power - twice 
lethally. In 89 BC, for example, legate and former consul, A. Postumius Albinus, was 
stoned to death by his mutinous soldiers when he called a contio:^^"^ at the time of his 
death, he was Sulla's legate besieging Pompeii, while Sulla was at nearby Stabiae with the 
remainder of the army: three legions.'®"' It was a significant act: the first time a Roman 
commander was killed by his men for more than three c e n t u r i e s . T h e excuse his soldiers 
used was treason,'®" but hatred earned by arrogance and cruelty probably provided an 
important impetus.'®'^ A proven record of incompetence and disregard for the welfare of 
soldiers must also have played a part. In 109 BC, during the war against Jugurtha, without 
permission or Rome's knowledge, he had embarked on a campaign in the middle of winter 
to capture Jugurtha's treasury, as legate left in charge of the African army by his consul 
brother, Sp. Postumius Albinus.'®'^ The campaign was a disaster. '"' ' In freezing conditions, 
he led his army onto marshy terrain, was outmaneuvered by Jugurtha, surprised by a night 
attack, and forced to surrender; the humiliated army was freed only after it passed under the 
"•""^App., BC1 .50 . 
Sulla's soldiers clearly expected to profit from war. As I have shown in Chapters One and Three above, 
the conventional explanation for their political intervention was mercenary concern, apparently encouraged by 
Sulla, that they would miss out on the booty to be gained in a war against Mithridates in the lucrative east 
p., BC1.57) . 
' Liv., Per. 75; Oros. 5.18.22; Plut., Sull. 6. This was the descendant of P. Regillensis who died in similar 
circumstances during a mutiny in 414 BC (Liv. 4.50). See Chapter Six above. 
Plin. A^ar. 3.70. 
Ironically, P. Regillensis, Albinus' ancestor, was killed in the unsuccessful mutiny of 414 BC. 
" " Liv., Per. 75. Livy says Albinus was discredited for treason and this led to his death at the hands of his 
soldiers. With Livy, there are no details on what sort of treason or the circumstances of his death. See also 
Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 106. 
Oros. 5.18. Keaveney argues for a slightly different interpretation: Albinus died while making a heavy-
handed attempt to impose discipline (Keaveney, 2007, pp. 77 and 78). Chrissanthos argues that the soldiers 
were probably ill-disciplined and unused to military service (Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 106). This is 
unconvincing: there was nothing to suggest that these soldiers were any less experienced than Sulla's other 
soldiers. 
" " Sal., lug. 37 f f Postumius had gone to Rome to conduct the consular election for 109 BC. 
Jugurtha was well aware of Albinus' arrogance and incompetence; he took advantage of these traits to 
undermine the army's morale and place it in an impossible tactical position (Sal., lug. 38). 
yoke.'^'^ This record would have been known to his men before Pompeii in 89 BC and 
influential in their decision to mutiny; it confirmed his avarice, disregard for his men, 
incompetence and dishonourable conduct. After Albinus' death, Sulla re-incorporated these 
soldiers back into his army. 
I argue that the soldiers did not murder Albinus from a misplaced belief that Sulla would 
condone or encourage it; on the contrary, Sulla was not personally commanding the soldiers 
when they acted, nor was he physically present. Moreover, he considered the crime a 
serious transgression that could only be expiated by enemy b l o o d . F r o m their reactions, 
the men also expected to be punished, and there were those who urged Sulla to do just 
that.'®" But although he did not encourage the initial act, Sulla subsequently chose not to 
punish them. By doing so, he helped reinforce the message that civil strife of previous 
decades had taught: it was not only acceptable to kill magistrates, it was an effective 
solution to difficulties, and there were unlikely to be any consequences from the state in 
retaliation.'®'^ He simply asked them to atone for their crime by bravery in battle against 
the former Italian a l l i e s . "" Sulla's soldiers had acquired a deadly disrespect for the 
" " Sal., lug. 38. Albinus' blundering resulted in the Mamilian Commission to investigate the conduct of the 
war; his brother took the blame and was exiled (Sal., lug. 40). See also Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 102. 
Plut., Sull. 6; Oros. 5.18.23. There is no evidence to indicate, as might be suggested, that this act of 
violence was incited by Sulla's nature as a commander, who, for example, might have condoned such 
violence against state representatives for his own political ends. When it occurred, Sulla was a fully compliant 
magistrate of the Republic, fighting to defeat a serious existential threat to the state, with no personal history 
of encouraging such extreme measures on the part of his soldiers, and nothing to suggest that he secretly 
encouraged his men to act accordingly. It would only be later, in 88 BC, after the sobering experience of 
nearly being killed by his political opponents on the streets of Rome in the manner of the Gracchi, that he 
resorted to the army in the time-honoured tradition as the final source of authority and legitimacy, and stepped 
beyond the bounds of what was considered conventional political behavior. Even when he had done that, and 
seized Rome, he was scrupulously careful to keep a tight rein on the behaviour of his soldiers on the streets, 
punishing looters and enforcing strict discipline (App., BC 1.59). 
Plut., Sull 6; Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 107. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 78. Chrissanthos, 2001, pp. 109 and 110. Chrissanthos calls this event one of the most 
important in Roman history (Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 101). I agree with his sentiment: it is an event that has not 
attracted much scholarship; Keaveney does cover it superficially, but does not make a link between political 
violence. As I have shown above, it was significant in that it was the first commander killed by his men in 
more than three centuries. 1 will argue that it was no accident that this occurred at a time when political 
violence in public discourse had become a norm. 
" " Oros. 5.18.22. The reason he did this was not clear. He did not need to show mercy out of fear: he had 
three legions at his disposal at Stabiae. Plutarch says he did it because he knew he needed the soldiers in the 
looming confrontation with Marius (Plut., Sull. 6). This is unconvincing: Sulla at this point cannot have 
known what Marius would do more than a year later, or that he would be forced to flee for his life to the army 
after Sulpicius' violent passage of the bill relieving Sulla of his command against Mithridates. There was 
simply too much spontaneity involved in that event to ascribe prescience to Sulla's apparent leniency in 89 
BC. But it may not have been leniency at work at all. Keaveney says Plutarch may have "spluttered in 
indignation" at Sulla's response, but says that Frontinus, a soldier, was impressed with the way Sulla handled 
the men (Keaveney, 2007, p. 78). While it is not at all clear the relevant passage in Frontinus was referring to 
symbols and representatives of republican power: a year later, they again used stones 
outside Nola to kill magistrates sent from Rome to take over the army.'^^" Moreover, on the 
way to Rome, they stripped two intercepting praetors of their senatorial togas, insulted 
them, and broke their fasces, symbols of Roman republican power.''^' They were lucky to 
escape: the soldiers initially meant to kill, but Sulla may have interceded.'"^ The sight of 
magistrates in Rome stripped of their insignia nevertheless had a useful effect, producing 
despondency among Sulla's enemies. 
1 argue that it was no accident that Sulla's soldiers began killing magistrates and showing 
disrespect for their insignia of office, and that the army subsequently interfered in politics, 
at the same time as endemic violence emerged to permeate political discourse. The two 
factors were causally related. 1 have, for example, shown that as far back as 151 BC, the 
army was at the centre of growing tension between ordinary citizens, the tribunate and the 
governing elite over the levy. The army's interests, or interests of the agrestes from which 
the army primarily recruited, were also major components of reform packages proposed by 
revolutionary tribunes that generated endemic political violence from 131 BC onwards. 
Furthermore, I have shown that agrestes were from the outset thus involved heavily in the 
new political violence supporting the agrarian reforms of obstructionist and revolutionary 
tribunes in their argument with the governing elite, and fought with rival urbanites for 
political reasons.'^'" Moreover, Roman consular armies were recruited primarily from the 
countryside; at its heart, the consular army was thus a predominantly rural institution.'^^' 
The link between countryside and military service, for example, was famously evident in 
the origins of the veteran centurion, Spurius Ligustinus, whom 1 have mentioned several 
Albinus' murder in 89 BC (Fron., Str, 1.9), Keaveney draws our attention to the useful example of a mutiny 
that occurred in the Italian army during the First World War: the ring leaders were condemned but sent to the 
front to redeem themselves (Keaveney, 2007, p. 132). Sulla's response may not, in the light of this example, 
be seen as a lax or irresponsible act, but rather as a crafty and acceptable way to handle what was a difficult 
situation. It apparently worked: Orosius tells us Sulla's army entered battle determined to succeed or die in 
the attempt. They routed the enemy Italian army (Oros. 5.18.23). 
Plut., Sull. 9; V.Max. 9.7. 
Plut., SM//. 9; App., S C 1.57. 
Plutarch's account of the incident, for example, suggested the soldiers would have gladly killed the 
praetors, but something stopped them; in the language, there is definite sense of action being interrupted 
(Plut., Sull. 9). It was then that they contented themselves with showing disrespect for the symbols of 
republican power and office. 
Plut., Sull. 9. 
This is a point not lost on Lintott in his analysis of violence in republican Rome (Lintott, 1999(b), p. 74). 
Gabba, 1976, p. 24. Nicolet, 1980, p. 132. See also Chapter Two above. 
times in chapters above:'"® by 171 BC, he had completed 22 years of active service all 
over the Mediterranean and made primus pilus, but he was also an agrestis, bom just before 
the Second Punic War on a small Sabine peasant holding.'®^' More than 70 years later, the 
dominance of agrestes was still evident in the demographic makeup of Marius' veterans 
who defeated the Germanic tribesmen. Satuminus' most loyal advocates for his agrarian 
bill, and the men on which he subsequently most relied, came from the country because 
they had fought for Marius in the Cimbric wars.'®^^ Such an institution, drawing heavily 
from agrestes, was thus probably interested in a political discourse which had as one of its 
central themes a struggle between urban and rural interests, and it is reasonable to conclude 
that it wanted to get involved. The enthusiasm with which Marius' veterans supported 
Satuminus' agrarian bill in 100 BC against urbanite opposition, for example, was a sure 
indication of a strong interest in political matters where economic interests were directly 
involved.'" ' 
It therefore follows that, as part of the broader mral support base, individual soldiers were 
directly involved in, exposed to, or conducted, political violence. 1 will suggest that they 
saw first-hand the re-assertion of the revolutionary character of the tribunate and its conflict 
with the goveming elite, as well as being exposed to - and on several occasions, involved 
in - the senate's violent response which suppressed the reform programs of populist 
tribunes who threatened the political balance. 1 argue that soldiers could not be thus 
exposed and be unchanged by the experience:'®^® involvement provided a ready conduit by 
which the army became acquainted with political violence, leamt that it was effective in 
For example, in Chapter Four above. 
Liv. 42.34. Alston, 2007, p. 178. For more on the link between the rural population and military service, 
especially the importance of land distributions to veterans who had served many consecutive years and the 
affect this had on their farms, see de Ligt's excellent discussion (De Ligt, 2012, pp. 150-154). See Chapter 
Two above. 
App., BC1 .29 . 
' " ' G a b b a , 1976, pp. 24-25. 
The important point to remember here is that the citizen-militia, and military service at the time, was not 
disconnected from Roman society, as the standing, fiilly professional legions of the later imperial period may 
have been (see Chapter Two above). Major societal themes that affected citizens and allies could also resonate 
with the army; as I have shown, there were instances of the army mutinying against the state for political or 
societal causes, as well as for reasons about incompetence, harsh treatment or an insufficient share in the 
material booty that war provided. In other words, the violence that became part of political discourse did not 
happen in the abstract, far from the citizen-soldier, with the army hermetically sealed off from its 
implications, convulsions and influences. Rather, the army was of society and its citizen-soldier members 
were intimately connected to the ongoing civilian political process and the big political questions of the day. 
In this context, it is reasonable to think that the chances of soldiers being exposed to such tumultuous civil 
events that generated the emergence of political violence were high. 
forcing political change, and - most importantly - habituated to its normative use in public 
life. Moreover, civil strife exposed soldiers on occasion to examples of violence, targeting 
not only political rivals, but also republican symbols and representatives of power. 1 assert 
that these types of attacks, such as breaking the fasces or assassinating serving magistrates, 
were too specific and loaded with too much symbolism,'^'' to have been coincidental: it is 
plausible to think, for example, that when Sulla's army broke the praetors' fasces and 
stripped them of praetorial insignia outside Rome, it was incited by examples from earlier 
civil strife, such as the partisans of Ti. Gracchus who attacked and broke the consuls'^aicei 
during the violence accompanying his re-election.'"^ 
The consequence of all this is critical to the question: where did the army learn that it was 
not only acceptable to begin intervening directly in politics, but that it was also highly 
effective? 1 argue that it was on the streets of Rome, in the political struggles between rural 
and urban gangs, that the army, already inclined by tradition to political activism and 
insubordination, was indoctrinated and habituated to the use of endemic political violence, 
and was thus made more receptive to a request for intervention from a Marius or a Sulla. Of 
course, this effect cannot be known categorically; the voices of the actors themselves, the 
soldiers, are silent in much of the literary tradition that we have inherited. Nevertheless, 
there is a strong circumstantial case to be made that draws a direct line between the 
experience of witnessing the new endemic civil violence, engaging in violent behaviour in 
the political sphere, and the army subsequently acting in an unprecedented manner by 
involving itself in politics. In the absence of perfect understanding, therefore, the evidence 
for this process becomes the changing - and out of character - behaviour of the soldiers 
themselves which betrays their mindset; from habitually killing magistrates'"' and 
Nippel emphasises the symbolic role of the Uctors and the fasces, arguing that the breaking of the fasces 
sent a strong symbolic signal: the de facto deposition of a magistrate or a demonstrative disregard of the 
magistrate's authority (Nippel, 1984, p. 23). While 1 accept the first consequence, my emphasis remains on 
the latter: in short, what it said about the attitude towards the magistrate's official power. Nippel reaches the 
right conclusion in my analysis. The Uctors themselves, walking in single file before the magistrate, had no 
real functional role: they could not provide personal protection to their magistrate arranged like that, and the 
tribune's intercessional powers on the behalf of citizens to prevent physical punishment with rod and axe 
rendered the physical coercion role largely mute. What was left was the potent symbolism of the rods and axe, 
and the symbolic power of life and death the magistrate wielded over individual citizens: it was this, and their 
authority, that the soldiers attacked when they targeted the insignia of the magistrate. 
App . ,BC1 .15 . 
The emphasis here is on 'habitually' attacking magistrates and their symbols of power. As 1 have shown 
in Chapter Six above, mutiny and insubordination against the state were part of the army's inherited and 
known tradition, and once before, in 414 BC, a magistrate had been killed by his soldiers (Liv. 4.49; Zon. 
I l l 
a t t a ck ing thei r s y m b o l s o f p o w e r , to the u l t ima te demons t r a t i on o f c h a n g i n g v i e w s on the 
u s e o f m i h t a r y p o w e r and its p l a c e in the pol i t ical sys tem: c i t izens f o r m e d in leg ions 
in t e rven ing d i rec t ly in po l i t i cs fo r the first t i m e in the R e p u b l i c ' s h is tory. 
So ld ie r s and Pol i t ica l V io l ence : L e a r n i n g Les sons Ind iv idua l lv 
Lin to t t in h i s d i scuss ion o f v io l ence in the late Repub l i c a rgues that the re is little d o u b t that 
s t r i fe in the c i ty w a s the first s tep to civil war : it p repared the g round psycho log ica l ly , wh i l e 
the t rans i t ion f r o m fighting w i th g a n g s in the s t reets to fighting wi th a r m i e s in the field is 
essen t ia l ly o n e o f s c a l e . ' " " Lintot t is r ight in h i s i n s t i n c t s . ' " ^ Taci tus , in his in t roduct ion to 
the h i s to ry o f the R e p u b l i c ' s civil wars , t raced the or ig ins o f civil w a r b a c k to s t ruggles 
b e t w e e n the g o v e r n i n g eli te, unru ly t r i bunes and o rd ina ry c i t i z ens ; ' ' ' ^ the re w e r e , he wro te , 
trial r u n s fo r it in the city and f o r u m . B o t h Lintot t and Taci tus , howeve r , unde res t ima te 
the po in t abou t scale; I sugges t that it is no smal l s tep f r o m g a n g v io lence to so ld iers 
w i l l i ng to fo rce a pol i t ica l so lu t ion on the state, and in do ing so, risk civil war . Such a shif t 
7.20). But, as 1 have argued, this was an aberration for most of the life of the Republic: another magistrate 
would not be killed by the army until 89 BC, and then from that point onwards, it occurred with a regularity in 
Sulla's army which, I argue, was unusual. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the change of behavior 
occurred by the start of the first century BC - and certainly by 89 BC. 
" " Lintott, 1999(b), p. 1. Lintott also argues defeat in street battles in the city provided the provocation for a 
man to resort to war. This is unconvincing: agrestes were more often than not likely to benefit from the 
reform programs of revolutionary tribunes; the agrarian bills of Ti. Gracchus, his brother C. Gracchus, and 
Satuminus, all contained provisions which clearly benefited veterans on the land, or those who had the 
agrarian skills and knowledge to take advantage of the opportunity. In the case of Satuminus' agrarian bill, as 
I have shown above, Marius' veterans were specifically catered for: the bill passed and was enacted. They did 
not lose out in this arrangement. When the moment of crisis came, and Sulla's soldiers decided to march on 
Rome in 88 BC, the interests of the army had not recently suffered a major defeat or reversal in political 
violence in Rome. Nor had the agrestes, which made up the majority of his army, been worsted in any way in 
recent street violence; most people were busy focused at that time on defeating the very serious threat to the 
Republic fi-om the Italian confederation. From the perspective of political violence, then, there was no 
provocation; we must look to other reasons to explain the decision of the soldiers to support Sulla and 
intervene (which, of course, is the raison d'etre of this thesis). 
The argument that Lintott makes here about violence preparing the ground psychologically, is one with 
which 1 strongly agree: as I have argued, my argument rests of the ability of political violence through 
exposure and involvement to change concepts among soldiers and citizens regarding the use of military force 
in the civil sphere. 
It is not clear here if he is referring to the original struggles of the Conflict of the Orders, or the outbreak 
of civil strife during the second half of the second century BC and into the first century BC. Ash favours the 
Conflict of the Orders (Ash, 2010, p. 124). 1 prefer the later time period; as I have shown, the original 
struggles between the ruling elite and ordinary citizens did not lead to large scale, endemic political violence, 
whereas the second outbreak in 131 BC did, and Tacitus immediately follows this phrase with a comment 
about violence in the city and forum (Tac., Hist. 2.38). For my purposes, however, this is of less importance: 
the important point is that Tacitus saw violence in the city as a precursor to civil war. 
" " Tac., Hist. 2.38. This is obviously an oblique reference to political violence which accompanied conflict 
between revolutionary tribunes, the ruling elite and ordinary citizens; it was a precursor to civil war (on this 
point, see also Ash, 2010, pp. 123 and 124). 
requires a cogent explanation of how civil strife could produce such soldiers, but Lintott 
does not provide a convincing one."'® I thus argue that for political violence to have 
prepared the ground p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , i t was necessary for a direct connection to have 
existed between military service and the emergence of civil strife. In particular, exposure 
and habituation could only occur if the opportunity existed for soldiers to be in places 
where violence took place; it is more difficult to learn its lessons, or become habituated to 
its use, if one is not directly exposed or involved. 
I propose that that connection, and those opportunities, existed. The army may have 
intervened in politics as a formed institution most obviously in 88 BC; the same cannot be 
said for its component parts: individual citizen-soldiers and their allied counterparts. As 
Nicolet points out, civil war was only the most extreme form of a pervasive presence 
whereby the army had made its weight felt in politics without actually fighting.As 1 
have shown, the agrestes that formed the army were interested in the political struggle 
between rural and urban interests that manifested itself as violence. Populist tribunes relied 
heavily on the support of agrestes; they were involved in political violence fighting 
urbanites. As a ready-made pool of men who knew how to wield a sword and handle 
themselves in a fight, it is reasonable to think that, from the outset, there were individual 
soldiers amongst the gangs of agrestes. I thus argue that soldiers were involved in civil 
strife as private citizens, or members of allied rural communities, decades before the army 
intervened: this is how they were habituated and desensitised to the use of violence. The 
agrarian bill of Ti. Gracchus in 133 BC, for example, benefited citizen and Italian 
agrestes:^^'*^ they came in from the fields to support Gracchus' struggle to pass his 
legislation,'^"^ and subsequently fought for his re-election in the violence that followed. It 
is inconceivable that their number did not include serving soldiers on leave or veterans. It 
Instead, he succumbs to the conventional explanation: the poor fought in gang fights and subsequent civil 
war for the simple reason of bribes (Lintott, 1999(b), p. 2). 
' ' ' ' Which I agree occurred. 
Nicolet, 1980, p. 140. In support of Nicolet 's point, I have shown already that the army in the field was 
able, on occasion, to exercise its right as citizens and influence political events in Rome by writing to friends 
and families advocating a particular political candidate, in my example, Marius during his campaign to get 
elected as consul; see Chapter Six above. 
App., BC 1.10 ff; Konrad, 2006, p. 168. It is also worth pointing out in this regard that Ti. Gracchus 
intended to parcel out the legacy of the King of Pergamum to the recipients of the redistributed land to help 
them re-stock and till the fields. It was certainly in the financial interests of many agrestes, or those in the city 
with the skills and knowledge who were considering returning to the land, to support Gracchus (Plut., TG 14). 
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was in their financial interests to ensure Ti. Gracchus' reforms passed; the bill had, in large 
part, been designed specifically for them and included other provisions which benefited 
citizens and Italians in military service.'^'*' It proposed, for example, a provision which 
reduced the time required for military service.'^"" Meanwhile, other Italian veterans were 
vitally interested in the bill, but for different reasons. In 129 BC, those who stood to lose 
land, or were being sued, chose their former commander, P. Aemilianus,''"^ to represent 
their grievances about the land redistribution. Aemilianus felt he could not refuse them 
because they had rendered such good service during previous wars.'^''^ Agrestes, soldiers 
and their interests, on both sides, were thus inextricably bound up with Ti. Gracchus' 
reform; this placed them circumstantially at the centre of this struggle. 
In relation to 133 BC, I must rely on circumstantial evidence. For the civil strife of 101 BC 
- 99 BC, there is direct evidence of individual soldiers involved in - and conducting -
political violence. Marius' soldiers, for example, killed Satuminus' rival and legally-elected 
tribune, A. Nunnius,'^"" during the assembly holding the tribunate elections in 101 BC.'^ "*^ 
Soldiers had both the opportunity and motive: the army was in Rome for the triumph it won 
Perhaps the most famous of Ti. Gracchus' remarks that indicated this focus was the statement he made 
about the beasts that roamed over Italy and all had a lair or cave, but that in contrast, the Roman and Italian 
soldiers who did the fighting and dying to protect the state, did not have a home or farm to support 
themselves, and wandered about Italy with their families. Apart from suggesting that the minimum property 
qualification needed to serve in legions had, by this time, sunk to such a low level that there was little to 
distinguish the lowest of the propertied class from the mass of poor, it also shows the motivation behind 
Gracchus' agrarian reform (Plut., TG 9). See also Stockton for further detail on Gracchus' focus and 
motivation (Stockton, 1979, p. 40). Gracchus' motivation, and the legitimacy of the agrarian problem the 
literary tradition espoused as preserved by Appian and Plutarch, has been the subject of some speculation: for 
example, Lintott, 1992, pp. 53-57. In the most recent analysis, however, de Ligt argues for the validity of Ti. 
Gracchus' concern about the number of agrestes that were sliding into rural poverty, and the effect that was 
having on Rome 's ability to recruit for the army (given the minimum property qualification required to serve 
in the legions: already very low by 133 BC, but still a barrier to the very poor). In his exhaustive study of 
population in the Republic released in 2012, he argues that many families would have welcomed the 
opportunity to send sons away to the army given the opportunities for booty and economic enrichment 
campaigning traditionally provided. Thus, the scaling down of military operations fi-om 167 BC onwards 
would have been seen as a negative development, reducing household incomes and placing more rural 
families below the minimum property threshold. According to de Ligt, the advantage of this hypothesis was 
that it provided a credible explanation for the poverty that worried Gracchus so much. In the end, de Ligt 
takes seriously the Gracchan concern, and there is no good reason to doubt him in this (de Ligt, 2012, pp. 
168-170). 
Plut., TG 16. 
Scipio subsequently died mysteriously soon after his deposition to the senate on behalf of the Italian 
veterans; it is not clear if he was murdered, committed suicide, or died of natural causes. Appian speculates 
that his feud with the Gracchi was the cause, or that interests who didn't want the agrarian law abolished or 
tampered with committed murder (App., BC 1.20). 
' " ' A p p . , S C 1.19. 
'Nonius ' in Plut., Mar. 29, and in App., BC 1.28. 
Liv., Per. 69. 
for defeating Germanic tribesmen that year,'^"' and Marius allied with Satuminus to 
advance his political agenda.'"" During the political violence of 100 BC associated with 
Satuminus, soldiers were again involved.''^' Marius released them from service so they 
could mingle with civilians in the civic assemblies to provide the coercion needed to 
overcome urbanite opposition to Satuminus' legislation.'^" I have already shown that these 
soldiers subsequently fought against urbanites to pass the bill by violence; their number 
almost certainly included allied soldiers as well as citizens. These incidents are significant: 
serving soldiers were categorically placed in time and space at specific moments in the 
history of Roman political discourse where violence was a decisive factor, and they 
participated directly. An opportunity was provided for these soldiers to take back to the 
citizen-militia new ideas about the role of violence in forcing political change.'''^ 1 argue 
that it was also reasonable to think that the experience taught the soldiers who were 
involved that violence was not only a normative part of political expression, but that it was 
an effective response to political difficulties. Later on, individual soldiers had a chance to 
consolidate these lessons. In 91 BC, tribune Dmsus used Italians to force through his 
legislation. Most were agrestes who stood to benefit from his agrarian provisions; as in 133 
BC and 100 BC, soldiers, or veterans, were likely amongst them.'^''' Furthermore, during 
the struggle between Sulla and Marius, the tribune Sulpicius went around Rome with an 
informal retinue of 3,000 supporters armed with s w o r d s . T h a t number of men was the 
better part of a republican legion, and while I am not suggesting it was a formed legion, it is 
also highly unlikely that its makeup did not include numbers of veterans whose weapons 
handling skills and knowledge of fighting would have made them attractive recruits. 
Plut., Mar. 24,27; Nicolet, 1980, p. 141. 
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Shorter uses the involvement of Marius' soldiers in this violence as evidence of the growing politicisation 
of the army, assisted by Marius" 107 recruiting reform which abolished the minimum property qualification, 
and allowed landless men into the army. Shotter argues that the inherent danger to the Republic was evident 
in these episodes; the army was involved in politics for its own interests in ensuring its veterans got land 
(Shorter, 2005, p.38). It is an unconvincing argument. As I have shown in Chapter Four above, Marius" 
recruitment reform did not result in a sudden influx of poor and landless into the army: this event has 
consistently been overstated, and Shorter continues the trend. Furthermore, the soldiers were there to support 
Satuminus with the express support of Marius, and were not threatening the state. It is significant that when 
they had to turn on Marius"s partner a little under a year later, and suppress Satuminus and his supporters, 
they obeyed orders and did so. They seemed to have been well controlled. 
Plut., Mar. 28; Liv., Per. 69; App., S C l . 2 9 , 3 1 ; Oros. 5.17. See also Flower, 2010(a), p. 77. 
Marius" consular army in 101 BC was still formed and nearby waiting for the triumph when the soldiers 
assisted Satuminus. An ideal opportunity existed, therefore, for the soldiers involved in the violence to return 
to the ranks and spread their experiences among the army. 
Liv., Per . 71. 
Plut., Sull. 8. 
Soldiers and Political Violence: The Threat and Use of Whole Units 
I have shown through direct evidence and circumstantial argumentation that serving 
soldiers or veterans were part of political violence in Rome long before 88 BC; in most 
cases, they participated as individuals. But the threat, if not the actuality, of intervention 
and violence by whole armies also became a feature of inimicitiae between magistrates 
during this period, and part of the political landscape. In the aftermath of the victory over 
the Cimbri at Vercellae in 101 BC, for example, there was tension between the legions of 
Marius and the proconsul, Q. Lutatius Catulus: together, they had destroyed the Cimbric 
army.'^'^ But a serious dispute between the soldiers arose over which army deserved to take 
battle honours:'^" Catulus and his soldiers in the centre, or Marius and his legions on the 
wings? The two sides could not agree; an impartial embassy from the Italian town of Parma 
was asked to arbitrate. They decided in favour of Marius, but he nevertheless celebrated a 
joint triumph because of his fear of Catulus' legions drawn up and ready to use in case their 
general was deprived of his honour.'^^® 
Sherwin-White argues that Marius voluntarily agreed to share the triumph with Catulus, 
and that this, inter alia, was evidence of his compliant integration into the governing 
e l i t e . B u t Shenvin-White's thesis is unconvincing. An arbiter was needed to break the 
deadlock, which suggests that Marius remained unmoved by Catulus' claim; it would be 
strange to then voluntarily concede in the absence of some sort of external pressure. I argue 
instead that the threat of conflict between the contending armies, in a way not previously 
seen, nor on such a scale, was unambiguous. Catulus' men identified closely with their 
general; they carved his name, for example, into their spear shafts, and were serious about 
backing his claim.""'" Marius' men presumably identified as closely with him, and were as 
determined; it was the subsequent risk of fighting that forced Marius to change his mind, 
and reluctantly agree to share the public glory with Catulus. I argue that for that to have 
occurred, and presuming that Marius did not relent out of the goodness of his heart, there 
Plut., Mar. 26; Plut., Suit. 8. 
" " The question of who deserved battle honours after a victory was evidently a serious business in the 
Roman army; in this case, the two sides refused to back down over who had done more to defeat the 
tribesmen. Winning battle honours meant the possibility of a triumph, with all its attendant public glory and 
chances for further donatives from the commanding general. 
Plut., Mar. 27. 
Sherwin-White, 1956, p. 4. 
Plut., Mar. 27. 
must have been something substantial behind the t h r e a t : a n army determined to use 
force to bacic up its claim to a bigger share in the victory over the Cimbri. The threat of 
organised military violence thus became a factor in public life during this period on at least 
one occasion prior to Sulla's intervention. It is only one example, but Catulus' soldiers must 
have been willing to risk fighting fellow citizens to make the threat effective; I suggest that 
it was as significant a marker of changed political discourse as the actual use of violence in 
civil strife. It was only a relatively short step from threatening military force, to using it in 
actuality; the effect on changing individual behavior, and in the precedents it set, amounted 
to much the same. 
Beyond the threat of conflict between armies, it was not only individual soldiers who 
participated in civil strife. There is also circumstantial evidence to suggest that the state 
used formed elements of the army to quell political unrest, exposing and indoctrinating 
whole sections of it to the use of violence in a political context - but we first have to go 
back to the familiar violence that ended the career of C. Gracchus in 121 BC to see it. As 
we have seen, in 133 BC, a mob of senators and their attendants led by the pontifex 
maximus, P. Scipio Nasica, killed Gracchus' brother, Ti. Gracchus, scattered his supporters, 
and suppressed his sedition, in spontaneous attack after the consul, P. Mucius Scaevola, 
pointedly refused to kill citizens without a t r i a l . T h e state did not authorise the action, 
nor were state weapons or troops used; a private citizen and his supporters, exasperated at 
the refusal of the consul to act, attacked another private citizen in the tradition of defending 
the state from perceived tyranny.'^^^ In 121 BC, however, the situation was different: C. 
Gracchus and Flaccus, who as tribunes pursued an agenda which challenged the authority 
of the senate and the political status quo, were private citizens when they died. But they 
were killed as enemies of the state; this was much more like civil war."'^'' When they and 
their supporters seized the Aventine in armed i n s u r r e c t i o n , t h e state declared an 
Which, I contend, was unhkely, given that Marius and his soldiers could not agree in the first place to 
allow a bigger part in the victory to Catulus and his legions. The fact that a third party was called in to decide 
the matter hints at the intractability of the matter, and suggests it was something else which persuaded Marius; 
that 'something else' was the threat of violence between the contending legions. 
App., BC1.16; Plut., TG 19; Shotter, 2005, p. 33; Konrad, 2006, pp. 169 and 170;Nippel, 1984, p. 26. 
Flower, 2010(a), p. 76. See this chapter above for more on the cultural tradition of private citizens acting 
in defense of the Republic. 
"^"Flower, 2010(a), p. 76. 
App . ,BC1.26 ;P lu t . , CG 14. 
emergency'^ ' ' - a senatus consultum ultimum - and authorised the consul, Opimius, to 
suppress the sedition. 
I argue that it is likely Opimius needed considerable military force to overcome the 
insurrection; up to 3,000 insurgents were killed in the fighting and immediate aftermath, 
indicating numerous defenders. '^" Moreover, since 456 BC, ordinary citizens built their 
houses and temples on the Aventine,'^^^ and the defenders fortified several of them."^'' 
Fighting in such urban environments was notoriously difficult; sizeable numbers of 
determined defenders in barricaded buildings could prove hard to overcome.'^™ Indeed, the 
description by Orosius of the battle to retake the Aventine, if we can believe it, suggested 
just such difficuhies:'^" fierce fighting, the outcome confused and uncertain for a long 
time, and defenders using fortified houses and temples as they slowly retreated, which 
required government forces to break in.""'^ It is not known explicitly what sort of armed 
force was used by Opimius. According to the literary tradition, he assembled senators, 
equestrians and their slaves, constituting numerous men-at-arms;'^'^ there was also a force 
of Cretan archers."''" Sherwin-White argues that Opimius used a posse of knights to attack 
and eliminate the two leaders of the plebeians.' ' '^ Flower focuses on the presence of 
foreign troops; Opimius relied on the foreign archers because Roman troops were normally 
It was the first time the senate had issued the senatus consultum ultimum, the 'ultimate decree'. See 
Stoclcton's informative analysis of its legal status and meaning: he concludes that it did not actually confer 
any extra-legal powers upon the consul charged to deal with the crisis, as a consul acting in this manner 
already had all the powers he needed to respond effectively, including using the army. But it was important 
because it was a formal acknowledgement and authorisation to act to solve the emergency, and it reinforced 
his authority, strengthened his resolve, and armed him with a plausible defence should he later be called to 
account in the courts for his actions during the emergency (Stockton, 1979, p. 199). 
" " P l u t . , C G 1 7 . 
' " ' S t o c k t o n , 1979, p. 196. 
App . ,BC 1.26; Oros. 5.12. 
In 88 BC, Sulla's soldiers - experienced, hardened and familiar with combat - found out just how hard 
street fighting could be: residents in Rome used roofs and narrow alleyways to pelt the soldiers with stones 
and missiles. Only the threat of fire forced them to stop before the Sullans gained control of the situation 
(App., BC 1.58; Plut., Sull. 9). 
The descriptions of the battle as related by Appian, Livy and Plutarch are cursory; only Orosius provides 
detail. He is, of course, writing in the late-Imperial period, far in time and space from the events he describes. 
But the details of the fighting as he relates the incident, with its sense of closed-in urban combat, are 
convincing, given what we can deduce about the probable nature of the conflict, and opens the possibility that 
he was drawing on some source unavailable to the others (or, of course, simply elaborating his own account). 
Oros. 5.12. 
" " Plut., CG 15; App., B C I . 2 6 ; Liv., Per. 61. 
' " "P lu t . , CG 16. 
" " Sherwin-White, 1956, p. 5. 
not allowed to enter the city under arms."^^ None of these explanations are convincing: it 
was far from a normal situation,'^" and the job of evicting from a densely populated urban 
environment a group of armed, determined and fortified defenders that almost certainly 
included hardened veterans, was not a job for hastily armed and untrained slaves, aging 
senators or enthusiastic city equestrians. Moreover, archers, as effective as they were in 
open terrain, were much less useful in an urban environment where fighting was at close 
quarters, and plenty of shelter existed from arrows - even assuming targets conveniently 
presented themselves in bunched groups to be shot at. Arrows alone were not sufficient; 
troops needed to engage at close quarters to physically clear streets, houses and temples. 
The most obvious force of trained, armed and well-organised men thus available to a consul 
at short notice during a state emergency were the legions raised as normal that year. 
Opimius' force may have included senators, equestrians and archers, but 1 argue that it was 
plausible he also used elements of the army for the difficult task of retaking the Aventine. 
There was nothing approaching a police force upon which the consul could draw;'^'^ unless 
he used a mob of street fighters, the army was the only other sizeable and organised armed 
force immediately available. He had enough time to summon them. The presence of Cretan 
archers suggested troops were pre-positioned; ' '" there is nothing to indicate Cretan archers 
were habitually stationed in Rome. It is therefore likely that he brought them to Rome 
beforehand when trouble seemed imminent; at the same time, the opportunity existed to 
summon accompanying infantry. Moreover, I suggest that the very presence of archers in 
the city suggested that infantry units were also involved. The military system did not use 
Flower, 2010(a), p. 77; Flower, 2010(b), pp. 86 and 87. The archers certainly played their part in the 
battle: Orosius wrote that fighting was fierce and hung in the balance for a long time, but that archers sent in 
by Opimius helped tip the fighting in favour of the consul's men (Oros. 5.12). Flower makes much of the 
presence of Cretan archers in both her volumes, but only in as much as they symbolise the extent to which the 
violence had descended by the use of foreign troops to kill Roman citizens (for example, Flower, 2010(b), p. 
86). This may be so, but she misses in her discussion of the violence the traditional connection between the 
presence of Cretan archers, and regular Roman troops, and thus what the presence in Rome that day of the 
archers might be telling us about what sort of armed force might have been used to quell the insurrection. 
As the proclamation of a senatus comultum ultimum indicates. 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 13; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 4; Nicolet, 1980, p. 144. There were, of course, 
administrative, functional and symbolic officials that accompanied the magistrates: a few dozen lictors that 
attended the higher magistrates and administrative staff. The city aediles also had as part of their civic 
responsibilities functions which contributed to public order. But these were too few, and in a major 
emergency, such as large numbers of insurgents seizing the Aventine, these officials and their attendants 
could not provide the necessary force. See Nippel for a detailed analysis of the various functions of officials 
and their attendants in relation to policing Rome (Nippel, 1984, pp. 21 -29). 
Stockton, 1979, p. 197. This also suggested a level of premeditated planning by Opimius, indicating that 
the governing elite at least thought it obvious that fighting was a distinct possibility. 
archers as independent units;"^^® archers, especially Cretan archers, were habitually 
attached to consular armies as missile troops supporting infantry. It is unlikely that 
Opimius broke with convention, and separated archers from their accompanying infantry, 
especially when archers likely needed infantry protection to operate effectively in confined 
urban environments where there was plenty of cover for the enemy to approach them. I 
suggest that the use of Cretan archers in Rome therefore becomes a likely indicator of the 
presence of heavy infantry units. Furthermore, I argue that Opimius would not have needed 
to use an irregular, ad-hoc force to retake the Aventine. He was acting legitimately as 
consul of the Roman state, in a civil emergency, with the express authority of the senate; he 
could legally use the army,'^^^ and the pre-positioning of Cretan archers suggested that he 
did draw upon elements from it. It is unlikely he thus resorted to irregular methods to quell 
what effectively amounted to an armed uprising. The evidence is circumstantial, but 
positive: I contend that it is probable the battle for the Aventine was the first time formed 
elements of the army were used in political violence. 
In 100 BC, however, during the political violence to suppress the armed sedition'^*' of 
Satuminus and his supporters,"'^" it is clearer that the army was involved.''^' When 
Satuminus seized the Capitol with a force of agrestes, the senate responded by declaring a 
state of emergency, voting them public e n e m i e s , a n d authorising the consul, Marius, to 
1680 jj^g reason for this, I contend, is that by themselves, archery units are extremely vulnerable to cavalry and 
infantry; their normal function was to support the infantry as it advanced to contact. When they are 
mentioned, it is almost always in conjunction with infantry (PIb. 3.75), suggesting they were rarely, if ever, 
used separately from them. 
Liv. 22.37; V.Max. 9.3.7; Plb. 3.75. As far back as Cannae in 216 BC, for example, there were 1000 
archers sent by Hiero of Syracuse attached to the consular armies; at least 500 of them were Cretan archers. 
Cretan archers were with the army in 171 BC being prepared to fight in Macedon (Liv. 42.35), and there were 
also Cretan archers with the army in Spain in 141 BC; Q. Metellus broke their bows to sabotage the army 
when he learnt his enemy, Q. Pompeius, had been allocated the province (V.Max. 9.3.7). They appear again in 
90 BC during the Social War, fighting variously for Italian and Roman armies (Diod. 37.18). The link 
between Cretan archers and the army was, in my mind, clearly established (on this point, see also Cagniart, 
2008, p. 88). 
' '*-Nicolet, 1980, p. 144. 
App . ,BC1 .30 . 
" " See this chapter above. As I have shown, Satuminus used soldiers or ex-soldiers as a support base to help 
pass legislation in the civil assemblies, often by violence. 
Alston argues convincingly that Marius was asked by the senate to use troops against Satuminus (Alston, 
2007, p. 180). He is right. The irony was that these same troops had, until recently, been providing the 
'muscle ' on the street to support the passage of Satuminus' legislation. It is difficult to reconstruct the 
political motivation of these soldiers categorically, but as Alston points out, they simply may have responded 
to Marius as the lawful consul and representative of the state, with his formal senatorial authorisation to act, 
and followed his orders against their erstwhile colleagues. 
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suppress the insurrection.'^^' Marius may have exploited dissatisfactions among ordinary 
citizens to further his c a r e e r , a n d allied with the militant tribunate of Satuminus to 
ensure land was provided for his veterans, but he was no revolutionary."^^' When 
Satuminus produced such a program in 100 BC, Marius dissolved the alliance and moved 
against him in his role of consul acting to suppress sedition and insurrection. He 
consequently besieged the insurgents and compelled them to surrender. They survived but 
were killed by an angry mob. The evidence for the use of the army in this incident is 
persuasive. The literary tradition, for example, is consistent: Plutarch has Marius leading 
his soldiers into the forum,'^'" Livy wrote Satuminus was put down by military force in a 
kind of w a r , " " and Orosius even used the term 'maniples', a basic tactical formation of the 
republican army, in his description of the battle."^'" I suggest that this all points to the use 
of units from the army.'^'^ Moreover, as in 121 BC, the army was the most effective, 
organised armed force available at short notice. Marius was a legitimate magistrate acting 
with express senatorial authority against enemies of the state; he was thus empowered to 
use its resources, including the army. He did not need to use civilians, informal supporters, 
or a mob; I argue, therefore, that this was the second time the state used the army to 
suppress political violence. 
Liv., Per. 69; Oros. 5.17; App., BC 29,30. 
For example, when he tapped into dissatisfaction at the progress of the war against Jugurtha to help his 
campaign for election to his first consulship (Sal., lug. 73). 
See Sherwin-White's dated, but still influential, analysis of Marius as the conservative and loyal servant 
of the state during this period. He argues that Marius never harboured the revolutionary designs that 
Satuminus entertained; their alliance was a matter of convenience (Sherwin-White, 1956, p. 3). But, while 
Marius may not have had revolutionary ambitions at this point, he was subsequently prepared to resort to 
military force against the state once he had been shown by Sulla the potential of the army to intervene and 
underwrite inimicitiae with enemies, and as an effective solution to intractable political problems. But, in 100 
BC, it is clear enough that Satuminus' actions were too much, even for Marius, and, in this context, he could 
happily fulfill his responsibilities as the chief magistrate responding to a state of emergency, charged by the 
senate to suppress the insurrection. 
Plut., Mar. 30. 
Liv., Per. 69. 
Oros. 5.17. Again, Orosius is writing late in the Imperial period of this incident, but, intriguingly, he uses 
an anachronistic term from the earlier republican period that does not sit with the period in which he was 
writing, nor that he would have been normally familiar with - suggesting to me that he may have been 
drawing upon an earlier, authentic source in his description of the conflict. Of course, 1 argued in Chapter 
Five above that maniples had, by this time, been largely replaced by Marius' reforms by the larger cohort as 
the tactical sub-formation of the legion. However, in the narrow, confined streets of the city, and against a 
defending force of less than 5000, it is likely that the cohort was too large and unwieldy to use easily in the 
urban environment. In this environment, 1 argue that the smaller maniples were the better tactical solution, 
much easier to control and wield by commanders; it is thus plausible that they were indeed used. 
" " The only source that does not indicate that soldiers or military force was used is Appian (App., BC 
1.29,30). 
Flower argues that the confrontation between C. Gracchus and Opimius may have been 
violent, but it was not necessarily civil war."' '" While this may be true, and can also be said 
about Marius' suppression of Satuminus in 100 BC, I argue that they were, nevertheless, 
significant collective experiences as far as the army was concerned, and important for the 
examples they presented about normative political behavior. In both instances, the state 
used force to suppress what it considered was armed insurrection: in the course of both 
events, it killed citizens without trial, and, the second time, it killed magistrates still in 
office. For the soldiers, it must have made an indelible impression; I suggest that it 
reinforced the lesson that the use of endemic violence against fellow citizens, including 
serving magistrates, was, for political reasons, legitimate. Moreover, it showed the soldiers 
how the army collectively could become involved in political violence, and how decisive 
the brutal effectiveness of organised military strength could be. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given a plausible explanation of where the army, individually and 
collectively, learnt to denigrate and destroy the symbols of republican power, and how 
political violence on the streets of Rome could change views about the use of organised 
military power in politics. The evidence that it did change views was in the aberrant 
behaviour of Sulla's soldiers against magistrates, their symbols of power and, ultimately, 
the state. I have shown that politics and public life for much of the Republic's life was as 
fractious and disruptive as anything produced in the civil war period. The big difference, 
however, was the absence of endemic violence; but there was a change after 151 BC, when 
the relative unity between ordinary citizens, the tribunate and the governing elite began to 
fracture. From 133 BC on, endemic violence became a normative part of political 
discourse, and the example it set to soldiers of what was now acceptable, was crucial in 
making them more receptive to the suggestion of unprecedented action from magistrates 
who wanted to realise the ultimate potential of military force in the political sphere. 
The example of political violence was not trivial; because of such violence, the nature of 
political competition within the state was fundamentally changed, and significant numbers 
' Flower, 2010(a), p. 77. She does, however, accept that it was more like a civil war. 
of people were killed during the four decades leading up to Nola. The dead included lictors, 
former and serving magistrates, tribunes and leading men of the state, such as the two 
Gracchi brothers, as well as numbers of ordinary citizens and their allied counterparts. It 
almost killed Sulla.'^'^ The lessons of the use of violence were also compelling because 
soldiers, and whole units of the army, were involved. 1 have placed individual soldiers or 
veterans in the same place and time where political violence occurred. I have placed them 
amongst the groups that conducted the violence. On two occasions, I have circumstantially 
involved whole units of the army in instances of political violence and suppressing armed 
sedition. The opportunity certainly existed for soldiers and the army to absorb the lessons 
of the effectiveness of military force in solving political problems. Furthermore, on one 
occasion, I have shown that contending armies were willing to fight each other in support 
of the claims of their contending magistrates. In 101 BC, this did not eventuate because 
Marius relented. But although it took the subsequent Social War to fully socialise soldiers 
to the idea of civil war, I argue that this incident showed that norms of behavior had already 
changed within the citizen-militia to allow the possibility of civil war more than a decade 
before it broke out. 
The next, concluding, chapter focuses on the army at Nola in 88 BC when it decided to 
support Sulla against his political enemies, and intervene in politics. It brings together all 
the factors discussed in previous chapters - factors that, I argue, influenced the responses of 
the soldiers on that day. Chapter Eight will show that, far from a single dominant factor, 
such as the desire to profit from war, it was a grouping of factors acting in unison that 
proved decisive, and thus allows us to explain more accurately the rise of the politically 
interventionist legion. 
' Plut.. S;///. 8; App., 5C1.56. 
Chapter Eight 
Integrating the Factors and Thesis Conclusion 
Factors Caolesce at Nola: A Holistic Explanation for Intervention 
The previous four chapters discussed a range of hypothetical factors acting on L. Cornelius 
Sulla's soldiers in 88 BC. These, I argued, positively influenced their decision to help him 
against his political enemies. 1 assert that these factors more comprehensively explain why 
the army was receptive to his invitation to intervene directly in the civilian political process 
with organised military force. The desire to profit from war, desensitisation to the risk of 
fighting fellow citizens, the citizen-militia tradition of insubordination in political cause and 
as the ultimate redress of grievance, and the pernicious influence of contemporary endemic 
violence on Roman political discourse, all influenced in various degrees the motivations of 
the army. Added to these factors was background confusion among Sulla's soldiers over 
who represented the state. This chapter brings together these threads, and discusses how 
they framed the decision of the soldiers on the day. The chapter will show that, rather than 
a single factor dominating - long the conventional explanation for intervention''' ' - it was 
instead a grouping of factors acting in unison, which together proved decisive, and meant 
the emergence of the politically interventionist legion was all but inevitable. 
Nola: The General Situation in 88 BC 
The preceding discussion has brought us to a point early in 88 BC outside the Campanian 
town of Nola; it was here, in a contio, that Sulla invited the army to help him during the 
dying stages of the Social War. At the time, Sulla's army, comprising up to six legions,' '" 
was besieging Nola."'® It was a difficult and protracted war , ' ' " but, by 88 BC, Rome had 
almost succeeded in extinguishing it: Nola was one of the insurrection's last strongholds. 
See Chapter Three above. 
This constituted an army of up to 35 000 infantry, cavalry and support troops (Plut., Mar. 35; Plb. 6.20). 
Veil. 2.18; Plut., SuU. 7; Oros. 5.19. See also Konrad, 2006. p. 179. 
" " See Chapter Five above. 
Most of Sulla's army had for the past year operated south of Rome, and fought major 
engagements against the Italian rebels;'™" by the time Nola was besieged, they were 
experienced and hardened by war. As I have shown, Sulla's army was conventional in most 
ways,'™' but when it began the siege, it had already exhibited indications of a trait that 
would distinguish it from all other Roman armies to date: a willingness to regularly kill 
serving magistrates and show disrespect for their symbols of p o w e r . O n the international 
front, there was war with the eastern potentate, Mithridates - although in 88 BC, the first 
priority of the state remained the suppression of the Italian insurrection.'™' In 89 BC, 
Rome declared war when the king invaded provinces under Roman protection,'™" arguably 
after provocation.'™' Sulla, as one of two consuls, received the eastern province of Asia, 
and thus command of the war against Mithridates. It was done by lot administered by the 
senate in the traditional way, and conferred upon him the legitimate, lawful authority to 
lead the army and conduct the campaign.""^ The prospect of economic enrichment and 
glory in the east must have been considerable: for Sulla, even the coveted consulship paled 
into comparison with opportunities promised by the campaign against Mithridates.'™' 
Meanwhile, the endemic violence which had been a feature of political discourse for the 
past four decades""^ continued to punctuate relations between revolutionary tribunes. 
App., BC 1.46; Plut., SuU. 6; Oros. 5.18; Liv., Per. 75; Keaveney, 2005, p. 43. 
Nicolet, 1980, p. 130. In particular, Nicolet makes the point that the Roman armies during the Social War 
were recruited by levy in the traditional manner. There is no good reason to disbelieve it. 
See Chapter Seven above. A. Postumius Albinus, Sulla's legate commanding part of Sulla's army in his 
absence, was stoned to death by mutinous soldiers when he called a contio in 89 BC (Liv., Per. 75; Oros. 
5.18.22; Plut., SuU. 6). As I have shown, ironically, he was, according to tradition, the descendent of P. 
Postumius Albinus Regillensis who died in similar circumstances during a mutiny in 414 BC (Liv. 4.50). See 
Chapter Six above. 
Rome seems to have underestimated the danger presented by Mithridates, and to have made his defeat a 
second priority behind extinguishing the last remnants of the Social War. Sulla, for example, after being 
elected consul and being granted the eastern province, does not seem to have been in a particular hurry to 
move against Mithridates. He returned to Nola to finish its entrenchment (Plut., SuU. 7). This is perhaps 
understandable: the Social War at its height was a serious, immediate threat to Rome; Mithridates was far 
away in Asia Minor. 
'™App. ,M/r / ; . 22; Fe//.2.18. 
For a background to this war, see Keaveney's useful discussion on the troubled relationship Rome had 
with the Pontic king, including various attempts by Roman magistrates, including Marius, to provoke 
Mithridates into war for reasons of avarice and the opportunity for glory (Keaveney, 2005, pp. 30-31, 36-37). 
Veil. 2.18; App., Mith. 22. The people's assemblies may have elected the magistrates, but the senate 
traditionally handled foreign relations, the raising of armies and the allocation of provinces to magistrates by 
casting lots. Examples at Liv. 40.44; Liv. 41.9; Liv.42.1. See Rosenstein for a recent discussion of the 
senate's 'soft power' and dominance in the Republican system of government (Rosenstein, 2012, pp. 11-13). 
See also de Blois, 1987, p. 42. 
Plut., SuU. 7; Keaveney, 2005, p. 46. 
See Chapter Seven above. 
ordinary citizens and the governing elite. With Sulla's army busy at Nola, there was civil 
strife associated with yet another assertive tribune in Rome challenging senatorial authority 
and using violence to pass populist legislation. P. Sulpicius Rufus had thoroughly learnt the 
lessons of political violence and the effectiveness of coercion; '"" for protection and 
intimidation, he employed 3,000 swordsmen called the ' a n t i - s e n a t e ' , a n d styled himself 
on L. Appuleius Sa tuminus ."" Conflict with the governing elite, including the consuls, 
was inevitable. At first, some of his actions were in Sulla's interests; using armed gangs, he 
intimidated and dissuaded Sulla's rival for the consulship in 89 BC, C. lulius Caesar 
Strabo, and thus helped Sulla secure the consulship for 88 BC. '"^ But he then formed an 
association with C. Mar ius , ' " ' and with his support, pushed through an ambitious and 
controversial legislative package; as Keaveney points out, it was guaranteed to enrage 
citizens, and attract fierce opposition from urbanites and the senate. '"" It included recalling 
citizens exiled in the aftermath of Satuminus' suppression'"^ and limiting the size of 
allowable debt carried by a senator . ' " ' The most controversial measure, however, was a 
motion which distributed the new Italian citizens throughout the original 35 Roman tribes. 
Keaveney, 2005, pp. 47-48. 
Siill. 8. Plutarch had a different number: 600 armed equestrians (Plut., Mar. 35). 
" " Sulpicius admired Satuminus and his legislative program, but thought him not radical enough in his ideas 
or methods (Plut., Mar. 35). Sulpicius would not make the same mistake as Satuminus, and the large retinue 
of swordsmen that accompanied his tribunate provided physical protection, and the muscle to intimidate 
opposition to his legislative programs. 
Konrad, 2006, p. 179; Keaveney, 2005. p.47; Lintott, 1999(b), p. 187. 
" " App., BC 1.57; Plut., Mar. 35; Veil. 2.18. Powell, however, argues Sulpicius acted from the start in the 
interests of Marius; a consistency in the measures being proposed under the legislative bill, and the 
observation that Marius would not have objected to anything Sulpicius proposed, persuades Powell to 
conclude that he was probably in alliance early in his tribunate (Powell, 1990, p.458). For my argument, 
however, it is a nuance not important. What matters is that Sulpicius acted violently when he perceived 
opposition to his agenda, as well as proposing the fateful Mithridatic bill. In the end, he lost his life 
supporting Marius (Plut., Su//. 10). 
Keaveney, 2005, p. 48. 
See Myers' analysis on who these exiles were. Myers, who makes a useful re-evaluation of the role and 
place of Sulpicius in the events of 88 BC, particularly the question of whether he was little more than a lackey 
of Marius, uses the inclusion of the recall component in the bill as evidence of Sulpicius' political savvy and 
consistency (Myers, 2009, pp. 5-9). in the final analysis, Myers downplays the relationship with Marius, 
arguing he was an independent agent who acted out of his own self-interest more often than not. This is not 
controversial; nevertheless, it does not rule out a political alliance with Marius, nor acting in his specific 
interests - as Sulpicius so clearly did when he introduced the Mithridatic bill. 
" " Keaveney argues that although it is thought this measure may have been aimed at Sulla, who had amassed 
large debts, success in a series of wars, and the resulting booty, probably made Sulla richer (Keaveney, 2005, 
p. 48). Such a notion is, however, contentious. Too much should not be assumed; unlike foreign wars, where 
there were always foreign kingdoms and cities to plunder, the Social War, fought in Italy, did not necessarily 
yield excessive amounts of booty, and wars, no matter where they are fought, were invariably expensive. We 
should not assume Sulla was made rich and thus had no sizeable debts. Powell dismisses the debt component 
as a generalist popularis move (Powell, 1990, p. 456). In my view, it remains unclear exactly against whom 
the measure was targeted, if indeed it was an individual, and not the goveming elite as a whole. 
giving them a numerical voting advantage over R o m a n s ; ' ' " this undoubtedly contributed to 
political unrest and friction. '"^ Indeed, Flower goes further, and argues that the question of 
citizenship for the Italians was at the heart of the failure of the republican system: the only 
way for Rome to survive was to offer full citizenship to the Italians, but this meant 
completely changing the nature of Roman politics to the point that it bore no resemblance 
to the old republican s y s t e m . " " 
At this time, Sulla was in Rome; serious civil strife between Sulpicius' supporters and those 
opposed brought Sulla back from the army at Nola to stabilise the situation and fhistrate 
Sulpicius' and Marius' agenda. '™ In this way, Sulla was swept up in the endemic political 
violence that followed, but rather than turning to partisan supporters to protect him, as the 
Gracchi and Satuminus had done when confronted with violence,"^' Sulla instead turned to 
the army. When Sulpicius, for example, used force to suppress opposition to his bill, Sulla 
and fellow consul, Q. Pompeius Rufus, responded by calling a festive vacation that 
suspended public business to stop the assembly vote."^^ Sulpicius reacted by declaring the 
vacation illegal, threatened to kill the consuls, and forced Sulla at sword point to annul 
it; '™ Sulpicius' legislation was then passed by force. It was a major personal humiliation 
" " App., BC 1.57. As Appian pointed out, the Italians, for whom citizenship was a concession obtained by 
resistance in the Social War (see Chapter Five above), were at an advantage because they far outnumbered the 
original Roman citizens, and could thus wield greater voting influence if arranged in the original 35 tribes. 
The original plan had been to confine them to 10 or 8 of the last tribes to accommodate the Italians, and thus 
place them at the back of the voting sequence. Given the Roman voting system used a 'first to achieve a 
majority' system to determine voting results in elections (see Chapter Six above), this very effectively would 
have negated any political power Italian citizens may have wielded. Sulpicius' program changed that, and 
gave them political power. See Keaveney, 2005, p. 48. See also North, 2006. pp. 263 ff for a fuller discussion 
on the political characteristics of the Roman constitution and its voting assemblies. See Powell for a 
discussion of the bill to distribute the newly enfranchised Italians in the 35 tribes in the larger context of 
whether he had always been an ally of Marius, or only turned to him later out of frustration (Powell, 1990. pp. 
449 and 450). 
" " For example, it is listed by Appian as one of the reasons that led to street battles in Rome (App., S C 1.55). 
" " Flower, 2010(b), pp. I l l and 112. In the sense that Roman politics changed irrevocably after the 
admission of the Italians to citizenship (see Chapter Two above for examples), and that a major destructive 
war had been required to achieve it. Flower's analysis of the 'Italian question' forcing a transition of the old 
Republic into something different is persuasive. In this sense, the old Republic indeed 'failed' , as Flower 
argues. 
Powell, 1990, p. 459. Powell makes much of the fact that Sulpicius and Marius only gave Sulla the reason 
to act as he did when they conspired to take his command away; up until that point, Sulla, as consul, was 
acting as the senior magistrate should to stabilise the political violence, and this inevitably placed him in 
opposition to Sulpicius. I would add that the experience of almost losing his life, and the humiliation suffered 
at Sulpicius' hands, would also have given Sulla good personal cause to act against him. 
For details of these events, and the nature of the political violence, see Chapter Seven above. 
App., S C 1.55; Veil. 2.18; Plut., Suit. 8; Liv., Per. 77. 
The resulting violence killed Sulla's son-in-law, Q. Pompeius (Liv., Per. 77). 
for Sulla, and for the reputation of the office of consul;"^" he was almost killed, forced to 
seek refuge in the house of his enemy, Marius, to escape the mob, and succumbed to 
pressure to annul the vacation,"^' before returning meekly to his army to prepare for the 
eastern c a m p a i g n . T h e r e was, however, more to come."" Sulpicius, as part of his 
legislative package - and prima facie, unknown to Sulla"^^ - also passed by unorthodox 
plebiscite'''" a motion that stripped Sulla of the eastern command and transferred it to 
Marius, a private citizen, with a special grant of imperium.™" Sulpicius and Marius 
overreached themselves; when Sulla heard about it, he called the army together in a contio, 
outlined the situation and grievances done to him, and urged them to be ready to obey his 
Keaveney, 2005, p. 49. 
I argue that Sulla really had no choice if he wanted to survive the violence. There is no surviving record of 
the exchange between Marius and Sulla in the house, but Marius, in his bluff soldierly way, probably gave 
him a stark choice: rescind the vacation and survive, or refuse and die. Either way, it would have been a 
humiliating back down on Sulla's part, and immensely damaging to his prestige and sense of honour. 
App., BC 1.56; Plut., Sull. 9. On this point, I acknowledge that there is a difference between the situation 
of Sulla and P. Scipio a century earlier. When he was defeated by his political enemies, Sulla could retreat to 
a formed army in the field, ready to use. P. Scipio, holding no office when he was bested by opponents, could 
not; he settled among his veterans but they were not formed into an army ready to use. In any case, these are 
minor differences: much more important, I argue, were the cultural factors that had emerged by this time 
acting on the ordinary soldiers of 88 BC - and which constitute the bulk of my argument. 
" " Konrad rightly exphasises the damage done to Sulla's reputation and personal dignitas: as he explains, the 
abrogation of Sulla's command in the east "meant a full measure of humiliation," and followed close behind 
the experience of begging Marius for protection (Konrad, 2006. P. 179), Konrad neatly encapsulates the sense 
of continued humiliation that Sulla must have felt leading up to Nola, as his enemies continued to thwart his 
political aspirations. 
Appian makes much of the point that Sulla was not aware of Sulpicius' and Marius' plans when he left 
Rome (App., BC 1.56). Plutarch, however, implies that the legislation to strip him of command was part of 
the legislation that caused violence, while Sulla was still in Rome, and thus suggests by inference, that Sulla 
was aware (Plut., Sull. 8). 1 argue that it seems unlikely Sulla would have been totally unaware of Sulpicius' 
plan: Marius made no secret of his plans for the east (according to Plut., Mar. 34), and if this is correct, it is 
inconceivable that Sulla would not have been aware of them. He may not have, of course, calculated that 
Marius would try to act immediately, rather than wait for Sulla's term as consul to expire. Furthermore, even 
if he was aware of rumours of Marius' and Sulpicius' planned plebiscite, there had been no actual attempt to 
replace him, and in this context, it may have suited Sulla to leave the city and return to the army as if he was 
not aware of anything - so he could play the victim to justify the enormity of what he subsequently did. 
Moreover, regarding this event, it is also worth remembering that Appian, unlike Plutarch (Plut., Mar. 35), 
does not identify his sources, but it is plausible that they were drawn from Sulla's own account (see Powell, 
1990, p. 455). Unlike Plutarch, for example, who either added graphic details himself or used other sources, 
Appian portrayed Sulla as in control of the situation, omitted the degrading chase and hiding in Marius' 
house, and stated emphatically that Sulla was ignorant of his enemies' plans, portraying him as the victim of 
the piece. If Appian did draw his account largely from Sulla's version of events, and it is impossible to really 
know, then it would have made sense to portray Sulla as the innocent victim, unaware of his enemies' plans, 
and pushed into doing what he ultimately did. 
As I have shown above, this was not the traditional way of allocating provinces to magistrates: the senate 
conventionally ascribed by lot provinces to magistrates about to embark on their year 's service. By passing 
this plebiscite, Sulpicius, like the Gracchi before him, was challenging the senate's traditional power and 
intruding on matters of foreign import which had always been with the senate (see Chapter Seven above). 
Plut., Sull. 8; App., BC 1.56; Flower, 2010(a), pp. 77-78. This was obviously the measure by which 
Sulpicius bought Marius' support for other components of the legislative package. On this point, see also 
Keaveney, 2005, p. 47; Konrad, 2006, p. 179. 
orders. For its part, the army understood his unstated intention, accepted his invitation to 
become involved in the dispute with his political enemies, killed two tribunes who arrived 
to take over the army, and marched with him on Rome."^ ' After decades of endemic civil 
strife, punctuated by the use individually and collectively of the military by assertive 
tribunes and the state, political violence had finally reached its full expression: organised 
military coercion, in the form of the politically interventionist legion, was now a reality. 
Inter\'ention: Recasting the Focus 
By any measure, the actions of Sulla and his army in 88 BC were unprecedented. They 
have been noted and discussed by scholars searching for specific explanations of civil 
war."^^ Myers, in her analysis of Sulla's request, argues that he spoke to his men as a 
consul asking for help to restore order in the c i t y . " " This is a unique interpretation; it is 
possible that some of those listening to Sulla rationalised his intent in this way, especially 
those for whom the thought of attacking Rome was repugnant. I argue that Sulla did not, 
however, couch his request in these terms. Rather, he implied a course of action of an order 
of magnitude more audacious than a simple exercise to restore order: march against Rome, 
take the city, disperse enemies, and impose a political agenda - all with a high risk of 
provoking civil war.'^^"* Although Sulla did not say it directly, his intent, I suggest, was 
clear; the fact that his army urged him to lead them to Rome suggested that most 
understood this. 
Sulla's crime was to break the ancient political and religious prohibition against a military 
commander leading soldiers across the pomeriiw?^^^ without permission,'"' ' and to 
App., BC 1.57; Oros. 5.19;Liv., Per. 77; Plut., Sidl. 9. 
Flower is topical: "The decisive military action that caused civil war happened in 88 BC with Sulla's first 
march on Rome (Flower. 2010(a). p. 77 and 78). But see also Keaveney: "Sulla's march on Rome in 88 was 
unprecedented" (Keaveney. 2007, p. 37). Also Konrad, 2006, p. 180. 
Myers. 2009. p. 44. M j e r s argues fiirther that Sulla would have used the precedence of consuls using 
troops to restore order in the city (Myers, 2009, pp. 44-45). But as 1 argue above, it was clear that Sulla meant 
something different to mere restoration of order, and the fact that his officers left him suggests strongly that 
this intention was clear. 
Keaveney describes Sulla's planned intervention as an act beside which the excesses of Sulpicius and 
Marius paled in comparison (Keaveney. 2005, p. 53). 
This was the ancient religious line around Rome geographically which separated the civil from military 
spheres of public life, and the extraordinary imperium of the commander from the mores of normal civil life. 
The example in 215 BC of the consul, Q. Fabius Maximus. holding consular elections on the Campus 
Martius, carefully placed outside the pomerium, to maximise his influence over the elections by retaining his 
imperium, illustrated well the traditional prohibition on entering the city while still in command and leading 
introduce into civilian political discourse organised military force to compel cooperation, 
thereby endowing one individual with enormous power, and upsetting the careful structural 
balance enshrined in the Roman constitution. The moment coercive power of this nature 
was introduced into political discourse was the point at which the Republic indisputably 
ceased to function in the traditional sense. The enormity of Sulla's act was obvious to the 
men at Nola; all but one of his officers left him when his intentions became clear, because 
they would not countenance the idea of attacking their own s t a t e . " " Sulla, however, 
couched it differently: when questioned on the way to Rome by two praetors about his 
motives for marching against his country, Sulla said he was saving her from tyrants. 
Recent scholarship on the question of Sulla's motivations adds useful nuances to this blunt 
exchange. Flower, for example, makes much of the unique political situation at the time as 
a prime motivation. She contends that Sulla turned to extreme violence and open war to 
achieve his political goals because he perceived - and indeed may have argued in his 
memoirs - that the traditional rules governing competitive republican politics were no 
longer functioning; he was replaced, for example, by plebiscite in contravention to the 
traditional role and authority of the senate."^' She argues that republican government in the 
period 91 BC to 81 BC was never fully functional; the rhetoric of 'politics as usual' and the 
continued use of traditional names could not cover up lawlessness, violence and contempt 
soldiers (Liv. 24.7). Inside the pomerium, the citizen was protected by provocatio from the arbitrary and 
extreme power of the senior magistrate; outside it, he served in the army and was thus not protected. Consuls 
needed to conduct special rituals to assume command before leaving the pomerium (by donning military garb, 
undertaking special ceremonies, etc), and more rituals later when laying down power to enter it again, once 
the command period had finished (for examples, see Liv. 5.52; Liv. 41.10; Liv. 45.39). Special permission 
was needed from the senate and by vote of the people in assembly before a commander could enter the 
pomerium with his army to celebrate a triumph (Liv. 26.21; Liv. 33.22). The significance of a commander 
who ignored the ancient prohibition so essential to the smooth fijnctioning of civic and political life of the 
Republic was thus profound. See Drogula for more detail on the significance and nature of the pomerium, and 
its complicated association with the imperium of consuls (Drogula, 2007, p. 419 ff). 
Rosenstein, 2007, p. 229. 
" " App., BC 1.57. The 'one' officer was the army's quartermaster, paymaster and financier, the quaestor. 
The refusal of most of the officers to join Sulla is interesting for another reason, when placed against an 
earlier incident that occurred at Nola at the start of the Social War. When the Italian commander, G. Papius, 
captured Nola, he offered the Romans there their lives if they would change their allegiance and serve with 
him: all 2000 soldiers agreed, but their officers refused, and were subsequently starved to death (App., BC 
1.42). In 88 BC, it was again the officers who refused to countenance unconstitutional behavior, while the 
soldiers supported Sulla. This might suggest that the social pressure on the officer class, normally aristocrats 
and members of the governing elite, not to countenance sedition against the state was stronger than in other 
classes. Alston describes this elevated sense of duty among the officer class of Sulla's army as a commitment 
to the traditionalism of the old Republic, particularly its governing elite (Alston, 2007, p. 182). 
App., BC1.57; Val.Max. 9.7. 
Flower, 2010(b), p. 92. 
for accepted political norms.' '"" Sulla, responding to this failure of the republican system of 
government, was the first to openly designate a Roman citizen as a 'foreign enemy', and 
the first to use the army against the Republic."'" Meanwhile, Keaveney's explanation 
focuses on Sulla's visceral reaction to the personal experience of political violence and 
humiliation - and emphasises the humanistic side of his actions.""^ He argues, for 
example, that Sulla had no choice but to march on Rome: he was a 'frightened man' who 
knew his consular dignity had not protected him from his enemies, and would not do so in 
the future; cornered by his enemies, he was desperate and acted accordingly. 
These explanations for intervention both have merit, and contribute to understanding the 
Republic's transition to civil war: the emergence of political violence, a more assertive 
tribunate, and civil strife between citizens and non-citizens, city dwellers and agrestes, did 
change the nature and rules of political discourse. It was an unusual, even unprecedented. 
Flower, 2010(a), p. 79 ff. Flower, however, too narrowly limits the period of dysfunction to the Social 
War and period immediately afterwards. As I have shown in Chapter Seven above, the traditional unity and 
traditional norms actually began to fray after 151 BC with the re-emergence of a more assertive and 
revolutionary tribunate; by 131 BC, Republican politics had changed forever in a conventional sense with the 
emergence of endemic political violence. In as much as this can be described as dysfunctional republican 
government, and the abandonment of old political restraints, it should be noted that it occurred well before the 
start of the Social War. It is also worth noting that although violence had changed the way political discourse 
in Rome was conducted, much of the old system continued to function largely as normal in parallel: 
magistrates were elected, provinces allocated, bills paid, and wars fought. A thesis that describes Sulla as 
acting in a vacuum of functioning republican government and institutions should thus not be overstated. 
Flower, 2010(b), p. 92. Flower, in her survey of Rome's first civil war, introduces the idea of the failure 
of political tradition and state function, and links it to Sulla's march on Rome. She emphasises the 
fundamental problem of the existence of civil war for the Republic and its institutions, in which Romans had 
traditional pride, and which existed to obviate the extremes of political behavior. The traditional function of 
the Republic was to work at the prevention of conflict between contending power bases, especially extreme 
civil strife. Civil war was, therefore, an existential crisis for the Republic; it called into question the very basis 
of republican political culture which was founded on a basis of the settlement of disputes by legal means. 
Civil war meant the Republic had failed in its most basic function of mediating strife between individuals 
(Flower, 2010(a), pp. 74 and 75; Flower, 2010(b), 92 ff.). 
Keaveney is one of the few scholars who have recently looked closely at the events of 88 BC, and 
explored in detail the motivations of its key protagonists, especially Sulla. Unfortunately, he does not focus 
the same level of attention on the motivations of the soldiers at Nola, the one key element in Sulla's plan -
without which the challenge to his political enemies, and his intention to impose a political solution upon the 
state, could not have been possible. 
" " Keaveney, 2005, pp. 50 and 51. Keaveney offers a more human analysis of Sulla's motivation. The 
visceral emphasis aligns more neatly with the sense of spontaneity with which this event appeared to unfold. 
Sulla was, for example, unaware of plans to replace him, or, if he was aware, chose to take no action to 
prevent it, when he returned to the army. He was subsequently shocked and outraged when Marius and 
Sulpicius moved against him, and appealed instinctively to the army around him for protection and legitimacy 
to act. Moreover, he regarded the eastern command as a great prize, and to have it taken away was too much; 
his furious reaction was natural in the circumstances. As a human-centric thesis, 1 find Keaveney's analysis 
plausible and persuasive. 
situation - although, as I have a r g u e d , i t was not so much the presence of intense 
inimicitiae between aristocratic and wealthy competitors, or fractious poHtics, but rather 
endemic violence in a political cause, as the dominant discriminator, which really set this 
period apart from the past. Sulla's actions in response to humiliation, fear of political 
opponents, and as self-defence, are also credible; the haste with which Sulla returned to the 
army""*^ suggested that the human experience of near-death in Rome made an indelible 
impression upon him. 
By focusing primarily on Sulla and his inimicitiae with political opponents in Rome, 
however, both explanations are ultimately unsatisfactory as comprehensive rationales for 
intervention. Flower stresses the uniqueness of the situation, the importance of the Italian 
question in changing the nature of Roman politics, and argues about the functionality, or 
otherwise, of republican political discourse. But the one act that indisputably gave Sulla his 
casus belli, the removal by plebiscite of his eastern command, and which could be 
viewed as evidence of the failure of republican political norms, was not without a 
contemporary partial precedent. In 107 BC, a plebiscite proposed by an antagonistic tribune 
stripped Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus of his province allocated by the senate in the 
traditional manner, and his imperium there was conferred upon a political enemy.''"*' In 107 
BC, this act did not lead to civil war; it follows that by itself, the fact that Sulla, like 
Metellus, lost his province by plebiscite in 88 BC was not enough of an aberration to be a 
complete explanation for intervention. Similarly, the question of Italian citizenship, 
undoubtedly one of the sources of political friction in 88 BC,"'*^ had nevertheless been 
simmering for decades before the outbreak of the Social War , ' "" without any evidence that 
For example, in Chapter Seven above. 
Plut., Sull. 9. It is at this point that Sulla, I argue, must have realised that the best personal protection he 
had against his ascendant political enemies lay in his army. I suggest that he must have looked at the lessons 
of the past, at the Gracchi and Satuminus, and seen how they placed their trust in supporters on the streets of 
Rome, and those supporters had not been enough to protect them from either political enemies or the state. He 
did not make that mistake; instead of turning to supporters in Rome to safeguard him when faced with 
existential violence, he turned to the army. By the standards of the time, it was a sensible decision. 
' ™ C f . Flower, 2010(b), p. 91. 
" " Sal., lug. 73. 
' ™ A p p . , B C I . 5 5 . 
App., BC 1. 19; see also Chapter Two above. 
it led to a critical failure of republican governance, or that Sulla felt strongly enough about 
it in 88 BC to launch the army at Rome. '"" 
Like Flower's explanation which emphasises the political aspects of the situation as they 
related to its key actors, Keaveney's discussion of the human factors that motivated Sulla is 
useful, but also misses the essential point: the critical role of the soldiers. Sulla may have 
been frightened and given no choice to act in self-defence, but he - or any ambitious 
magistrate - was a threat to no one unless he could in 88 BC exploit the one unique 
discriminator that, I argue, surpassed all other factors in significance: the willingness of 
citizen-soldiers to risk civil war, agree to support their general's claim, and intervene 
directly in politics. To thus understand the events of 88 BC, and why the army intervened, 
the emphasis must be on Nola, not Rome, and on understanding the motivation of the 
soldiers which made Sulla's act possible. It must, in particular, make a distinction between 
factors that emerged for the first time that day in 88 BC to influence the soldiers, and those 
which did not. 
At Nola: The Fateflil Day - Contio and Rebellion 
The Subordinate Role of Pecuniarv Self-Interest 
As I have shown in Chapter Three above, pecuniary self-interest is the conventional, 
dominant explanation advanced to explain why the citizen-militia subsequently supported 
Intriguingly, did the 'Italian question', however, provide a motivation for the men of Sulla's army to 
march against Marius and Sulpicius, who were known to support a larger political role for the newly 
enfranchised Italians (App., BC 1.55; see this chapter, note 22)? Given the paucity of the sources, it remains 
impossible to categorically know: we simply do not know the ratio of citizens to Italians serving in Sulla's 
army. But there is evidence of Italians in it (e.g.; App., BC 1.50), and given what we know about the 
importance of allied contingents to Roman field armies (see Chapter Five above), it is also reasonable to think 
that Italians (those who had stayed loyal) made up a large portion. In any case, 1 argue that it is unlikely to 
have been a major motivation for the army, and that we need to look for other factors. For one thing, if we 
accept that there were Italians serving in Sulla's army in numbers, then it would not have been in their 
personal interest to support any action which resulted in their political marginalisation in the new Republic. 
For another, the majority of Sulla's officers - who were undoubtedly Roman citizens - left him when his 
intention became clear. If dealing with the 'Italian question' was a major motivation for the army, then surely 
it would have been in the political interests of these officers to remain with Sulla and oust Marius and 
Sulpicius, thereby ensuring their continued political dominance. Nor does it seem to have been an issue 
motivating Rome's resistance to Sulla; urban citizens fiercely resisted his army's entrance to Rome (App., BC 
1.58). Yet, it is reasonable to think that it was not in the interests of these urban citizens to give more voting 
power to the much more numerous Italians who lived outside Rome: if the "Italian question' was at the 
foreft-ont of their minds, they should have welcomed Sulla with cheers, not bricks. 
Sulla, intervened in politics, and risked civil war. It was undisputedly one of the factors in 
the minds of Sulla's soldiers at Nola; all Roman soldiers expected to profit from war . ' " ' I 
argue, however, that it has been given undue prominence as the dominant explanation for 
intervention; by itself, pecuniary self-interest cannot explain why the army at Nola 
intervened in politics.'"^ 
In Appian's account, Sulla, in a contio during his appeal to the army, did not directly 
mention the subject of booty, in the same way that he did not mention marching on 
Rome."^^ I suggest that by announcing Marius had replaced him, Sulla nevertheless played 
on the irrational fears of the army that it would miss out on the lucrative opportunities to 
amass booty in the east."^" The soldiers were vitally interested in booty; they expected to 
gain financially from service.'"' If Sulla considered the command against Mithridates a 
prize above even the consulship,'"' service in the east was equally desirable to his soldiers 
- and for good reason. '" ' Campaigns there traditionally offered citizen and allied soldiers 
the chance to generate great wealth.'"^ As far back as 171 BC, for example, during the 
levies to raise consular armies for the war against Macedon, '" ' there were many volunteers 
because recruits saw that soldiers who served previously in the east returned rich."'" The 
impending campaign against Mithridates promised to be no different. Sulla's personal crisis 
thus reminded the soldiers listening to him in contione of their own position; in the Roman 
See Chapter Four above. 
See Chapter Four above for a detailed rebuttal and re-casting of the conventional explanation. 
" " App., BC 1.57. As Morstein-Marx points out. we cannot know what proportion of the army at Nola in 88 
BC consisted of men without property, or were poor (Morstein-Marx, 2011, p. 260). It must also be 
acknowledged that nor do we have any idea of the ratio of allied soldiers that stayed loyal to Rome to Roman 
citizens present in Sulla's army. If Sulla's army was mustered along traditional lines using a proportion of 
Latin/Italian allies who remained loyal, or who defected back to Rome during the war - and there is no reason 
to believe that it was not - than there must have been some. In the end, however, we simply don't know. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 37. 
In Chapter Four above, 1 emphasised the point that citizen and allied soldiers traditionally expected 
military service to provide opportunities to generate wealth through donatives, but especially booty gained 
from victory in war. Sulla's soldiers were no different in this regard from their ancestors; it is worth re-
emphasising the point here outside Nola. On this subject, see also Rosenstein, 2012, p. 110. 
Plut., SulL 1. See this chapter above. 
" " App., BC 1.57. 
Citizens also benefited indirectly in a financial sense from victory in war. The lands of defeated enemies 
could become ager publicus populi Romaiii; they could then be allocated to citizens and allies for farms, 
colonies and other agricultural use. For a detailed discussion of this principle at work in the Republic, see 
Rosenstein. 2012, pp. 109 and 110. 
Plut., ^ em. 20. 
Liv. 42.32. See also Chapter Five above. 
military system, the onus was traditionally on commanding magistrates to recruit their own 
armies,'^®' and Sulla's soldiers feared Marius would replace them."'^ 
At Nola, however, with the war against the Italians not yet over and another about to start 
in the east against a formidable opponent, I argue that this was unlikely - and it is 
reasonable to think that many listening to Sulla also knew it. It is true, for example, that 
commanding magistrates had considerable latitude raising armies, but it was not at all clear 
Marius planned to disband the army en masse. The soldiers, especially those with 
experience, would have known that more often than not magistrates entering a new 
command simply replaced officers and took over existing armies,"^' especially during war 
when it made tactical sense to retain battle experience. They had only to recall the recent 
past to feel reassured: early in the Social War, in 90 BC, for example, Marius and Q. 
Caepio took over the army of former consul P. Rutilius L u p u s , a n d C. Baebius took over 
the army of C. lulius Caesar besieging Ascu lum."" Neither of these armies was disbanded 
or replaced with fresh ones. In 109 BC, the disgraced proconsul, Sp. Postumius Albinus,"^^ 
handed over the army in Numidia to the incoming consul, Q. Metellus; reinforcements were 
brought, but the army stayed largely intact. '^' ' Sulla himself could not be sure his men 
would be replaced; I argue that it is significant that his rhetoric in contione did not mention 
booty or disbandment."^^ If Sulla was - as Keaveney persuasively suggests - a desperate, 
'fi-ightened man' , it is reasonable to think that he would have used these threats to 
" " As L. Calpumius Bestia did, for example, when setting out for Numidia for the war against Jugurtha 
(Sail., lug. 27,28). Also at Liv. 40.1. See Rich, 1993, p. 44. For a contextual description of consular armies, 
and the role of commanding magistrates, see Chapter Two above. 
" " App., BC 1.57. De Blois doubts whether Marius really intended to disband the army, but concludes that 
the soldiers probably thought he would (de Blois, 2008, p. 170). 
" " I contend that there was greater pressure to refresh the officer level of consular armies on a regular basis. 
From the perspective of the governing elite, and those who aspired to a political career, the opportunity to 
serve and build reputation was critical; it was thus important to refresh the tribunes, legates, quaestors and 
other magisterial positions in the army as often as possible to give new aspirants the opportunity to get 
military experience. As a result, the Roman military system gave newly elected consuls the right to select 
some of their tribunes, while the assemblies selected the others (PIb. 6.12). When consuls took up their 
military appointment, they brought with them a good percentage of their own selectees, and the office class 
was thus replaced, while the rank and file could be retained in service. 
" " A p p . , BCI.44. 
App., BC 1.48. There are many instances of armies being retained, while the officer level was replaced: in 
141 BC, Q. Pompeius replaced Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus in Spain, but kept the army intact. 
(Val.Max. 9.3.7). Other examples at Sal., lug. 35; Liv. 40.36; Liv. 41.11. 
Albinus was not a credible commander, and was fated to be the first Roman commander for centuries to 
be killed by his troops; for details, see Chapter Seven above. 
" " Sal., lug. 44. 
App., BC 1.57. 
strengthen his case if they were a real possibility; they were not, so he instead concentrated 
on outlining grievances and a call to be ready. It proved sufficient for the soldiers to intuit 
his intention. There were other overt indicators to suggest Marius planned to use Sulla's 
army; he sent tribunes to take over the army, not disband it, and Sulpicius' plebiscite 
replaced only Sulla. Furthermore, the imperatives of the international situation also made 
disbandment a remote possibility. In 88 BC, the east, long neglected, was pressing; by the 
time Rome finally turned its attention to Mithridates, he had massacred up to 80,000 
citizens and Italians, overrun Asia minor, and broken into Greece, where his armies 
threatened to undo Rome's strategic ga ins . " ' ' Rome needed an experienced army for the 
campaign, and to act quickly; given this, it did not make sense to delay further by 
disbanding Sulla's veteran army and raising a new one, especially when preparations for 
embarkation had already begun. 
As the dominant factor pushing soldiers toward intervention, therefore, I argue that 
mercenary self-interest was not a plausible rationale to explain the army's decision to 
participate in an act of such enormity. It was not that the desire to profit from war was 
absent at Nola: the army had concerns about missing out on booty, and Sulla's removal 
from command heightened those fears. Despite those concerns, however, it was also 
obvious to most that it was unlikely the army would be replaced en masse; knowing this, I 
argue that it was not credible for this motivation alone that the army would have exposed 
itself to the grave charge of sedition, nor participated in an act with such serious 
consequences. But there are other reasons to be skeptical about the conventional 
explanation; as I have shown in Chapter Four above, mercenary self-interest was not new in 
88 BC, nor was it the exceptional ingredient at Nola which subverted the army and made 
the decisive difference. Rather, Sulla's soldiers expressed a thoroughly traditional 
concern:"™ soldiers had always looked toward their commanders, military service, and war 
for opportunities to enrich themselves."" Ab iirbe condita, it provided a powerful motive 
' ™ A p p . , Mr/;. 22,23; Veil. 2.18. 
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, 2006, p. 632. As I have shown in Chapter Three above, although they are 
one of the few to nuance their analysis, they eventually succuitib to the simplistic, economic explanation for 
intervention, and they do so without explaining why this should be so in any original way. Instead, Sulla's 
troops intervened for money: they were afraid of being replaced by new troops and missing out on booty. But 
more usefully, they note that this was also an incentive that was noted as far back as the popular vote for the 
war against Carthage in 264 BC (Plb. 1.11). In this, they are correct. 
" " In Chapter Four above, as well as airing examples of the mercenary motive at work in the army across the 
centuries, 1 also make the point that soldiers traditionally looked toward their commanders, not the state, for 
to fight; Sulla's veterans were no different from any who had come before. In 205 BC, for 
example, the soldiers of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus were eager to begin the campaign 
against the Carthaginians because it promised much booty; they were fired with a desire to 
land in Africa as soon as possible when they saw captured booty being unloaded in 
Sicily.'"^ So ingrained in the soldier was the desire to profit from war, that the consul for 
357 BC, C. Marcius Rutilus, had to extract from his army in contione an oath that they 
would fight the enemy instead of loot; in exchange, he promised to give them the enemy 
city and camp for b o o t y . A strong mercenary impulse had been a feature of military 
service for centuries without it producing soldiers prepared to risk civil war or interfere in 
civilian politics. I therefore argue that it cannot explain per se why the army at Nola did do 
these things. What changed in 88 BC was not the emergence of soldiers motivated to do 
anything for financial gain, but the willingness to intervene, with all its attendant risks. 
Other, more influential, factors were thus at work. 
Leveraging the Decisive Experience of the Social War 
When Sulla convinced the army to support him at Nola, he faced a major risk; his use of 
military coercion would compel opponents, for reasons of self-defence, to co-opt other 
armies to oppose him." '" Taken to its logical conclusion, this situation produced civil war: 
sooner or later, armies supporting opposing magistrates would be drawn into battle to 
resolve the irreconcilable differences of their commanders. A commander like Sulla, who 
wished to use the army in this fashion, with all republican history and tradition against 
h im, ' ' ' ' could not just casually invite the army to break centuries of tradition, especially 
opportunities to generate wealth, and had done so since the beginning of Rome's expansion. In this regard, 
Sulla's troops were unremarkable. See also Keaveney, 2007, p. 94. 
Liv. 29.6. 
Liv. 7.16. In this case, Rutilus' example is used to demonstrate how ingrained the desire for booty among 
soldiers could be. This same instance is also used in Chapter Four above, with a different focus; there, it is 
used as the archetypal example of transactional leadership, and of a purely transactional arrangement being 
made between commander and soldier. 
This is exactly what happened: Sulla's act found immediate imitators. L. Cinna co-opted the remnants of 
the army left behind at Nola shortly after Sulla left Rome for the eastern campaign, and used it as a political 
weapon and for protection (App., BC 1.65,66). See also Keaveney, 2007, pp. 96 and 97; Konrad, 2006, p. 
180. 
" " The republican tradition, against which Sulla set himself, was deep and pervasive: consider, for example, 
the strong cultural tradition that republican civic memory chose to preserve, with its emphasis on punishing 
individuals in defence of the Republic who aspired to kingship or who were perceived to have set out to upset 
the traditional balance of political power (for specific examples, see Chapter Six above). The Republic killed 
kings, or those who aspired to kingship, and Sulla, by appealing to the army at Nola, was challenging that 
tradition head on. Another example of republican tradition against which Sulla necessarily set himself against 
when doing so risked such a momentous and destructive outcome."'^ For his appeal to 
succeed, he first had to overcome the natural reluctance of citizens to fight each other in 
civil war; the prospect of meeting brothers, sons and fathers in combat, and treating Rome 
as a foreign enemy, could be a powerful inhibitor. Stories from early Roman history, for 
example, suggest that fear of internecine conflict had been a brake on conflict before. 
During negotiations with the governing elite in 492 BC, spokesman for the mutinous army, 
L. Sicinius, urged soldiers in a contio to refrain from civil war: there was no greater evil, he 
said, and he appealed to soldiers and patricians not to engage in such an abhorrent 
calamity.'"' The crisis was thus ended by negotiation. In 342 BC,'™ a mutinous army 
marching to Rome confronted another sent to stop it led by dictator, M. Valerius 
Corvus. '" ' He was prepared to fight:"^" in one version of the incident, the armies started 
deploying for battle."^' Before fighting began, however, opposing soldiers who knew each 
other, and in many cases were related, called out and started mingling; not accustomed to 
the idea of fighting fellow citizens, and reluctant to shed each other's blood, they looked for 
another way to solve the standoff According to the literary tradition, the fact that 
soldiers were unaccustomed to the concept of civil war was crucial in preventing fighting; 
the idea of the army turning on itself was an anathema: it existed to protect Rome and 
expand empire, not fight fellow citizens. The horror of civil war thus found uniform 
expression in literary and historical memory; Breed, Damon and Rossi argue that the 
was the sacrosanct status of the pomerium: it sealed Rome, and there was a sacred injunction against leading 
soldiers within it, except in a small number of highly-ritualised occasions. 
" " Blattman and Miguel, 2009, p.73. "Civil wars and conflicts arguably inflict more suffering on humanity 
than any other social phenomenon." Blattman and Miguel analyse the economic considerations and 
implications of civil war; they do so in a modem context, but I argue that their fundamental finding is valid 
equally for civil war across antiquity, given the immense disruptive effect it had on Roman society, and on the 
ultimate fate of the Republic. 
" " D.H. 6.79. For more detail, see Chapter Six above. 
Liv. 7.38,42; D.H. 15.3; App., Sam. 1,2. The rebellious army was a serious threat to the state: it intended 
to march to Rome, was 20 000 strong by the time it drew near on the Via Appia, was led (albeit reluctantly) 
by a former consul, T. Quinctius Poenus, and was battle-ready under standards. 
'Corvinus' in App., Sam. 2. 
Liv. 7.40. Corvus called the mutinous army 'enemies' , and was prepared to fight if it did not back down 
and disperse. 
In Livy's account: Liv. 7. 42. See Chapter Six above. 
In Livy's version of events, the soldiers recognised friends and relatives in the opposing lines, and called 
to each other. It was this which showed commanders that their men were not going to fight fellow citizens, so 
they called a halt and began negotiating (Liv. 7.42). A deal was worked out; the crisis was averted: the 
soldiers gained debt relief and legal protection for insolvent soldiers, immunity from punishment and 
prosecution, and a military reform which meant they could not be discharged without their consent (Liv. 
7.41). 
b u r d e n o f c i v i l w a r o n R o m a n m i n d s w a s hard to overes t imate ,"^^ and its t reatment b y 
R o m a n h i s tor ians and p o e t s s u g g e s t s th i s i s accurate . T h e ear ly imperia l h is tor ian, Tac i tus , 
for e x a m p l e , i n t r o d u c e d the c iv i l w a r s o f the R e p u b l i c as a des t ruc t ive h u m a n m a d n e s s 
w h i c h r e p l a c e d t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h despot i sm. ' '^ ' ' T h e first c en tury B C 
his tor ian , Sa l lus t , a l s o c a l l e d c iv i l w a r m a d n e s s , the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f w h i c h w e r e c h a o s and 
devastat ion. ' ' '^' T h e p o e t , V e r g i l , in h i s first c o l l e c t i o n o f p o e m s , l a m e n t e d the 
d e v a s t a t i o n and s o c i a l d i srupt ion c a u s e d b y c iv i l w a r . " ^ ' T h e ear ly imper ia l R o m a n 
writer,'^^^ L u c a n , s i m i l a r l y d e p i c t e d c iv i l w a r a s an act o f great horror and cr imina l i ty , but 
h i s p o e t i c d e p i c t i o n o f batt le at Pharsa lus b e t w e e n the s o l d i e r s o f C. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s and 
C. l u l i u s C a e s a r , a l s o r e f l e c t e d that s e n s e o f ind iv idua l , v i scera l burden o n the R o m a n 
p s y c h e that B r e e d , D a m o n and R o s s i m e n t i o n e d : 
Ut rapido cursu fati suprema morantem, 
Consumpsere locum, parva tellure dirempti, 
Qua sua pila cadant aut quam sibi fata minentur 
Inde manum, spectant. Vultus, quo noscere possent 
Facturi quae monstra forent, videre parentum 
Frontibus adversis fratemaque comminus arma, 
Nec libuit mutare locum.'™ 
Breed, Damon and Rossi, 2010, pp. 4.9. In their survey of Roman attitudes to civil war as expressed in 
cultural memory and literature, they make the point that more than other wars, civil wars sear themselves into 
the cultural memories of people that suffer them; this was particularly true of Rome. They argue that civil 
wars in Roman literary memory came to be seen as a kind of madness; a furor, blinding citizens and 
threatening to annihilate the republic. This sense of madness and horror was evident in its treatment by 
literary figures such as, inter alia, Lucan: alia sedent civilis vulnera dexirae (Luc. 1.32), and the poet 
Propertius: duris temporibus, cum Romana egit suos Discordia civis (Prop. 1.22.4-5). 
Tac., Hisl. 2.38. He was writing about the civil wars between Galba, Otho, Aulus Vitellius and Vespasian, 
and concerned about drawing upon the troubles of the past to help explain contemporary civil strife. For 
general context of Tacitus and his works, see Homblower and Spawforth, 2004, p. 72. For Tacitus' treatment 
of civil war, and the literary practice of mustering of the past to respond to troubles in the present, see Ash, 
2010, pp. 123 and 124. 
Sal., lug. 5.1. Sallust's theme in Bellum lugurthinum, as it was in Bellum Catilinae, was political and 
social decline; the theme of civil war as a madness thus fits neatly into his accounts. On Sallust's literary style 
and general historical context, see Homblower and Spawforth, 2004, pp. 631-632. 
The Eclogues, published around 39-38 BC: the first and ninth poems dealt with land confiscations by 
Octavian to settle soldiers from his armies. Virgil had cause to be unhappy with civil strife: his father may 
have lost land in the confiscations. 
Verg., Eel. 1.71. Ash, 2010, pp. 4 and 5. 
For my argument, 1 refer to Lucan's De Bello Civili, a ten book poem depicting the struggle between 
Caesar and Pompey, including the climactic battle of Pharsalus in Greece, and from which this verse is taken. 
™ Luc. 7.460-465. "When they had quickly travelled across the flat of ground that delayed the fiat of 
destiny, and were parted only by a little space, each looked to see where his own javelin would land, or whose 
hand on the other side destiny threatened to use against him. That they might learn what horrors they were 
about to commit, they saw their fathers' faces over against them and their brothers' weapons close beside 
them, but they didn't give ground." 
Appian's account of Pharsalus is less poetic, but conveys similar emotions of dread and 
intuitive reluctance of combatants to fight fellow citizens, relatives, family and friends, that 
any commander trying to persuade his men to accept the risk of civil war, especially for the 
first time, had to overcome. '"" It is reasonable to think that similar feelings were at the 
heart of the soldiers' refusal to fight in 342 BC; in Sulla's time, they seem also to have been 
present. The Roman revulsion regarding internecine conflict, for example, was not confined 
to literary abstraction or the distant past; it had human consequences devastating at a 
personal level. In 87 BC, after a battle between armies of Gn. Pompeius Strabo and Q. 
Sertorius, a soldier discovered that he killed his brother on the opposing side; overcome 
with remorse and horror, he committed suicide over his brother's body, cursing civil 
w a r . " " This incident was widely known and moved many;'™^ Orosius lamented that such 
a sad story did not prevent further civil war." '^ The traditional inhibition regarding civil 
war was such that even in a climate of endemic political violence, it still made Sulla 
hesitant in front of his men. Although well acquainted with the mood of his army after 
more than a year of campaigning together, he was unsure if his appeal would alienate, 
rather than inspire, and dared not mention it directly in contione."'^'^ Fortunately for Sulla, 
something had changed at Nola: the fear of internecine conflict was no longer a brake on 
unprecedented or unconstitutional behaviour. In 342 BC, Corvus' soldiers refused to 
countenance civil war but, in 88 BC, Sulla's men did. Writing about the struggle between 
Marius and Sulla, the fourth century AD Latin theologian and philosopher, Augustine, 
offered an explanation: he reasoned that it took demonic intervention to persuade Romans 
to engage in civil war." '^ There were, however, no demons at Nola; rather, intimate and 
immediate memories of a protracted and bloody war with erstwhile Italian allies, but in 
combination with other factors, these were enough to produce Augustinus' demonic strife. 
As I have shown,'^'^ the Social War was critical to the emergence of the politically 
interventionist legion: the experience of fighting former Italian comrades identical in 
appearance and function, and with whom many citizens shared bonds of friendship and 
'™App., B C l . n . 
" " Liv., Per. 79; Oros. 5.12-16; August., CD. 2.25. Ash, 2010, p. 127. 
August., C.D. 2.25. 
Oros. 5.19. 
App., BC 1.57. As Keaveney points out, right up until he heard the shouts of his men, Sulla could not be 
sure he would not be arrested for sedition (Keaveney, 2005, p.51). 
August., £>.C. 2.25. 
In Chapter Five above. 
familial ties, inured the army to the concept of civil war. The Social War may have 
technically been a conflict between Latin Rome and ethnically distinct Italian peoples that 
recalled earlier struggles to unite the Italian peninsula under Roman suzerainty, but as far as 
the common Roman soldier was concerned, it carried all the hallmarks of a civil conflict; in 
their own minds, when Sulla made his appeal, soldiers had just fought a civil war. The 
gravity of violating this taboo presumably made Sulla hesitate, reluctant to mention it 
d i rect ly ." ' ' Instead, however, the soldiers urged him to lead them to Rome, and promptly 
demonstrated their commitment to this course of action by killing two magistrates sent to 
take over the army. I contend that Sulla's tentativeness around the subject of civil war 
indicated he was not yet totally free from its inhibition when he made his appeal: the 
change was with the soldiers. Not only were they unconcerned by the risk, they were so 
comfortable with the concept that they seized the initiative from their hesitant general, and 
spurred him on, dispelling any lingering reluctance Sulla may have still had. Sulla had 
underestimated the desensitising e.xperience of the Social War and, almost by accident, 
discovered its latent political possibilities: it made the army receptive to his audacious plan, 
and removed any residual brake on behavior that tradition or cultural inhibition might have 
performed. In this way, the Social War was inexorably and causally linked to the 
emergence of the politically interventionist legion. 
In Chapter Five above, I provided a plausible and coherent explanation how this was 
possible: by 88 BC, the homogenising consequence of the Roman policy of full 
integration,"'^ under the imperatives of tactical cohesion, by the efforts of reformers, and 
over time, had removed any differences in equipment, dress, tactics or ethos between 
citizen and allied soldiers - and changed the way citizens and allies felt about each other. 
During 89 BC, Sulla's army fought and defeated several Italian armies and besieged their 
c i t i es ; ' " ' because of the effects of full integration, their opponents looked and fought like 
them. Moreover, the Social War also felt like a civil war to Sulla's soldiers because they 
probably knew many of the Italian soldiers. I have shown, for example, how bonds between 
" " A p p . , BC1 .57 . 
I h a \ e called this process "full integration theor>"'. 
For example. Sulla's army engaged and defeated the large Italian army under L. Cluentius, killed 20 000 
of its soldiers and shut the rest up in Nola (App., BC 1.50; Oros. 5.18). Sulla fought and defeated another 
army under the command of the Samnite, Mutilus, besieged and took several towns including Bovanum. 
Stabiae and Pompeii (App.. BC 1.51: Oros. 5.18). His soldiers had many opportunities to come face to face 
with Italian soldiers and former comrades. 
contending Roman and Italian soldiers had once before during the Social War interfered on 
the battlefield;'^"® it is reasonable to think Sulla's army had similar experiences with 
veterans they recognised from the Marian campaign 12 years previously,'^"' although there 
is nothing to indicate that it ever prevented them from giving battle. 
Sulla found with his appeal that he could exploit the army's new-found tolerance of the risk 
of civil war for his own political ends. I argue that he was able to do this only because of 
the desensitising effect of the Social War on the army, a factor working in conjunction with 
the desire to profit, but far more influential on the army's decision to intervene. Moreover, 
it was a factor unique to Nola and to 88 BC - although once he demonstrated that the army 
could be exploited through this experience, others quickly followed under the pressure of 
endemic political violence,'^"^ and the course of Roman history was irrevocably 
changed:'*"^ Sullapotuil. ego nonpotero?^'^^'^ I suggest that P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, 
a hundred years earlier, could not have exploited his army as Sulla did; the same conditions 
acting on the army were simply not present. In Scipio's time, Rome's wars were against 
foreigners who looked and fought differently,'®"' and with whom the citizen-soldier shared 
few bonds of combat or familiarity; this situation would largely persist until the Social War. 
While Scipio's soldiers were just as concerned with booty, they differed significantly in 
that they were never exposed to the determining experience of fighting a protracted and 
bloody war against erstwhile allies identical in appearance and function who had been an 
integral part of the army's strength for centuries, and amongst whom there were bonds of 
familiarity, shared experience and familial relations. Consular armies did, of course, 
campaign against some cities in Italy that declared for Hannibal during the Second Punic 
Diod. 37.15. To recapitulate, this was the army of Marius going against the Italian army of Pompaedius 
Silo; battle was averted because the soldiers began fraternising with old friends and relatives, much to the 
disgust of their respective commanders. For more detail of this instructive incident, see Chapter Five above. 
Roth also believes the Italian armies included large numbers of Marian veterans (Roth, 2009. p. 96). 
For example, at App., BC 1.65,66. 
The shadow of Sulla's actions stretched far: Batstone, in his discussion of civil war in the 50s and the 
conflict between Pompey and Caesar, points out that, everywhere, Sulla was the terrifying exemplum 
(Batstone, 2010, p. 53). See also Cic., Art. 10.7; Cicero predicted that the victor in the struggle would conquer 
in the manner and according to the example of Sulla. 
Cic., An. 9.10: "If Sulla could do it, why can't I?" Attributed to Pompey invoking the example of Sulla 
and his actions in 88 BC for his own autocratic behavior during the second civil war. 
Hoyos gives a succinct survey of the range of foreign enemies Rome fought during the middle-Republic 
and throughout the second century BC. This is sufficient for illustrating the nature of Rome's wars during this 
period. Enemies to which the citizen and his allies were exposed, and which operated different military 
systems, wore different uniforms and used different weapons and tactics, included Carthaginian. Spanish, 
Gallic, Macedonian and Seleucid (Hoyos, 2007, pp. 73-75). 
War.'®"® I argue, however, that this was in the context of the invasion of Italy by an external 
enemy: the rebellions were not sustained or widespread enough, nor the process of 
integration advanced enough, to have caused the fundamental psychological dislocation 
that Sulla's soldiers were subjected to during the Social War. As it was in 342 BC for 
Corvus' soldiers, I contend that the idea of fighting fellow citizens, and intervening in the 
personal inimicitiae of elite competitors by marching on Rome, would thus have been 
unthinkable to Scipio's soldiers: a reluctance to risk internecine conflict that Scipio could 
not have overcome. 
Exploiting the Army's Tradition of Political Activism 
Despite all this, Sulla's intention to cross the pomerium with an army and involve it in a 
personal inimicitia was constitutionally illegal;'®"' the consequences were potentially grave, 
given the array of punishments and legal sanctions available to the state with which to 
punish transgressors, especially citizens under sacramentum.^^"^ Sulla might stress the 
legitimacy of his case, but it was still rebellion against the governing elite in Rome. Mutiny 
necessarily broke the sacramentum with the state that his soldiers were bound to protect.'®"' 
Soldiers were given a blunt reminder of this essential fact by the abandonment of the army 
by its officers, and their reftisal to participate. Sobering examples from history, such as the 
fate of 35 allied and citizen mutineers scourged and beheaded in front of Scipio's army in 
206 BC,'®'" very probably reinforced the potential gravity of their situation, should they 
assist Sulla. The problem for soldiers who wanted to help Sulla, but worried about 
committing sedition, was to justify the act, despite its illegality; an historical framework 
against which to contextualise and legitimise their participation would help. Fortunately for 
Sulla, one existed: the army's tradition of interventionist activism in political causes, and its 
role as the ultimate recourse for personal injustice. Sulla could tap into to it to help 
For example, Liv. 23.37; Liv. 26.12. 
For example, Liv. 24.7; Liv. 26.21; Liv. 33.22. Also Drogula, 2007, p. 419 ff; Rosenstein, 2008, p . l42; 
Forsythe, 2008, pp. 26 and 27. 
Chrissanthos, 2001, p. 9. Nicolet, 1980, p. 103. Soldiers who committed acts of illegality in the army, or 
more broadly, exposed themselves to a range of extraordinary sanctions. Punishment could be, for example, 
imposed without trial, as at Plb. 6.12,19; Fron., Str. 4.1; Plut., Luc. 15. It could also be extreme, and involve 
execution: Plb. 1.7; Liv. 28.28; Fron., Str. 4.1; V.Max. 11.7; Fron., Sir. 2.7. 
For a discussion on sacramentum, and its key role in contracting the citizen to obey his magistrates, and 
through them, the state, and my argument that breaking sacramentum was, by definition, sedition against the 
state, see Chapter Six above. 
Liv, 28.29. 
legitimise his plan to enter Rome by force; the army could use it to rationalise their 
involvement in sedition. 
In Chapter Six above, I showed that the army inherited a tradition of pohtical activism that 
linked successful political and economic reform, and concessions from the governing elite, 
to sedition, mutiny and activism. This view is, however, contested; Keaveney, for example, 
argues that the citizen-soldier's grasp of political issues was often uncertain and simplistic, 
being at times little more "than subscription to a slogan."'^" He contends that the soldiers 
were politicised for the first time by Sulla when he made his case for intervention in a 
contio; he achieved this by abolishing the distinction between civil and military 
contiones}^^^ This perspective, however, cannot be sustained: as I have shown, there is 
instead a persuasive circumstantial case that citizen-soldiers, rather than being political 
simpletons, had always been politically aware,'®'^ willing on occasion to rebel against the 
state over not only localised concerns such as incompetence, booty, or ill-treatment, but 
more abstract notions such as a sense of justice, economic hardship in society, and political 
or social change - especially when other avenues of redress failed or were not 
practicable.'^''' Keaveney also places too much emphasis on Sulla's use of the contio for 
political matters as a unique event at Nola. As I have shown, rather than inventing a 
tradition, Sulla was instead following one: others before him had done so. P. Scipio 
Africanus in 206 BC, for example, went far beyond immediate military matters when he 
discussed the political and civil consequences of sedition in a contio before the assembled 
army when dealing with the Sucro mutineers in Spain.'^'^ Moreover, I argued that revolt in 
civil and political cause was seen by ordinary citizens agitating for reform, including those 
" " Keaveney, 2007, p. 95. 
Keaveney, 2007, p. 37. "What Sulla did now was quite simply to abolish the difference between the two. 
He brought civil business before a gathering of soldiers. In doing so he politicized them. He invited them to 
become involved in the great issues of the day. Their response showed clearly they understood what was 
involved and their belief that they could do something about it." 
' ^ " S e e Chapter Six above. 
See also Chapter Six above. For a further concise discussion of the treatment in Roman historiography of 
the political power of ordinary citizens, and how it has translated into thinking about how the power equation 
worked in republican Rome, see Wiseman, 2009. pp. 5-32. 
" " Liv. 28.29. For more discussion on Scipio's admonition of his seditious men, and the political points he 
made at length, see Chapter Six above. For more examples of magistrates using a contio to place political and 
civil matters before their men, see this chapter below. As 1 have argued, far from inventing a tradition, Sulla 
was rather following it by using the contio to place before the army a civil matter, and the question of his 
personal grievance. 
in the army, as a legitimate act in extremison occasion, it was also legitimised by 
members of the governing e l i t e . T h i s tradition was well known to generations of citizen-
soldiers; they used it before to situate their own mutiny and insubordination in a broader 
historical context, and - according to the literary tradition - for leverage in negotiations 
with the governing elite. 
In 88 BC, at Nola, it thus served a similar purpose for Sulla's soldiers listening to him in 
the contio: it provided the necessary historical framework and precedent against which they 
could justify helping Sulla. 1 argue, for example, that they knew the army had a long 
tradition of sedition in worthy political cause; as I have shown, historical precedent allowed 
the army to act in this way, and soldiers could use it broadly to justify their involvement. 
Just as P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, in the comitia tributa, legitimised spontaneous, 
unprecedented and deadly violence against Ti. Gracchus and his followers in 133 BC as 
being necessary to control those who used unorthodox means to impose tyranny upon the 
state,'^" so could Sulla's soldiers reason that the involvement of the army was a worthy 
reaction to the attempt of Sulpicius and Marius to subvert, by identical methods, the 
traditional functioning of the Republic. More specifically, however, they could draw 
assurance from the fact that Sulla himself had a credible political cause, a necessary 
precondition if the army was to revolt against the governing elite in Rome. Elected consul 
by the people, Sulla was removed by unconventional and violent means from command in 
the east, conferred legitimately in the traditional m a n n e r , a n d his imperium transferred 
not to a fellow serving magistrate, but a private citizen. If, as the conventional explanation 
argues, soldiers were worried about losing the opportunity to amass booty, 1 argue that they 
were more indignant that Sulla was forced to surrender the Republic's highest authority to 
someone who held no office, indicating an attachment to proper convention and an 
understanding of Sulla's plight.''^' The army could also fortify itself with the knowledge 
As preserved in the literary tradition, this was evident in the language soldiers, and soldiers' spokesmen, 
used to justify their actions. The army's spokesman and main agitator in 492 BC, Lucius Sicinius, used 
themes of injustice, state intransigence and ingratitude, perfidy, economic hardship and broken promises to 
legitimise the revolt of the army (D.H. 6.77). See Chapter Six above. 
For example, in 199 BC. Villius Tappullus, chastiser of the mutinying Cannae veterans, nevertheless 
admitted in a contio that their demands had merit, and thus helped legitimise the soldiers" claims (Liv. 32.1). 
" " See Chapter Six above. 
" " Plut., 7"G 21. See also Chapter Seven above; Wiseman, 2009. pp. 8 and 9. 
Diod. 37. 28. See also above discussion. 
V.Max. 9.7. V. Maximus, in a section about violence and sedition, stated that Marius was a private citizen 
when the Sulpician law gave him the command in the east against Mithridates, and that the soldiers killed his 
that when it did commit sedition in civic cause, it was traditionally successftil, helping 
reinforce in the minds of soldiers the effectiveness of the army acting this way.'^^^ 
Moreover, the inherited tradition provided a precedent even for the most controversial 
aspect of Sulla's plan: to enter Rome with an army. Although rare, it had happened before 
according to tradition. In 449 BC during Rome's semi-mythical past, for example, two 
consular armies mutinied, entered Rome under standards, and occupied the Aventine to 
lead popular opposition against the decemvirs, placing pressure on the governing elite, and 
ending the reign of the decemvirs. '^" I suggest that this act was a powerful, useful, and 
knowable'^^" precedent for what Sulla was suggesting in 88 BC; an army at the forefront of 
resistance to tyranny, citizens arrayed not as members of the civic voting assemblies, but in 
their military formations and under standards, entering Rome and occupying a part of it to 
give force to their demands for change. Against this tradition, it is reasonable to think that 
soldiers could rationalise Sulla's invitation as neither unprecedented, nor so 'radical', and 
thus easier to accept. 
Furthermore, the army's participation in Sulla's plan could be legitimised in the minds of 
the soldiers; the army's involvement in political activism was especially justified when 
other avenues of redress failed, or were not p r a c t i c a b l e . F o r the soldiers at Nola, 1 argue 
that this condition was met. More broadly, for example, the consistent reaction of the 
governing elite who used violence to suppress a succession of more assertive tribunes from 
legate who arrived to take over the army because they were indignant that the command had been given to 
one with no office. This is an important insight: it is the only alternative known view in the ancient literature 
sources to simple mercenary impulse ascribed to the motivations of Sulla's soldiers. Unlike Appian, (App., 
BC 1.57), V. Maximus said Sulla's soldiers acted for reasons other than fear of losing out on booty in the east; 
in this case, they are motivated by a sense of injustice and outrage that normal process and convention was 
circumvented by Sulpicius. As I have consistently argued in this thesis, it suggested that the motivations of 
the soldiers were more nuanced and sophisticated that has conventionally been allowed. 
See Chapter Six above. 
Liv. 3.36.ff.; D.H. 9.1. According to the literary tradition, such a large-scale revolt, and the presence of 
the two consular armies which had elected their own commanders, gave the senate and decemvirs little choice 
but to acquiesce; the office of the tribune and the consuls were restored and the decemvirs resigned. 
We know that knowledge of these semi-mythical acts survived as part of the inherited tradition into the 
late Republic, and was used as a 'clarion call' for action; C. Gracchus and his supporters occupied the 
Aventine in 121 BC in obvious imitation of the army in 449 BC (App., BC 1.26; Plut., CG 15. See also 
Roller, 2010, pp. 131 and 132), and in 111 BC, the tribune Memmius referred to the army's occupation of the 
Aventine in a popular speech that was recorded for posterity (Sal., lug. 30). 
See Chapter Six above for discussion and examples on how, and when, the army's recourse to sedition 
and mutiny as remembered by tradition, was legitimised in the minds of soldiers, and members of the 
governing elite. 
133 BC onwards reinforced a sense of history repeating itself that helped the army place its 
own choices into historical context. As Rosenstein points out, the senate reacted with 
extreme violence when its control of the res publico was threatened; it did so when 
challenged by external enemies in the foreign sphere, and again internally against tribunes 
and populist movements.'^^' As I have shown, the governing elite used violence to suppress 
major populist movements led by assertive tribunes in 133 BC, 121 BC and again in 100 
g ^ 1827 jj^g refusal of the governing elite to accommodate the agenda of more assertive 
tribunes, the extreme violence of its reactions, and the suppression of legislative programs 
which challenged the authority of the senate, reinforced the message for soldiers that they 
were living in extraordinary times, and that normal political participation was increasingly 
futile or ineffective. 1 argue that this realisation, combined with continuing conflict and 
tension between tribunes, ordinary citizens and the senate, plausibly invited comparisons to 
earlier revolutionary periods for the army;'^^^ it helped encourage soldiers to think of 
themselves as living in an analogous period of civil strife, where the army had traditionally 
led opposition to governing elite intransigence and used its collective power to force 
change upon the s t a t e . W i t h this mindset, it was easier to justify intervention. More 
specifically, however, it was clear to the soldiers that Sulla's enemies used intimidation, 
violence, and unorthodox methods to suppress and murder opposition, threaten magistrates, 
chase Sulla from Rome, and pass legislation. Sulla's attempts to oppose them by legal 
s u b t e r f u g e , a n d the authority invested in the consul, failed; in an atmosphere of 
increasing violence,'^^' and against the unorthodox power in Rome of the populares 
Sulpicius and Marius, the consul had no other effective means to resist, but to turn to the 
army. Given the customary and structural limitations on the power of ordinary citizens to 
influence political outcomes, and Sulpicius' domination of the comitia tributa, the soldiers 
Rosenstein, 2012, p. 269. 
See Chapter Seven above. 
Such as, for example, the semi-mythical revolutionary period of Conflict of the Orders. 
As it did, for example, in 492 BC, 488 BC, 449 BC, and 342 BC. For details, see Chapter Six above. 
As I have shown, Sulla attempted to suspend voting on the controversial legislation by declaring a 
holiday, which meant no business could legally be conducted during its duration. It was a tactic well within 
the conventional armoury of a presiding consul, but in this case, it was a woefully inadequate answer to the 
pervasive endemic violence that now underwrote much of the Republic's political machinery and processes. 
Sulla was. on pain of death, forced to annul it (App., BC 1.55; Veil. 2.18; Plut., Sull. 8; Liv., Per. 77). See 
also Keaveney, 2005, p. 51. 
Epstein, 1987, p. 17. Epstein makes the point that the period during which Sulla operated was one that 
was increasingly revolutionary, where the collective action of the governing elite had failed to control 
inimicitiae of powerful contenders, and in which violence was the norm. Epstein refers to after 133 BC, but as 
1 have argued in Chapter Seven above, the change came earlier fi-om 151 BC. 
could hardly help Sulla as citizens participating in normal political processes; organised in 
their legions, however, they were much more significant. In this respect as well , they could 
draw upon the tradition o f the army's decisive intervention in 449 BC to end the decemvirs' 
oppression of the state,'®'^ and imagine themselves motivated by similar, publicly-spirited 
concerns: the army acting decis ively in the public interest when other avenues to alter the 
objectionable political situation were suspended, suppressed or i n e f f e c t i v e . I argue that 
this is what happened. 
Also influential on the motivation of the army was Sulla's appeal to it to redress 
reputational damage suffered to his dignitas as consul. A s 1 have shown, the army's record 
o f insubordination and sedition, according to tradition, included an established practice o f 
individuals using it as the ultimate source o f authority from which to draw legitimacy to 
redress personal g r i e v a n c e . I n this role, the army traditionally provided a forum in 
which grievances were aired, a case made for their legitimacy, and assistance was 
requested. The tradition included appeals by ordinary citizens and ostracised or 
marginalised members o f the governing elite; like the broader tradition of sedition in 
political cause, it is reasonable to think that Sulla's soldiers were well aware of the army 
acting in this capacity. Sulla's appeal, by design or incidentally, was consistent with this 
tradition. His invitation to the army, for example, was to become involved in his personal 
inimicitiae: he did not mention civil war, booty, or wider societal issues. Instead, he 
concentrated on the indignity Sulpicius and Marius had done to him, and appealed to the 
soldiers' obedience; if they stayed loyal, and obeyed his orders, they would agree to help 
him. Using an informal contio, the traditional forum for such appeals,'^" Sulla made the 
case for the legitimacy o f his cause; it is not categorically known, but it is reasonable to 
think that he mentioned his damaged dignitas, the injustice he suffered, the indignity done 
to the of f ice o f consul, and the fact that Marius was not a legitimately elected magistrate -
as well as the unorthodox manner by which he had been deprived of the eastern 
See Chapter Six above. 
" " Liv. 3.36,37. See also Ungem-Stemberg, 2005, p. 77 ff. 
" " See Chapter Six above. 
In every instance where individuals appealed to the army in this manner, they called an informal contio. 
See Chapter Six above for details. For my disagreement with Keaveney on this point, see also discussion 
above. 
c o m m a n d . T h e s e are the things he would have reasonably said to strengthen his case. By 
doing this, he followed precedents set by consul P. Servilius Pr i scus , ' " ' centurion 
Verginius,'^^^ and the Master of Horse Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus,'^^' and tapped into 
the tradition of the army acting as the ultimate recourse for personal grievance. For the 
soldiers being appealed to, this was another historical framework within which they could 
rationalise and legitimise their participation in sedition and assist Sulla; it made them more 
receptive to his invitation. 
In 88 BC, it can appear as if the army's acceptance of Sulla's invitation to intervene, and its 
willing participation in his plan, was without historical precedent. In fact, there existed for 
the soldiers a well-known tradition of army activism and insubordination within which to 
situate Sulla's request. Importantly, his request was consistent with tradition; the soldiers 
thus used the tradition to make sense of their own situation, and to help rationalise and 
legitimise their actions. Contained in it was an historical precedent for almost everything 
Sulla asked of them: supporting him in his personal inimicitiae, acting as the ultimate 
authority for redress, rebelling against the governing elite in Rome in political cause, even 
violating the pomerium by entering Rome. It was not, however, a unique factor available 
only to the army at Nola; I contend that Scipio's soldiers a hundred years earlier were just 
as aware of the army's record of sedition in civic cause, and of its role as the ultimate 
recourse for personal grievance. Despite this, a case can be made that the army's tradition 
of civic activism was nevertheless a factor making itself felt on the motivations of Sulla's 
soldiers. Of course, the tradition provided much, but not all, justification for participation in 
Sulla's audacious plan. Soldiers, for example, could not reasonably draw upon it to justify 
wholesale and sustained military coercion of the Republic's political institutions, and this is 
what Sulla planned. But 1 argue that where tradition failed in this respect, other factors -
such as the desire to profit from service, a more ready acceptance of the risk of civil war 
and the normative use in politics by this time of endemic violence to achieve effective 
App., BC 1.57. From Valerius Maximus' account of the contio, whatever Sulla said, his argument struck 
the right note, and was persuasive: according to the literary tradition, the soldiers were subsequently indignant 
that he was treated in this way, and their murder of the officers sent to take over the army indicated they were 
serious in their anger (V.Max. 9.7). 
" " D.H. 6.30; Liv. 2.26. 
Liv. 3.50. 
Liv. 8.30. 
political and economic outcomes - were available to bolster the logic of intervention for the 
soldiers. 
Taking Advantage of the Army's Familiaritv with Endemic Political Violence 
There was one further factor: Sulla's plan to introduce the army into his personal 
inimicitiae and impose a political solution upon the state necessarily linked the army to 
violence in politics. Sulla's enemies, the rest of the governing elite, and an unknown 
segment of ordinary Romans, would very probably resist the imposition of political control: 
the army would have to fight for Rome and disperse the opposition by f o r c e . B y inviting 
military intervention, Sulla took decades of street violence, intimidation and physical 
duress for political ends to its logical and most effective conclusion.'^"' Nevertheless, it 
was a significant escalation; no one before had used the army in quite this way, or in such 
force,'^"^ to circumvent the constitution and upset the balance of power. Yet, for the 
soldiers, Sulla's intention to use violence against his political enemies was neither 
inappropriate nor unexpected; it may have been illegal, and on an unprecedented scale, but 
it was also thoroughly consistent with the contemporary political milieu. 
As I have shown,'^''^ violence, intimidation, murder and coercion were by this time a 
normative and well-established part of political life. From 151 BC, republican political 
discourse began to change; from 133 BC, assertive tribunes, contending magistrates and the 
state used endemic violence to suppress opposition, force legislation, bring about political 
change, and advance sectarian interests. The army at Nola had a vivid demonstration of 
this: Sulla was in that position precisely because Sulpicius and Marius had used force to 
chase him from Rome. Violence in political cause charted a steadily evolving course; it 
started as citizens acting spontaneously for and against other citizens,'^'''' but quickly 
expanded to official state suppression of seditious tribunes, and to the murder by state 
forces of serving magistrates perceived as upsetting the balance of power, involving large-
""" This is indeed what happened (App., BC 1.58; Plut., Sull. 9; Veil. 2.19). 
Keaveney emphasises the self-protection aspect of the rationale to use the army in politics: the increasing 
violence meant that men sought to protect themselves by counter-violence. It was self-evident that the army 
could provide the ultimate protection; sooner or later, someone would test this theory - if not Sulla, then 
someone else in trouble (Keaveney, 2007, p. 94). 
Sulla marched on Rome with a force that equated to a reinforced consular army; six full legions (App., BC 
1.57). It was a large concentration of military power. 
See Chapter Seven above. 
For example, the violence that characterised the tribunate of the Ti. Gracchus: see Chapter Seven above. 
scale battles on the streets of R o m e . W i t h this in mind, and by their ready acceptance of 
Sulla's plan to involve them in his personal inimicitiae, 1 argue that most soldiers at Nola 
saw Sulla's intention to use them in such numbers against his political enemies as simply a 
further evolution of the use of violence in public life; by 88 BC, no soldier at Nola was 
surprised at the suggestion that coercion be used to force a political result, nor recoiled 
from its use. 
But Sulla was again fortunate to make the link between violence, politics and the army 
then, and not a hundred years earlier, when soldiers had not the same conditioning or 
familiarity with the use of violence for political ends. It is reasonable to think, for example, 
that in the absence of such conditioning, the army of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus would 
have viewed with deep suspicion and shock the suggestion that they involve themselves in 
violence in Rome to settle personal inimicitiae, suppress opposition, and impose a political 
agenda upon the state. The decisive change was the presence of endemic political violence 
in public life. As 1 have shown, the emergence from 151 BC onwards of more assertive 
tribunes acting in the interests of the army and ordinary citizens, and the rise from 133 BC 
of endemic political violence, was the discriminator that set this period apart from earlier 
political discourse.'^"' The late Republic, for example, had no monopoly on fractious, 
dysfunctional or destructive inimicitiae; politics before 151 BC was conducted with as 
much intensity, self-interest, and competition, and was, on occasion, almost as destructive 
to the smooth functioning of the Republic. But regardless of how bitter disputes became, 
endemic violence remained absent; political enemies instead used courts, position, fines, 
exile, rhetoric, official sancfion, and other means to discredit, compete and punish.'^"" 
By 88 BC, however, that had changed, and 1 suggest that it altered perspectives of military 
service; unlike earlier manifestations of the citizen-militia, the army outside Nola was 
habituated to the use of violence in politics; in particular, against the traditional symbols, 
insignia and bearers of republican o f f i c e . T h e evidence of that change lay in the aberrant 
Up to 3,000 people were killed in 121 BC during the battle to suppress C. Gracchus and M. Flaccus (Plut., 
CG 17): for more detail on the violence and its political implications, see Chapter Seven above. 
See Chapter Seven above. 
See Chapter Seven above. 
When Sulla spoke to it outside Nola, some parts of the army had already made a vivid demonstration of 
that by attacking and killing a republican legate outside Pompeii in 89 BC - the first time soldiers had 
attacked their commander in centuries (see Chapter Seven above). 
behavior of the army in its support of Sulla, its habitual assault on the symbols and insignia 
of republican p o w e r , i t s deviant and deadly attacks on office bearers of the Republic, 
and - more broadly - in the conviction to fight which, 1 argue, must have underpinned the 
threat of conflict in 101 BC between the legions of Q. Lutatius Catulus and Marius over a 
dispute about who had done more to defeat the Cimbric army at Vercellae.'®^' This was 
possible because the army had been intimately connected with the rise of violence since 
133 BC; '^" 1 argue that it could not be thus exposed and left unchanged by the experience. 
As I have shown, for example, individual soldiers and veterans, primarily from the 
countryside, were involved in civil strife supporting and protecting their interests in larger 
struggles between ordinary citizens and the governing elite, agrarian and urban interests, 
and between a succession of more assertive, revolutionary tribunes and the senate. There 
was also persuasive circumstantial evidence to suggest that elements of the army were used 
officially by the state on at least two occasions to suppress sedition in Rome, and kill 
revolutionary magistrates and their s u p p o r t e r s . T h i s involvement exposed the army first-
hand to the mechanics, logic and consequences of violence, conditioning it to its use; more 
significantly for Sulla, the fate of his appeal at Nola, and the Republic, the army ingested 
the lessons that it was a normative part of political life, that it worked, and that symbols, 
insignia and office bearers of the Republic were not immune from attack. For Sulla's 
soldiers, Sulpicius' assault in Rome on Sulla and his consular colleague, and the crucial 
role of violence in forcing through Sulpicius' legislation, reinforced these lessons. Some 
may have even learned these lessons personally: it is reasonable to think that the army 
included veterans of Marius' force that suppressed Satuminus' sedition 12 years earlier,'^^'' 
and thus had direct experience of state-sanctioned political violence against serving 
magistrates.'®^^ Sulla's plan to confront his enemies was thus predicated on the army's 
On the way to Rome, for example, Sulla's army stripped two intercepting praetors of their senatorial 
togas, insulted them, and broke their fasces, symbols of Roman republican power. (Plut., SuU. 9; App., BC 
1.57). 
As 1 showed in Chapter Seven above, Sulla's army became regular killers of magistrates as no previous 
army had. 
Plut., Mar. 26. See Chapter Seven above. 
As I showed in Chapter Seven above, the army had also been at the centre of the growing tension between 
tribunes, ordinary citizens and the governing elite from 151 BC onwards over the levy, the unpopular war in 
Spain, and changes made to the conditions of service. 
See Chapter Seven above. 
App., BC 1.30; Oros. 5.17; Liv., Per 69. 
Around 140 BC, tribunes passed a law limiting overseas service to six [presumably] continuous years as a 
result of unrest amongst ordinary citizens over the protracted and difficult wars in Spain at the time (App., 
Hisp. 78. See also Chapter Seven above). But for those serving in normal circumstances, 16 years was the 
familiarity with, and acceptance of, the use of political violence; this is why soldiers reacted 
with equanimity to his suggestion that they use violence themselves to ensure a beneficial 
political result. This familiarity was a unique factor influencing the decision of the army to 
support Sulla; it worked in his favour just as he was able to exploit the army's greater 
willingness to accept the risk of civil war, its tradition of sedition in political cause, and its 
fear of missing out on what promised to be a lucrative war against Mithridates. 
Background Confusion Over Who Represented the State 
To this grouping of decisive factors acting on the minds of soldiers at Nola in 88 BC, I 
argue that there was one more dynamic operating in the background which contributed to 
the conditions which allowed the politically interventionist legion to emerge: a sense of 
confusion among Sulla's soldiers over who actually represented the state at the moment of 
crisis. It was a unique situation: P. Scipio a century earlier could not have taken advantage 
of any such confusion over legitimacy, if he had decided to appeal to his veterans to help 
him against his political enemies. But in the climate of confusion of 88 BC, it was easier for 
the army to believe Sulla's claims to legitimacy, and in conjunction with the influence of 
the other factors 1 have outlined above, to decide to support him. Specifically, I assert that 
the confusion generated by competing claims to the army's obedience allowed the above 
factors time and space to work their influence on the logic for intervention in the soldiers' 
minds; the lack of unambiguous right and wrong introduced doubt and uncertainty. In this 
situation, the army fell back on what it knew, or what made sense at the time, to help guide 
a decision: its customary expectation to profit from war, its newfound acceptance of the 
risk of civil war, the long tradition of insubordination and revolt in civic cause, the 
convention of the army as final recourse for personal grievance, and its familiarity with the 
contemporary political milieu, where violence was normal, and its use made good sense. 
At Nola, the issue of who legitimately represented the state, and was thus entitled to lead 
the army against Mithridates in the east, was disputed. If Sulla had accepted Sulpicius' 
length of time a citizen was eligible for service in the infantry, and ten years for a cavalryman (PIb. 6.19. See 
also de Ligt, 2012. pp. 151 and 152. For details, see Chapter Seven above). Satuminus' tribunate and his 
suppression occurred well within the 16 year timeframe, and given that the stress of the Social War 
necessitated the mobilisation of every able-bodied citizen, 1 argue that the chances were high that Sulla's 
army included veterans of this violence. 
plebiscite, and surrendered his command, soldiers would not have faced this dilemma; as it 
was, he refused, placing them in a unique predicament. For the army, two competing claims 
to legitimacy presented themselves before it: one from Sulla, a serving consul with whom it 
had served in war, backed by the traditional prerogative to lead the Republic's armies; the 
other from Marius, an eminent citizen and proven general, given command by plebiscite in 
the comitia tributa. Both compounded the confusion by appealing directly to the army's 
obedience: Sulla personally in the contio, and Marius through two military tribunes sent to 
take control of the army from Sulla: I propose that the appearance of these two tribunes at 
Nola accentuated the confusion felt by the army. 
On the one hand, Sulla was a legally-elected magistrate and legitimate representative of 
state; the traditional role of the consul in the Republic was to lead its armies against foreign 
enemies. As Morstein-Marx points out, Sulla stood before his army as a duly and 
deservedly elected consul, the highest magistrate of the Roman state and a military hero: 
powerful markers of legitimacy that must have predisposed the men toward his cause.'^^^ 
Moreover, as I have shown, he received the eastern province of Asia, and hence command 
of the war against Mithridates, by lot administered by the senate in the conventional 
manner. '^ ' ' It is thus reasonable to think that there was little doubt in the minds of the 
soldiers that Sulla had a legitimate, lawful authority to lead them and conduct the 
campaign. Yet, a tribune, the traditional representative of ordinary citizens in the people's 
assembly, had passed a plebiscite giving command to Marius, a citizen of enormous 
reputation, undoubted competency, and, as little as 12 years ago, the saviour of the 
Republic from Germanic invasion.'*'^ The soldiers knew that the assembly was not an 
illegal or arcane institution. It had a traditional, valid and crucial constitutional role passing 
legislation and electing tribunes; the legislation it passed legally bound the state and all its 
citizens to obey its provisions.'^' ' As I have shown, what Sulpicius did was unorthodox. 
Morstein-Marx, 2011, p. 272. Morstein-Marx argues in a recent article that Sulla's consular status rarely, 
if ever, receives appropriate status as a mark of legitimacy (Morstein-Marx, 2011, pp. 275-276). He is right to 
draw our attention to this factor, as 1 argue above. In totality, however, Morstein-Marx's explanation for the 
support Sulla's soldiers gave him - centred exclusively on profit and legitimacy as it does - fails in my view 
to take a sufficiently wide perspective, and ignores the influence of the Social War as 'civil war' argument, 
the tradition of the army's insubordination toward the state, and the affect of decades of escalating political 
violence on the psychology of Sulla's soldiers, as equal contributors to the motivation of his army. As 1 have 
argued above, this is a serious shortcoming in any holistic explanation of the actions of Sulla's soldiers. 
See discussion above. 
Veil. 2.12; Plut., Mar. 27. 
North, 2006, p. 261; Lintott, 1999(b), pp. 50 and 51. 
and undoubtedly intruded into the traditional prerogative of the senate to allocate provinces 
and commands,'^'" but I contend that it was not technically illegal.'^'' The plebiscite thus 
compelled the army to obey it. Moreover, as I have argued, it had the added force of recent 
precedent: in 107 BC Metellus had been stripped of his pro-consular command against 
Jugurtha by plebiscite after the senate had given him Numidia, in exactly the same way that 
Sulla was stripped of his command; '^" the plebiscite gave Numidia to Marius, the newly-
elected consul at the time. It was these competing claims, both with a case for legitimacy, 
which generated confusion for the soldiers: whom were they to believe? 
The arrival of Marius' two tribunes forced them to choose: they ultimately decided to 
accept and support Sulla's claim to legitimacy over that of Marius, a decision they 
emphatically emphasised by killing Marius' two tribunes. I argue that the reason the army 
chose Sulla was partly because it was aware it was not backing an illegitimate rebel; Sulla 
was not a criminal intent on overthrowing the Republic, but a duly-elected consul, 
challenging those who had usurped his traditional authority. The army knew this; as 
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein argue - and as Morstein-Marx does more recently - soldiers 
were equally animated by their understanding of where legitimacy lay, as by material 
motives in their support of Sulla. '^' ' In a climate of confusion and competing claims, their 
decision was made easier by the way in which Sulpicius and Marius acted to achieve their 
goal. The army saw that Sulla's dignitas had been directly attacked by Sulpicius, a point 
Sulla emphasised when he tapped into its tradition as the ultimate recourse to personal 
grievance, and with which most soldiers could readily empathise.'^^" 
Moreover, the manner in which Sulpicius and his partisans chased the consuls from Rome, 
and used violence and coercion to force through their legislative package, was itself a gross 
violation of republican n o r m s . F o r citizen-soldiers, it is reasonable to think that this 
"^"Vell . 2 .18;App. , M;//;. 22. 
By this I mean there was nothing which categorically stated that a piece of legislation could not include in 
its provisions the granting of a command; if it were part of the legislative package, and if it were passed by 
the assembly, it technically had the force of law - even though it may, nevertheless, have been highly 
unusual. 
Sal., lug. 73. 
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, 2006, p.632. See also Morstein-Marx, 2011, pp. 259 ff. 
On this point, see also Morstein-Marx, 2011, p. 264. 
This distaste for Sulpicius' tactics, and the sense that he crossed the boundary of what was acceptable, 
emerged in some of the literary descriptions of the event; for example, in the pejorative description of 
Velleius Paterculus: Legemque ad populum tulit, qua SuUae imperium abrogaretur, C. Mario helium 
placed the plebiscite's legitimacy into doubt, and in the resulting confijsion, made them 
more receptive to Sulla's arguments. Even the precedent of allocation of command by 
plebiscite could be interpreted as suspect; there were important differences between its use 
in 107 BC and again in 88 BC, and it is plausible to think that Sulla made sure the soldiers 
were aware of them. Marius, the beneficiary of the plebiscite in 107 BC, was then an 
elected official; the plebiscite simply transferred the province from one legally-appointed 
magistrate to another - even though it intruded into the traditional prerogative of the senate. 
Furthermore, it was done without coercion or physical violence. That was not the case in 88 
BC: the plebiscite transferred command from a legitimately-elected and empowered 
magistrate to a private citizen with no office, and no authority from the people to command, 
beyond the plebiscite. As Morstein-Marx points out, in 88 BC, a sitting consul was 
deprived of command already entrusted to him, and that command given to a phvatus; a 
direct offence against the traditional prerogative of the consulship and its war-making 
role.'^^^ Furthermore, it was done with the aid of endemic violence, and succeeded only 
because of it. I argue that this combination of factors made the plebiscite of 88 BC 
unprecedented; it is highly likely that Sulla made much of this point in front of the soldiers. 
Thesis Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a cogent and plausible explanation for the emergence of the 
politically interventionist legion. Rather than just accepting its arrival as a matter of fact, or 
as a silent ancillary to the actions of key members of the governing elite, it has instead 
attempted to answer the question of its origins from the perspective of the common citizen-
soldier. This approach was fundamental to a more accurate understanding of why the army 
first involved itself in politics on such scale. To my mind, the critical ingredient in the 
seminal events of 88 BC was not only ambitious, quarrelling warlords, but the existence of 
decerneretur Mithridaticum, aliasque leges perniciosas et exUiabiles neque tolerandas liberae civitati tulit. 
Quin etiam Q. Pompei consults filium eundemque Sullae generum per emissarios factionis suae imerfecit 
(Veil. 2.18). "Along with other pieces of pernicious legislation abhorrent to a free state, he [Sulpicius] 
proposed a bill to the people's assembly which abropted Sulla's command and entrusted the Mithridatic war 
to Gaius Marius. He even went so far, by using factional emissaries, to cause the assassination of a man who 
was not only the son of Quintus Pompeius the consul, but also Sulla's son in law." See also Diodorus Siculus, 
who thought that Marius illegally wrested the eastern command from Sulla (Diod. 37. 28). Of course, by this 
time, the use of such tactics was commonplace in Roman political discourse; Sulpicius was behaving by the 
standards of the day, regardless of how much later historians and chroniclers may disapprove of his methods. 
""^Morstein-Marx, 2011, p. 263. 
soldiers willing to defy tradition, step beyond convention, and risk civil war with fellow 
citizens to impose a political solution on the state. Nothing could be achieved without them; 
my focus thus was necessarily on their motivations, and on the factors that, in my view, 
influenced their decision to support Sulla. To that end, the thesis provides a pathway, built 
on persuasive circumstantial and source evidence, to show how the army in 88 BC turned 
from defender of the Republic, to its attacker - and how citizens over time could plausibly 
reach the historic decision to intervene decisively in politics, not in their traditional voting 
assemblies, but as soldiers under sacramentum and arrayed in their formations. 
In doing so, my thesis exposes the weakness in the conventional explanation for 
intervention: that the army, corrupted by the influx of large numbers of poor by the 107 BC 
recruitment reform of Marius, and an accompanying mercenary spirit, supported Sulla in 
his personal inimicitiae with political enemies because of simple pecuniary greed; from fear 
of missing out on the opportunity to amass booty promised by the campaign against 
Mithridates. This is not to argue that pecuniary self-interest did not have a part to play on 
the motivations of the soldiers at Nola; Roman soldiers always expected to profit from war, 
especially from service in the traditionally lucrative east. Sulla's soldiers were no different 
in this respect, and his precarious political position heightened those fears, something 
which was advantageous to Sulla as he tried to convince the army to take part in his 
audacious and illegal plan. Given, however, that pecuniary interest had always motivated 
Roman armies without ever before leading to soldiers being willing to risk civil war and 
support their generals in personal inimicitiae, it alone is not a satisfactory explanation for 
the emergence of soldiers willing to risk civil war in 88 BC. It was thus placed in a proper 
historical context. As I have shown, pecuniary interest was not the only reason, nor even 
the most important, at work on the psyche of the soldiers at Nola. Instead, a combination of 
other factors, in conjunction with a healthy interest in booty, influenced the army and 
confirmed the logic of intervention - some factors being unique at Nola in 88 BC, some 
not. These factors coalesced at Nola to produce the exact conditions necessary for someone 
like Sulla to discover the army's latent political possibilities. 
Simply put, I argued that the reason the army accepted Sulla's invitation to intervene - in 
addition to an expectation that they would profit from war - came down largely to the 
decisive influence of four factors: the desensitising experience of the Social War reduced 
its fear of civil war; the tradition of insubordination in worthy pohtical cause justified for 
the army its involvement in sedition; the custom of individuals appealing to the army as the 
ultimate recourse for personal grievance allowed it to help Sulla in his inimicitiae; and the 
normative use by 88 BC of endemic violence and coercion in political discourse had 
thoroughly habituated the army to its logic. Acting entirely within the standards of the day, 
the army embraced the idea of using violence itself to impose a beneficial political solution 
upon the state. Underlying these factors was a sense of confusion over who legitimately 
represented the state in the political crisis of 88 BC. Faced with this dilemma, the army fell 
back on what it knew, or what made sense, giving the above factors the opportunity to 
bolster the logic for intervention. Sulla, by design or accidentally, exploited or harnessed 
these factors for his own personal political agenda - with momentous consequences for the 
Republic. 
Yet, despite this, it must also be acknowledged that something remains unknowable in the 
deepest motivations of the soldiers at Nola; their voices were largely silent, and it is mainly 
through their actions, by thoroughly drawing out what little source evidence there is, and 
from understanding the contemporary political and social milieu in which they operated, 
that it is even possible to extrapolate a cogent explanation for intervention from the 
perspective of the common soldier. Despite my best efforts, it must be admitted that a 
complete picture of why Sulla's soldiers decided to support him is still not definitively 
known. Given, however, their fijndamentally crucial role in the emergence of the politically 
interventionist legion, and the subsequent critical place the existence of such armies had in 
the fall of the Republic, the subject of the motivations of ordinary citizen-soldiers would 
benefit from further attention and scholarship - in particular, in order to understand the 
various political, social and economic factors and influences over time that were likely to 
have affected their perspectives. Just as Millar has refreshingly redefined the debate on the 
question of where political power lay in the Republic by detailed attention to the role of 
ordinary citizens,'^^' the field would similarly benefit from establishing a sustained, deep 
and formal focus on the ordinary citizen in service during the late Republic, not only in the 
lead up to 88 BC, but beyond it, into the civil war period. I argue that it is here that there 
'Millar, 1984, pp. 1-19. 
lies a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the transition from consensus Republic 
to imperial, autocratic state. 
Finis 
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